THE

DISCOURSES

OF

EPICTETUS:

Collected and Preſerved

BY

ARRIAN,

HIS DISCIPLE.

IN FOUR BOOKS.

Tranſlated from the GREEK.

by

Elizabeth Carter.

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ODE TO WISDOM.

BY THE TRANSLATOR.

THE ſolitary bird of night
Thro' the thick ſhades now wings his flight,
And quits his time-ſhook tow'r;
Where, ſhelter'd from the blaze of day,
In philoſophic gloom he lay,
Beneath his ivy bow'r.

With joy I hear the ſolemn ſound,
Which midnight echoes waft around,
And ſighing gales repeat.
Fav'rite of PALLAS! I attend,
And, faithful to thy ſummons, bend
At WISDOM's awful ſeat.

She loves the cool, the ſilent eve,
Where no falſe ſhews of life deceive,
Beneath the lunar ray.
Here Folly drops each vain diſguiſe,
Nor ſport her gaily-coloured dyes,
As in the beam of day.

O PALLAS! queen of ev'ry art,
That glads the ſenſe, and mends the heart,
  Bleſt ſource of pureſt joys:
In every form of beauty bright,
That captivates the mental ſight
  With pleaſure and ſurprize:

At thy unſpotted ſhrine I bow:
Attend thy modeſt ſuppliant's vow,
  That breathes no wild deſires:
But taught by thy unerring rules,
To ſhun the fruitleſs wiſh of fools,
  To nobler views aſpires.

Not FORTUNE's gem, AMBITION's plume,
Nor CYTHEREA's fading bloom,
  Be objects of my pray'r:
Let AV'RICE, VANITY, and PRIDE,
Thoſe envy'd glitt'ring toys, divide
  The dull rewards of care.

To me thy better gifts impart,
Each moral beauty of the heart,
  By ſtudious thoughts refin'd;
For WEALTH, the ſmiles of glad content,
For POW'R, its ampleſt, beſt extent,
  An empire o'er the mind.
When FORTUNE drops her gay parade,
When PLEASURE's tranſient roſes fade,
  And wither in the tomb,
Unchang'd is thy immortal prize;
Thy ever-verdant laurels riſe
  In undecaying bloom.

By thee protected, I defy
The coxcomb's ſneer, the ſtupid lye
  Of ignorance and ſpite:
Alike contemn the leaden fool,
And all the pointed ridicule
  Of undiſcerning wit.

From envy, hurry, noiſe and ſtrife,
The dull impertinence of life,
  In thy retreat I reſt:
Purſue thee to the peaceful groves,
Where PLATO's ſacred ſpirit roves,
  In all thy beauties dreſs'd.

He bad Iliſſus' tuneful ſtream
Convey the philoſophic theme,
  Of perfect, fair, and good:
Attentive Athens caught the ſound,
And all her liſt'ning ſons around,
  In awful ſilence ſtood:

Reclaim'd, her wild licentious youth
Confeſs'd the potent voice of TRUTH,
  And felt its juſt controul.
The Paſſions ceas'd their loud alarms,
And Virtue's ſoft perſuaſive charms
  O'er all their ſenſes ſtole.

Thy breath inſpires the POET's ſong,
The PATRIOT's free unbiaſs'd tongue,
  The HERO's gen'rous ſtrife;
Thine are Retirement's ſilent joys,
And all the ſweet engaging ties
  Of ſtill domeſtic life.

No more to fabled names confin'd,
To the ſupreme all-perfect Mind
My thoughts direct their flight:
Wiſdom's thy gift, and all her force
From thee deriv'd, eternal Source
Of intellectual light.

O ſend her ſure, and ſteady ray,
To regulate my doubtful way,
Thro' life's perplexing road:
The miſts of error to controul,
And thro' its gloom direct my ſoul
To happineſs and good.

Beneath her clear diſcerning eye
The viſionary ſhadows fly
Of folly's painted ſhow;
She ſees thro' ev'ry fair diſguiſe,
That all but VIRTUE's ſolid joys
Are vanity and woe.

TO THE PUBLIC.

ARRIAN, the diſciple of Epictetus, to whom we are obliged for theſe diſcourſes, was a Greek by birth, but a ſenator and conſul of Rome; and an able commander in war. He imitated Xenophon, both in his life and writings; and particularly, in delivering to poſterity the converſations of his maſter. There were originally twenty books of them, beſides the *Enchiridion*, which ſeems to be taken out of them, and an account of his life and death. Very little order or method is to be found in them, or was from the nature of them to be expected. The connexion is often ſcarcely diſcoverable: a reference to particular incidents, long ſince forgotten, at the ſame time that it evidences their genuineneſs, often renders them ob-

ſcure in ſome places; and the great corruption of the text, in others. Yet, under all theſe diſadvantages, this immethodical collection is perhaps one of the moſt valuable remains of antiquity; and they, who conſult it with any degree of attention, can ſcarcely fail of receiving improvement. Indeed it is hardly poſſible to be inattentive to ſo awakening a ſpeaker as Epictetus. There is ſuch a warmth and ſpirit in his exhortations; and his good ſenſe is enlivened by ſuch a keenneſs of wit, and gaiety of humour, as render the ſtudy of him, a moſt delightful as well as profitable entertainment.

For this reaſon it was judged proper, that a tranſlation of him ſhould be undertaken; there being none, I believe, but of the *Enchiridion*, in any modern language, excepting a pretty good French one, publiſhed about a hundred and fifty years ago, and

ſo extremely ſcarce, that I was unable to procure it, till Mr. Harris obligingly lent it me, after I had publiſhed the propoſals for printing this: which, notwithſtanding the aſſiſtance given me in the proſecution of it, hath ſtill, I am ſenſible, great faults. But they, who will ſee them the moſt clearly, will be the readieſt to excuſe, as they will know beſt the difficulty of avoiding them. There is one circumſtance, which, I am apprehenſive, muſt be particularly ſtriking, and poſſibly ſhocking to many, the frequent uſe of ſome words in an unpopular ſenſe: an inconvenience, which could not be altogether avoided. In the tranſlation of technical terms, if the ſame Greek word had not always been rendered in the ſame manner, at leaſt, when the propriety of our language will at all permit it, every new expreſſion would have been apt to raiſe a new

idea. The reader, I hope, will pardon, if not approve, the uncouthneſs, in many places, of a tranſlation pretty ſtrictly literal: as it ſeemed neceſſary, upon the whole, to preſerve the original ſpirit, the peculiar turn and characteriſtic roughneſs of the author. For elſe, taking greater liberties would have ſpared me no ſmall pains.

I have been much indebted to Mr. Upton's edition: by which, many paſſages, unintelligible before, are cleared up. His emendations have often aſſiſted me too in the text.

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ARRIAN

TO

LUCIUS GELLIUS

Wiſheth all Happineſs

I NEITHER compoſed the diſcourſes of Epictetus in ſuch a manner, as things of this nature are commonly compoſed: nor did I myſelf produce them to public view, any more than I compoſed them. But whatever ſentiments I heard from his own mouth, the very ſame I endeavoured to ſet down in the very ſame words, as far as poſſible, and preſerve as memorials, for my own uſe, of his manner of thinking, and freedom of ſpeech.

THESE diſcourſes are ſuch as one perſon would naturally deliver from his own thoughts, *extempore*, to another; not ſuch as he would prepare to be read by numbers afterwards. Yet, notwithſtanding this, I cannot tell how, without either my conſent or knowlege, they

have fallen into the hands of the public. But it is of little conſequence to me, if I do not appear an able writer; and of none to Epictetus, if any one treats his diſcourſes with contempt; ſince it was very evident, even when he uttered them, that he aimed at nothing more than to excite his hearers to virtue. If they produce that one effect, they have in them what, I think, philoſophical diſcourſes ought to have. And ſhould they fail of it, let the readers, however, be aſſured, that when Epictetus himſelf pronounced them, his audience could not help being affected in the very manner he intended they ſhould. If by themſelves they have leſs efficacy, perhaps it is my fault, or perhaps it is unavoidable.

Farewell.

THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

Of the things which are, and of thoſe which are not, in our own power.

§. 1. OF other faculties, you will find no one that contemplates, or conſequently approves or diſapproves, itſelf. How far does the contemplative power of grammar extend?

As far as the judging of language.

Of muſic?

As far as judging of melody.

Does either of them contemplate itſelf, then?

By no means.

Thus, for inſtance, when you are to write to your friend, grammar will tell you what to write: but whether you are to write to your friend at all, or no, grammar will not tell you. Thus muſic, with regard to tunes: but whether it be proper or im-

proper, at any particular time, to ſing or play, muſic will not tell you.

What will tell, then?

That which contemplates both itſelf and all other things.

And what is that?

The *reaſoning faculty*: for that alone is found to conſider both itſelf, its powers, its value, and likewiſe all the reſt. For what is it elſe that ſays gold is beautiful? (for the gold itſelf does not ſpeak) evidently that faculty, which judges of the appearances of things. What elſe diſtinguiſhes muſic, grammar, the other faculties, proves their uſes, and ſhows their proper occaſions?

Nothing but this.

§. 2. As it was fit then, this moſt excellent and ſuperior faculty alone, a right uſe of the appearances of things, the Gods have placed in our power; but all other matters, not in our power. Was it becauſe they would not? I rather think, that if they could, they had granted us theſe too: but they certainly could not. For, placed upon earth, and confined to ſuch a body, and to ſuch companions, how was it poſſible that, in theſe reſpects, we ſhould not be hindered by things without us?

§. 3. But what ſays Jupiter? "O Epictetus, if "it were poſſible, I had made this little body and "property of thine free, and not liable to hin- "drance. But now do not miſtake: it is not thy "own, but only a finer mixture of clay. Since, "then, I could not give thee this, I have given "thee a certain portion of myſelf: this faculty of "exerting the powers of purſuit and avoidance, of

" deſire and averſion; and, in a word, the uſe of " the appearances of things. Taking care of this " point, and making what is thy own to conſiſt in " this, thou wilt never be reſtrained, never be hin- " dered; thou wilt not groan, wilt not complain, " wilt not flatter any one. How then! Do all " theſe advantages ſeem ſmall to thee? Heaven " forbid! Let them ſuffice thee then, and thank the " Gods."

§. 4. But now, when it is in our power to take care of *one* thing, and to apply to *one*, we chuſe rather to take care of *many*, and to incumber ourſelves with *many*; body, property, brother, friend, child, and ſlave; and, by this multiplicity of incumbrances, we are burdened and weighed down. Thus, when the weather doth not happen to be fair for ſailing, we ſit ſcrewing ourſelves, and perpetually looking out.—Which way is the wind?—North.—What have we to do with that?—When will the Weſt blow?—When itſelf, friend, or Æolus pleaſes; for Jupiter has not made *you* diſpenſer of the winds, but Æolus.

§. 5. What then is to be done?

To make the beſt of what is in our power, and take the reſt as it naturally happens.

And how is that?

As it pleaſes God.

What, then, muſt *I* be the only one to loſe my head?

Why, would you have all the world, then, loſe their heads for your conſolation? Why are not you willing to ſtretch out your neck, like Lateranus, when he was commanded by Nero to be beheaded? For, ſhrinking a little, after receiving a weak blow,

he ſtretched it out again. And before this, when Epaphroditus, the freedman of Nero, interrogated him about the conſpiracy; "If I have a mind to ſay "any thing, replied he, I will tell it to your ma-"ſter."

§. 6. What then ſhould we have at hand upon ſuch occaſions? Why what elſe but—what is *mine*, and what not *mine*; what is permitted me, and what not.—I muſt die: and muſt I die *groaning* too?—Be fettered. Muſt it be *lamenting* too?—Exiled. And what hinders me, then, but that I may go ſmiling, and chearful, and ſerene?—"Betray a ſecret"—I will not betray it; for this is in my own power.—"Then I will fetter you."—What do you ſay, man? Fetter *me?* You will fetter my *leg*; but not Jupiter himſelf can get the better of my *choice*. "I will throw you into pri-"ſon; I will behead that paltry body of yours." Did I ever tell you that I alone had a head not liable to be cut off?———Theſe things ought philſophers to ſtudy; theſe ought they daily to write; and in theſe to exerciſe themſelves.

§. 7. Thraſeas uſed to ſay, "I had rather be "killed to-day, than baniſhed to-morrow." But how did Rufus anſwer him? "If you prefer it as a "heavier misfortune, how fooliſh a preference! If "as a lighter, who has put it in your power? Why "do not you ſtudy to be contented with what is "allotted you?"

§. 8. Well, and what ſaid Agrippinus, upon this account? "I will not be a hindrance to myſelf." Word was brought him, "Your cauſe is trying in the ſenate."—"Good luck attend it.—But it is e-"leven o'clock" (the hour when he uſed to exer-

ciſe before bathing:) "Let us go to our exerciſe." When it was over, a meſſenger tells him, "You "are condemned." To baniſhment, ſays he, or death? "To baniſhment."—What of my eſtate? —"It is not taken away." Well then, let us go as far as Aricia, and dine there.

§. 9. This it is to have ſtudied what ought to be ſtudied; to have rendered our deſires and averſions incapable of bing reſtrained, or incurred. I muſt die: if inſtantly, I will die inſtantly; if in a ſhort time, I will dine firſt; and when the hour comes, then I will die. How? As becomes one who reſtores what is not his own.

CHAP. II.

In what manner, upon every occaſion, to preſerve our character.

§. 1. TO a reaſonable creature, that alone is inſupportable which is unreaſonable; but every thing reaſonable may be ſupported. Stripes are not naturally inſupportable.—"How ſo?—See how the Spartans bear whipping, after they have learned that it is a reaſonable thing. Hanging is not inſupportable: for, as ſoon as a man has taken it into his head that it is reaſonable, he goes and hangs himſelf. In ſhort, we ſhall find by obſervation, that no creature is oppreſſed ſo much by any thing, as what is unreaſonable; nor, on the other hand, attracted to any thing ſo ſtrongly, as to what is reaſonable.

§. 2. But it happens that different things are *rea-*

ſonable and *unreaſonable*, as well as good and bad, advantageous and diſadvantageous, to different perſons. On this account, chiefly, we ſtand in need of a liberal education, to teach us, to adapt the preconceptions of reaſonable and unreaſonable to particular caſes, conformably to nature. But to judge of reaſonable and unreaſonable, we make uſe not only of a due eſtimation of things without us, but of what relates to each perſon's particular character. Thus, it is reaſonable for one man to ſubmit to a dirty diſgraceful office, who conſiders this only, that if he does not ſubmit to it, he ſhall be whipt, and loſe his dinner; but if he does, that he has nothing hard or diſagreeable to ſuffer: whereas to another it appears inſupportable, not only to ſubmit to ſuch an office himſelf, but to bear with any one elſe who does. If you aſk me, then, whether you ſhall do this dirty office or not, I will tell you, it is a more valuable thing to get a dinner, than not; and a greater diſgrace to be whipt, than not to be whipt: ſo that, if you meaſure yourſelf by theſe things, go and do your office.

"Ay, but this is not ſuitable to my character."

It is *you* who are to conſider that, not *I:* for it is you who know yourſelf, what value you ſet upon yourſelf, and at what rate you ſell yourſelf: for different people ſell themſelves at different prices.

§. 3. Hence Agrippinus, when Florus was conſidering whether we ſhould go to Nero's ſhows, ſo as to perform ſome part in them himſelf, bid him go.—"But why do not *you* go then?" ſays Florus. "Becauſe, replied Agrippinus, *I* do not deliberate about it." For he who once ſets himſelf about ſuch conſiderations, and goes to calculating the

worth of external things, approaches very near to thoſe who forget their own character. For, why do you aſk me whether death or life be the more eligible? I anſwer, life: pain or pleaſure? I anſwer, pleaſure.——"But if I do not act a part, "I ſhall loſe my head."——Go and act it then, but *I* will not.——"Why?"——Becauſe you eſteem yourſelf only as one thread of many that make up the piece.——"What then?"——You have nothing to care for, but how to be like the reſt of mankind, as one thread deſires not to be diſtinguiſhed from the others. But *I* would be purple, that ſmall and ſhining thing, which gives a luſtre and beauty to the reſt. Why do you bid me reſemble the multitude then? At that rate, how ſhall I be the purple?

§. 4. This Priſcus Helvidius too ſaw, and acted accordingly: for when Veſpaſian had ſent to forbid his going to the ſenate, he anſwered, "It is in your "power to prevent my continuing a ſenator; but "while I am one, I muſt go."——"Well then, "at leaſt be ſilent there."——"Do not aſk my "opinion, and I will be ſilent."——"But I muſt "aſk it"——"And I muſt ſpeak what appears to "me to be right."——"But if you do, I will put "you to death."——"Did I ever tell you that I "was immortal? You will do your part, and I "mine: it it yours to kill, and mine to die intre"pid; yours to baniſh me, mine to depart untrou"bled."

§. 5. What good, then, did Priſcus do, who was but a ſingle perſon? Why, what good does the purple do to the garment? What, but the being a ſhining character in himſelf, and ſetting a good ex-

ample to others? Another, perhaps, if in ſuch circumſtances Caeſar had forbidden his going to the ſenate, would have anſwered, "I am obliged to you for excuſing me." But ſuch a one he would not have forbidden to go: well knowing, that he would either ſit like a ſtatue; or, if he ſpoke, he would ſay, what he knew to be agreeable to Caeſar, and would overdo it by adding ſtill more.

§. 6. Thus acted even a wreſtler, who was in danger of death, unleſs he conſented to an ignominious amputation. His brother, who was a philoſopher, coming to him, and ſaying, "Well, bro. "ther, what do you deſign to do? Let us cut a- "way this morbid part, and return again to the "field." He refuſed, and courageouſly died.

§. 7. When it was aſked, whether he acted thus as a wreſtler, or a philoſopher? I anſwer, as a *man*, ſaid Epictetus; but as a man who had been proclaimed a champion at the Olympic games; who had been uſed to ſuch places, and not exerciſed merely in the ſchool of Bato. Another would have had his very head cut off, if he could have lived without it. This is that regard to character, ſo powerful with thoſe who are accuſtomed to introduce it, from their own breaſts, into their deliberations.

§. 8. "Come now, Epictetus, take off your "beard."—If I am a philoſopher, I anſwer, I will not take it off.——"Then I will take off your "head."—If that will do you any good, take it off.

§. 9. It was aſked, how ſhall each of us perceive what belongs to his character? Whence, replied Epictetus, does a bull, when the lion approaches, perceive his own qualifications, and expoſe himſelf alone for the whole herd? It is evident, that with

the qualifications, occurs, at the ſame time, the conſciouſneſs of being indued with them. And in the ſame manner, whoever of us hath ſuch qualifications will not be ignorant of them. But neither is a bull, nor a gallant ſpirited man, formed all at once We are to exerciſe and qualify ourſelves, and not to run raſhly upon what doth not concern us.

§. 10. Only conſider at what price you ſell your own will and choice, man: if for nothing elſe, that you may not ſell it for a trifle. Greatneſs indeed, and excellence, perhaps belong to others, to ſuch as Socrates.

Why then, as we are born with a like nature, do not all, or the greater number, become ſuch as he?

Why, are all horſes ſwift? Are all dogs ſagacious? What then, becauſe nature hath not befriended me, ſhall I neglect all care of myſelf? Heaven forbid! Epictetus is inferior to Socrates; but if ſuperior to————this is enough for me. I ſhall never be Milo, and yet I do not neglect my body; nor Croeſus, and yet I do not neglect my property: nor, in general, do we omit the care of any thing belonging to us, from a deſpair of arriving at the higheſt degree of perfection.

CHAP. III.

How, from the doctrine that God is the father of mankind, we may proceed to its conſequences.

§. 1. IF a perſon could be perſuaded of this principle as he ought, that we are all originally deſcended from God, and that he is the father of Gods and men; I conceive he never would think

meanly or degenerately concerning himſelf. Suppoſe Caeſar were to adopt you, there would be no bearing your haughty looks: and will you not be elated on knowing yourſelf to be the ſon of Jupiter? Yet, in fact, we are not elated. But having two things in our compoſition, intimately united, a body in common with the brutes, and reaſon and ſentiment in common with the Gods; many incline to this unhappy and mortal kindred, and only ſome few to the divine and happy one. And, as of neceſſity every one muſt treat each particular thing, according to the notions he forms about it; ſo thoſe few, who think they are made for fidelity, decency, and a well-grounded uſe of the appearances of things, never think meanly or degenerately concerning themſelves. But with the multitude the caſe is contrary: "For what am I? A "poor contemptible man, with this miſerable fleſh "of mine!" Miſerable indeed. But you have likewiſe ſomething better than this paultry fleſh. Why then, overlooking *that*, do you pine away in attention to *this?*

§. 2. By means of this [animal] kindred, ſome of us, deviating towards it, become like wolves, faithleſs, and inſidious, and miſchievous: others, like lions, wild, and ſavage, and untamed: but moſt of us foxes, and wretches even among brutes. For what elſe is a ſlanderous and ill-natured man, than a fox, or ſomething yet more wretched and mean? See then, and take heed, that you do not become ſuch wretches.

CHAP. IV.

Of Improvement

§. 1. HE who is entering on a ſtate of improvement, having learnt from the philoſophers, that the object of deſire is good, of averſion, evil; and having learnt too, that proſperity and eaſe are no otherwiſe attainable by man, than in not being diſappointed of his deſire, nor incurring his averſion: ſuch an one removes totally from himſelf and poſtpones deſire, and applies averſion only to things dependent on choice. For if he ſhould be averſe to things independent on choice; he knows, that he muſt ſometimes incur his averſion, and be unhappy. Now if virtue promiſes happineſs, proſperity, and eaſe; then, an improvement in virtue is certainly an improvement in each of theſe. For to whatever point the perfection of any thing abſolutely brings us, improvement is always an approach towards it.

§. 2. How happens it then, that when we confeſs virtue to be ſuch, yet we ſeek, and make an oſtentatious ſhow of improvement in other things? What is the buſineſs of virtue?

A proſperous life.

Who is in a ſtate of improvement then? He who hath read the many treatiſes of Chryſippus? Why, doth virtue conſiſt in having read Chryſippus through? If it doth, improvement is confeſſedly nothing elſe than underſtanding a great deal of Chryſippus: otherwiſe we confeſs virtue to produce one thing;

and declare improvement, which is an approach to it, to be quite another thing.

§. 3. This perſon, ſays one [of you], is already able to read Chryſippus, by himſelf——"Certain-"ly, Sir, you have made a vaſt improvement! What improvement? Why do you ridicule him? Why do you withdraw him from a ſenſe of his misfortunes? Why do not you ſhow him the buſineſs of virtue, that he may know where to ſeek improvement?——Seek it there, wretch, where your buſineſs lies. And where doth your buſineſs lie? In deſire and averſion; that you may neither be diſappointed of the one, nor incur the other; in exerting the powers of purſuit and avoidance, that you may not be liable to fail; in aſſent and ſuſpenſe, that you may not be liable to be deceived. The firſt and moſt neceſſary is the firſt topic. But if you ſeek to avoid incurring your averſion, trembling and lamenting all the while, at this rate how do you improve?

§. 4. Show me then your improvement in this point. As if I ſhould ſay to a wreſtler, ſhow me your ſhoulders; and he ſhould anſwer me, "See my "poiſers."——Do you and your poiſers look to that: I deſire to ſee the effect of them.

"Take the treatiſe on the ſubject of *the active* "*powers*, and ſee how thoroughly I have peruſed "it."

I do not enquire into this, wretch; but how you exert thoſe powers: how you manage your deſires and averſions, how your intentions and purpoſes; how you are prepared for events, whether conformably or contrary to nature. If conformably, give me evidence of that, and I will ſay you improve: if contrary, go your way, and not only comment

on theſe treatiſes, but write ſuch yourſelf; and what ſervice will it do you? Do not you know that the whole volume is ſold for half a crown? Doth he who comments upon it, then, value himſelf at more than half a crown? Never look for your buſineſs in one thing, and for improvement in another.

Where is improvement, then?

If any of you, withdrawing himſelf from externals, turns to his own faculty of choice, to exerciſe, and finiſh, and render it conformable to nature; elevated, free, unreſtrained, unhindered, faithful, decent: if he hath learnt to, that whoever deſires, or is averſe to, things out of his own power, can neither be faithful or free, but muſt neceſſarily be changed and toſſed up and down with them; muſt neceſſarily too be ſubject to others, to ſuch as can procure or prevent what he deſires or is averſe to: if, riſing in the morning, he obſerves and keeps to theſe rules; bathes and eats as a man of fidelity and honour; and thus, on every ſubject of action, exerciſes himſelf in his principal duty; as a racer, in the buſineſs of a racer: as a public ſpeaker, in the buſineſs of exerciſing his voice: this is he, who truly improves; this is he, who hath not travelled in vain. But if he is wholly intent on reading books, and hath laboured that point only, and travelled for that: I bid him go home immediately, and not neglect his domeſtic affairs; for what he travelled for, is nothing. The only real thing is, ſtudying how to rid his life of lamentation, and complaint, and *alas!* and *I am undone*, and misfortune, and diſappointment; and to learn what death, what exile, what priſon, what poiſon is:

that he may be able to ſay in a priſon, like Socrates, "My dear Crito; if it thus pleaſes the Gods, thus "let it be; and not ——" Wretched old man, "have I kept my grey hairs for this!" Who ſpeaks thus? Do you ſuppoſe I will name ſome mean and deſpicable perſon? Is it not Priam who ſays it? Is it not Oedipus? Nay, how many kings ſay it? For what elſe is tragedy, but the ſufferings of men, ſtruck by an admiration of externals, repreſented in that kind of poetry? If one was to be taught by fictions, that externals independent upon choice are nothing to us; *I*, for my part, ſhould wiſh for ſuch a fiction, as that, by which I might live proſperouſly and undiſturbed. What *you* wiſh for, it is *your* buſineſs to conſider.

§. 5. Of what ſervice, then, is Chryſippus to us? To teach you, that thoſe things are not falſe, on which proſperity and eaſe depend. "Take my "books, and you will ſee, how true and conform-"able to nature thoſe things are, which render me "eaſy." How great a happineſs! and how great the benefactor, who ſhows the way! To Triptolemus all men have raiſed temples and altars, becauſe he gave us a milder kind of food: but to him who hath diſcovered, and brought to light, and communicated, the truth of all; the means, not of living, but of living well; who among you ever raiſed an altar or a temple, or dedicated a ſtatue, or who worſhips God on that account? We offer ſacrifices on the account of thoſe [benefactors] who have given us corn and the vine; and ſhall we not give thanks to God, for thoſe who have produced that fruit in the human underſtanding, by which they proceed to diſcover to us the true doctrine of happineſs?

CHAP. V.

Concerning the Academies.

§. 1. IF any one oppoſes very evident truths, it is not eaſy to find a reaſon which may perſuade him, to alter his opinion. This ariſes neither from his own ſtrength, nor from the weakneſs of his teacher: but when, after being driven upon an abſurdity, he becomes petrified, how ſhall we deal with him any longer by reaſon?

§. 2. Now there are two ſorts of petrifaction: the one, a petrifaction of the underſtanding; the other, of the ſenſe of ſhame, when a perſon hath obſtinately ſet himſelf not to aſſent to evident truths, nor to quit the defence of contradictions. We all dread a bodily mortification; and would make uſe of every contrivance to avoid it: but none of us is troubled about a mortification in the ſoul. And yet, indeed, even with regard to the ſoul, when a perſon is ſo affected, as not to apprehend or underſtand any thing, we think him in a ſad condition: but where the ſenſe of ſhame and modeſty is under an abſolute mortification, we go ſo far, as even to call *this*, ſtrength of mind.

§. 3. Are you certain that you are awake?—— "I am not (replies ſuch a perſon:) for neither am "I certain, when, in dreaming, I appear to myſelf "to be awake."—— Is there no difference, then, between theſe appearances?—— "None."—— Shall I argue with this man any longer? For what

ſteel or what cauſtic can I apply, to make him ſenſible of his mortification? He is ſenſible of it: and pretends not to be ſo. He is even worſe than dead. Doth not he ſee the repugnancy of contradictory propoſitions? He ſees it; and is never the better. He is neither moved, nor improves. Nay, he is in a yet worſe condition: his ſenſe of ſhame and modeſty is utterly extirpated. His reaſoning faculty indeed is not extirpated; but turned wild and ſavage. Shall I call *this*, ſtrength of mind? By no means: unleſs we allow it be ſuch in the vileſt debauchees, publicly to ſpeak and act whatever comes into their heads.

CHAP. VI.

Of Providence.

§. 1. FROM every event that happens in the world, it is eaſy to celebrate Providence, if a perſon hath but theſe two circumſtances in himſelf; a faculty of conſidering what happens to each individual, and a grateful temper. Without the firſt, he will not perceive the uſefulneſs of things which happen: and without the other, he will not be thankful for them. If God had made colours, and had not made the faculty of ſeeing them, what would have been their uſe?

None.

On the contrary, if he had made the faculty, without ſuch objects as fall under its obſervation, what would have been the uſe of that?

None.

Again: if he had formed both the faculty and the objects, but had not made light?

Neither in that caſe would they have been of any uſe.

§. 2. Who is it then that hath fitted each of theſe to the other? Who is it that hath fitted the ſword to the ſcabbard, and the ſcabbard to the ſword? Is it no one? From the very conſtruction of a complete work, we are uſed to declare poſitively, that it muſt be the operation of ſome artificer, and not the effect of mere chance. Doth every ſuch work, then, demonſtrate an artificer; and do not viſible objects, and the ſenſe of ſeeing, and light, demonſtrate one? Doth not the difference of the ſexes, and their inclination to each other, and the uſe of their ſeveral powers; do not theſe things, neither, demonſtrate an artificer?

Moſt certainly they do.

§. 5. But farther: this conſtitution of underſtanding, by which we are not ſimply impreſſed by ſenſible objects; but take and ſubſtract from them; and add and compoſe ſomething out of them; and paſs from ſome to others abſolutely remote: is not all this, neither, ſufficient to prevail on ſome men, and make them aſhamed of leaving an artificer out of their ſcheme? If not, let them explain to us what it is that effects each of theſe; and how it is poſſible that things ſo wonderful, and which carry ſuch marks of contrivance, ſhould come to paſs ſpontaneouſly, and without deſign.

What, then, do theſe things come to paſs for *our* ſervice only?

Many for *ours* only; ſuch as are peculiarly neceſ-

ſary for a reaſonable creature: but you will find many, common to us with mere animals.

Then, do *they* too underſtand what is done?

Not at all: for uſe is one affair, and underſtanding another. But God had need of animals, to make uſe of the appearances of things; and of Us to *underſtand* that uſe. It is ſufficient, therefor, for them to eat, and drink, and ſleep, and continue their ſpecies, and perform other ſuch offices as belong to each of them: but to *us*, to whom he hath given likewiſe a faculty of underſtanding, theſe offices are not ſufficient. For if we do not act in a proper and orderly manner, and ſuitably to the nature and conſtitution of each thing; we ſhall no longer attain our end. For where the conſtitution of beings is different, their offices and ends are different likewiſe. Thus where the conſtitution is adapted only to uſe, there uſe is alone ſufficient: but where underſtanding is added to uſe, unleſs that too be duely exerciſed, the end of ſuch a being will never be attained.

§. 4. Well then: each of the animals is conſtituted either for food, or huſbandry, or to produce milk: and the reſt of them for ſome other like uſe: and for theſe purpoſes what need is there of *underſtanding* the appearances of things, and being able to make diſtinctions concerning them? But God hath introduced *man*, as a ſpectator of himſelf, and his works; and not only as a ſpectator, but an interpreter of them. It is therefor ſhameful that *man* ſhould begin, and end, where irrational creatures do. He is indeed rather to begin there, but to end where nature itſelf hath fixt our end; and that is in contemplation, and underſtanding, and in a ſcheme of life conformable to nature.

§. 5. Take care, then, not to die without ſpectators of theſe things. You take a journey to Olympia to behold the work of Phidias, and each of you thinks it a misfortune to die without a knowlege of ſuch things: and will you have no inclination to underſtand, and be ſpectators of thoſe works, for which there is no need to take a journey; but which are ready and at hand, even to thoſe who beſtow no pains? Will you never perceive, then, either what you are, or for what you were born; nor for what purpoſe you are admitted ſpectators of this ſight?

But there are ſome things unpleaſant and difficult, in life.

And are there none at Olympia? Are not you heated? Are not you crouded? Are not you without good conveniencies for bathing? Are not you wet through, when it happens to rain? Do not you bear uproar, and noiſe, and other diſagreeable circumſtances? But I ſuppoſe, by comparing all theſe with the advantage of ſeeing ſo valuable a ſight, you ſupport and go through them. Well: and [in the preſent caſe] have not you received faculties by which you may ſupport every event? Have not you received greatneſs of ſoul? Have not you received a manly ſpirit? Have not you received patience? What ſignifies to me any thing that happens, while I have a greatneſs of ſoul? What ſhall diſconcert or trouble or appear grievous to me? Shall I not make uſe of my faculties, to that purpoſe for which they were granted me; but lament and groan at what happens?

§. 6. Oh, but my noſe runs.

And what have you hands for, beaſt, but to wipe it?

But was there then any good reaſon, that there ſhould be ſuch a dirty thing in the world?

And how much better is it that you ſhould wipe your noſe, than complain? Pray, what figure do you think Hercules would have made, if there had not been ſuch a lion, and a hydra, and a ſtag, and unjuſt and brutal men; whom he expelled and cleared away? And what would he have done, if none of theſe had exiſted? Is it not plain, that he muſt have wrapt himſelf up and ſlept? In the firſt place, then, he would never have become a Hercules, by ſlumbering away his whole life in ſuch delicacy and eaſe: or if he had, what good would it have done? What would have been the uſe of his arm, and the reſt of his ſtrength; of his patience, and greatneſs of mind: if ſuch circumſtances and ſubjects of action had not rouſed and exerciſed him?

What then, muſt we provide theſe things for ourſelves; and introduce a boar, and a lion, and a hydra, into our country?

This would be madneſs and folly. But as they were in being, and to be met with, they were proper ſubjects to ſet off and exerciſe Hercules. Do *you* therefor likewiſe, being ſenſible of this, inſpect the faculties you have: and after taking a view of them, ſay, "Bring on me now, O Jupiter, what "difficulty thou wilt, for I have faculties granted "me by thee, and abilities by which I may acquire "honour and ornament to myſelf." ——— No: but you ſit trembling, for fear this or that ſhould happen: and lamenting, and mourning, and groaning at what doth happen; and then you accuſe the Gods. For what is the conſequence of ſuch a mean-ſpiritedneſs, but impiety? And yet God hath not

only granted us theſe faculties, by which we may bear every event, without being depreſſed or broken by it; but, like a good prince, and a true father, hath rendered them incapable of reſtraint, compulſion, or hinderance, and intirely dependent on our own pleaſure: nor hath he reſerved a power, even to himſelf, of hindering or reſtraining them. Having theſe things free, and your own, will you make no uſe of them, nor conſider what you have received, nor from whom? But ſit groning and lamenting, ſome of you, blind to him who gave them, and not acknowleging your benefactor; and others, baſely turning yourſelves to complaints and accuſations of God? Yet I undertake to ſhow you, that you have qualifications and occaſions for greatneſs of ſoul, and a manly ſpirit: but what occaſions you have to find fault, and complain, do *you* ſhow me.

CHAP. VII.

Of the uſe of convertible and hypothetical propoſitions, and the like.

§. 1. IT is a ſecret to the vulgar, that the practice of convertible, and hypothetical, and interrogatory arguments, and, in general, of all other logical forms, hath any relation to the duties of life. For, in every ſubject of action, the queſtion is, how a wiſe and good man may find a way of extricating himſelf, and a method of behaviour conformable to his duty upon the occaſion. Let them ſay, therefor, either that the man of virtue will not engage in queſtions and anſwers; or that, if he doth,

he will not think it worth his care whether he behaves raſhly and at hazard in queſtioning and anſwering: or if they allow neither of theſe; it is neceſſary to confeſs, that ſome examination ought to be made of thoſe topics, in which the affair of queſtion and anſwer is principally concerned. For what is the profeſſion of reaſoning? To lay down true poſitions; to reject falſe ones; and to ſuſpend the judgment in doubtful ones. Is it enough, then, to have learned merely this?——It is enough, ſay you.——Is it enough, then, for him who would not commit any miſtake in the uſe of money, merely to have heard, that we are to receive the good pieces, and reject the bad?——This is not enough.——What muſt be added beſides?——That faculty which tries and diſtinguiſhes what pieces are good, what bad.——Therefor, in reaſoning too, what hath been already ſaid is not enough: but it is neceſſary that we ſhould be able to prove and diſtinguiſh between the true, and the falſe, and the doubtful.——It is neceſſary.

§. 2. And what farther is profeſſed in reaſoning?——To admit the conſequence of what you have properly granted.——Well: and here, too, is the mere knowing this enough?——It is not; but we muſt learn how ſuch a thing is the conſequence of ſuch another; and when one thing follows from one thing, and when from many things in common. Is it not moreover neceſſary, that he, who would behave ſkilfully in reaſoning, ſhould both himſelf demonſtrate whatever he delivers, and be able to comprehend the demonſtrations of others; and not be deceived by ſuch as ſophiſticate, as if they were demonſtrating. Hence, then, the employment and

exerciſe of concluding arguments and figures ariſes; and appears to be neceſſary.

§. 3. But it may poſſibly happen, that from the premiſes which we have properly granted, there ariſes ſome conſequence, which, though falſe, is nevertheleſs a conſequence. What then ought I to do? To admit a falſhood?——And how is that poſſible?——Well; or to ſay that my conceſſions were not properly made?——But neither is this allowed——Or that the conſequence doth not ariſe from the premiſes?——Nor is even this allowed——What then is to be done in the caſe?——Is it not this? As the having once borrowed money, is not enough to make a perſon a debtor, unleſs he ſtill continues to owe money, and hath not paid it: ſo the having granted the premiſes, is not enough to make it neceſſary to grant the inference, unleſs we continue our conceſſions. If the premiſes continue to the end, ſuch as they were when the conceſſions were made, it is abſolutely neceſſary to continue the conceſſions, and to admit what follows from them. But if the premiſes do not continue ſuch as they were when the conceſſion was made, it is abſolutely neceſſary to depart from the conceſſion, and admit [rather the contrary: I mean] what doth not follow from the argument itſelf. For this inference is no conſequence of ours, nor belongs to us, when we have departed from the conceſſion of the premiſes. We ought then to examine theſe kinds of premiſes, and their changes and converſions, on which any one, by laying hold, either in the queſtion itſelf, or in the anſwer, or in the ſyllogiſtical concluſion, or in any other thing of that ſort, gives an occaſion to the unthinking of being diſconcerted, not foreſeeing the

conſequence.——Why ſo?——That in this topic we may not behave contrary to our duty, nor with confuſion.

§. 4. The ſame thing is to be obſerved in hypotheſes and hypothetical arguments. For it is ſometimes neceſſary to require ſome hypotheſis to be granted, as a kind of ſtep to the reſt of the argument. Is every given hypotheſis then to be granted, or not every one; and if not every one, which? And is he, who has granted an hypotheſis, for ever to abide by it? Or is he ſometimes to depart from it, and admit only conſequences, but not to admit contradictions?——Ay: but a perſon may ſay, on your admitting the hypotheſis of a poſſibility, I will drive you upon an impoſſibility. With ſuch a one as this, ſhall the man of prudence not engage; but avoid all examination and converſation with him? ——And yet who, beſides the man of prudence, is capable of treating an argument; or who beſides is ſagacious in queſtions and anſwers, and incapable of being deceived and impoſed on by ſophiſtry?—— Or will he indeed engage, but without regarding whether he behaves raſhly and at hazard in the argument?——Yet how then can he be ſuch a one as we are ſuppoſing him? But, without ſome ſuch exerciſe and preparation, is it poſſible for him to preſerve himſelf conſiſtent? Let them ſhew this: and all theſe theorems will be ſuperfluous and abſurd, and unconnected with our idea of the virtuous man. Why then are we ſtill indolent, and ſlothful, and ſluggiſh, ſeeking pretences of avoiding labour? Shall we not be watchful to render reaſon itſelf accurate? ——"But ſuppoſe, after all, I ſhould make a mi-
"ſtake in theſe points: have I killed a father?"——

Wretch! why, in this caſe, where had you a father to kill? What is it then that you have done? The only fault that you could commit, in this inſtance, you have committed. This very thing I myſelf ſaid to Rufus, when he reproved me, for not finding ſomething that was omitted in ſome ſyllogiſm. Why, ſaid I, have I burnt the capitol then? Wretch! anſwered he, was the thing here omitted the capitol? Or are there no other faults, but burning the capitol, or killing a father? And is it no fault to treat the appearances preſented to our minds raſhly, and vainly, and at a hazard; not to comprehend a reaſon, nor a demonſtration, nor a ſophiſm; nor, in ſhort, to ſee what is for, or againſt one's ſelf in a queſtion or anſwer? Is nothing of all this any fault?

CHAP. VIII.

That faculties are not ſafe to the uninſtructed.

§. 1. IN as many ways as equivolent ſyllogiſms may be varied, in ſo many may the forms of arguments, and enthymemas, be varied likewiſe. As for inſtance: *If you had borrowed, and not paid, you owe me money. But you have not borrowed, and not paid; therefor you do not owe me money.* To perform this ſkilfully, belongs to no one more than a philoſopher. For if an enthymema be an imperfect ſyllogiſm; he, who is exerciſed in a perfect ſyllogiſm, muſt be equally ready at an imperfect one.

Why then do we exerciſe ourſelves and others, after this manner?

Becauſe, even now, though we are not exerciſed in theſe things, nor diverted, by me, at leaſt, from the ſtudy of morality; yet we make no advances in virtue. What is to be expected then if we ſhould add this avocation too? Eſpecially, as it would not only be an avocation from more neceſſary ſtudies, but likewiſe a capital occaſion of conceit and inſolence. For the faculty of arguing, and of perſuaſive reaſoning is great; and, particularly, if it be much laboured, and receive an additional ornament from rhetoric. For, in general, every faculty is dangerous to weak and uninſtructed perſons; as being apt to render them arrogant and elated. For by what method can one perſuade a young man, who excells in theſe kinds of ſtudy, that he ought not to be an appendix to *them*, but they to *him?* Will he not trample upon all ſuch advice; and walk about elated, and puffed up, not bearing any one ſhould touch him, to put him in mind, where he is wanting, and in what he goes wrong.

What then, was not Plato a philoſopher?

Well, and was not Hippocrates a phyſician? Yet you ſee [how elegantly] he expreſſes himſelf. But is it in quality of phyſician, then, that he expreſſes himſelf ſo? Why do you confound things accidentally united, from different cauſes, in the ſame men? If Plato was handſome and well-made, muſt I too ſet myſelf to endeavour at becoming handſome and well-made; as if this was neceſſary to philoſophy, becauſe a certain perſon happened to be at once handſome and a philoſopher? Why will you not perceive and diſtinguiſh what are the things that make men philoſophers, and what belong to them on other ac-

counts? Pray, if I were a philoſopher, would it be neceſſary that you ſhould be lame too?

§. 2. What then? Do I reject theſe faculties? By no means. For neither do I reject the faculty of ſeeing. But if you aſk me, what is the good of man; I have nothing elſe to ſay to you, but that it is a certain regulation of the choice, with regard to the appearances of things.

CHAP. IX.

How from the doctrine of our kindred to God, we are to proceed to its conſequences.

§. 1. IF what philoſophers ſay of the kindred between God and man be true; what has any one to do, but, like Socrates, when he is aſked what countryman he is, never to ſay that he is a citizen of Athens, or of Corinth; but of the world? For why do you ſay that you are of Athens: and not of that corner only, where that paultry body of yours was laid at its birth? Is it not, evidently, from what is principal, and comprehends not only that corner, and your whole houſe; but the general extent of the country, from which your pedigree is derived down to you, that you call yourſelf an Athenian, or a Corinthian? Why may not he then, who underſtands the adminiſtration of the world; and has learned that the greateſt, and moſt principal, and comprehenſive, of all things, is this ſyſtem, compoſed of men and God: and that from him the ſeeds of being are deſcended, not only to my father or grandfather, but to all things that are produced and born on earth; and eſpecially to rational na-

tures, as they alone are qualified to partake of a communication with the deity, being connected with him by reaſon: why may not [ſuch a one] call himſelf a citizen of the world? Why not a ſon of God? And, why ſhall he fear any thing that happens among men? Shall kindred to Caeſar, or any other of the Great at Rome, enable a man to live ſecure, above contempt, and void of all fear whatever: and ſhall not the having God for our maker, and father, and guardian, free us from griefs and terrors?

§. 2. "But how ſhall I ſubſiſt? For I have no-"thing."

Why, how do ſlaves, how do fugitives? To what do they truſt, when they run away from their maſters? Is it to their eſtates? Their ſervants? Their plate? To nothing but themſelves. Yet they do not fail to get neceſſaries. And muſt a philoſopher, think you, when he leaves his own abode, reſt and rely upon others; and not take care of himſelf? Muſt he be more helpleſs and anxious than the brute beaſts; each of which is ſelf-ſufficient, and wants neither proper food, nor any ſuitable and natural proviſion? One would think, there ſhould be no need for an old fellow to ſit here contriving, that you may not think meanly, nor entertain low and abject notions of yourſelves: but that his buſineſs would be, to take care, that there may not happen to be [among you] young men of ſuch a ſpirit, that, knowing their affinity to the Gods; and that we are as it were ſettered by the body and its poſſeſſions, and by ſo many other things as are neceſſary, upon theſe accounts, for the oeconomy and commerce of life; they ſhould reſolve to throw them off, as both troubleſome and uſeleſs, and depart to their kindred.

§. 3. This is the work, if any, that ought to employ your maſter and preceptor, if you had one: that you ſhould come to him, and ſay; "Epictetus, "we can no longer bear being tied down to this "paultry body: feeding and reſting, and cleaning "it, and hurried about with ſo many low cares on "its account. Are not theſe things indifferent, and "nothing to us: and death no evil? Are not we "relations to God: and did we not come from him? "Suffer us to go back thither from whence we came: "ſuffer us, at length, to be delivered from theſe "fetters, that chain and weigh us down. Here, "thieves and robbers, the courts of judicature, and "thoſe who are called tyrants, ſeem to have ſome "power over us, on account of the body and its "poſſeſſions. Suffer us to ſhow them, that they "have no power."

§. 4. And in this caſe it would be my part to anſwer: "My friends, wait for God, till he ſhall give "the ſignal, and diſmiſs you from this ſervice: then "return to him. For the preſent, be content to re"main in this poſt, where he has placed you. The "time of your abode here is ſhort, and eaſy to ſuch "as are diſpoſed like you: for what tyrant, what "robber, what thief, or what courts of judicature "are formidable to thoſe, who thus account the "body, and its poſſeſſions, as nothing? Stay. De"part not inconſiderately."

§. 5. Thus ought the caſe to ſtand between a preceptor and ingenuous young men. But how ſtands it now? The preceptor has no life in him: you have none neither. When you have had enough to-day, you ſit weeping about to-morrow, how you ſhall get food. Why, if you have it,

wretch, you will have it: if not you will go out of life. The door is open: why do you lament? What room doth there remain for tears? What occaſion for flattery? Why ſhould any one perſon envy another? Why ſhould he be ſtruck with awful admiration of thoſe who have great poſſeſſions, or are placed in high rank, [as is common,]? eſpecially, if they are powerful and paſſionate? For what will they do to us? The things which *they* can do, *we* do not regard: the things which *we* are concerned about, *they* cannot do. Who then, after all, ſhall command a perſon thus diſpoſed? How was Socrates affected by theſe things? As it became one perſuaded of his being a relation of the Gods. "If "you ſhould tell me (ſays he to his judges,) we will "acquit you, upon condition that you ſhall no lon-"ger diſcourſe in the manner you have hitherto "done, nor make any diſturbance either among "our young or our old people;" I would anſwer; "You are ridiculous in thinking, that if your gene-"ral had placed me in any poſt, I ought to main-"tain and defend it, and chuſe to die a thouſand "times, rather than deſert it: but if God hath aſ-"ſigned me any ſtation or method of life, that I "ought to deſert *that* for you."

§. 6. This it is, for a man to be truly a relation of God. But we conſider ourſelves as a mere aſſemblage of ſtomach and entrails, and bodily parts. Becauſe we fear, becauſe we deſire; we flatter thoſe who can help us in theſe matters; we dread the very ſame perſons.

§. 7. A perſon deſired me once to write for him to Rome. He was one vulgarly eſteemed unfortunate, as he had been formerly illuſtrious and rich,

and afterwards ſtript of all his poſſeſſions, and reduced to live here. I wrote to him in a ſubmiſſive ſtile: but, after reading my letter, he returned it to me, and ſaid; "I wanted your aſſiſtance, not your "pity; for no evil hath befallen me."

§. 8. Thus Rufus, to try me, uſed to ſay, this or that you will have from your maſter. When I anſwered him, theſe are [uncertain] human affairs: why then, ſays he, ſhould I intercede with him, when you can receive theſe things from yourſelf? For what one hath of his own, it is ſuperfluous and vain to receive from another. Shall I then, who can receive greatneſs of ſoul and a manly ſpirit from myſelf, receive an eſtate, or a ſum of money, or a place, from you? Heaven forbid! I will not be ſo inſenſible of my own poſſeſſions. But, if a perſon is fearful and abject, what elſe is neceſſary, but to write letters for him as if he was dead. "Pray "oblige us with the corpſe and blood of ſuch a one." For, in fact, ſuch a one is corpſe and blood; and nothing more. For, if he was any thing more, he would be ſenſible, that one man is not rendered unfortunate by another.

CHAP. X.

Concerning theſe who ſtrove for preferments at Rome.

§. 1. IF we all applied ourſelves as heartily to our proper buſineſs, as the old fellows at Rome, do to their ſchemes; perhaps *we* too might make ſome proficiency. I know a man older than I am, and who is now ſuperintendant of proviſions at

Rome. When he paſt through this place, on his return from exile, what an account did he give me of his former life! and how did he promiſe, that for the future, when he was got back, he would apply himſelf to nothing but how to ſpend the remainder of his days in repoſe and tranquillity. "For how few have I remaining!"——You will not do it, ſaid I. When you are once got within the ſmell of Rome, you will forget all this: and, if you can but once gain admittance to court, you will go in, heartily rejoiced, and thank God. "If you "ever find me, Epictetus, ſaid he, putting one foot "into the court, think of me whatever you pleaſe." Now, after all, how did he act? Before he entered the city, he was met by a billet from Caeſar. On receiving it, he forgot all his former reſolutions; and has ever ſince been heaping up one incumbrance upon another. I ſhould be glad now, to have an opportunity of putting him in mind of his diſcourſe upon the road; and of ſaying, how much more clever a prophet am I than you!

§. 2. What then do I ſay? That man is made for an inactive life? No, ſurely. "But why is "not ours a life of activity?" For my own part, as ſoon as it is day, I recollect a little what things I am to read over again [with my pupils], and then ſay to myſelf quickly, what is it to me how ſuch a one reads? My chief point is to get to ſleep.

§. 3. But, indeed, what likeneſs is there between the actions of theſe [old fellows at Rome] and ours? If you conſider what it is they do, you will ſee. For about what are they employed the whole day, but in calculating, contriving, conſulting, about proviſions; about an eſtate; or other emoluments like

theſe? Is there any likelineſs, then, between reading ſuch a petition from any one, as——"*I intreat "you to give me a permiſſion to export corn;*" and ——"*I intreat you to learn from Chryſippus of what "nature the adminiſtration of the world is; and "what place a reaſonable creature holds in it. Learn "too, what you yourſelf are; and wherein your good "and evil conſiſts.*" Are theſe thing at all alike? Do they require an equal degree of application? And is it as ſhameful to neglect the one as the other.

§. 4. Well, then, are we preceptors the only idle dreamers? No: but you young men are ſo firſt, in a greater degree. And ſo even we old folks, when we ſee young ones trifling, are tempted to grow fond of trifling with them. Much more, then, if I was to ſee you active and diligent, I ſhould be excited to join with you in ſerious induſtry.

CHAP. XI.

Of natural affection.

§. 1. WHEN one of the great men came to viſit him; Epictetus, having inquired into the particulars of his affairs, aſked him, whether he had a wife or children? The other replying, that he had; Epictetus likewiſe inquired, in what manner do you live with them? Very miſerably, ſays he.——How ſo? For men do not marry, and get children, to be miſerable; but rather to make themſelves happy.—— But, I am ſo very miſerable about my children, that the other day, when my daughter was ſick, and appeared to be in danger; I

could not bear even to be with her; but ran away, till it was told me that ſhe was recovered.——And pray do you think this was acting right? It was acting naturally, ſaid he.——Well: do but convince *me*, that it was acting naturally, and I will convince *you* that every thing natural is right.—— All, or moſt of us fathers, are affected in the ſame way.—— I do not deny the fact: but the queſtion between us is, whether it be right. For, by this way of reaſoning, it muſt be ſaid, that tumours happen for the good of the body, becauſe they do happen: and even that vices are natural, becauſe all or the moſt part of us are guilty of them. Do you ſhow me then how ſuch a behaviour, as yours, appears to be natural.

I cannot undertake that. But do you rather ſhow me, how it appears to be neither natural, nor right.

If we were diſputing about black and white, what criterion muſt we call in, to diſtinguiſh them?

The ſight.

If about hot and cold, and hard and ſoft, what?

The touch.

Well then: when we are debating about natural and unnatural, and right and wrong; what criterion are we to take?

I cannot tell.

And yet, to be ignorant of a criterion of colours, or of ſmells, or taſtes, might perhaps be no very great loſs. But do you think, that he ſuffers only a ſmall loſs, who is ignorant of what is good and evil, and natural and unnatural, to man?

No. The very greateſt.

Well: tell me; Are all things which are judged good and proper by ſome, rightly judged to be ſo?

Is it poſſible, that the ſeveral opinions of Jews, and Syrians, and Egyptians, and Romans, concerning food, ſhould all be right?

How can it be poſſible?

I ſuppoſe then, it is abſolutely neceſſary, if the opinions of the Egyptians be right, the others muſt be wrong: if thoſe of the Jews be good, all the reſt muſt be bad.

How can it be otherwiſe?

And where ignorance is, there likewiſe is want of learning, and inſtruction, in neceſſary points.

It is granted.

Then, as you are ſenſible of this, you will for the future apply to nothing, and think of nothing elſe, but how to acquaint yourſelf with the criterion of what is agreeable to nature: and to uſe that in judging of each particular caſe.

§. 2. At preſent the aſſiſtance I have to give you, towards what you deſire, is this. Doth affection ſeem to you to be a right and a natural thing?

How ſhould it be otherwiſe?

Well: and is affection natural and right, and reaſon not ſo?

By no means.

Is there any oppoſition, then, between reaſon and affection?

I think not.

If there was, of two oppoſites if one be natural, the other muſt neceſſarily be unnatural. Muſt it not?

It muſt.

What we find, then, at once affectionate, and reaſonable, *that* we may ſafely pronounce to be right and good.

Agreed.

Well, then: you will not diſpute, but that to run away, and leave a ſick child, is contrary to reaſon. It remains for us to conſider, whether it be conſiſtent with affection.

Let us conſider it.

Did you, then, from an affection to your child, do right in running away, and leaving her? Hath her mother no affection for the child?

Yes, ſurely, ſhe hath.

Would it have been right, then, that the mother too ſhould leave her; or would it not?

It would not.

And doth not her nurſe love her?

She doth.

Then ought not ſhe likewiſe to leave her?

By no means.

And doth not her preceptor love her?

He doth.

Then ought not he alſo to have run away, and left her: and ſo the child to have been alone, and unaſſiſted, from the great affection of her parents, and her friends; or to die in the hands of people, who neither loved her, nor took care of her.

Heaven forbid!

But is it not unreaſonable and unjuſt, that what you think right in yourſelf, on the account of your affection; ſhould not be allowed to others, who have the very ſame affection as you?

It is abſurd.

Pray, if you were ſick yourſelf, ſhould you be willing to have your family, and even your wife and children, ſo very affectionate, as to leave you helpleſs and alone?

By no means.

Or would you wiſh to be ſo loved by your friends, as from their exceſſive affection, always to be left alone when you were ſick? Or would you not rather wiſh, if it were poſſible, to have ſuch a kind of affection from your enemies, as to make them always keep from you? If ſo, it remains, that your behaviour was by no means affectionate. Well then: was it merely *nothing* that induced *you* to deſert your child?

How is that poſſible?

No: but it was ſome ſuch motive, as induced a perſon at Rome to hide his face while a horſe was running, to which he earneſtly wiſhed ſucceſs: and when, beyond his expectation, it won the race; he was obliged to have recourſe to ſpunges, to recover his ſenſes.

And what was this motive?

At preſent perhaps it cannot be accurately explained. It is ſufficient to be convinced, (if what philoſophers ſay be true) that we are not to ſeek it from without: but that there is univerſally one and the ſame cauſe, which moves us to do or forbear any action; to ſpeak or not to ſpeak; to be elated or depreſſed; to avoid or purſue: that very cauſe which hath now moved us two; you, to come, and ſit and hear me; and me, to ſpeak as I do.

And what is that?

Is it any thing elſe, than that it ſeemed right to us to do ſo?

Nothing elſe.

And if it had ſeemed otherwiſe to us, what ſhould we have done elſe than what we thought right? This, and not the death of Patroclus, was the cauſe

of lamentation to Achilles, (for every man is not thus affected by the death of a friend) that it ſeemed right to him. This too was the cauſe of your running away from your child, that it ſeemed right: and if hereafter you ſhould ſtay with her, it will be becauſe *that* ſeemed right. You are now returning to Rome, becauſe it ſeems right to you: but if you ſhould alter your opinion, you will not return. In a word neither death, nor exile, nor pain, nor any thing of this kind, is the cauſe of our doing, or not doing, any action: but our opinions and principles. Do I convince you of this, or not?

You do.

§. 3. Well then: ſuch as the cauſe is, ſuch will be the effect. From this day forward, then, whenever we do any thing wrong, we will impute it only to the principle from which we act: and we will endeavour to remove that, and cut it up by the roots with greater care than we would wens and tumours from the body. In like manner, we will aſcribe what we do right, to the ſame cauſe: and we will accuſe neither ſervant, nor neighbour, nor wife, nor children, as the cauſes of any evils to us, perſuaded, that if we had not ſuch principles, ſuch conſequences would not follow. Of theſe principles we ourſelves, and not externals, are the maſters.

Agreed.

From this day, then, we will neither conſider, nor enquire of what ſort, or in what condition, any thing is; our eſtate, or ſlaves, or horſes, or dogs, but only our *principles*.

I wiſh to do it.

You ſee, then, that it is neceſſary for you to become a ſcholar: that kind of animal which every

one laughs at; if you really desire to make an examination of your principles. But this, as you are sensible, is not the work of an hour or a day.

CHAP. XII.

Of Contentment.

§. 1. CONCERNING the Gods, some affirm, that there is no deity: others, that he indeed exists; but slothful, negligent, and without a providence: a third sort admit both his being and providence, but only in great and heavenly objects, and in nothing upon earth: a fourth, both in heaven and earth; but only in general, not individuals: a fifth like Ulysses and Socrates:

O Thou, who, ever present in my way,
Dost all my motions, all my toils survey.

POPE'S Homer.

It is, before all things, necessary to examine each of these; which is, and which is not, rightly said. Now, if there are no Gods, how is it our end to follow them? If there are, but they take no care of any thing; how will it be right, in this case, to follow them? Or, if they both are, and take care; yet, if there is nothing communicated from them to men, nor indeed to myself in particular, how can it be right even in this case? A wise and good man, after examining these things, submits his mind to him who administers the whole, as good citizens do to the laws of the commonwealth.

§. 2. He, then, who comes to be instructed,

ought to come with this intention: "How may I "in every thing follow the Gods? How may I ac- "quieſce in the divine adminiſtration? And how "may I be free?" For he is free, to whom all happens agreeably to his choice, and whom no one can reſtrain.

What, then! is freedom diſtraction?

By no means; for madneſs and freedom are incompatible.

But I would have whatever appears to me to be right, happen; however it comes to appear ſo.

You are mad: you have loſt your ſenſes. Do not you know, that freedom is a very beautiful and valuable thing? But for me to chuſe at random, and for things to happen agreeably to ſuch a choice, may be ſo far from a beautiful thing, as to be, of all others, the moſt ſhocking. For how do we proceed in writing? Do I chuſe to write the name of Dion [for inſtance] as I will? No; but I am taught to be willing to write it, as it ought to be writ. And what is the caſe in muſic? The ſame. And what in every other art or ſcience? Otherwiſe, it would be to no purpoſe to learn any thing; if it was to be adapted to each one's particular humour. Is it then only in the greateſt and principal point, that of freedom, permitted me to will at random? By no means: but true inſtruction is this: learning to will, that things ſhould happen as they do. And how do they happen? As the appointer of them hath appointed. He hath appointed, that there ſhould be ſummer and winter; plenty and dearth; virtue and vice; and all ſuch contrarieties, for the harmony of the whole. To each of us he hath given a body, and its parts, and our ſeveral properties, and companions. Mind-

ful of this appointment, we ſhould enter upon a courſe of education and inſtruction, not to change the conſtitutions of things; which is neither put within our reach, nor for our good; but that being as they are, and as their nature is with regard to us, we may have our mind accommodated to what exiſts. Can we, for inſtance, fly mankind? And how is that poſſible? Can we, by converſing with them, change them? Who hath given us ſuch a power? What then remains, or what method is there to be found for ſuch a commerce with them, that while *they* act agreeably to the appearances in their own minds, *we* may nevertheleſs be affected conformably to nature? But we are wretched and diſcontented. If you are alone, you term it a deſart; and if with men, you call them cheats and robbers. You find fault too with your parents and children, and brothers and neighbours. Whereas you ought, when you live alone, to call *that* a repoſe and freedom; and to eſteem yourſelf as reſembling the Gods: and when you are in company, not to call it a crowd and a tumult, and a trouble; but an aſſembly, and a feſtival: and thus to take all things contentedly. What, then, is the puniſhment of thoſe who do not? To be juſt as they are. Is any one diſcontented with being alone? Let him be in a deſart. Diſcontented with his parents? Let him be a bad ſon; and let him mourn. Diſcontented with his children? Let him be a bad father. Throw him into priſon. What priſon? Where he already is: for he is in a ſituation againſt his will; and whenever any one is againſt his will, that is to him a priſon: juſt as Socrates was *not* in priſon: for he was willingly there. "What then, muſt my leg be lame?"

——And is it for one paultry leg, wretch, that you accuſe the world? Why will you not give it up to the whole? Why will you not withdraw yourſelf from it? Why will not you gladly yield it to him who gave it? And will you be angry and diſcontented with the decrees of Jupiter; which he, with the fates, who ſpun in his preſence the thread of your birth, ordained and appointed? Do not you know how very ſmall a part you are of the whole? That is, as to body: for, as to reaſon, you are neither worſe, nor leſs, than the Gods. For reaſon is not meaſured by length or height; but by principles. Will you not therefor place your good there, where you are equal to the Gods? "How wretched am I "in ſuch a father and mother!"—What, then, was it granted you to come before-hand, and make your own terms, and ſay; "Let ſuch and ſuch per-"ſons, at this hour, be the authors of my birth?" It was not granted: for it was neceſſary that your parents ſhould exiſt before you, and ſo you be born afterwards.—Of whom?—Of juſt ſuch as they were. What, then, ſince they are ſuch, is there no remedy afforded you? Now ſurely if you were ignorant to what purpoſe you poſſeſs the faculty of ſight, you would be wretched and miſerable, in ſhutting your eyes at the approach of colours: and are not you more wretched and miſerable, in being ignorant, that you have a greatneſs of ſoul, and a manly ſpirit, anſwerable to each of the abovementioned accidents? Occurrences proportioned to your faculty [of diſcernment] are brought before you: but you turn it away, at the very time when you ought to have it the moſt open, and quick-ſighted. Why do not you rather thank the Gods, that they have made you

ſuperior to whatever they have not placed in your own power; and have rendered you accountable for that only which is in your own power? Of your parents they acquit you; as not accountable: of your brothers they acquit you: of body, poſſeſſions, death, life, they acquit you. For what, then, have they made you accountable? For that which is alone in your own power; a right uſe of the appearances of objects. Why, then, ſhould you draw thoſe things upon yourſelf, for which you are not accountable? This is giving one's ſelf trouble, without need.

CHAP. XIII.

How every thing may be performed acceptably to the Gods.

WHEN a perſon inquired, how any one might eat acceptably to the Gods? If he eats with juſtice, ſays Epictetus, and gratitude; and fairly and temperately, and decently, muſt he not alſo eat acceptably to the Gods? And when you call for hot water, and your ſervant doth not hear you: or, if he doth, brings it only warm; or perhaps is not to be found at home; then, not to be angry, or burſt with paſſion: is not this acceptable to the Gods?

But how, then, can one bear ſuch things?

Wretch! will you not bear with your own brother, who hath God for his father, as being a ſon from the ſame ſtock, and of the ſame high deſcent [with yourſelf]? But, if you chance to be placed in ſome ſuperior ſtation, will you preſently ſet yourſelf up for a tyrant? Will you not remember what you are,

and over whom you bear rule? That they are by nature your relations, your brothers; that they are the offspring of God?

But I have them by right of purchaſe, and not they me.

Do you ſee what it is you regard? That it is earth and mire, and theſe wretched laws of dead men; and that you do not regard thoſe of the Gods.

CHAP. XIV.

That all things are under the divine inſpection.

§. 1. WHEN a perſon aſked him, how any one might be convinced, that each of his actions are under the inſpection of God? Do not you think, ſays Epictetus, that all things are mutually bound together and united?

I do.

Well: and do not you think, that things on earth feel the influence of the heavenly bodies?

Yes.

Elſe how could the trees ſo regularly, as if by God's expreſs command, bud, bloſſom, bring forth fruit, and ripen it: then let it drop, and ſhed their leaves, and lie contracted within themſelves in quiet and repoſe; all when he ſpeaks the word? Whence, again, are there ſeen, on the increaſe and decreaſe of the moon, and the approach and departure of the ſun, ſo great viciſſitudes and changes, to the direct contrary, in earthly things? Have then the very leaves, and our own bodies, this connection and ſympathy with the whole; and have not our ſouls

much more? But our ſouls are thus connected and intimately joined to God, as being indeed members, and diſtinct portions, of his eſſence: and muſt not he be ſenſible of every movement of them, as belonging, and connatural to himſelf? Can even *you* think of the divine adminiſtration, and every other divine ſubject, and together with theſe of human affairs alſo? Can *you* at once receive impreſſions on your ſenſes and your underſtanding from a thouſand objects? At once aſſent to ſome things, deny or ſuſpend your judgment concerning others, and preſerve in your mind impreſſions from ſo many and various objects, and whenever you are moved by [the traces of] them, hit on ideas ſimilar to thoſe which firſt impreſſed you? Can *you* retain a variety of arts, and the memorials of ten thouſand things? And is not God capable of ſurveying all things, and being preſent with all, and receiving a certain communication from all? Is the ſun capable of illuminating ſo great a portion of the univerſe, and of leaving only that ſmall part of it illuminated, which is covered by the ſhadow of the earth: and cannot *he* who made and revolves the ſun, a ſmall part of himſelf, if compared with the whole; cannot *he* perceive all things?

§. 2. "But *I* cannot (ſay you) attend all things "at once." Why, doth any one tell you, that you have equal power with Jupiter? No: but nevertheleſs he has aſſigned to each man a director, his own good genius, and committed him to his guardianſhip: a director, whoſe vigilance no ſlumbers interrupt, and whom no falſe reaſonings can deceive. For, to what better and more careful guardian could he have committed us? So that when you have ſhut your doors, and darkened your room, remember,

never to ſay that you are alone; for you are not: but God is within, and your genius is within: and what need have they of light, to ſee what you are doing? To this God you likewiſe ought to ſwear ſuch an oath as the ſoldiers do to Caeſar. For do they, in order to receive their pay, ſwear to prefer before all things, the ſafety of Caeſar: and will not *you* ſwear, who have received ſo many and ſo great favours: or, if you have ſworn, will you not ſtand to it? And what muſt you ſwear? Never to diſobey, nor accuſe, nor murmur at any of the things appointed by him: nor unwillingly to do or ſuffer any thing neceſſary. Is this oath like the former? In the firſt, perſons ſwear not to honour any other beyond Caeſar; in the laſt, beyond all, to honour themſelves.

CHAP. XV.

What it is that philoſophy promiſes.

§. 1. WHEN one conſulted him, how he might perſuade his brother to forbear treating him ill: philoſophy, anſwered Epictetus, doth not promiſe to procure any thing external to man; otherwiſe it would admit ſomething beyond its proper ſubject-matter. For the ſubject-matter of a carpenter is wood; of a ſtatuary, braſs: and ſo, of the art of living, the ſubject-matter is each perſon's life.

What, then, is my brother's?

That, again, belongs to his own art [of living]; but to your's is external: like an eſtate, like health, like reputation. Now philoſophy promiſes none of

theſe. In every circumſtance I will preſerve the governing part conformable to nature. Whoſe governing part? His in whom I exiſt.

But how, then, is my brother to lay aſide his anger againſt me?

Bring him to me, and I will tell *him*; but I have nothing to ſay to *you* about his anger.

§. 2. Well: but I ſtill farther aſk, how am I to keep myſelf in a ſtate of mind conformable to nature, though he ſhould not be reconciled to me?

No great thing is brought to perfection ſuddenly; when not ſo much as a bunch of grapes or a fig is. If you will tell me, that you would at this minute have a fig, I will anſwer you, that there muſt be time. Let it firſt bloſſom, then bear fruit, then ripen. Is then the fruit of a fig tree not brought to perfection ſuddenly, and in one hour; and would you poſſeſs the fruit of the human mind in ſo ſhort a time, and without trouble? I tell you, expect no ſuch thing.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Providence.

§. 1. BE not ſurpriſed, if other animals have all things neceſſary to the body ready provided for them, not only meat and drink but lodging: that they want neither ſhoes, nor bedding, nor clothes: while we ſtand in need of all theſe. For they not being made for themſelves, but for ſervice, it was not fit that they ſhould be formed ſo as to need the help of others. For, conſider

what it would be for us to take care, not only for ourſelves, but for ſheep and aſſes too: how they ſhould be clothed, how ſhod, and how they ſhould eat and drink. But as ſoldiers are ready for their commander, ſhod, clothed, and armed (for it would be a grievous thing for a colonel to be obliged to go through his regiment to put on their ſhoes and clothes): ſo nature likewiſe has formed the animals made for ſervice, ready provided, and ſtanding in need of no further care. Thus, one little boy, with only a crook, drives a flock.

§. 2. But now we, inſtead of being thankful for this, complain of God, that there is not the ſame kind of care taken for us likewiſe. And yet, good heaven! any one thing in the creation is ſufficient to demonſtrate a providence, to a modeſt and grateful mind. Not to inſtance at preſent in great things: but only in the very production of milk from graſs, cheeſe from milk, and wool from ſkins: who formed and contrived theſe things? No one, ſay you. O ſurpriſing ſtupidity, and want of ſhame! But come; let us omit the *works* of nature. Let us contemplate what ſhe hath done, as it were, by the bye. What is more uſeleſs than the hairs which grow on the chin? And yet hath ſhe not made uſe even of theſe, in the moſt becoming manner poſſible? Hath ſhe not by theſe diſtinguiſhed the ſexes? Doth not nature in each of us call out, even at a diſtance, I am a man; approach and addreſs me as ſuch; enquire no farther; ſee the characteriſtic. On the other hand, with regard to women, as ſhe hath mixed ſomething ſofter in their voice, ſo ſhe hath deprived them of a beard. But no: to be ſure, the animal ſhould have been left undiſtinguiſhed, and

each of us obliged to proclaim, *I am a man!* But why is not this characteriſtic beautiful and becoming, and venerable? How much more beautiful than the comb of cocks; how much more noble than the mane of lions! Therefor, we ought to have preſerved the divine characteriſtics: we ought not to have rejected them; nor confounded, as much as in us lay, the diſtinct ſexes.

§. 3. Are theſe the only works of providence, with regard to us . . . . . And what words can proportionably expreſs our applauſes and praiſe? For, if we had any underſtanding, ought we not both, in public and in private, inceſſantly to ſing hymns, and ſpeak well of the Deity, and rehearſe his benefits? Ought we not, whether we are digging, or ploughing, or eating, to ſing the hymn [due] to God? Great is God, who has ſupplied us with theſe inſtruments to till the ground: great is God, who has given us hands, a power of ſwallowing, a ſtomach: who hath given us to grow inſenſibly, to breathe in ſleep. [Even] theſe things we ought upon every occaſion to celebrate; but to make it the ſubject of the greateſt and moſt divine hymn, that he has given us the faculty of apprehending them, and uſing them in a proper way. Well then: becauſe the moſt of you are blind and inſenſible, was it not neceſſary, that there ſhould be ſome one to fill this ſtation, and give out, for all men, the hymn to God? For what elſe can I, a lame old man, do, but ſing hymns to God? If I was a nightingale, I would act the part of a nightingale: if a ſwan, the part of a ſwan. But, ſince I am a reaſonable creature, it is my duty to praiſe God. This is my buſineſs. I do it. Nor

will I ever deſert this poſt, as long as it is vouchſafed me: and I exhort you to join in the ſame ſong.

CHAP. XVII.

That the art of reaſoning is neceſſary.

§. 1. SINCE it is reaſon which ſets in order and finiſhes all other things, it ought not itſelf to be left in diſorder. But by what ſhall it be ſet in order?

Evidently, either by itſelf, or by ſomething elſe.

Well: either *that* too is reaſon, or there is ſomething elſe ſuperior to reaſon (which is impoſſible): and, if it be reaſon, what, again, ſhall ſet that in order? For, if reaſon can ſet itſelf in order in one caſe, it can in another: and, if we will ſtill require any thing further, it will be infinite, and without end.

But, the more urgent neceſſity is to cure [our opinions, paſſions], and the like.

Would you hear about theſe, therefor? Well: hear. But then, if you ſhould ſay to me, "I can-"not tell whether your arguments are true or falſe;" and if I ſhould happen to expreſs myſelf doubtfully, and you ſhould ſay, "diſtinguiſh [which ſenſe you "mean]," I will bear with you no longer; but will retort your words upon you; *the more urgent neceſſity is*, etc. Therefor, I ſuppoſe, the art of reaſoning is firſt ſettled: juſt as, before the meaſuring of corn, we ſettle the meaſure. For, unleſs we firſt determine what a buſhel, and what a balance is, how ſhall we be able to meaſure or weigh? Thus,

in the preſent caſe: unleſs we have firſt learnt, and accurately examined, that which is the criterion of other things, and by which other things are learnt, how ſhall we be able accurately to learn any thing elſe? And how is it poſſible? Well: a buſhel, however, is only wood, a thing of no value [in itſelf]: but it meaſures corn. And logic [you ſay] is of no value in itſelf. That we will conſider hereafter. Let us, for the preſent, then, make the ceſſation. It is enough that it diſtinguiſhes and examines, and as one may ſay, meaſures and weighs all other things. Who ſays this? Is it only Chryſippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes? And doth not Antiſthenes ſay it? And who is it, then, who has written, that the beginning of a right education is the examination of words? Doth not Socrates ſay it? Of whom, then, doth Xenophon write, that he began by the examination of words; what each ſignified.

§. 2. Is this, then, the great and admirable thing to underſtand or interpret Chryſippus?

Who ſays that it is? But what, then, is the admirable thing?

To underſtand the will of nature.

Well then: do you apprehend it of yourſelf? In that caſe, what need have you for any one elſe? For if it be true, that men never err but involuntarily; and you have learnt the truth, you muſt neceſſarily act right.

But, indeed, I do not apprehend the will of nature.

Who, then, ſhall interpret *that?*

They ſay, Chryſippus. I go and inquire what this interpreter of nature ſays. I begin not to underſtand his meaning. I ſeek one to interpret that.

Here explain how this is expreſſed, and as if it were put into Latin. How, then, doth a ſupercilious ſelf-opinion belong to the interpreter!

Indeed, it doth not juſtly belong to Chryſippus himſelf, if he only interprets the will of nature, and doth not follow it: and much leſs to his interpreter. For we have no need of Chryſippus, on his own account; but that, by his means, we may apprehend the will of nature: nor do we need a diviner on his own account; but that, by his aſſiſtance, we hope to underſtand future events, and what is ſignified by the Gods: nor the entrails of the victims, on their own account; but, on the account of what is ſignified by them: neither is the raven, or the crow, that we admire; but the God, who delivers his ſignifications by their means. I come, therefor, to the diviner and interpreter of theſe things; and ſay, "Inſpect "the entrails for me: what is ſignified to me?" Having taken and laid them open, he thus interprets them. You have a choice, man, incapable of being reſtrained or compelled. This is written here in the entrails. I will ſhow you this firſt, in the faculty of aſſent. Can any one reſtrain you from aſſenting to truth?—"No one."—Can any one compel you to admit a falſhood?—"No one."—You ſee, then, that you have in this topic a choice incapable of being reſtrained, or compelled, or hindered. Well: is it any otherwiſe with regard to *purſuit* and *deſire?* What can conquer one purſuit?———"Another "purſuit."———"What, deſire and averſion? "Another deſire and another averſion." If you *ſet death before me* (ſay you) *you compel me.* No: not what is ſet before you doth it: but your principle, that it is better to do ſuch or ſuch a thing, than

to die. Here, again, you ſee it is your own principle which compels you: that is, choice compels choice. For, if God hath conſtituted that portion which he hath ſeparated from his own eſſence, and given to us, capable of being reſtrained or compelled, either by himſelf, or by any other, he would not have been God; nor have taken care of us, in a due manner.

§. 3. Theſe things, ſays the diviner, I find in the victims. Theſe things are ſignified to you. If you pleaſe, you are free. If you pleaſe, you will have no one to complain of; no one to accuſe. All will be equally according to your own mind, and to the mind of God.

§. 4. For the ſake of this oracle, I go to the diviner and the philoſopher: admiring not *him* merely on the account of his interpretation, but the *things* which he interprets.

CHAP. XVIII.

That we are not to be angry with the errors of others.

§. 1. IF what the philoſophers ſay be true, that all mens actions proceed from one ſource: that, as they aſſent, from a perſuaſion that a thing is ſo, and diſſent, from a perſuaſion that it is not; and ſuſpend their judgment, from a perſuaſion that it is uncertain; ſo, likewiſe, they exert their purſuits, from a perſuaſion that ſuch a thing is for their advantage: and it is impoſſible to eſteem one thing advantageous, and deſire another; to eſteem one thing a

duty, and purſue another: why, after all, ſhould we be angry at the multitude?

They are thieves and pilferers.

What do you mean by thieves and pilferers? They are in an error concerning good and evil. Ought you, then, to be angry, or to pity them? Do but ſhow them their error, and you will ſee, that they will amend their faults: but if they do not ſee it, the principles they form, are to them their ſupreme rule.

What, then, ought not this thief and this adulterer to be deſtroyed?

By no means [aſk that]: but ſay rather, "Ought "not he to be deſtroyed, who errs and is deceived "in things of the greateſt importance; blinded, not "in the ſight that diſtinguiſhes white from black, but "in the judgment, that diſtinguiſhes good from e-"vil?" By ſtating your queſtion thus, you ſee how inhuman it is; and juſt as if you would ſay, "Ought "not this blind, or that deaf man, to be deſtroyed?" For, if the greateſt hurt be a deprivation of the moſt valuable things, and the moſt valuable thing to every one is a right judgment of chuſing; when any one is deprived of this, why, after all, are you angry? You ought not to be affected, man, contrary to nature, by the ills of another, pity him rather. Do not be angry; nor ſay, as many do, What! ſhall theſe execrable and odious wretches dare to act thus! Whence have you ſo ſuddenly learnt wiſdom? Becauſe we admire thoſe things which ſuch people take from us. Do not admire your clothes, and you will not be angry with the thief. Do not admire the beauty of your wife, and you will not be angry with an adulterer. Know, that a thief and an

adulterer have no place in the things that are properly your own; but in thoſe that belong to others; and which are not in your power. If you give up theſe things, and look upon them as nothing, with whom will you any longer be angry? But, while you admire them, be angry with yourſelf, rather than with others. Conſider only: you have a fine ſuit of clothes; your neighbour has not. You have a window; you want to air them. He knows not in what the good of man conſiſts; but imagines it is in a fine ſuit of clothes: the very thing which you imagine too. Muſt not he, then, of courſe, come and take them away? When you ſhow a cake to greedy people, and are devouring it all yourſelf; would not you have them ſnatch it from you? Do not provoke them. Do not have a window. Do not air your clothes. I, too, the other day, had an iron lamp burning before my houſhold deities. Hearing a noiſe at the window, I ran. I found my lamp was ſtolen. I conſidered, that he who took it away did nothing unaccountable. What then? To-morrow, ſays I, you ſhall find an earthen one: for a man loſes only what he hath. *I have loſt my coat.* Ay: becauſe you had a coat. *I have a pain in my head.* Why, can you have a pain in your horns? Why, then, are you out of humour? For loſs and pain can be only of ſuch things as are poſſeſſed.

§. 2. But the tyrant will chain——What? ——A leg——He will take away——What? ——A head.——What is there, then, that he can neither chain, nor take away?——The will, and choice. Hence the advice of the ancients ——*Know thyſelf.*

What ought to be done, then?

Exerciſe yourſelf, for heaven's ſake, in little things; and thence proceed to greater. "I have "a pain in my head."——Do not cry, alas!——"I have a pain in my ear."——Do not cry, alas! I do not ſay, you may not groan; but do not groan inwardly: or, if your ſervant is a long while in bringing you ſomething to bind your head, do not bawl, and diſtort yourſelf; and ſay; "every body hates me." For, who would not hate ſuch a one?

§. 3. Relying for the future on theſe principles, walk upright, and free; not truſting to bulk of body, like a wreſtler: for one ſhould not be unconquerable in the ſenſe that an aſs is.

Who then is unconquerable? He whom nothing, independent on choice, diſconcerts. Then I run over every circumſtance, and conſider [ſuch a one in each. As they ſay] of an athletic champion. He has been victorious in the firſt encounter: what will he do in the ſecond? What, if the heat ſhould be exceſſive? What, if he were to appear at Olympia? So I ſay in this caſe. What, if you throw money in his way? He will deſpiſe it. What, if a girl? What, if in the dark? What, if he be tried by popular fame, calumny, praiſe, death? He is able to overcome them all. What, then, if he be placed in the heat, or in the rain? What, if he be hypochondriac, or aſleep? [Juſt the ſame.] This is my unconquerable athletic champion.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the behaviour to be obſerved towards tyrants.

§. 1. WHEN a perſon is poſſeſſed of ſome either real or imaginary ſuperiority, unleſs he hath been well inſtructed, he will neceſſarily be puffed up with it. A tyrant, for inſtance, ſays; "I am ſupreme over all."——And what can you do for me? Can you exempt my deſires from diſappointment? How ſhould you? For do you never incur you own averſions? Are your own purſuits infallible? Whence ſhould *you* come by that privilege? Pray, on ſhip-board, do you truſt to yourſelf, or to the pilot? In a chariot, to whom but to the driver? And to whom in all other arts? Juſt the ſame. In what, then, doth your power conſiſt?——"All men pay regard to me."

So do I to my deſk. I waſh it, and wipe it; and drive a nail, for the ſervice of my oil flaſk.—"What, then, are theſe things to be valued beyond "*me*?——No: but they are of ſome uſe to *me*, and therefor I pay regard to them. Why, do not I pay regard to an aſs? Do I not waſh his feet? Do not I clean him? Do not you know, that every one pays regard to himſelf; and to you, juſt as he doth to an aſs? For who pays regard to you as a man? Show that. Who would wiſh to be like *you*? Who would deſire to imitate *you*, as he would Socrates?—"But I can take off your head."——"You ſay right. I had forgot, that one is to pay regard to you as to a fever, or to the cholic; and

that there ſhould be an altar erected to you, as there is to the goddeſs *Fever* at Rome.

§. 2. What is it, then, that diſturbs and ſtrikes terror into the multitude? The tyrant, and his guards? By no means. What is by nature free, cannot be diſturbed, or reſtrained, by any thing but itſelf. But its own principles diſturb it. Thus, when the tyrant ſays to any one; "I will chain your "leg:" he who values his leg, cries out for pity: while he, who ſets the value on his own will and choice, ſays; "If you imagine it for your own in-"tereſt, chain it."——"What! do not you care?"——No: I do not care——"I will ſhow you "that I am maſter."——*You?* How ſhould *you?* Jupiter has ſet me free. What! do you think he would ſuffer his own ſon to be enſlaved? You are maſter of my carcaſe. Take it.——"So that, when "you come into my preſence, you pay no regard "to me?"——No: but to myſelf: or, if you will have me ſay, to you alſo: I tell you; the ſame to you as to a pipkin. This is not ſelfiſh vanity: for every animal is ſo conſtituted, as to do every thing for its own ſake. Even the ſun doth all for his own ſake: nay; and to name no more, even Jupiter himſelf. But, when he would be ſtiled the diſpenſer of rain and plenty, and the father of Gods and men, you ſee that he cannot attain theſe offices and titles, unleſs he contributes to the common utility. And he hath univerſally ſo conſtituted the nature of every reaſonable creature, that no one can attain any of its own proper advantages, without contributing ſomething to the uſe of ſociety. And thus it becomes not unſociable to do every thing for one's own ſake. For, do you expect that a ma

ſhould deſert himſelf, and his own intereſt? How, then, can all beings have one and the ſame original inſtinct, attachment to themſelves? What follows, then? That where thoſe abſurd principles, concerning things independent on choice, as if they were either good or evil, are at the bottom, there muſt neceſſarily be a regard paid to tyrants: and I wiſh it were to tyrants only, and not to the very officers of their bed-chamber too. And how wiſe doth a man grow on a ſudden, when Caeſar has made him clerk of the cloſe-ſtool? How immediately we ſay, "Felicio talked very ſenſibly to me!" I wiſh he were turned out of the bed-chamber, that he might once more appear to you the fool he is.

§. 3. Epaphroditus had [a ſlave that was] a ſhoemaker; whom, becauſe he was good for nothing, he ſold. This very fellow being, by ſome ſtrange luck, bought by a courtier, became ſhoemaker to Caeſar. Then you might have ſeen how Epaphroditus honoured him. "How doth good Felicio do, pray? And, if any of us aſked, what the great man himſelf was about, it was anſwered; "He is conſulting about affairs with Felicio." Did not he kill him, as good for nothing? Who, then, hath, all of a ſudden, made a wiſe man of him? This it is to honour any thing, beſides what depends on choice.

§. 4. Is any one exalted to the office of tribune? All that meet him congratulate him. One kiſſes his eyes, another his neck, and the ſlaves his hands. He goes to his houſe; finds it illuminated. He aſcends the capitol. Offers a ſacrifice. Now, who ever offered a ſacrifice for having good deſires? For exerting purſuits conformable to nature? For we thank the Gods for that wherein we place our good.

§. 5. A perſon was talking with me to-day about the prieſthood of Auguſtus. I ſay to him, let the thing alone, friend: you will be at great expence for nothing. "But my name, ſays he, will be writ-"ten in the annals." Will you ſtand by, then, and tell thoſe who read them; "*I am the perſon whoſe* "*name is written there?*" But, if you could tell every one ſo now, what will you do when you are dead?——"My name will remain."—Write it upon a ſtone, and it will remain juſt as well. But, pray what rememberance will there be of you out of Nicopolis? "But I ſhall wear a crown of gold."—If your heart is quite ſet upon a crown, take and put on one of roſes; for it will make the prettier appearance.

CHAP. XX.

In what manner reaſon contemplates itſelf.

EVERY art, and every faculty, contemplates ſome things as its principal objects. Whenever, therefor, it is of the ſame nature with the object of its contemplations, it neceſſarily contemplates itſelf too. But, where it is of a different nature it cannot contemplate itſelf. The art of ſhoemaking, for inſtance, is exerciſed upon leather; but itſelf intirely diſtinct from the materials it works upon: therefor it doth not contemplate itſelf. Again grammar is exerciſed on articulate ſpeech. Is the art of grammar itſelf, then, articulate ſpeech?

By no means.

Therefor it cannot contemplate itſelf. To what purpoſe, then, is reaſon appointed by nature?

To a proper uſe of the appearances of things.

And what is reaſon?

A compoſition of certain appearances to the mind: and, thus, by its nature, it becomes contemplative of itſelf too. Again: what ſubjects of contemplation belong to prudence?

Good and evil, and indifferent.

What, then, is prudence itſelf?

Good.

What, imprudence?

Evil.

You ſee, then, that it neceſſarily contemplates both itſelf and its contrary. Therefor, the firſt and greateſt work of a philoſopher is, to try and diſtinguiſh the appearances; and to admit none untried. Even in money, where our intereſt ſeems to be concerned, you ſee what an art we have invented; and how many ways an aſſayer uſes to try its value. By the ſight; the touch; the ſmell; and, laſtly, the hearing. He throws the piece down, and attends to the jingle; and is not contented with its jingling only once; but, by frequent attention to it, becomes quite muſical. In the ſame manner, whenever we think it of conſequence, whether we are deceived or not, we uſe the utmoſt attention to diſtinguiſh thoſe things which may poſſibly deceive us. But, yawning and ſlumbering over the poor miſerable ruling faculty, we admit every appearance that offers. For here the miſchief does not ſtrike us. When you would know, then, how very languidly you are affected by good and evil, and how vehemently by things indifferent; conſider how you are affected with regard to being blinded; and how with regard to being deceived; and you will find, that you are

far from being moved, as you ought, in relation to good and evil.

But much previous qualification, and much labour, and learning, are wanted.

What, then? Do you expect the greateſt of arts is to be acquired by ſlight endeavours? And yet the principal doctrine of the philoſopers, of itſelf, is ſhort. If you have a mind to know it, read Zeno, and you will ſee. For what prolixity is there in ſaying, *Our end is to follow the Gods?* And, *The eſſence of good conſiſts in the proper uſe of the appearance of things.* Indeed, if you ſay, What, then, is God? What is *an appearance?* What is particular, what univerſal nature? Here the affair becomes prolix. And ſo, if Epicurus ſhould come and ſay, that good muſt be placed in body; here, too, it will be prolix: and it will be neceſſary to hear, what is the principal, the ſubſtantial and eſſential part in us. It is unlikely, that the good of a ſnail ſhould be placed in the ſhell: and, is it likely, that the good of a man ſhould? You yourſelf, Epicurus, have ſomething ſuperior to this. What is that in you, which deliberates, which examines, which forms the judgment, concerning body itſelf, that it is the principal part? And why do you light your lamp, and labour for us, and write ſo many books? That we may not be ignorant of the truth? What are *we?* What are *you?* Thus the doctrine becomes prolix.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the deſire of admiration.

WHEN a perſon maintains his proper ſtation in life, he doth not gape after externals. What would you have, man?

"I am contented, if my deſires and averſions are "conformable to nature: if I manage my powers "of purſuit and avoidance, my purpoſes, and in- "tentions and aſſent, in the manner I was formed "to do."

Why, then, do you walk as if you had ſwallowed a ſpit?

"I could wiſh moreover to have all who meet "me, admire me, and all who follow me, cry out, "What a great philoſopher!"

Who are thoſe, by whom you would be admired? Are they not the very people, who, you uſed to ſay, were mad? What, then, would you be admired by madmen?

CHAP. XXII.

Of pre-conceptions.

§. 1. PRECONCEPTIONS are common to all men: and one pre-conception doth not contradict another. For, who of us doth not lay it down as a maxim, that good is advantageous and eligible, and at all events, to be purſued and

followed: that juſtice is fair and becoming? Whence then, ariſes the diſpute?——In adapting theſe pre-conceptions to particular caſes. As, when one cries; "Such a perſon hath acted well: he is a gallant "man:" and another; "No; he hath acted like a "fool." Hence ariſes the diſpute among men. This is the diſpute between Jews, and Syrians, and Egyptians, and Romans: not whether ſanctity be preferable to all things, and in every inſtance to be purſued; but whether the eating ſwine's fleſh be conſiſtent with ſanctity, or not. This, too, you will find to have been the diſpute between Achilles and Agamemnon. For, call them forth. What ſay you, Agamemnon? Ought not that to be done, which is fit and right?——Yes, ſurely.——Achilles, what ſay you? Is it not agreeable to you, that what is right ſhould be done?——Yes: beyond every other thing. Adapt your pre-conceptions then. Here begins the diſpute. One ſays; "It is not fit, "that I ſhould reſtore Chryſeis to her father." The other ſays; "Yes; but it is." One, or the other of them, certainly makes a wrong adaption of the pre-conception of fitneſs. Again: one ſays; "If it be fit, that I ſhould give up Chryſeis; it is "fit, too, that I ſhould take ſome one of your priz-"es." The other: "What, that you ſhould take "my miſtreſs?" "Ay; yours." "What, *mine* "only? Muſt *I* only, then, loſe my prize?"

§. 2. What, then, is it to be properly educated? To learn how to adapt natural pre-conceptions to particular caſes, conformably to nature: and, for the future, to diſtinguiſh, that ſome things are in our own power; others not. In our own power, are choice, and all actions dependent on choice: not

in our power, the body, the parts of the body, property, parents, brothers, children, country; and, in ſhort, all with whom we are engaged in ſociety. Where, then, ſhall we place good? To what kind of things ſhall we adapt the pre-conception of it? To that in our own power.

§. 3. What, then, is not health, and ſtrength, and life, good? And are not children, nor parents, nor country? Who will have patience with you?

Let us tranſfer it, then, to the other ſort of things. Can he who ſuffers harm, and is diſappointed of good things, be happy?

He cannot.

And can he preſerve a right behaviour with regard to ſociety? How is it poſſible he ſhould? For I am naturally led by my intereſt. If, therefor, it is for my intereſt, to have an eſtate, it is for my intereſt likewiſe to take it away from my neighbour. If it is my intereſt to have a ſuit of clothes; it is for my intereſt likewiſe to ſteal it wherever I find it. Hence, wars, ſeditions, tyranny, unjuſt invaſions. How ſhall I, if this be the caſe, be able, any longer, to preſerve my duty towards Jupiter? If I ſuffer harm, and am diſappointed, he takes no care of me. And, what is Jupiter to me, if he chuſes I ſhould be in the condition I am in? Henceforward I begin to hate him. What, then, do we build temples, do we raiſe ſtatues to Jupiter, as to evil demons, as to the goddeſs Fever? How, at this rate, is he the preſerver; and how the diſpenſer of rain and plenty? If we place the eſſence of good anywhere here, all this will follow.——What, then, ſhall we do?

§. 4. This is the enquiry of him who philoſophi-

zes in reality, and labours to bring forth [Truth]. "Do not I now ſee what is good, and what is e-"vil?" Surely I am in my ſenſes. Ay: but ſhall I place good any-where on this other ſide; in things dependent [only] on my own choice? Why every one will laugh at me. Some grey-headed old fellow will come, with his fingers covered with gold rings, and ſhake his head, and ſay; "Hark ye, "child, it is fit you ſhould learn philoſophy; but "it is fit, too, you ſhould have brains. This is "nonſenſe. You learn ſyllogiſms from philoſo-"phers: but how you are to act, you know better "than they." "Then, why do you chide me, "Sir, if I do know." What can I ſay to this wretch? If I make no anſwer, he will burſt. I muſt even anſwer thus: "Forgive me, as they do "people in love. I am not myſelf. I have loſt "my ſenſes."

CHAP. XXIII.

Againſt EPICURUS.

§. 1. EVEN Epicurus is ſenſible, that we are by nature ſociable: but having once placed our good in the mere ſhell, he can ſay nothing afterwards different from that. For, again, he ſtrenuouſly maintains, that we ought not to admire, or receive, any thing ſeparated from the nature of good. And he is in the right to maintain it. But how, then, came any ſuch ſuſpicions [as your doctrines imply, to ariſe], if we have no natural affection towards an offſpring? Why do you

Epicurus, diſſuade a wiſe man from bringing up children? Why are you afraid, that, upon their account, he may fall into uneaſineſſes? Doth he fall into any for a mouſe, that feeds within his houſe? What is it to him, if a little mouſe bewails itſelf there? But Epicurus knew, that, if once a child is born, it is no longer in our power not to love and be ſolicitous for it. For the ſame reaſon, he ſays a wiſe man will not engage himſelf in public buſineſs: for he knew very well, that ſuch an engagement would oblige him to do: for what would reſtrain any one from affairs, if we may behave among men, as we would among a ſwarm of flies.

§. 2. And doth he, who knows all this, dare to bid us not bring up children? Not even a ſheep, or a wolf, deſerts its offspring; and ſhall man? What would you have? That we ſhould be as ſilly as ſheep? Yet even theſe do not deſert their offspring. Or ſavage as wolves? Neither do theſe deſert them. Pray, who would mind *you*, if he ſaw his child fallen upon the ground, and crying? For my part, I am of opinion, that your father and mother, even if they could have foreſeen, that you would have been the author of ſuch doctrines, would not, however, have thrown you away.

CHAP. XXIV.

How we are to ſtruggle with difficulties.

§. 1. DIFFICULTIES are the things that ſhew what men are. For the future, on any difficulty, remember, that God, like a ma-

ſter of exerciſe, has engaged you with a rough antagoniſt.

For what end?

That you may be a conqueror, like one in the Olympic games: and it cannot be without toil. No man, in my opinion, has a more advantageous difficulty on his hands than you have; provided you will but uſe it, as an athletic champion doth his antagoniſt. We are now ſending a ſpy to Rome: but no one ever ſends a timorous ſpy, who, when he only hears a noiſe, or ſees a ſhadow, runs back, frighted out of his wits, and ſays; "The enemy is "juſt at hand." So now, if you ſhould come tell us; "Things are in a fearful way at Rome: death "is terrible; baniſhment, terrible; calumny, ter-"rible; poverty, terrible: run, good people, the "enemy is at hand:" we will anſwer; get you gone, and propheſy for yourſelf; our only fault is, that we have ſent ſuch a ſpy. Diogenes was ſent a ſpy before *you*: but he told us other tidings. He ſays, that death is no evil; for it is nothing baſe: that defamation is only the noiſe of madmen. And what account did this ſpy give us of pain? of pleaſure? of poverty? He ſays, that, to be naked is better than a purple robe: to ſleep upon the bare ground the ſofteſt bed: and gives a proof of all he ſays, by his own courage, tranquillity, and freedom; and, moreover, by a healthy and robuſt body. There is no enemy near, ſays he. All is profound peace.——How ſo, Diogenes? Look upon *me*, ſays he. Am *I* hurt? Am *I* wounded? Have *I* run away from any one? This is ſuch a ſpy as he ought to be. But you come, and tell us one thing after another. Go

back again, and examine things more exactly, and without fear.

§. 2 What ſhall I do, then?

What do you do when you come out of a ſhip? Do you take away the rudder, or the oars, along with you? What do you take, then? Your own, your bottle, and your bundle. So, in the preſent caſe, if you will but remember what is your own, you will not claim what belongs to others. Are you bid to put off your conſular robe?—Well: I am in my equeſtrian. Put off that too.—I have only my coat.—Put off that too.—Well: I am naked. —Still you raiſe my envy.—Then e'en take my whole body. If I can throw off a paultry body, am I any longer afraid of a tyrant?

§. 5. But ſuch a one will not leave me his heir. What, then, have I forgot, that none of thoſe things is mine? How, then, do we call them *mine?* As a bed, in an inn. If the landlord, when he dies, leaves you the beds; well and good: but, if to another, they will be his; and you will ſeek one elſewhere: and, conſequently, if you do not find one, you will ſleep upon the ground: only ſleep quiet, and ſnore ſoundly; and remember, that tragedies have no other ſubjects, but the rich, and kings, and tyrants. No poor man fills any other place in one, than as part of the chorus: whereas kings begin, indeed, with proſperity. "*Crown the palace with feſtive garlands.*" —But, then, about the third or fourth act; "*Alas,* Citheron! "*why didſt thou receive me!*" Where are thy crowns, wretch; where is thy diadem? cannot thy guards help thee?

Whenever you approach any of theſe then, remember, that you meet a tragic player; or, rather,

not an actor, but *Oedipus* himself.—But such a one is happy. He walks with a numerous train. Well: I join myself with the croud, and I too walk with a numerous train.

§. 4. But, remember the principal thing; That the door is open. Do not be more fearful than children; but, as they, when the play doth not please them, say; "I will play no longer:" so do you, in the same case, say; "I will play no longer;" and go: but, if you stay, do not complain.

CHAP. XXV.

On the same subject.

§. 1. If these things are true; and we are not stupid, or acting a part, when we say, that the good or ill of man consists in choice, and that all besides is nothing to us? why are we still troubled? Why do we still fear? What hath been *our* concern, is in no one's power: what is in the power of others, *we* do not regard. What embarassment have we left?

But direct me.

Why should *I* direct you? Hath not Jupiter directed you? Hath he not given you what is your *own*, incapable of restraint, or hindrance; and what is *not* your own, liable to both? What directions, then, what orders, have you brought from him? "By all methods keep what is your own: what be- "longs to others, do not covet. Honesty, is your "own: a sense of virtuous shame is your own. "Who, then, can deprive you of these? Who "can restrain you from making use of them, bu

" yourſelf? And how do you do it? When you " make that your concern which is not your own, " you loſe what is." Having ſuch precepts and directions from Jupiter, what ſort do you ſtill want from me? Am *I* better than *he?* More worthy of credit? If you obſerve theſe, what others do you need? Or are not theſe directions *his?* Produce your natural pre-conceptions: produce the demonſtrations of philoſophers: produce what you have often heard, and what you have ſaid yourſelf; what you have read, and what you have ſtudied.

How long is it right to obſerve theſe things, and break up the game?

As long as it goes on agreeably. A king is choſen at the Saturnalian feſtival (for it was agreed to play at the game): he orders; " Do you drink: " you mix the wine: you ſing: you go: you come." I obey; that the game may not be broken up by my fault.——" Well: but I bid you think yourſelf to " be unhappy." I do not think ſo: and who ſhall compel me to think ſo? Again: we agreed to play Agamemnon and Achilles. He who is appointed for Agamemnon, ſays to me: " Go to Achilles, and " force away Briſeis." I go. " Come." I come.

§. 2. We ſhould converſe in life as we do in hypothetical arguments. " Suppoſe it to be night." ——Well: ſuppoſe it.——" Is it day, then?" No: for I admitted the hypotheſis, that it is night. ——" Suppoſe, that you think it to be night."—— Well: ſuppoſe it.——" But think alſo, in reality, " that it is night."——That doth not follow from the hypotheſis. Thus, too, in the other caſe. Suppoſe you have ill luck.——Suppoſe it,——" Are " you, then, unlucky?"——Yes.——" Have you

ſome croſs Demon."——Yes.——"Well: but think too [in earneſt], that you are unhappy."——This doth not follow from the hypotheſis: and there is one who forbids me [to think ſo].

How long, then, are we to obey ſuch orders?

As long as it is worth while: that is, as long as I preſerve what is becoming and fit.

§ 3. Further: ſome are peeviſh and faſtidious; and ſay, I cannot dine with ſuch a fellow, to be obliged to hear him all day recounting, how he fought in Myſia. "I told you, my friend, how I gained "the eminence. There I am beſieged again." But another ſays, "I had rather get a dinner, and hear "him prate as much as he pleaſes."

Do you compare the value of theſe things, and judge for yourſelf: but do not let it be with depreſſion, and anxiety; and with a ſuppoſition, that you are unhappy: for no one compels you to that. Is the houſe in a ſmoke? If it be a moderate one, I will ſtay: if a very great one, I will go out. For you muſt remember, and hold to this, that the door is open: "Well: do not live at Nicopolis."—I will not live there.—"Nor at Athens."—Well: nor at Athens.—"Nor at Rome."—Nor at Rome neither.—"But you ſhall live at Gyaros."—I will live there. But living at Gayros ſeems to me like living in a great ſmoke. I will retire where no one can forbid me to live; (for that abode is open to all) and put off my laſt garment, this paultry body of mine: beyond this, no one hath any power over me. Thus Demetrius ſaid to Nero; "You ſentence *me* to death, and nature, *you*;" If I place my admiration on body, I give myſelf up for a ſlave: if on an eſtate, to ſame; for I immediately betray myſelf, how I m

be taken. Juſt as when a ſnake pulls in his head, I ſay ſtrike that part of him which he guards: and be you aſſured, that whatever you ſhew a deſire to guard, there your maſter will attack you. Remember but this, whom will you any longer flatter, or fear?

But I want to ſit where the ſenators do.

Do not you ſee, that by this you ſtraiten yourſelf? You ſqueeze yourſelf?

Why, how elſe ſhall I ſee the ſhow, in the amphitheatre cleverly?

Do not ſee it [at all,] man; and you will not be ſqueezed. Why do you give yourſelf trouble? Or wait a little while; and when the ſhow is over, go ſit in the ſenators places, and ſun yourſelf. For remember, that this holds univerſally; we ſqueeze ourſelves; we ſtraiten ourſelves: that is; our own principles ſqueeze and ſtraiten us. What is it to be reviled, for inſtance? Stand by a ſtone, and revile it; and what will you get? If you, therefor, would hear like a ſtone, what would your reviler be the better? But, if the reviler hath the weakneſs of the reviled for an advantage-ground, then he carries his point.—"Strip him." "What do you mean by "*him?*" "Take my clothes; ſtrip off *them* [if "you will]."—"I have put an affront upon you."—"Much good may it do you."

§. 4. Theſe things were the ſtudy of Socrates; and, by this means, he always preſerved the ſame countenance. But *we* had rather exerciſe and ſtudy any thing, than how to become unreſtrained and free.

The philoſophers talk paradoxes.

And are there not paradoxes in other arts? What

is more paradoxical, than the pricking any one's eye, to make him ſee? If a perſon was to tell this to one ignorant of ſurgery, would not he laugh at him? Where is the wonder then, if, in philoſophy too, many truths appear paradoxes to the ignorant?

CHAP. XXVI.

What the law of life is.

§. 1. AS one [of his ſcholars] was reading hypothetical ſyllogiſms; it is likewiſe a law in theſe, ſays Epictetus, to admit what follows from the hypotheſis; but much more is it a law in life, to do what follows from nature. For, if we deſire in every ſubject of action, and in every circumſtance, to keep up to nature; we muſt, on every occaſion, evidently make it our aim, neither to let conſequences eſcape our obſervation, nor to admit contradictions. Philoſophers, therefor, firſt exerciſe us in theory, which is the more eaſy taſk, and then lead us to the more difficult: for in theory, there is nothing to oppoſe our following what we are taught; but in life, there are many things to draw us aſide. It is ridiculous, then, to ſay, we muſt begin from theſe: for it is not eaſy to begin from the moſt difficult: and this excuſe muſt be made to thoſe parents, who diſlike that their children ſhould learn philoſophical ſpeculations.—"Am I to blame then, Sir, and ig-
"norant of my duty, and of what is incumbent
"on me? If this is neither to be learnt, nor taught,
"why do you find fault with me? If it is to be
"taught, pray teach me yourſelf; or, if you can-

" not, give me leave to learn it from thoſe who " profeſs to underſtand it. Beſides: do you think " that I voluntarily fall into evil, and miſs of good? " Heaven forbid! what then, is the cauſe of my " faults?" Ignorance. " Are you not willing then " that I ſhould get rid of my ignorance? Who was " ever taught the art of muſic, or navigation, by " anger? Do you expect then, that your anger " ſhould teach me the art of living?"——This however, is allowed to be ſaid only by one who really hath that intention. But he who reads theſe things, and applies to the philoſophers, merely for the ſake of ſhewing, at an entertainment, that he underſtands hypothetical ſyllogiſms; what doth he do it for, but to be admired by ſome ſenator, who happens to ſit near him . . . . .

§. 2. . . . . I once ſaw a perſon weeping and embracing the knees of Epaphroditus; and deploring his hard fortune, that he had not 50,000*l.* left. What ſaid Epaphroditus, then? Did he laugh at him, as we ſhould do? No: but cried out with aſtoniſhment, poor man! How could you be ſilent? How could you bear it?

§. 3. . . . . The firſt ſtep, therefore, towards becoming a philoſopher, is, being ſenſible in what ſtate the faculty of the mind is: for, when a perſon knows it to be in a weak one, he will not immediately employ it in great attempts. But, for want of this, ſome, who can ſcarce get down a morſel, buy, and ſet themſelves to ſwallow, whole treatiſes; and ſo they throw them up again, or cannot digeſt them: and then come cholics, fluxes, and fevers. Such perſons ought to conſider what they can bear. Indeed, it is eaſy to convince an ignorant perſon in

theory; but in matters relating to life, no one offers himſelf to conviction; and we hate thoſe who have convinced us. Socrates uſed to ſay, that we ought not to live a life unexamined.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of the ſeveral appearances of things to the mind: and what remedies are to be provided for them.

§. 1. APPEARANCES to the mind are of four kinds. Things are either what they appear to be: or they neither are, nor appear to be: or they are, and do not appear to be: or they are not, and yet appear to be. To form a right judgment in all theſe caſes, belongs only to the completely inſtructed. But whatever preſſes, to that a remedy muſt be applied. If the ſophiſtries of *Pyrrhoniſm*, or the academy, preſs us, the remedy muſt be applied *there*: if ſpecious appearances, by which things ſeem to be good which are not ſo, let us ſeek for a comedy *there*. If it be cuſtom which preſſes us, we muſt endeavour to find a remedy againſt it.

What remedy is to be found againſt cuſtom?

A contrary cuſtom. You hear the vulgar ſay, "ſuch a one, poor ſoul! is dead."——Why, his father died: his mother died.——"Ay: but he "was cut off in the flower of his age, and in a fo"reign land."——Hear the contrary ways of ſpeaking: withdraw yourſelf from theſe expreſſions. Oppoſe to one cuſtom, a contrary cuſtom; to ſophiſtry, the art of reaſoning, and the frequent uſe and exerciſe of it. Againſt ſpecious appearances, we

muſt have clear pre-conceptions, brightened up, and ready. When death appears as an evil, we ought immediately to remember, that evils may be avoided, but death is neceſſity. For what can I do, or where can I fly from it? Let me ſuppoſe myſelf to be Sarpedon, the ſon of Jove, that I may ſpeak in the ſame gallant way,

Brave tho' we die, and honour'd if we live;
Or let us glory gain, or glory give. POPE.

If I can atchieve nothing myſelf, I will not envy another the honour of doing ſome gallant action. But ſuppoſe this to be a ſtrain too high for *us*; are not we capable [at leaſt] of arguing thus?——— Where ſhall I fly from death? Shew me the place; ſhew me the people, to whom I may have recourſe, whom death doth not overtake. Shew me the charm to avoid it. If there be none, what would you have me do? I cannot eſcape death: but cannot I eſcape the dread of it? Muſt I die trembling, and lamenting? For the origin of the diſeaſe is, wiſhing for ſomething that is not obtained.. In conſequence of this, if I can bring over externals to my own inclination, I do it: if not, I want to tear out the eyes of whoever hinders me. For it is the nature of man, not to bear the being deprived of good; not to bear the falling into evil. And ſo, laſt, when I can neither bring over things [to my own inclination], nor tear out the eyes of him who hinders me, I ſit down, and groan, and revile him whom I can; Jupiter, and the reſt of the Gods. For what are they to me, if they take no care of me?

Oh! but you will be guilty of impiety.

What then? Can I be in a worſe condition than

I am now? In general, remember this, that unleſs piety and intereſt be placed in the ſame thing, piety cannot be preſerved in any mortal breaſt.

§. 2. Do not theſe things ſeem to have force? Let a Pyrrhoniſt, or an academic, come and oppoſe them. For my part, I am not at leiſure; nor able to ſtand up as an advocate for general conſent. Even if buſineſs were concerning an eſtate, I ſhould call in another advocate. With what advocate, then, am I contented [in the preſent caſe]? With any that may be upon the ſpot. I may be at a loſs, perhaps, to give a reaſon, how ſenſation is performed: whether it be diffuſed univerſally, or reſide in a particular part: for I find difficulties that ſhock me, in each caſe: but, that you and I are not the ſame perſon, I very exactly know.

How ſo?

Why, I never, when I have a mind to ſwallow any thing, carry it to *your* mouth; but my own. I never, when I wanted to take a loaf, take a bruſh: but went directly to the loaf, as fit to anſwer my purpoſe. And do you yourſelves, who deny all evidence of the ſenſes, act any otherwiſe? Who of you, when he intended to go into a bath, ever went into a mill?

What, then, muſt not we, to the utmoſt, defend theſe points? ſupport the general conſent [of mankind]? be fortified againſt every thing that oppoſes it?

Who denies that? But, it muſt be done by him who hath abilities; who hath leiſure: but he, who is full of trembling and perturbation, and inward diſorders of heart, muſt employ his time about ſomething elſe.

CHAP. XXVIII.

That we are not to be angry with mankind. What things are little, what great, among men.

§. 1. WHAT is the cauſe of aſſent to any thing?

Its appearing to be true.

Why?

Becauſe it is the very nature of the underſtanding to agree to truth; to be diſſatisfied with falſhood; and to ſuſpend its belief, in doubtful caſes.

What is the proof of this?

Perſuade yourſelf, if you can, that it is now night.

Impoſſible.

Unperſuade yourſelf that it is day.

Impoſſible.

Perſuade yourſelf, that the ſtars are, or are not, even.

Impoſſible.

§. 2. When any one, then, aſſents to what is falſe, be aſſured, that he doth not wilfully aſſent to it, as falſe (for, as Plato affirms, the ſoul is never voluntarily deprived of truth): but what is falſe, appears to him to be true. Well, then: have we, in actions, any thing correſpondent to true and falſe, in propoſitions?

Duty, and contrary to duty: advantageous, and diſadvantageous: ſuitable and unſuitable; and the like.

A perſon, then, cannot think a thing advantageous to him, and not chuſe it.

He cannot. But how ſays Medea?

" *I know what evils wait my dreadful purpoſe*;
" *But vanquiſh'd reaſon yields to powerful rage.*"

Becauſe ſhe thought, that very indulgence of her rage, and the puniſhing her huſband, more advantageous than the preſervation of her children.

Yes: but ſhe is deceived.

Shew clearly to her, that ſhe is deceived, and ſhe will forbear: but, till you have ſhewn it, what is ſhe to follow, but what appears to herſelf?

Nothing.

Why, then, are you angry with her, that the unhappy woman is deceived, in the moſt important points; and inſtead of a human creature, becomes a viper? Why do not you rather, as we pity the blind and lame, ſo likewiſe pity thoſe who are blinded and lamed, in their ſuperior faculties? Whoever, therefor, duly remembers, that the appearance of things to the mind is the ſtandard of every action to man: that this is either right or wrong: and, if right, he is without fault; if wrong, he himſelf bears the puniſhment: for that one man cannot be the perſon deceived, and another the ſufferer: will not be outrageous and angry at any one; will not revile, or reproach, or hate, quarrel with, any one.

§. 3. So then, have all the great and dreadful deeds, that have been done in the world, no other original than *appearance?*

Abſolutely, no other. The Iliad conſiſts of nothing but the appearances [of things to the mind]; and the uſe of thoſe appearances. It *appeared* [right] to Paris, to carry off the wife of Menelaus. It *appeared* [right] to Helen, to follow him. If, then, it had *appeared* [right] to Menelaus, to perſuade him-

ſelf, that it was an advantage to be robbed of ſuch a wife, what would have happened? Not only the Iliad had been loſt, but the Odyſſey too.

Do theſe great events, then, depend on ſo ſmall a cauſe?

What are theſe events, which you call great?

Wars, and ſeditions; the deſtruction of numbers of men; and the overthrow of cities.

And what great matter is there in all this? Nothing. What great matter is there in the death of numbers of oxen, numbers of ſheep, or in the burning or pulling down numbers of neſts of ſtorks or ſwallows?

Are theſe like caſes, then?

Perfectly like. The bodies of men are deſtroyed, and the bodies of ſheep and oxen. The houſes of men are burnt, and the neſts of ſtorks. What is there great or dreadful in all this? Pray, ſhew me what difference there is between the houſe of a man, and the neſt of a ſtork, ſo far as it is a habitation, excepting that houſes are built with beams, and tiles, and bricks; and neſts, with ſticks and clay?

What, then, is a ſtork and a man a like thing? What do you mean?

With regard to body, extremely like.

Is there no difference, then, between a man and a ſtork?

Yes, ſurely: but not in theſe things.

In what then?

Enquire; and you will find, that the difference conſiſts in ſomething elſe. See, whether it be not, in acting with diſcernment: whether it be not, in a ſocial diſpoſition; in fidelity, honour, ſteadineſs, judgment.

§. 4. Where, then, is the great good or evil of man?

Where his difference is. If this is preſerved, and remains well fortified, and neither honour, fidelity, or judgment, is deſtroyed, then he himſelf is preſerved likewiſe: but, when any of theſe is loſt and demoliſhed, he himſelf is loſt alſo. In this do all great events conſiſt. Paris, they ſay, was undone, becauſe the Greeks invaded Troy, and laid it waſte; and his family were ſlain in battle. By no means: for no one is undone by an action, not his own. All *that* was only laying waſte the neſts of ſtorks. But his true undoing was, when he loſt the modeſt, the faithful, the hoſpitable, and the decent character. When was Achilles undone? When Patroclus died? By no means. But when he gave himſelf up to rage; when he wept over a girl; when he forgot, that he came there, not to get miſtreſſes, but to fight. This is human undoing; this is the ſiege; this the overthrow; when right principles are ruined; when theſe are deſtroyed.

But, when wives and children are led away captives, and the men themſelves killed, are not theſe, evils?

Whence do you conclude them ſuch? Pray, inform me, in my turn.

Nay: but whence do you affirm, that they are not evils?

§. 5. Let us recur to the rules. Produce the pre-conceptions. One cannot ſufficiently wonder at what happens, in this reſpect. When we would judge of light and heavy, we do not judge by gueſs: when of ſtrait and crooked, not by gueſs: and, in general, when it concerns us to know the truth of

any particular, no one of us will do any thing, by gueſs. But where the firſt and principal cauſe is concerned, of acting either right or wrong; of being proſperous or unproſperous, happy or unhappy; there only do we act raſhly, and by gueſs. No-where any thing like a balance; no-where any thing like a rule; but ſome fancy ſtrikes me, and I inſtantly act conformably to it. For am I better than Agamemnon or Achilles; that they, by following their fancies, ſhould do and ſuffer ſo many things, and fancy not ſuffice me? And what tragedy hath any other original? The Atreus of Euripides, what is it? Fancy. The Oedipus of Sophocles? Fancy. The Phoenix? The Hippolytus? All fancy. To what character, then, doth it belong, think you, to take no care of this point? What are they called who follow every fancy?

Madmen.

Do *we*, then, behave any otherwiſe?

CHAP. XXIX.

Of Intrepidity.

§. 1. THE eſſence of good and evil, is a certain diſpoſition of the choice.

What are externals, then?

Materials to the faculty of choice: in the management of which, it will attain its own good or evil.

How, then, will it attain good?

If it doth not admire the materials themſelves: for right principles, concerning theſe materials, con-

ſtitute a good choice: but perverſe and diſtorted principles, a bad one. This law hath God ordained, who ſays; "If you wiſh for good receive it from "yourſelf." You ſay, No: but from another. ——"Nay; but from yourſelf." In conſequence of this, when a tyrant threatens, and ſends for me; I ſay, againſt what is your threatening pointed? If he ſays, "I will chain you;" I anſwer, it is my *hands* and *feet* that you threaten. If he ſays, "I "will cut off your head;" I anſwer, it is my *head* that you threaten If he ſays, "I will throw you "into priſon;" I anſwer, it is the whole of this paultry *body* that you threaten: and, if he threatens baniſhment, juſt the ſame.

Doth not he threaten *you*, then?

If I am perſuaded, that theſe things are nothing to me, he doth not: but, if I fear any of them, it is *me* that he threaten. Whom, after all, is it that I fear? The maſter of what? Of things in my own power? Of theſe no one is the maſter. Of things not in my power? And what are theſe to *me?*

§. 2. What, then! do you philoſophers teach us a contempt of kings?

By no means. Who of us teaches any one to contend with them, about things of which they have the command? Take my body; take my poſſeſſions; take my reputation; take thoſe who are about me. If I perſuade any one to contend for theſe things, as his own, accuſe me, with juſtice.——"Ay: but I "would command your *principles* too."—And who hath given you that power? How can you conquer the principle of another?—By applying terror, I will conquer it.——Do not you ſee, that what conquers itſelf, is not conquered by another? And nothing but

itſelf can conquer the choice. Hence, too, the moſt excellent and equitable law of God; that the better ſhould always prove ſuperior to the worſe. Ten are better than one.

To what purpoſe?

For chaining, killing, dragging where they pleaſe, for taking away an eſtate. Thus ten conquer one, in the inſtance wherein they are better.

In what, then, are they worſe?

When the one hath right *principles*, and the others have not. For can they conquer in this point? How ſhould they? If we were weighed in a ſcale, muſt not the heavier outweigh?

§. 3. That ever Socrates ſhould ſuffer ſuch things from the Athenians!

Wretch! what do you mean by Socrates? Expreſs the fact as it is. That ever the poor paultry *body* of Socrates ſhould be carried away, and dragged to priſon, by ſuch as were ſtronger [than itſelf]: that ever any one ſhould give hemlock to the *body of* Socrates; and that it ſhould expire! Do *theſe* things appear wonderful to you? *Theſe* things unjuſt? Is it for ſuch things as *theſe* you accuſe God? Had Socrates, then, no equivalent for them? In what, then, to him, did the eſſence of good conſiſt? Whom ſhall we mind; you, or him? And what doth he ſay? "Anytus and Melitus may indeed kill; but "hurt me they cannot." And again: "If it ſo "pleaſes God, ſo let it be"

§. 4. But ſhew me, that he who hath the worſe principles, gets the advantage over him, who hath the better. You never will ſhew it, nor any thing like it: for the law of nature and of God, is this; let the better be always ſuperior to the worſe.

In what?

In that, wherein it is better. One body is ſtronger than another: many than one; and a thief, than one who is not a thief. Thus I, too, loſt my lamp; becauſe the thief was better at keeping awake, than I. But he bought a lamp, at the price of being a thief, a rogue, and a wild beaſt. This ſeemed to him a good bargain: and much good may it do him!

§. 5. Well: but one takes me by the coat, and draws me to the Forum; and then all the reſt bawl out——"Philoſopher, what good do your *princi-* "*ples* do you? See, you are dragging to priſon: "ſee, you are going to loſe your head!"—— And, pray what rule of philoſophy could I contrive, that, when a ſtronger than myſelf lays hold on my coat, I ſhould not be dragged? or that, when ten men pull me at once, and throw me into priſon, I ſhould not be thrown there? But have I learnt nothing, then? I have learnt to know, whatever happens, that, if it is not a matter of choice, it is nothing to *me*. Have my principles, then, done me no good? What, then! do I ſeek for any thing elſe to do me good, but what I have learnt? Afterwards, as I ſit in priſon, I ſay: he, who makes this outcry, neither hears what ſignal is given, nor underſtands what is ſaid; nor is it any concern to him to know what philoſophers ſay, or do. Let him alone.——[Well: but I am bid] to come out of priſon again.——If you have no further need for me, in priſon, I will come out: if you want me again, I will return.——For how long "[will you "go on thus?]"——Juſt as long as reaſon requires I ſhould continue in this paultry body: when that

is over, take it, and fare ye well. Only let not this be done inconſiderately; nor from cowardice; nor upon every ſlight pretence: for that, again, would be contrary to the will of God: for he hath need of ſuch a world, and ſuch [creatures] to live on earth. But, if he ſounds a retreat, as he did to Socrates, we are to obey him, when he ſounds it, as our general.

§. 6. Well: but are theſe things to be ſaid to the world?

For what purpoſe? Is it not ſufficient to be convinced one's ſelf? When children come to us, clapping their hands, and ſaying; "To morrow is the "good feaſt of Saturn:" do we tell them, that *good* doth not conſiſt in ſuch things? By no means: but we clap our hands along with them. Thus, when you are unable to convince any one, conſider him as a child, and clap your hands with him: or, if you will not do that, at leaſt hold your tongue. Theſe things we ought to remember; and, when we are called to any difficulty, know, that an opportunity is come, of ſhewing whether we have been well taught. For he who goes from a philoſophical lecture to a difficult point of practice, is like a young man who has been ſtudying to ſolve ſyllogiſms. If you propoſe an eaſy one, he ſays; give me rather a fine intricate one, that I may try my ſtrength. Even athletic champions are diſpleaſed with a ſlight antagoniſt. He cannot lift me, ſays one. This is a youth of ſpirit. No: but, I warrant you, when the occaſion calls upon him, he muſt fall a crying, and ſay; "I want-"ed to learn a little longer firſt."—Learn what? If you did not learn theſe things to ſhew them in

practice, why did you learn them at all? I am perſuaded there muſt be ſome one among you who ſit here, that feels ſecret pangs of impatience, and ſays; "When will ſuch a difficulty come to *my* ſhare, as "hath now fallen to his? Muſt I ſit waſting my life "in a corner, when I might be crowned at Olympia? When will any one bring the news of ſuch "a combat, for *me?*" Such ſhould be the diſpoſition of you all. Even among the gladiators of Caeſar, there are ſome who bear it very ill, that they are not brought upon the ſtage, and matched; and who offer vows to God, and addreſs the officers, begging to fight. And will none among *you*, appear ſuch? I would willingly take a voyage, on purpoſe to ſee how a champion of mine acts; how he treats his ſubject.—"I do not chuſe ſuch a ſubject," ſay you.—Is it in your power, then, to take what ſubject you chuſe? Such a body is given you; ſuch parents, ſuch brothers, ſuch a country, and ſuch a rank in it; and, then, you come to me, and ſay, "Change my ſubject." Beſides, have not you abilities to manage that which is given you? It is your buſineſs, [we ſhould ſay] to propoſe; mine, to treat the ſubject well.—"No. But do not propoſe "*ſuch* an argument to me; but *ſuch* a one: do not "offer *ſuch* an objection to me; but *ſuch* a one." —There will be a time, I ſuppoſe, when tragedians will fancy themſelves to be mere maſks, and buſkins, and long train. Theſe things are your materials, man, and your ſubject. Speak ſomething; that we may know, whether you are a tragedian, or a buffoon: for both have all the reſt, in common. If any one, therefor, ſhould take away his buſkins, and his maſk, and bring him upon the ſtage, in his com-

mon dreſs, is the tragedian loſt, or doth he remain? If he hath a voice, he remains. "Here, this inſtant, "take upon you the command." I take it; and, taking it, I ſhew how a perſon, who hath been properly inſtructed, behaves.——"Lay aſide your "robe; put on rags, and come upon the ſtage in "that character."—What then? Is it not in my power to bring a good voice [and manner] along with me?"——"In what character do you now ap- "pear? As a witneſs cited by God.——"Come "you, then, and bear witneſs for me; for you are "a witneſs worthy of being produced by me. Is "any thing, external to the choice, either good or "evil? Do I hurt any one? Have I placed the good "of each individual in any one, but in himſelf? "What evidence do you give for God?"—*I am in a miſerable condition, O Lord; I am undone: no mortal cares for me: no mortal gives me any thing: all blame me; all ſpeak ill of me.*—Is *this* the evidence you are to give? And will you bring diſgrace upon his citation, who hath conferred ſuch an honour upon you, and thought you worthy of being produced as a witneſs in ſuch a cauſe?

§. 7. But he who hath the power, hath given ſentence. "*I judge you to be impious and profane.*"—What hath befallen you?—I have been judged to be impious and profane—Any thing elſe?—Nothing—Suppoſe he had paſſed his judgment upon an hypothetical propoſition, and pronounced it to be a falſe concluſion, that, if it be day, it is light; what would have befallen the propoſition? In this caſe, who is judged; who condemned; the propoſition, or he who is deceived, concerning it? Doth he, who hath the power of pronouncing any thing, concerning

you, know, what pious, or impious, mean? Hath he made it his ſtudy, or learned it? Where? From whom? A muſician would not regard him, if he pronounced baſs to be treble: nor a mathematician, if he paſſed ſentence, that lines drawn from the center to the circle, are not equal. And ſhall he, who is truly learned, regard an unlearned man, when he pronounces upon pious and impious, juſt and unjuſt?

§. 8. "Oh the injuries to which the learned are expoſed!" Is it *here* that you have learned this? Why do not you leave ſuch pitiful reaſonings to idle pitiful fellows; and let them ſit in a corner, and receive ſome little ſorry pay; or grumble, that nobody gives them any thing? But do *you* appear, and make uſe of what you have learned. It is not *reaſonings* that are wanted now. On the contrary, books are ſtuffed full of Stoical reaſonings.

What is wanted, then?

One to apply them; whoſe actions may bear teſtimony to his doctrines. Aſſume me this character, that we may no longer make uſe of the examples of the ancients, in the ſchools; but may have ſome example of our own.

§. 9. To whom, then, doth the contemplation of theſe [ſpeculative reaſonings] belong?

To him, that hath leiſure. For man is an animal fond of contemplation. But it is ſhameful to take a view of theſe things, as run-away ſlaves do of a play. We are to ſit quietly, and liſten, ſometimes to the actor, and ſometimes to the muſician: and not do like thoſe, who come in and praiſe the actor, and at the ſame time look round them every way: then, if any one happens to name their maſter, are frighted out of their wits, and run off. It

is ſhameful for a philoſopher, thus to contemplate the works of nature. Now, what, in this caſe, is the maſter? Man is not the maſter of man; but death, and life, and pleaſure, and pain: for without theſe, bring Caeſar to me, and you will ſee how intrepid I ſhall be. But, if he comes thundering and lightening with *theſe*; and *theſe* are the objects of my terror; what do I elſe, but, like the run-away ſlave, acknowlege my maſter? While I have any reſpite from theſe, as the fugitive comes into the theatre, ſo I bathe, drink, ſing; but all, with terror and anxiety. But, if I free myſelf from my maſters, that is, from ſuch things as render a maſter terrible, what trouble, what maſter have I remaining?

§. 10. What, then, are we to publiſh theſe things to all men?

No. But humour the vulgar, and ſay; This poor man adviſes me to what he thinks good for himſelf. I excuſe him: for Socrates, too, excuſed the jailer, who wept when he was to drink the poiſon: and ſaid, "How heartily he ſheds tears "for us." Was it to *him* that Socrates ſaid, "For "this reaſon we ſent the women out of the way?" No: but to his *friends*; to ſuch, as were capable of hearing it: while he humoured the other, as a child.

CHAP. XXX.

What we ought to have ready, in difficult circumſtances.

WHEN you are going to any of the Great, remember, that there is another, who ſees from above, what paſſes; and whom you ought to pleaſe, rather than man. He, therefor, aſks you:

In the ſchools, what did you uſe to call exile, and priſon, and chains, and death, and defamation?

I? Indifferent things.

What, then, do you call them *now?* Are they at all changed?

No.

Are *you* changed, then?

No.

Tell me, then, what things are indifferent.

Things independent on choice.

Tell me the conſequence too.

Things independent on choice, are nothing to *me.*

Tell me, likewiſe, what appeared to us, to be the good of man.

A right choice, and a [right] uſe of the appearances of things.

What his end?

To follow thee.

Do you the ſame things *now*, too?

Yes. I do the ſame things, even now.

Well, go in, then, boldly, and mindful of theſe things; and he [to whom you are going] will ſee, what a youth, who hath ſtudied what he ought, is

among men, who have not. I proteſt, I imagine you will have ſuch thoughts as theſe: "Why do "we provide ſo many and great qualifications, for "nothing? Is the power, the antechamber, the at- "tendants, the guards, no more than this? Is it for "theſe, that I have liſtened to ſo many diſſertations? "Theſe are nothing: and I had qualified myſelf as "for ſome encounter."

END *of the* FIRST BOOK.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

That courage is not inconsistent with caution.

§. 1 WHAT is asserted by the philosophers may, perhaps, appear a paradox to some: let us, however, examine, as well as we can, whether this be true; that it is possible in all things, to act at once with caution and courage. For caution seems, in some measure, contrary to courage: and contrarieties are by no means consistent. The appearance of a paradox to many, in the present case, seems to me to arise from something like this: if, indeed, we assert, that courage and caution are to be used, in the same instances, we should justly be accused of uniting contradictions: but, in the way that we affirm it, where is the absurdity? For, if what hath been so often said, and so often demonstrated, be certain, that the essence of good and evil consists in the use of the appearances; and that things independent on choice, are not of the nature either of good or evil; what paradox do the philosophers assert, if they say: "Where "things are not dependent on choice, be courageous; "where they are, be cautious?" For in these only, if evil consists in a bad choice, is caution to be used. And if things independent on choice, and not in our power, are nothing to us, in these we are to make

uſe of courage. Thus we ſhall be at once cautious and courageous: and, indeed, courageous on the account of this very caution; for by uſing caution with regard to things really evil, we ſhall gain courage, with regard to what are not ſo.

§. 2. But we are in the ſame condition as [hunted] deer: when theſe, in a fright, fly from the feathers*, where do they turn, and to what do they retire for ſafety? To the toils. And thus they are undone, by inverting the objects of fear and confidence. Thus we, too. In what inſtances do we make uſe of fear? In things independent on choice. In what, on the other hand, do we behave with courage, as if there were nothing to be dreaded? In things dependent on choice. To be deceived then, or to act raſhly or impudently, or to indulge an ignominious deſire, is of no importance to us, if we do but take a good aim, in things independent on choice. But where death, or exile, or pain, or ignominy, are concerned, there is the retreat, there, the flutter and fright. Hence, as it muſt be with thoſe who err in matters of the greateſt importance, what is naturally courage, we render bold, deſperate, raſh, and impudent: and what is naturally caution, timid and baſe, and full of fears and perturbations. For if a perſon was to transfer caution to choice, and the actions of choice, by a willingneſs to be cautious, he will, at the ſame time, have it in his power to avoid [what he guards againſt:] but if he transfers it to things not in our power, or choice, by fixing his averſion on what is not in our own power,

* This was a kind of ſcare-crow, formed of different coloured feathers, by which the animal was terrified, and ſo driven into the net: which was the ancient manner of hunting.

but dependent on others, he will neceſſarily fear; he will be hurried; will be diſturbed. For it is not death, or pain, that is to be feared; but the *fear* of pain, or death. Hence we commend him who ſays:

Death is no ill, but ſhamefully *to die.*

Courage, then, ought to be oppoſed to death, and caution to the fear of death: whereas *we*, on the contrary, oppoſe to death, flight; and to our principle concerning it, careleſſneſs, and deſperateneſs, and indifference.

§. 3. Socrates uſed, very properly, to call theſe things vizards: for, as maſks appear ſhocking and formidable to children, from their inexperience; we are affected in like manner, with regard to things, for no other reaſon, than as children are, with regard to vizards. For what is a child? Ignorance. What is a child? Want of learning: for, ſo far as the knowlege of children extends, they are not inferior to us. What is death? A vizard. Turn it, be convinced. See, it doth not bite. This little body and ſpirit muſt be ſeparated (as they formerly were) either now, or hereafter: why, then, are you diſpleaſed if it be now? For if not *now*, it will be hereafter. Why? To complete the revolution of the world: for that hath need of ſome things preſent, others to come, and others already completed. What is pain, a vizard. Turn it, and be convinced.

This paultry fleſh is ſometimes affected by harſh, ſometimes by ſmooth impreſſions. If ſuffering be not worth your while, the door is open; if it be,

bear it: for it was fit the door ſhould be open, againſt all accidents. And thus we have no trouble.

§. 5. What, then, is the fruit of theſe principles? What it ought to be; the moſt noble, and the moſt becoming the truly educated, tranquillity, ſecurity, freedom. For in this caſe, we are not to give credit to the many, who ſay, that none ought to be educated but the free; but rather to the philoſophers, who ſay, that the well-educated alone are free.

How ſo?

Thus: is freedom any thing elſe, than the power of living as we like?

Nothing elſe.

Well: tell me then, do you like to live in error?

We do not. No one, ſure, that lives in error, is free.

Do you like to live in fear? Do you like to live in ſorrow? do you like to live in perturbation?

By no means.

No one, therefor, in a ſtate of fear, or ſorrow, or perturbation, is free: but whoever is delivered from ſorrow, fear, and perturbation, by the ſame means, is delivered likewiſe from ſlavery. How ſhall we believe you, then, good legiſlators, when you ſay; "We allow none to be educated, but the "free?" For the philoſophers ſay; we allow none "to be free, but the liberally-educated:" that is, God doth not allow it.

What, then, when any perſon hath turned his ſlave about before the conſul, hath he done nothing?

Yes, he hath.

What?

He hath turned his ſlave about, before the conſul.

Nothing more?

Yes, he pays a fine for him.

Well then: is not the man, who hath gone thro' this ceremony, rendered free?

No more than [he is rendered] exempt from perturbation. Pray, have you, who are able to give this freedom to others, no maſter of your own? Are not you a ſlave to money? to a girl? to a boy? to a tyrant? to ſome friend of a tyrant? Elſe, why do you tremble when *any* of theſe is in queſtion? Therefor, I ſo often repeat to you, let this be your ſtudy; have this always at hand; in what it is neceſſary to be courageous, and in what cautious: courageous, in what doth not depend on choice; cautious, in what doth.

§. 5. But have not I read my papers to you? Do not you know what I am doing?

In what?

In my eſſays.

Show me in what ſtate you are, as to deſire and averſion. Whether you do not fail of what you wiſh, and incur what you would avoid: but, as to theſe common-place eſſays, if you are wiſe, you will take them, and obliterate them.

Why, did not Socrates write?

Yes: who ſo much? But how? As he had not always one at hand, to argue againſt his principles, or to be argued againſt in his turn, he argued with and examined, himſelf; and always treated, at leaſt, ſome one natural notion, in a manner fitted for the uſe of life. Theſe are the things which a philoſopher writes: but for ſuch common-place eſſays as thoſe I am ſpeaking of, he leaves to the inſenſible, or to the happy creatures whom idleneſs furniſhes with

leiſure; or to ſuch as are too weak to regard conſequences. And will you, when you are gone from hence, which the time now calls for, be fond of ſhowing, and reading, and be ridiculouſly conceited, of theſe things?

Pray ſee, how I compoſe dialogues.

Talk not of that, man; but rather be able to ſay; ſee, how I avoid being diſappointed of my deſire: ſee, how I ſecure myſelf againſt incurring my averſion. Set death before me; ſet pain, ſet a priſon, ſet ignominy, ſet condemnation before me; and you will know me. This is the [proper] oſtentation of a young man come out from the ſchools. Leave the reſt to others. Let no one ever hear you utter a word about them: nor ſuffer it, if any one commends you for them: but think you are nobody, and that you have nothing. Appear to know only this, how you may never be diſappointed of your deſire; never incur your averſion. Let others ſtudy cauſes, problems, ſyllogiſms. Do *you* ſtudy death, chains, torture, exile: and all theſe, with courage, and reliance upon him who hath called you to them, and judged you worthy a poſt, in which you may ſhow, what the rational governing faculty can do, when ſet in array, againſt powers independent on choice. And thus, this paradox becomes neither impoſſible, nor a paradox, that we muſt be at once cautious and courageous: courageous, in what doth not depend upon choice; and cautious, in what doth.

CHAP. II.

Of Tranquillity.

CONSIDER, you who are going to take your trial, what you wiſh to preſerve, and in what to ſucceed. For if you wiſh to preſerve a choice conformable to nature, you are intirely ſafe: every thing goes well; you have no trouble on your hands. While you wiſh to preſerve what is in your own power, and which is naturally free, and are contented with that, whom have you longer to care for? For who is the maſter of things like theſe? who can take them away? If you wiſh to be a man of honour and fidelity, who ſhall prevent you? If you wiſh not to be reſtrained, or compelled, who ſhall compel you to deſires, contrary to your principles; to averſions, contrary to your opinion? The judge, perhaps, will paſs a ſentence againſt you, which he thinks formidable: but how can he likewiſe make you receive it with averſion? Since, then, deſire and averſion are in your own power, what have you elſe to care for? Let this be your introduction; this your narration; this your proof; this your victory; this your concluſion; and this your applauſe. Thus Socrates, to one who put him in mind to prepare himſelf for his trial; "Do not you think, ſays he, that I have been preparing myſelf for this very "thing my whole life?"—By what kind of preparation?—"I have preſerved what is in my own "power."—What do you mean?—"I have done "nothing unjuſt, either in public, or in private life."

§. 2. But if you wiſh to preſerve externals too: your paultry body, your eſtate, or dignity; I adviſe you immediately to prepare yourſelf by every poſſible preparation; and beſides, conſider the diſpoſition of your judge, and of your adverſary. If it be neceſſary to fall down at his feet; fall down at his feet: if to weep, weep: if to groan; groan. For when you have ſubjected what is in your own power to externals, ſubmit to ſlavery at once, and do not ſtruggle; and at one time, be willing to be a ſlave, and at another, not willing: but ſimply, and with your whole intention, be one or the other; free, or a ſlave; well educated, or not; a game cock, or a craven: either bear to be beat till you die, or give out at once; and do not be ſoundly beat firſt, and then give out at laſt. If both theſe be ſhameful, make the diſtinction immediately.

§. 3. Where is the nature of good and evil? Where truth likewiſe is. Where truth and where nature are, there is caution: where truth and where nature are not, there is courage. Why, do you think, that if Socrates had wiſhed to preſerve externals, that he would have ſaid, when he appeared at his trial, "Anytus and Melitus may indeed kill; "but hurt me they cannot?" Was he ſo fooliſh, as not to ſee that this way doth not lead to the end, but the contrary? What, then, is the reaſon, that he not only diſregards, but provokes his judges? Thus, my friend Heraclitus, in a trifling ſuit, about a little eſtate at Rhodes, after having proved to the judges, that his cauſe was good, when he came to the concluſion of his ſpeech; "I will not intreat "you, ſays he; nor care what judgment you give: "for it is rather *you* who are to be judged than *I*."

And thus he loſt his ſuit. What need was there of this? Be content not to intreat; do not *tell* them too, that you will not intreat; unleſs it be a proper time to provoke the judges deſignedly; as in the caſe of Socrates. But if you too are preparing for ſuch a ſpeech, what do you wait for? Why do you ſubmit to be tried? For if you wiſh to be hanged, have patience and the gibbet will come. But if you chuſe rather to ſubmit, and make your defence as well as you can, all the reſt is to be ordered accordingly; with a due regard, however, to the preſervation of your own character.

§. 4. For this reaſon it is ridiculous too to ſay "Suggeſt to me what is to be done." How ſhould I know what to ſuggeſt to you? [You ſhould rather ſay] inform my underſtanding to accommodate itſelf to whatever may be the event. The former is juſt as if an illiterate perſon ſhould ſay, "Tell me what "to write, when any name is propoſed to me;" and I direct him to write Dion; and then another comes, and propoſes to him the name not of Dion, but of Theon; what will be the conſequence? What will he write? Whereas, if you had made writing your ſtudy, you would be ready prepared for whatever word might occur: if not, how can I ſuggeſt to you? For, if the circumſtances of the affair ſhould ſuggeſt ſomething elſe, what will you ſay, or how will you act? Remember, then, the general rule, and you will need no ſuggeſtion: but if you gape after externals, you will neceſſarily be toſſed up and down, according to the inclination of your maſter.

And who is my maſter?

He, in whoſe power is placed whatever you ſtrive to acquire, or would avoid.

CHAP. III.

Concerning ſuch as recommend perſons to the philoſophers.

§. 1. DIOGENES rightly anſwered one, who deſired letters of recommendation from him, "At firſt ſight he will know you to be a man; "and whether you are a good or a bad man, if he "hath any ſkill in diſtinguiſhing, he will know like-"wiſe; and, if he hath not, he will never know "it, though I ſhould write a thouſand times." Juſt as if you were a piece of coin, and ſhould deſire to be recommended as good, in order to be tried: if it be to an aſſayer, he will know your value; for you will recommend yourſelf.

§. 2. We ought, therefor, in life alſo, to have ſomething analagous to this ſkill in gold; that one may be able to ſay, like the aſſayer; bring me whatever piece you will, and I will find out its value: or, as I would ſay with regard to ſyllogiſms, bring me whomever you will, and I will diſtinguiſh for you, whether he knows how to form ſyllogiſms, or not. Why? becauſe I can form ſyllogiſms myſelf, and have that faculty, which is neceſſary for one who knows how to find out perſons ſkilled in the ſolution of ſyllogiſms. But how do I act in life? I at ſometimes call a thing good; at others, bad. What is the cauſe of this? The contrary to what happens in ſyllogiſms; ignorance, and inexperience.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning a perſon, who had been guilty of adultery.

§. 1. AS he was ſaying, that man is made for fidelity; and that whoever ſubverts this, ſubverts the peculiar property of man; one of thoſe who paſs for men of literature happened to come in, who had been found guilty of adultery, in that city. But, continues Epictetus, if, laying aſide that fidelity for which we were born, we form deſigns againſt the wife of our neighbour, what do we do? What elſe but deſtroy and ruin—What? Fidelity, honour, and ſanctity of manners.——Only theſe? And do not we ruin neighbourhood? Friendſhip? Our country? In what rank do we place ourſelves? How am I to conſider you, Sir? As a neighbour? A friend? What ſort of one? As a citizen? How ſhall I truſt you? Indeed, if you were ſome ſorry veſſel, ſo noiſome that no uſe could be made of you; you might be thrown on a dunghil, and no mortal would take the trouble to pick you up: but if, being a *man*, you cannot fill any one place in human ſociety, what ſhall we do with you? For, ſuppoſe you cannot hold the place of a friend, can you hold even that of a ſlave? And who will truſt you? Why, then, ſhould not you alſo be contented to be thrown upon ſome dunghill, as a uſeleſs veſſel, and indeed as mere dung? Will you ſay, after this, hath no one any regard for *me*, a man of letters? Why, you are wicked, and fit for no uſe. Juſt as if waſps ſhould take it ill that no one hath any re-

gard for them; but all ſhun, and whoever can, beats them down. You have ſuch a ſting, that whoever you ſtrike with it, is thrown into troubles and pangs. What would you have us do with you? There is no-where to place you.

§. 2. What, then, are not women, by nature, common?

I admit it: and ſo is a pig at table common to all thoſe who are invited. But, after it is diſtributed, go, if you think proper, and ſnatch away the ſhare of him who ſits next you; or ſlily ſteal it, or ſtretch out your hand, and taſte; and, if you cannot tear away any of the meat, dip your fingers and lick them. A fine companion! A Socratic gueſt indeed! Again: is not the theatre common to all citizens? Therefor come, when all are ſeated, if you think proper, and turn any of them out of his place. Thus women are common by nature: but when the legiſlator, like the maſter of an entertainment, diſtributes them, will not you, like the reſt of the company, be contented with deſiring a ſhare for yourſelf; but muſt you pilfer, and taſte what belongs to another?

But I am a man of letters, and underſtand Archedemus.

With all your underſtanding of Archedemus, then, be an adulterer, and a rogue: and, inſtead of a man, a wolf, or an ape. For where is the difference?

CHAP. V.

How magnanimity may be conſiſtent with care.

§. 1. THE *materials* of action are indifferent; but the *uſe* of them is not indifferent. How, then, ſhall one preſerve intrepidity and tranquillity; and at the ſame time be careful, and neither raſh, nor indolent?

By imitating thoſe who play at tables. The dice are indifferent; the pieces are indifferent. How do I know what will fall out? But it is my buſineſs, to manage carefully and dextrouſly whatever doth fall out. Thus in life too, this is the chief buſineſs: diſtinguiſh, and ſeparate things; and ſay, "Exter-"nals are not in my power; choice is. Where "ſhall I ſeek good and evil? Within; in what is "my own." But in what belongs to others, call nothing good, or evil, or profit, or hurt, or any thing of that ſort.

§. 2. What, then, are we to treat theſe, in a careleſs way?

By no means: for this, on the other hand, is an evil exerciſe of the faculty of choice; and on that account, againſt nature. But we are to act with care, becauſe the *uſe* of the materials [of action] is not indifferent; and at the ſame time with intrepidity and tranquillity, becauſe the *materials* themſelves are indifferent. For where a thing is not indifferent, there no one can reſtrain or compel me. Where I am capable of being reſtrained, or compelled, the acquiſition doth not depend upon me;

nor is either good or evil. The *uſe* of it, indeed, is either good or evil; but that *doth* depend upon me. It is difficult, I own, to blend and unite [in one character] the carefulneſs of one who is affected by the materials of action, and the intrepidity of one who diſregards them; but it is not impoſſible: if it be, it is impoſſible to be happy. How do we act in a voyage? What is in my power? To chuſe the pilot, the ſailors, the day, the time of day. Afterwards comes a ſtorm. What have I to care for? My part is performed. The ſubject belongs to another, to the pilot. But the ſhip is ſinking: what then have I to do? That which alone I can do; I am drowned, without fear, without clamour, or accuſing God; but as one who knows, that what is born, muſt likewiſe die. For I am not eternity, but a man; a part of the whole, as an hour is of the day. I muſt come like an hour, and like an hour muſt paſs away. What ſignifies it whether by drowning, or by a fever? For, in ſome way or other, paſs I muſt.

§. 3. This you may ſee to be the practice of thoſe, who play ſkilfully at ball. No one contends for the ball [itſelf], as either a good or an evil; but how he may throw, and catch it again. Here lies the addreſs, here the art, the nimbleneſs, the ſagacity; that I may not be able to catch it, even if I hold up my lap for it; another may catch it, whenever I throw it. But if we catch or throw it, with fear or perturbation, what kind of play will this be? How ſhall we keep ourſelves ſteady; or how ſee the order of the game? One will ſay, throw: another, do not throw: a third, you have thrown once already. This is a mere quarrel; not

a play. Therefor Socrates well underſtood playing at ball.

What do you mean?

Uſing pleaſantry at his trial. "Tell me, ſays he, "Anytus, how can you ſay, that I do not believe "a God? What do you think Demons are? Are "they not either the offſpring of the Gods, or com- "pounded of Gods and men?"——"Yes."—— "Do you think, then, that one can believe there "are mules, and not believe, that there are aſſes?" This was juſt as if he had been playing at ball. And what was the ball he had to play with? Life, chains, exile, a draught of poiſon, ſeparation from a wife, and the deſertion of orphan children. Theſe were what he had to play with; and yet, nevertheleſs, he did play, and threw the ball with addreſs. Thus we ſhould be careful how we play; but indifferent, as to the ball itſelf. We are by all means to manage external materials with art; not taking them for ourſelves; but ſhowing our art about them, whatever they may happen to be. Thus a weaver doth not make the wool: but employs his art upon what is given him. It is another who gives you food, and a property: and may take them away, and your paultry body too. Do you, however, work upon the materials you have received; and then, if you come off unhurt, others, no doubt, who meet you, will congratulate you on your eſcape. But he who hath a clearer inſight into ſuch things, if he ſees [indeed] you have behaved in a becoming manner, will praiſe and congratulate you: but, if you owe your eſcape to any unbecoming action, the contrary. For where there is a reaſonable cauſe o

rejoicing; there is likewiſe [a reaſonable cauſe] of congratulation.

§. 4. How, then, are ſome external things ſaid to be according to nature; others contrary to it?

When we are conſidered as unconnected individuals. I will allow it is natural for the foot, [for inſtance,] to be clean. But if you take it as a foot, and not as an unconnected individual thing, it will be fit that it ſhould walk in the dirt, and tread upon thorns; and ſometimes that it ſhould even be cut off, for the good of the whole: otherwiſe it is no longer a foot. We ſhould reaſon in ſome ſuch manner concerning ourſelves. What are you? A man. If then, indeed, you conſider yourſelf, as an unconnected individual, it is natural that you ſhould live to old age; be rich and healthy: but if you conſider yourſelf as a man, and as a part of the whole, it will be fit, on the account of the whole, that you ſhould at one time be ſick; at another, take a voyage, and be expoſed to danger: ſometimes be in want; and poſſibly it may happen, die before your time. Why, then, are you diſpleaſed? Do not you know, that elſe, as the other is no longer a foot, ſo you are no longer a man? For what is man? A part of a commonwealth; principally of that which conſiſts of Gods and men; and next, of that to which you immediately belong, which is a miniature of the univerſal city.

§. 5. What then, muſt I, at one time, be called to a trial; muſt another, at another time, be ſcorched by a fever; another be expoſed to the ſea; another die; and another be condemned?

Yes: for it is impoſſible, in ſuch a body, in ſuch a world, and among ſuch companions, but that ſome

or other of us muſt fall into ſuch circumſtances. Your buſineſs, when you come into them, is, to ſay what you ought, to order things as you can. Then ſays one, "I decide that you have acted unjuſtly." Much good may it do you; I have done *my* part. You are to look to it, whether you have done *yours*; for there is ſome danger of that too, let me tell you.

CHAP. VI.

Of Indifference.

§. 1. A Hypothetical propoſition is an indifferent thing; but the judgment concerning it, is not indifferent: but is either knowlege, or opinion, or miſtake. Thus life is indifferent, the *uſe* of it not indifferent. When you are told, therefor, that theſe things are indifferent, do not, upon that account, ever be careleſs; nor, when you are excited to carefulneſs, be abject, and ſtruck by the admiration of the materials of action. It is good to know your own qualifications and powers; that, where you are not qualified, you may be quiet, and not angry that others have the advantage of you, in ſuch things. For you too, [in your turn,] will think it reaſonable, that you ſhould have the advantage in the art of ſyllogiſms: and, if others ſhould be angry at it, you will tell them, by way of conſolation, "*I* have learned it, and *you* have not." Thus too, where-ever practice is neceſſary, do not pretend to what can be attained no other way; but leave the matter to thoſe who are practiſed in it, and do you

be contented with a compoſed firmneſs of mind. "Go, for inſtance, and pay your compliments to ſuch "a perſon." "How?" "Not meanly."——— "But I have been ſhut out; for I have not learned "to get in at the window: and, finding the door "ſhut, I muſt neceſſarily either go back, or get in "at the window." "But ſpeak to him too." "I "will ſpeak to him." "In what manner?" "Not "meanly." But you have not ſucceeded; for this was not *your* buſineſs, but *his*. Why do you claim what belongs to another? Always remember what is your own, and what is another's; and you will never be diſturbed.

§. 2. Hence Chryſippus rightly ſays; while conſequences are uncertain, I will keep to thoſe things which are beſt adapted to the attainment of what is conformable to nature: for God himſelf hath formed me to chuſe this. If I knew, that it was now deſtined for me to be ſick, I would even exert my purſuits towards it: for even the foot, if it had underſtanding, would exert itſelf to get into the dirt. For why are ears of corn produced, if it be not to ripen? and why do they ripen, if not to be reaped? For they are not ſeparate individuals. If they were capable of ſenſe, do you think they would wiſh never to be reaped: and we ought to know, that it would be a curſe upon man, not to die; like that of not ripening, and not being reaped. Since, then, it is neceſſary for us to be reaped, and we have, at the ſame time, underſtanding to know it, are we angry at it? This is only becauſe we neither know what we are, nor have ſtudied what belongs to man, as jockies do, what belongs to horſes. Yet Chryſantas, when he was about to ſtrike an enemy, on

hearing the trumpet ſound a retreat, drew back his hand: for he thought it more eligible to obey the command of his general, than his own inclination. But none of *us*, even when neceſſity calls, is ready and willing to obey it: but we ſuffer, whatever things we do ſuffer, weeping and groaning, and calling them our circumſtances. What circumſtances, man? For if you call what ſurrounds you, *circumſtances*, every thing is a *circumſtance*: but, if you apply this name to hardſhips, where is the hardſhip, that whatever is born muſt die. The inſtrument is either a ſword, or a wheel, or a ſea, or a tile, or a tyrant. And what doth it ſignify to you, by what way you deſcend to Hades? All are equal: but, if you would hear the truth, the ſhorteſt is that by which a tyrant ſends you. No tyrant was ever ſix months, in cutting any man's throat: but a fever is often a year [in killing.] All theſe things are mere ſound, and the pomp of empty names.

My life is in danger from Caeſar.

And am not *I* in danger, who dwell at Nicopolis, where there are ſo many earthquakes? And when you yourſelf croſs the Adriatic, what is then in danger? Is not your life?

Ay: but I am in danger with reſpect to opinion.

What, your own? How ſo? Can any one compel you to have any opinion, contrary to your own inclination?

But the opinions of others too.

And what danger is it of *yours*, if others have falſe opinions?

But I am in danger of being baniſhed.

What is it to be baniſhed? To be ſome-where elſe than at Rome.

Yes; but what if I ſhould be ſent to Gyaros?

If it be worth your while, you will go: if not, you have another place to go to; where he, who now ſends you to Gyaros, muſt go likewiſe, whether he will or not. Why, then, do you come to theſe, as to great trials? They are not equal to your qualifications. So that an ingenious young man would ſay, it was not worth while for this, to have read, and writ, ſo much, and to have ſat ſo long, liſtening to a good-for-nothing old fellow. Only remember, that diviſion, by which your *own*, and *not* your own, is diſtinguiſhed, and you will never claim what belongs to others. A tribunal, and a priſon, is, each of them, a place; one high, the other low: but choice is equal: and if you have a mind to keep it equal for both places, it may be kept. We ſhall then become imitators of Socrates, when, even in a priſon, we are able to write hymns of praiſe: but, as we now are, conſider whether we could bear, that even another ſhould ſay to us in a priſon, "Shall I "read you a hymn of praiſe?"——"Why do you "trouble me: do you know in what a ſad ſituation "I am?" "In ſuch circumſtances, am I able to hear "hymns?——"What circumſtances?"——"I am "going to die."——"And are all other men to be "immortal?

CHAP. VII.

Of Divination

§. 1. FROM an unſeaſonable regard to divination, we omit many duties. For what can the diviner ſee, beſides death, or danger, or ſickneſs, or, in ſhort, things of this kind? When it is neceſſary, then, to expoſe one's ſelf to danger for a friend, or even a duty to die for him, what occaſion have I of divination? Have not I a diviner within, who hath told me the eſſence of good and evil; and who explains to me the indications of both? What further need, then, have I of the entrails [of victims], or [the flight] of birds? Can I bear with the other diviner, when he ſays, "This is "for your intereſt?" For doth *he* know what is for my intereſt? Doth he know what good is? Hath he learned the indications of good and evil, as he hath thoſe of the victims? If ſo, he knows the indications likewiſe of fair and baſe, juſt and unjuſt. Do you tell me, Sir, what is indicated to me? Life or death; riches or poverty. But whether theſe things are for my intereſt, or not, I ſhall not enquire of *you*. "Why?" Becauſe you do not give your opinion about grammar [or any eſtabliſhed point of knowlege]; and do you give it here, in things about which we all take different ways, and diſpute with one another? Therefor the lady, who was going to ſend a month's proviſion to Gratilla, in her baniſhment, made a right anſwer to one, who told her Do-

mitian would ſeize it: I had rather, ſays ſhe, that he ſhould ſeize it, than I not ſend it.

§. 2. What, then, is it that leads us ſo often to divination? Cowardice; the dread of events. Hence we flatter the diviners. "Pray, Sir, ſhall I inherit "my father's eſtate?"——"Let us ſee; let us ſa- "crifice upon the occaſion."——"Nay, Sir, juſt "as fortune pleaſes." Then, if he ſays, "You "ſhall inherit it," we give him thanks, as if we received the inheritance from *him*. The conſequence of this is, that they play upon us.

§. 3. What, then, is to be done?

We ſhould come without previous deſire or averſion. As a traveller inquires the road of the perſon he meets, without any deſire for that which turns to the right hand, more than to the left: for he wiſhes for neither of theſe; but that only which leads him properly. Thus we ſhould come to God, as to a guide. Juſt as we make uſe of our eyes: not perſuading them to ſhow us one object rather than another; but receiving ſuch as they preſent to us. But now we hold the bird with fear and trembling: and, in our invocations to God, intreat him; "Lord "have mercy upon me: ſuffer me to come off ſafe." You, wretch! would you have any thing then, but what is beſt? And what is beſt, but what pleaſes God? Why do you, as far as in you lies, corrupt your judge, and ſeduce your adviſer?

CHAP. VIII.

Wherein conſiſts the eſſence of good.

§. 1. GOD is beneficial. Good is alſo beneficial. It ſhould ſeem, then, that where the eſſence of God is, there too is the eſſence of good. What then is the eſſence of God? Fleſh? ——By no means. An eſtate?——Fame?—— By no means. Intelligence? Knowlege? Right reaſon? Certainly. Here then, without more ado, ſeek the eſſence of good. For, do you ſeek it in a plant?——No.——Or in a brute? No.—— If then you ſeek it only in a rational ſubject, why do you ſeek it any where but in what is diſtinct from irrationals? Plants have not the uſe of the appearances of things; and therefor you do not apply the term *good* to them.——*Good*, then, requires the uſe of theſe appearances. And nothing elſe? If ſo, you may ſay, that good, and happineſs, and unhappineſs, belong to mere animals. But this you do not ſay; and you are right: for, how much ſoever they have the uſe of the appearances of things, they have not the faculty of underſtanding that uſe; and with good reaſon: for they are made to be ſubſervient to others, and not principals themſelves. Why was an aſs made? Was it as a principal? No: but becauſe we had need of a back able to carry burdens. We had need too that he ſhould walk; therefor he had the uſe of the appearances of things added; otherwiſe he would not have walked. But here his endowments end: for, if an underſtanding of that

uſe had been likewiſe added, he would not, in reaſon, been ſubject to us, nor have done us theſe ſervices; but would have been like, and equal to ourſelves. Why will you not, therefor, ſeek the eſſence of good in that, without which, you will not ſay, there can be good in any thing?

§. 2. What then? Are not theſe likewiſe the works of the Gods? They are: but not principals, nor parts of the Gods. But you are a principal. You are a diſtinct portion of the eſſence of God; and contain a certain part of him in yourſelf. Why then are you ignorant of your noble birth? Why do not you conſider, whence you came? why do not you remember, when you are eating, who you are who eat; and whom you feed? When you are in the company of women; when you are converſing; when you are diſputing; do not you know, that it is a God you feed; a God you exerciſe? You carry a God about with you, wretch, and know nothing of it. Do you ſuppoſe I mean ſome God without you of gold or ſilver? It is within yourſelf you carry him; and profane him, without being ſenſible of it, by impure thoughts, and unclean actions. If even the image of God were preſent, you would not dare to act as you do: and when God himſelf is within you, and hears and ſees all, are not you aſhamed to think and act thus; inſenſible of your own nature, and hateful to God?

§. 3. After all, why are we afraid, when we ſend a young man from the ſchool, into action, that he ſhould behave indecently, eat indecently, converſe indecently with women: that he ſhould either debaſe himſelf by a ſhabby dreſs, or clothe himſelf too finely? Doth not he know the God within him?

Doth not he know with whom he ſets out? Have we patience to hear him ſay, "I wiſh to have *you* "with me."

Have you not God? Do you ſeek any other, while you have *him?* Or will he tell you any other than theſe things? If you were a ſtatue of Phidias, either Jupiter or Minerva, you would remember both yourſelf and the artiſt; and, if you had any ſenſe, you would endeavour to do nothing unworthy of him who formed you, or of yourſelf: nor to appear in an unbecoming manner, to ſpectators. And are you now careleſs how you appear, becauſe you are the workmanſhip of Jupiter? And yet, what compariſon is there, either between the artiſts, or the things they have formed? What work of any [human] artiſt contains in itſelf, thoſe faculties which are ſhown, in forming it? Is it any thing but marble, or braſs, or gold, or ivory? And the Minerva of Phidias, when its hand is once extended, and a *victory* placed in it, remains in the attitude, for ever. But the works of God are indued with motion, breath, the uſe of the appearances of things, judgment. Being, then, the formation of ſuch an artiſt, will you diſhonour him; eſpecially, when he hath not only formed, but intruſted, and given the guardianſhip of you, to yourſelf? Will you not only be forgetful of this, but, moreover, diſhonour the truſt? If God had committed ſome orphan to your charge, would you have been thus careleſs of him? He hath delivered yourſelf to your care; and ſays, "I had no one fitter to be truſted than you: "preſerve this perſon for me, ſuch as he is by nature; modeſt, faithful, ſublime, unterrified, diſpaſ-

" ſionate, tranquil:" And will you not preſerve him?

§. 4. But it will be ſaid; " Whence this ſuper-
" cilious look, and gravity of face?" [in our young philoſopher]——" I have not yet ſo much gra-
" vity, as the caſe deſerves. I do not yet truſt to
" what I have learned, and aſſented to. I ſtill fear
" my own weakneſs. Let me but take courage a
" little, and then you ſhall ſee ſuch a look, and
" ſuch an appearance, as I ought to have. Then
" I will ſhow you the ſtatue, when it is finiſhed,
" when it is poliſhed. Do you think I will ſhow
" you a ſupercilious countenance? Heaven forbid!
" for Olympian Jupiter doth not lift up his brow;
" but keeps a ſteady countenance, as becomes him
" who is about to ſay,

——————*Th' immutable decree*
No force can ſhake: what is, that ought to be.

POPE.

" Such will I ſhow myſelf to you: faithful, mo-
" deſt, noble, tranquil."——" What, and immor-
" tal too, and exempt from age and ſickneſs?" No. But ſickening and dying as becomes a God. This is in my power; this I can do. The other is not in my power, nor can I do. Shall I ſhow you the nerves of a philoſopher?

" What nerves are thoſe?"

A deſire undiſappointed; an averſion unincurred; purſuits duly exerted; a careful reſolution; and an unerring aſſent. Theſe you ſhall ſee.

CHAP. IX.

That when we are unable to fulfil what the character of a man promiſes, we aſſume that of a philoſopher.

§. 1. IT is no common attainment, merely to fulfil what the nature of man promiſes. For what is man?

A rational and mortal being.

Well: from what are we diſtinguiſhed by reaſon?

From wild beaſts.

From what elſe?

From ſheep, and the like.

Take care, then, to do nothing like a wild beaſt; otherwiſe, you have deſtroyed the man; you have not fulfilled what your nature promiſes. Take care too, to do nothing like cattle: for thus likewiſe the man is deſtroyed.

In what do we act like cattle?

When we act gluttonouſly, lewdly, raſhly, ſordidly, inconſiderately, into what are we ſunk?

Into cattle.

What have we deſtroyed?

The rational being.

When we behave contentiouſly, injuriouſly, paſſionately, and violently, into what are we ſunk?

Into wild beaſts.

§. 2. And farther; ſome of us are wild beaſts of a larger ſize: others, little miſchievous vermin; whence there is room to ſay, let me rather be eat by a lion. By all theſe means, is deſtroyed what the

nature of man promiſes. For, when is a conjunctive propoſition preſerved?

When it fulfils what its nature promiſes.

So that the preſervation of ſuch a propoſition conſiſts in this; that its ſeveral parts are a conjunction of truths.

When is a disjunctive propoſition preſerved?

When it fulfils what its nature promiſes.

When is a flute, a harp, a horſe, or a dog, preſerved?

When each fulfils what its nature promiſes.

Where is the wonder then, that man ſhould be preſerved, and deſtroyed, in the ſame manner? All are preſerved and improved by operations correſpondent [to their ſeveral faculties]; as a carpenter, by building; a grammarian, by grammar: but if he accuſtom himſelf to write ungrammatically, his art will neceſſarily be ſpoiled and deſtroyed. Thus modeſt actions preſerve the modeſt man, and immodeſt ones deſtroy him; faithful actions, the faithful man; and the contrary deſtroy him. On the other hand, contrary actions heighten contrary characters. Thus impudence, an impudent one; knavery, a knaviſh one; ſlander, a ſlanderous one; anger, an angry one; and unequitable dealings, a covetous one.

§. 3. For this reaſon, philoſophers adviſe us, not to be contented with mere learning; but to add meditation likewiſe, and then practice. For we have been long accuſtomed to contrary actions, and have practiſed upon wrong opinions. If therefor, we do not likewiſe habituate ourſelves to practiſe upon right opinions, we ſhall be nothing more than expoſitors of the principles of others. For who among us is not already able to diſcourſe, according to the rules

of art, upon good and evil? *That ſome things are good, ſome evil, and others indifferent: the good, virtue, and whatever partakes of virtue; the evil, the contrary; and the indifferent, riches, health, reputation:* and then, if, while we are ſaying all this, there ſhould happen more-than-ordinary noiſe, or one of the by-ſtanders ſhould laugh at us, we are diſconcerted. Philoſopher, what is become of what you were ſaying? Whence did it proceed? Merely from your lips? Why, then, do you pollute the aids which others have provided? Why do you trifle on the moſt important ſubjects? It is one thing to hoard up proviſion in a ſtore-houſe, and another to eat it. What is eaten is concocted, digeſted, and becomes nerves, fleſh, bones, blood, colour, breath. Whatever is hoarded up is ready indeed, whenever you have a mind to ſhow it; but of no farther uſe to you than the mere notion, that you have it. For what difference is there, whether you explain *theſe* doctrines, or thoſe of perſons of oppoſite principles? Sit down now, and comment, according to the rules of art, upon the principles of Epicurus: and perhaps you may comment more practically than he could have done himſelf. Why then do you call yourſelf a Stoic? Why do you act a Jew, when you are a Greek? Do not you ſee on what terms each is called a Jew, a Syrian, an Egyptian? And when we ſee any one wavering, we are wont to ſay, this is not a Jew; but acts one. But, when he aſſumes the ſentiments of one who hath been baptized and circumciſed, then he both really is, and is called, a Jew. Thus we, falſifying our profeſſion are Jews in name, but in reality ſomething elſe. Our ſentiments are inconſiſtent with our diſcourſe; far from practiſing

what we teach, and what we pride ourſelves in the knowlege of. Thus, while we are unable to fulfil what the character of a man promiſes, we aſſume, beſides, ſo vaſt a weight as that of a philoſopher. As if a perſon, incapable of lifting ten pounds, ſhould endeavour to heave the ſame ſtone with Ajax.

CHAP. X.

How we may inveſtigate the duties of life from the names whereof we bear.

§. 1. EXAMINE who you are. In the firſt place, a man, that is, one who hath nothing ſuperior to the faculty of choice; but all things ſubject to this; and this itſelf uninſlaved, and unſubjected, to any thing. Conſider then, from what you are diſtinguiſhed by reaſon. You are diſtinguiſhed from wild beaſts: you are diſtinguiſhed from cattle. Beſides: you are a citizen of the world, and a part of it: not a ſubſervient, but a principal, part. You are capable of comprehending the divine oeconomy; and of conſidering the connexions of things. What then doth the character of a citizen promiſe? To hold no private intereſt; to deliberate of nothing as a ſeparate individual, but like the hand or the foot; which, if they had reaſon, and comprehended the conſtitution of nature, would never purſue, or deſire, but with a reference to the whole. Hence the philoſophers rightly ſay, that, if a wiſe and good man could foreſee what was to happen, he would help forward ſickneſs, and death, and mutilation, to himſelf; being ſenſible, that theſe things are appoint-

ed from the order of the univerſe; and that the whole is ſuperior to a part, and the city to the citizen. But, ſince we do not foreknow what is to happen, it becomes our duty to adhere to what is more naturally adapted to our option: for, amongſt other things, we were born for this.

§. 2. Remember next, that you are a ſon: and what doth this character promiſe? To eſteem every thing that is his, as belonging to his father: in every inſtance to obey him: not to revile him to another: not to ſay or do any thing injurious to him: to give way and yield in every thing; co-operating with him to the utmoſt of his power.

§. 3. After this, know likewiſe, that you are a brother: and that to this character it belongs, to make conceſſions; to be eaſily perſuaded; to uſe gentle language: never to claim, for yourſelf, any of the things independent on choice; but chearfully to give theſe, that you may have the larger ſhare of what is dependent on it. For conſider what it is, inſtead of a lettuce, for inſtance, or a chair, to procure for yourſelf a good temper? How great an advantage gained!

§. 4. If, beſides this, you are a ſenator of any city, conſider yourſelf as a ſenator: if a youth, as a youth: if an old man, as an old man. For each of theſe names, if it comes to be conſidered, always points out the proper duties. But, if you go and revile your brother, I tell you, you have forgot who you are, and what is your name. For even if you were a ſmith, and made an ill uſe of the hammer, you would have forgot the ſmith: and, if you have forgot the brother, and are become, inſtead of a brother, an enemy, do you imagine you

have made no change of one thing for another, in that caſe? If, inſtead of a man, a gentle, ſocial creature, you are become a wild beaſt, miſchievous, inſidious, biting; have you loſt nothing? But muſt you loſe money, in order to ſuffer damage; and is there no other thing, the loſs of which endamages a man? If you were to part with your ſkill in grammar, or in muſic, would you think the loſs of theſe a damage? And, if you part with honour, decency, and gentleneſs, do you think *that* no matter? Yet the firſt are loſt by ſome cauſe external, and independent on choice; but the laſt, by our own fault. There is no ſhame either in not having, or in loſing the one; but either not to have, or to loſe, the other, is equally ſhameful, and reproachful, and unhappy. What doth the pathic loſe? The man. What doth the ſmooth effeminate fellow loſe? Many other things; but however the man alſo. What doth an adulterer loſe? The modeſt, the chaſte character; the neighbour. What doth an angry perſon loſe? Something elſe. A coward? Something elſe. No one is wicked without ſome loſs, or damage. Now, if, after all, you have made the loſs of money the only damage, all theſe [wretches] are unhurt and undamaged. Nay, it may be, even gainers; as, by ſuch practices, their money may poſſibly be increaſed. But conſider: if you refer any thing to *money*, the man who loſes his noſe is not hurt. Yes, ſay you; he is maimed in his body. Well: but doth he who loſes his ſmell itſelf, loſe nothing? Is there, then, no faculty of the ſoul, which he who poſſeſſes it is the better for; and he who parts with it, the worſe?

What ſort do you mean?

Have we not a natural ſenſe of honour?

We have.

Doth he, who loſes this, ſuffer no damage? Is he deprived of nothing? Doth he part with nothing that belongs to him? Have we no natural fidelity? no natural affection? No natural diſpoſition to mutual uſefulneſs, to mutual forbearance? Is he, then, who careleſsly ſuffers himſelf to be damaged in theſe reſpects, unhurt and undamaged?

§. 5. What, then, ſhall nôt I hurt him, who hath hurt me?

Conſider firſt what *hurt* is; and remember what you have heard from the philoſophers. For, if both good and evil conſiſt in choice, ſee whether what you ſay, doth not amount to this: "Since he hath "hurt himſelf, by injuring me; ſhall not I hurt "myſelf by injuring him?" Why do we not make ſome ſuch repreſentation to ourſelves, as this? Are we hurt, when any detriment happens to our bodily poſſeſſions; and are we not at all hurt, when any happens to our faculty of choice? He who is deceived, or hath done an injury, hath no pain in his head, nor loſes an eye, a leg, or an eſtate: and we wiſh for nothing beyond theſe. Whether we have a modeſt and faithful, or a ſhameleſs and unfaithful, will and choice, we make not the ſmalleſt difference; except only in the ſchools, as far as a few words go. Therefor all the improvement we make, reaches only to words; and beyond them is abſolutely nothing.

CHAP. XI.

What the beginning of philoſophy is.

§. 1. THE beginning of philoſophy, at leaſt to ſuch as enter upon it in a proper way, and by the door, is a conſciouſneſs of our own weakneſs, and inability, in neceſſary things. For we came into the world without any natural idea of a right-angled triangle; of a dieſis, or a hemitone, in muſic: but we learn each of theſe things by ſome inſtruction of art. Hence, they who do not underſtand them, do not form any conceit of underſtanding them. But who ever came into the world, without an innate idea of good and evil; fair and baſe; becoming and unbecoming; happineſs and miſery; proper and improper; what ought to be done, and what not to be done? Hence we all make uſe of the names, and endeavour to apply our preconceptions to particular caſes. "Such a one hath "acted well; not well: right; not right: is un-"happy; is happy: is juſt; is unjuſt." Who of us refrains from theſe names? Who defers the uſe of them, till he had learnt it; as thoſe do, who are ignorant of lines and ſounds? The reaſon of this is, that we come inſtructed, in ſome degree, by nature upon theſe ſubjects; and from this beginning, we go on to add ſelf-conceit. "For why, ſay you, "ſhould I not know what fair and baſe is? Have "not I the idea of it?" You have. "Do not I "apply this idea to particulars?" You do. "Do "not I apply it right, then?" Here lies the whole

queſtion; and here ariſes the ſelf-conceit. For, beginning from theſe acknowleged points, men proceed to what is in diſpute, by means of their unſuitable application. For, if they poſſeſt a right method of application, what would reſtrain them from being perfect? Now, ſince you think, that you make a ſuitable application, of your pre-conceptions, to particular caſes, tell me whence you derive this.

From its ſeeming ſo to me.

But it doth not ſeem ſo to another: and doth not he too form a conceit, that he makes a right application?

He doth.

Is it poſſible, then, that each of you ſhould apply your pre-conceptions right, on the very ſubjects about which you have contradictory opinions?

It is not.

Have you any thing to ſhow us, then, for this application, preferable to its *ſeeming* ſo to you? And doth a madman act any otherwiſe than ſeems to him, right? Is this then a ſufficient criterion to him too?

It is not.

Come therefor, to ſomething preferable to what *ſeems*.

What is that?

§. 2. The beginning of philoſophy is this: the being ſenſible of the diſagreement of men with each other: an inquiry into the cauſe of this diſagreement; and a diſapprobation, and diſtruſt of what merely *ſeems*: a certain examination into what ſeems, whether it ſeem rightly: and an invention of ſome rule, like a balance, for the determination of weights: like a ſquare, for ſtrait and crooked.

Is this the beginning of philoſophy, that all things, which ſeem right to all perſons, are ſo?

Why; is it poſſible, that contradictions can be right?

Well then, not all things; but all that ſeem ſo to *us*.

And why more to *you*, than to the Syrians, or Egyptians? than to me, or to any other man?

Not at all more.

§. 3. Therefore [merely] what *ſeems* to each man, is not ſufficient to determine the reality of a thing. For even in weights or meaſures we are not ſatisfied with the bare appearance: but for every thing we find ſome rule. And is there, in the preſent caſe then, no rule, preferable to what *ſeems*? Is it poſſible, that what is of the greateſt neceſſity in human life, ſhould be left incapable of determination and diſcovery?

There is, then, ſome rule.

And why do we not ſeek, and diſcover it: and, when we have diſcovered, make uſe of it, without fail, ever after, ſo as not even to move a finger, without it. For this, I conceive, is what, when found, will cure thoſe of their madneſs, who make uſe of no other meaſure, but their own perverted way of thinking. That afterwards, beginning from certain known and determinate points, we may make uſe of preconceptions, properly applied to particulars. What is the ſubject that falls under our inquiry?

Pleaſure.

Bring it to the rule. Throw it into the ſcale. Muſt good be ſomething into which it is fit to confide? and to which we may truſt?

Yes.

Is it fit to truſt to any thing unſteady?

No.

Is pleaſure then, a ſteady thing?

No.

Take it, then, and throw it out of the ſcale, and drive it far diſtant from the place of good things. But, if you are not quick-ſighted, and one balance is inſufficient, bring another. Is it fit to be elated by good?

Yes.

Is it fit, then, to be elated by a preſent pleaſure? See that you do not ſay it; otherwiſe I ſhall not think you ſo much as worthy to uſe a ſcale. Thus are things judged, and weighed, when we have the rules ready. This is the part of philoſophy, to examine, and fix the rules: and to make uſe of them, when they are known, is the buſineſs of a wiſe and good man.

CHAP. XII.

Of Diſputation.

§. 1. WHAT things are to be learned, in order to the right uſe of reaſon, the philoſophers of our ſect have accurately taught: but we are altogether unpractiſed in the due application of them. Only give any of us, that you pleaſe, ſome illiterate perſon, for an antagoniſt, and he will not find out, how we treat him. But when he hath a little moved the man, if he happens to anſwer beſide the purpoſe, he knows not how to deal with him

any further; but either reviles, or laughs at him, and ſays, "He is an illiterate fellow: there is no "making any thing of him." Yet a guide, when he perceives his charge going out of the way, doth not revile, and ridicule, and then leave him; but leads him into the right path. Do you alſo ſhow your antagoniſt the truth, and you will ſee, that he will follow. But till you do ſhow it, do not ridicule him; but rather be ſenſible of your own incapacity.

§. 2. How then, did Socrates uſe to act? He obliged his antagoniſt himſelf to bear teſtimony to him; and wanted no other witneſs. Hence he might well ſay, "I give up all the reſt; and am always "ſatisfied with the teſtimony of my opponent: and "I call in no one to vote, but my antagoniſt alone." For he rendered the arguments drawn from natural notions ſo clear, that every one ſaw, and avoided the contradiction.—"Doth an envious man rejoice?" ——"By no means. He rather grieves." (This he moved him to ſay, by propoſing the contrary.)— "Well: and do you think envy to be a grief, for "miſery?"——And who ever envied miſery?—— "(Therefor he makes the other ſay, that envy is a "grief, for happineſs.)——Doth any one envy "thoſe who are nothing to him?"——"No, "ſurely." Having thus drawn [from his opponent] a full and diſtinct idea, he then left that point; and doth not ſay, "Define to me what envy is: and after he had defined it; "You have defined it "wrong: for the definition doth not reciprocate to "the thing defined." Technical terms, and therefor grievous, and ſcarcely to be made intelligible to the illiterate, which yet *we*, it ſeems, cannot part

with. But we have no capacity at all to move them, by ſuch arguments, as might induce them, in following the tract of the appearances in their own minds, to allow, or diſprove, any point. And, from a conſciouſneſs of this incapacity, theſe among us, who have no modeſty, give the matter intirely up: but the greater part, raſhly entering upon theſe debates, mutually confound, and are confounded; and, at laſt, reviling, and reviled, walk off. Whereas it was the principal and moſt peculiar characteriſtic of Socrates, never to be provoked, in a diſpute; nor to throw out any reviling or injurious expreſſion: but to bear patiently with thoſe who reviled him; and to put an end to the controverſy. If you would know, how great abilities he had in this particular, read Xenophon's Banquet, and you will ſee, how many controverſies he ended. Hence, even among the poets, that perſon is juſtly mentioned with the higheſt commendation,

Whoſe lenient art attentive crowds await,
To ſtill the furious clamours of debate.

HESIOD.

But what then? This is no very ſafe affair now, and eſpecially at Rome. For he who doth it, muſt not do it in a corner: but go to ſome rich conſular ſenator, for inſtance, and queſtion him. "Pray, Sir, "can you tell me to whom you intruſt your horſ"es?——"Yes, certainly."——"Is it then, to "any one indifferently, though he be ignorant o"horſemanſhip?"——"By no means."——"To "whom do you intruſt your gold, or your ſilver "or your clothes?——"Not to any one indiffe

" rently."——" And did you ever conſider, to " whom you committed the care of your body?" ——" Yes, ſurely."——" To one ſkilled in exer- " ciſe, or medicine, I ſuppoſe."——" Without " doubt."——" Are theſe things your chief good; " or are you poſſeſſed of ſome thing better than all " of them?"——" What do you mean?"—— ——" Something which makes uſe of theſe; and " proves and deliberates about each of them?"—— " What then, do you mean the ſoul?"——" You " have gueſſed right; for indeed I do mean that." ——" I do really think it a much better poſſeſſion " than all the reſt."——" Can you ſhow us, then, " in what manner you have taken care of this ſoul? " For it is not probable, that a perſon of your wiſ- " dom, and approved character in the ſtate, ſhould " careleſly ſuffer the moſt excellent thing that be- " longs to you, to be neglected, and loſt."—— " No certainly."——" But do you take care of it " yourſelf? And is it by the inſtructions of another, " or by your own diſcovery [how it ought to be " done?]"——Here, now, comes the danger, that he may firſt ſay, pray, good Sir, what buſineſs is that of yours? What are you to me? Then, if you perſiſt to trouble him, he may lift up his hand, and give you a box on the ear. I myſelf was once a great admirer of this method of inſtruction, till I fell into ſuch kind of adventures.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Solicitude.

§. 1. WHEN I ſee any one ſolicitous, I ſay, what doth this man mean? Unleſs he wanted ſomething or other, not in his own power, how could he ſtill be ſolicitous? A muſician, for inſtance, feels no ſolicitude, while he is ſinging by himſelf: but when he appears on the ſtage he doth; even if his voice be ever ſo good, or he plays ever ſo well. For what he wants is not only to ſing well, but likewiſe to gain applauſe. But this is not, in his own power. In ſhort, where his ſkill lies, there is his courage. (Bring any ignorant perſon, and he doth not mind him.) But in the point which he neither underſtands, nor hath ſtudied, there he is ſolicitous.

What point is that?

He doth not underſtand what a multitude is; nor what the applauſe of a multitude. He hath learnt, indeed, how to ſtrike baſs and treble; but what the applauſe of the many is, and what force it hath in life, he neither underſtands, nor hath ſtudied. Hence he muſt neceſſarily tremble, and turn pale. I cannot, indeed, ſay that a man is no muſician, when I ſee him afraid; but I can ſay ſomething elſe; and that not one, but many things. And, firſt of all, I call him a ſtranger: and ſay, this man doth not know in what country he is: and though he hath lived here ſo long, he is ignorant of the laws and cuſtoms of the ſtate; and what is permitted, and what not:

nor hath he ever conſulted any lawyer, who might tell and explain to him the laws. Yet no man writes a will, without knowing how it ought to be written, or conſulting ſome one who doth know: nor doth he raſhly ſign a bond, or give ſecurity. But he uſes his deſire and averſion, exerts his purſuits, intentions, and reſolutions, without conſulting any lawyer about the matter.

How do you mean, without a *lawyer?*

He knows not, that he chuſes what is not allowed him; and doth not chuſe what is neceſſary: and he knows not what is his own, and what belongs to others: for if he did know, he would never be hindered; would never be reſtrained; would never be ſolicitous.

How ſo?

Why: doth any one fear things that are not evils?

No.

Doth any one fear things, that are evils indeed, but which is in his own power to prevent?

No, ſurely.

§. 2. If, then, the things independent on choice, are neither good nor evil: and all that do depend on choice, are in our own power, and can neither be taken away from us, or given to us, unleſs we pleaſe; what room is there left for ſolicitude? But we are ſolicitous about this paultry body, or eſtate, of ours; or about the determination of Caeſar; and not at all about any thing internal. Are we ever ſolicitous not to take up a falſe opinion? No: for this is in our own power. Or not to exert our purſuits, contrary to nature? No: nor this neither. When, therefor, you ſee any one pale with ſolici-

tude, as the phyſician pronounces from the complexion, that ſuch a patient is diſordered in the ſpleen, another in the liver; ſo do you likewiſe ſay, this man is diſordered in his deſires and averſions: he cannot walk ſteady; he is in a fermentation. For nothing elſe changes the complexion, or cauſes a trembling, or ſets the teeth a chattering.

No force, no firmneſs, the pale coward ſhows;
He ſhifts his place; his colour comes and goes.
Terror and death in his wild eye-balls ſtare;
With chatt'ring teeth he ſtands, and ſtiffen'd hair.
POPE'S Homer.

Therefor Zeno, when he was to meet Antigonus, felt no ſolicitude. For over what he admired, Antigonus had no power; and thoſe things of which he had the power, Zeno did not regard. But Antigonus felt a ſolicitude when he was to meet Zeno; and with reaſon: for he was deſirous to pleaſe him; and this was external. But Zeno was not deſirous to pleaſe Antigonus: for no one ſkilful in any art, is deſirous to pleaſe a perſon unſkilful.

I am deſirous [ſays one of his ſcholars] to pleaſe *you*.

For what? Do you know the rules, by which one man judges of another? Have you ſtudied to underſtand what a good, and what a bad man is; and how each becomes ſuch? Why then are not you yourſelf a good man;

On what account am I not?

Becauſe no good man laments, nor ſighs, nor groans; no good man turns pale, and trembles, and ſays, "How will ſuch a one receive me; how will

"ſuch a one receive me; how will he hear me?"
——As he thinks fit, wretch. Why do you trouble yourſelf about what belongs to others? Is it not *his* fault, if he receives you ill?

Yes, ſurely.

And can one perſon be in fault, and another the ſufferer?

No.

Why then are you ſolicitous, about what belongs to others?

Well: but I am ſolicitous how I ſhall ſpeak to him.

What then, cannot you ſpeak to him as you will?

But I am afraid I ſhall be diſconcerted.

If you were going to write the name of Dion, ſhould you be afraid of being diſconcerted.

By no means.

What is the reaſon? Is it not becauſe you have ſtudied how to write?

Yes.

And if you were going to read, would it not be exactly the ſame?

Exactly.

What is the reaſon?

Becauſe every art hath a certain aſſurance and confidence, in the ſubjects that belong to it.

Have you not ſtudied then, how to ſpeak? And what elſe did you ſtudy at ſchool?

Syllogiſms, and convertible propoſitions.

For what purpoſe? Was it not in order to talk properly? And what is that, but to talk ſeaſonably, and cautiouſly, and intelligibly, and without flutter and heſitation; and, in conſequence of all this, with courage?

Very true.

When, therefor, you go into the field on horſeback, are you ſolicitous about one, who is here now on foot? Solicitous in a point which you have ſtudied, and another hath not?

Ay, but the perſon [with whom I am to talk] hath power to kill me.

Then ſpeak the truth, pitiful wretch, and do not be arrogant; nor take the philoſopher upon you; nor conceal from yourſelf who are your maſters: but while you may thus be laid hold on by the body, follow every one who is ſtronger than you. Socrates, indeed, had ſtudied how to ſpeak, who talked in ſuch a manner to tyrants, and judges, and in a priſon. Diogenes had ſtudied how to ſpeak, who talked in ſuch a manner to Alexander, to Philip, to the pirates, to the perſon who bought him. This belonged to them who had ſtudied the point; who had courage. But do *you* walk off about your own affairs, and never ſtir from them. Retire into ſome corner, and there ſit and weave ſyllogiſms, and propoſe them to others. For there is not, in *you*, one able,

To rule the ſacred citadel within.

CHAP. XIV.

Concerning NASO.

§. 1. WHEN a certain Roman came to him with his ſon, and had heard one leſſon, this, ſaid Epictetus, is the method of teaching; and ſtopt. When the other deſired him to go on;

every art, anſwered he, is tedious, when it is delivered to a perſon ignorant and unſkilful in it. Indeed the things performed by the common arts, quickly diſcover the uſe for which they were made; and moſt of them have ſomething engaging and agreeable. Thus the trade of a ſhoemaker, if one would ſtand by, and endeavour to comprehend it, is an unpleaſant thing: but the ſhoe is uſeful; and beſides, not diſagreeable to ſee. The trade of a ſmith is extremely uneaſy to an ignorant perſon that chances to be preſent: but the work ſhows the uſefulneſs of the art. You will ſee this much more ſtrongly in muſic: for if you ſtand by, while a perſon is learning, it will appear to you of all ſciences the moſt unpleaſant: but the effects are agreeable and delightful, even to thoſe who do not underſtand it.

§. 2. Now here, we imagine it to be the work of one who ſtudies philoſophy, to adapt his will to whatever happens. So that none of the things which happen, may happen againſt our inclination; nor thoſe which do not happen, be wiſhed for by us. Hence they who have ſettled this point, have it in their power never to be diſappointed of their deſire, or incur their averſion; but to lead a life exempt from ſorrow, fear, and perturbation, in themſelves; and in ſociety, preſerving all the natural and adventitious relations of a ſon, a father, a brother, a citizen, a huſband, a wife, a neighbour, a fellow-traveller, a ruler, or a ſubject. Something like this, is what we imagine to be the work of a philoſopher. It remains to inquire, how it is to be effected. Now we ſee, that a carpenter, by learning certain things, becomes a carpenter; and a pilot, by learning cer-

tain things, becomes a pilot. Probably, then, it is not ſufficient, in the preſent caſe, merely to be willing to be wiſe and good; but it is moreover neceſſary that certain things ſhould be learned. What theſe things are, is the queſtion. The philoſophers ſay, that we are firſt to learn that there is a God; and that his providence directs the whole; and that it is impoſſible to conceal from him, not only our actions, but even our thoughts and emotions. We are next to learn, what the Gods are: for ſuch as they are found to be, ſuch muſt *he*, who would pleaſe and obey them, to the utmoſt of his power, endeavour to be. If the deity is faithful, *he* too muſt be faithful: if free, beneficent, and exalted, he muſt be free, beneficent and exalted, likewiſe; and, in all his words and actions, behave as an imitator of God.

§. 3. Whence, then, are we to begin?

If you will give me leave, I will tell you. It is neceſſary in the firſt place, that you ſhould underſtand words.

So then! I do not underſtand them now?

No. You do not.

How is it, then, that I uſe them?

Juſt as the illiterate do written expreſſions; and brutes, the appearances of things. For uſe is one thing, and underſtanding another. But if you think you underſtand them, bring whatever word you pleaſe, and let us ſee whether we underſtand it, or not.

Well: but it is a grievous thing for a man to be confuted who is grown old; and perhaps arrived, through a regular courſe of military ſervice, to the dignity of a ſenator.

I know it very well: for you now come to me, as if you wanted nothing. And how can it enter into your imagination, that there ſhould be any thing in which you are defective? You are rich; and perhaps have a wife and children, and a great number of domeſtics. Caeſar takes notice of you: you have many friends at Rome: you render to all their dues: you know how to requite a favour, and revenge an injury. In what are you deficient? Suppoſe then, I ſhould prove to you, that you are deficient, in what is moſt neceſſary and important to happineſs; and that hitherto you have taken care of every thing, rather than your duty; and, to complete all, that you underſtand neither what God or man, or good or evil means? That you are ignorant of all the reſt, perhaps, you may bear to be told: but if I prove to you, that you are ignorant even of *yourſelf*, how will you bear with me, and how will you have patience to ſtay and be convinced? Not at all. You will immediately be offended, and go away. And yet what injury have I done you; unleſs a looking-glaſs injures a perſon not handſome, when it ſhows him to himſelf, ſuch as he is? Or unleſs a phyſician can be thought to affront his patient, when he ſays to him; "Do you "think, Sir, that you ail nothing? You have a fe-"ver. Eat no meat to-day, and drink water." Nobody cries out here, "What an intolerable af-"front!" But, if you ſay to any one, your deſires are in a fermentation; your averſions are low; your intentions, contradictory; your purſuits, not conformable to nature; your opinions, raſh, and miſtaken; he preſently goes away, and complains, he is affronted.

§. 4. This is the nature of our proceedings. As in a crowded fair, the horſes and cattle are brought to be ſold, and the greateſt part of men come either to buy or ſell; but there are few, who come only to look at the fair, and inquire, how it is crrried on; and why in that manner; and who appointed it; and for what purpoſe. Thus, in the fair of the world, ſome, like cattle, trouble themſelves about nothing but fodder. For, as to all you, who buſy yourſelves about profeſſions, and farms, and domeſtics, and public poſts, theſe things are nothing elſe but mere fodder. But there are ſome few men, among the crowd, who are fond of looking on, and conſidering: "What then, after all, is the world? "who governs it? hath it no governor? How is it "poſſible, when neither a city nor a houſe can re- "main ever ſo ſhort a time, without ſome one to "govern and take care of it, that this vaſt and "beautiful ſyſtem ſhould be adminiſtered, in a for- "tuitous and diſorderly manner? Is there then a "governor? what ſort of one is he? and how doth "he govern; and what are we, who are under "him? and for what deſigned? have we ſome con- "nexion and relation to him; or none?" In this manner are the few affected; and apply themſelves only to view the fair, and then depart well: and are they laughed at by the multitude? Why, ſo are the lookers-on, by the buyers and ſellers; and, if the cattle had any apprehenſion, they too would laugh at ſuch, as admired any thing but fodder.

CHAP. XV.

Concerning thoſe who obſtinately perſevere in whatever they have determined.

§. 1. SOME, when they hear ſuch diſcourſes as theſe, *That we ought to be ſteady; that choice is by nature, free and uncompelled; and that all elſe is liable to reſtraint, compulſion, ſlavery, and belongs to others;* imagine, that they muſt remain immutably fixed to every thing which they have determined. But it is firſt neceſſary, that the determination ſhould be a ſound one. I agree, that there ſhould be a tenſion of the nerves, in the body; but ſuch as appears in a healthy, an athletic body; for, if you ſhow me, that you have the tenſion of a lunatic, and value yourſelf upon that, I will ſay to you, get yourſelf to a phyſician, man: this is not a tenſion of the nerves; but a relaxation, of another kind. Such is the diſtemper of mind, in thoſe who hear theſe diſcourſes in a wrong manner: like an acquaintance of mine, who, for no reaſon, had determined to ſtarve himſelf to death. I went the third day, and inquired what was the matter. He anſwered, "I am determined."——Well: but what is your motive? For, if your determination be right, we will ſtay, and aſſiſt your departure; but, if unreaſonable, change it.——"We ought to keep our "determinations."——What do you mean, Sir? Not all; but ſuch as are right. Elſe, if you ſhould juſt now take it into your head, that it is night, if you think fit, do not change; but perſiſt, and ſay,

We ought to keep our determinations. What do you mean, Sir? Not all. Why do not you begin, by firſt laying the foundation, in an inquiry, whether your determination be a ſound one, or not; and then build your firmneſs and conſtancy upon it? For, if you lay a rotten and crazy foundation, you muſt not build: and the greater and more weighty the ſuperſtructure is, the ſooner will it fall. Without any reaſon, you are withdrawing from us, out of life, a friend, a companion, a fellow-citizen both of the ſame greater, and leſſer city: and while you are committing murder, and deſtroying an innocent perſon, you ſay, *We muſt keep our determinations.* Suppoſe, by any means, it ſhould ever come into your head to kill *me*; muſt you keep ſuch a determination?

§. 2. With difficulty this perſon was, however, at laſt convinced: but there are ſome at preſent, whom there is no convincing. So that now I think I underſtand, what before I did not, the meaning of that common ſaying, that a fool will neither bend nor break. May it never fall to my lot to have a wife, that is an untractable fool, for my friend. "It is all to no purpoſe: I am determined." So are madmen too; but the more ſtrongly they are determined upon abſurdities, the more need have they of hellebore. Why will you not act like a ſick perſon, and apply yourſelf to a phyſician? "Sir, I am "ſick. Give me your aſſiſtance: conſider what I "am to do. It is my part to follow your direc-"ons." So, in the preſent caſe: I know not what I ought to do; and I am come to learn.——— "No: but talk to me about other things: for up-"on *this* I am determined." What other things?

What is of greater conſequence, than to convince you, that it is not ſufficient to be determined, and to perſiſt. This is the tenſion of a madman; not of one in health. "I will die, if you compel me "to this." Why ſo, man: what is the matter? ——"I am determined." I have a lucky eſcape, that you are not determined to kill me. "I take "no money." Why ſo? "I am determined." Be aſſured, that with that very tenſion which you may now make uſe of to refuſe it, you may, very poſſibly, hereafter, have as unreaſonable a propenſity to take it; and again to ſay, "I am determined." As, in a diſtempered and rheumatic body, the humour tends ſometimes to one part, ſometimes to another; thus it is uncertain which way a ſickly mind will incline. But if, to its inclination and bent, an obſtinate tenſion be likewiſe added, the evil then becomes deſperate and incurable.

CHAP. XVI.

That we do not ſtudy to make uſe of the principles concerning good and evil.

§. 1. WHERE lies good? In choice. Where evil? In choice. Where neither good nor evil? In things independent on choice. What then? Doth any of us remember theſe leſſons out of the ſchools? Doth any of us ſtudy how to anſwer for himſelf in things, as in queſtions? "Is "it day?" "Yes." "Is it night, then?" "No." "Is the number of ſtars even?" "I cannot tell." When money is offered you, have you ſtudied to

make the proper anſwer, that it is not good? Have you exerciſed yourſelf in ſuch anſwers as theſe; or only in ſophiſtries? Why do you wonder then, that you improve in points which you have ſtudied; and in thoſe which you have ſtudied, there you remain the ſame? When an orator knows, that he hath written; that he hath committed to memory what he hath written; and that he brings an agreeable voice with him; why is he ſtill ſolicitous? Becauſe he is not contented, with what he hath ſtudied. What doth he want, then? To be applauded by the audience. He hath ſtudied the power of ſpeaking then; but he hath not ſtudied cenſure and applauſe. For when did he hear from any one, what applauſe, what cenſure, is? What is the nature of each? What kind of applauſe is to be ſought, and what kind of cenſure to be ſhunned? And when did he ever apply himſelf, to ſtudy what follows from theſe leſſons? Why do you wonder then, if, in what he hath learned, he excels others; but, where he hath not ſtudied, he is the ſame with the reſt of the world? Juſt as a muſician knows how to play, ſings well, and hath the proper dreſs of his profeſſion; yet trembles when he comes upon the ſtage. For the firſt he underſtands: but what the multitude is, he doth not underſtand. Nor doth he even know, what ſolicitude itſelf is: whether it be our own affair, or that of others; or whether it be poſſible to ſuppreſs it, or not. Hence, if he is applauded, he is puffed up, when he makes his exit: but, if he is laughed at, the tumour is pricked, and ſubſides.

§. 2. Thus are we too affected. What do we admire? Externals. For what do we ſtrive? Externals. And are we then in any doubt how we

come to fear and be ſolicitous? What is the conſequence then, when we eſteem the things that are brought upon us, to be evils? We cannot but fear; we cannot but be ſolicitous. And then we ſay, "O Lord God, how ſhall I avoid ſolicitude!" Have you not hands, fool? Hath not God made them for you? Sit down now, and pray, that your noſe may not run. Wipe it rather; and do not murmur. Well; and hath he given you nothing in the preſent caſe? hath not he given you patience? hath not he given you magnanimity? hath not he given you fortitude? When you have ſuch hands as theſe, do you ſtill ſeek for ſomebody to wipe your noſe? But we neither ſtudy nor regard theſe things. For give me but one, who cares how he doth any thing, who doth not regard the ſucceſs of any thing, but his own manner of acting. Who, when he is walking, regards his own action? Who, when he is deliberating, the deliberation itſelf, and not the ſucceſs that is to follow it? If it happens to ſucceed, he is elated; and cries, "How prudently have we "deliberated! Did not I tell you, my dear friend, "that it was impoſſible, when we conſidered about "any thing, that it ſhould not happen right?" But, if it miſcarries, the poor wretch is dejected; and knows not what to ſay about the matter. Who among us ever, upon this account, conſulted a diviner? Who of us ever ſlept in a temple, to be informed concerning his manner of acting? I ſay, who? Show me one (that I may ſee what I have long ſought) who is truly noble and ingenuous. Show me either a young or an old man.

§. 3. Why then are we ſtill ſurpriſed, if, when we waſte all our attention on the materials of acti-

on, we are, in the manner of action itſelf, low, ſordid, worthleſs, fearful, wretched, and a mere heap of diſappointment and miſery? For we do not care about theſe things, nor make them our ſtudy. If we had feared, not death or exile, but fear itſelf, we ſhould have ſtudied not to fall into what appears to us to be evil. But, as the caſe now ſtands, we are eager and loquacious in the ſchools; and, when any little queſtion ariſes about any of theſe things, we are prepared to trace its conſequences: but drag us into practice, and you will find us miſerably ſhipwrecked. Let ſome alarming appearance attack us; and you will perceive what we have been ſtudying, and in what we are exerciſed. Beſides this negligence, we always accumulate ſomewhat elſe, and repreſent things greater than the reality. In a voyage, for inſtance, caſting my eyes down on the ocean below, and looking round me, and ſeeing no land, I am out of my wits; and imagine, that, if I ſhould be ſhip-wrecked, I muſt ſwallow all that ocean: nor doth it enter into my head, that three pints are enough to do my buſineſs. What is it then, that alarms me? the ocean? No: but my own *principle*. Again: in an earthquake, I imagine the city is going to fall upon me: but is not one little ſtone enough, to knock my brains out? What is it then, that oppreſſes, and puts us out of our wits? Why, what elſe but our *principles*? For what is it, but mere *principle*, that oppreſſes him, who leaves his country, and is ſeparated from his acquaintance, and friends, and place, and uſual manner of life? When children cry, if their nurſe happens to be abſent for a little while, give them a cake,

and they forget their grief. Shall we compare you to theſe children then?

No, indeed. For I do not deſire to be pacified by a cake; but by right *principles*. And what are they?

Such as man ought to ſtudy all day long, ſo as not to be attached to what doth not belong to him; neither to a friend, to a place, an academy; nor even to his own body: but to remember the law, and to have that conſtantly before his eyes. And what is the divine law? To preſerve inviolate what is properly our own: not to claim what belongs to others: to uſe what is given us; and not deſire what is not given us; and, when any thing is taken away, to reſtore it readily; and to be thankful for the time you have been permitted the uſe of it; and not cry after it, like a child for its nurſe and its mamma. For what doth it ſignify, what gets the better of you, or on what you depend? And in what are you ſuperior to him, who cries for a puppet, if you lament for a paultry academy, and a portico, and an aſſembly of young people; and ſuch like amuſements? Another comes, lamenting, that he muſt no longer drink the water of *Dirce*. Why, is not the *Marcian* water as good? "But I was uſ-"ed to that." And in time you will be uſed to the other. And, when you are attached to this too, you may cry again, and ſet yourſelf in imitation of Euripides, to celebrate, in verſe,

The baths of Nero, *and the* Marcian *water.*

Hence ſee the origin of tragedy, when trifling accidents befal foolish men. "Ah, when ſhall I ſee "Athens, and the citadel, again!" Wretch, are not

you contented with what you ſee every day? Can you ſee any thing better than the ſun, the moon, the ſtars, the whole earth, the ſea? But if beſides, you comprehend him who adminiſters the whole, and carry him about in yourſelf, do you ſtill long after pebbles, and a fine rock? What will you do then, when you are to leave even the ſun and moon? Will you ſit crying, like an infant? What then have you been doing in the ſchool? What did you hear? what did you learn? why have you written yourſelf a philoſopher, inſtead of writing the real fact? I have made ſome introductions [you may ſay]; and read over Chryſippus; but I have not ſo much as gone near the door of a philoſopher. For what pretenſions have I, to any thing of the ſame kind with Socrates, who died, and who lived, in ſuch a manner? or with Diogenes? Do you obſerve either of theſe crying, or out of humour, that he is not to ſee ſuch a man, or ſuch a woman; nor to live any longer at Athens, or at Corinth; but at Suſa, for inſtance, or Ecbatana? For doth he ſtay, and repine, who is at his liberty, whenever he pleaſes, to quit the entertainment, and play no longer? why doth he not ſtay, as children do, as long as he is amuſed? Such a one, no doubt, will bear perpetual baniſhment, and a ſentence of death, wonderful well! Why will not you be weaned, as children are; and take more ſolid food? will you never ceaſe to cry after your mammas and nurſes, whom the old women about you have taught you to bewail? "But if I "go away, I ſhall trouble them."——*You* trouble them! no: it will not be *you*: but that which troubles you too, *principle*. What have you to do then? Pluck out your [falſe] principle; and, if

they are wiſe, they will pluck out theirs too; or, if not, they will groan for themſelves.

§. 4. Boldly make a deſperate puſh, man, as the ſaying is, for proſperity, for freedom, for magnanimity. Lift up your head, at laſt, as free from ſlavery. Dare to look up to God, and ſay; "Make "uſe of me for the future as thou wilt. I am of "the ſame mind: I am equal with thee. I refuſe "nothing which ſeems good to thee. Lead me "whither thou wilt. Clothe me in whatever dreſs "thou wilt. Is it thy will, that I ſhould be in a "public or private condition; dwell here, or be ba-"niſhed; be poor, or rich? Under all theſe cir-"cumſtances I will make thy defence to men. I "will ſhow what the nature of every thing is."——— No. Rather ſit alone, in a warm place, and wait till your mamma comes to feed you. If Hercules had ſat loitering at home, what would he have been? Euryſtheus, and not Hercules. Beſides, by travelling through the world, how many acquaintance, and how many friends, had he? But none more his friend, than God: for which reaſon he was believed to be the ſon of God; and was ſo. In obedience to him, he went about extirpating injuſtice, and lawleſs force. But you are not Hercules; nor able to extirpate the evils of others: nor even Theſeus, to extirpate the evils of Attica. Extirpate your own then. Expel, inſtead of Procruſtes and Sciron, grief, fear, deſire, envy, malevolence, avarice, effeminacy, intemperance, [from your mind]. But theſe can be no otherwiſe expelled, than looking up to God alone, as your pattern: by attaching yourſelf to him alone, and being conſecrated to his commands. If you wiſh for any thing elſe, you will, with ſighs and

groans, follow what is ſtronger than you: always ſeeking proſperity without, and never able to find it. For you ſeek it where it is not, and neglect to ſeek it where it is.

CHAP. XVII.

How to adopt pre-conceptions to particular caſes.

§. 1. WHAT is the firſt buſineſs of one who ſtudies philoſophy? To part with ſelf-conceit. For it is impoſſible for any one to begin to learn what he hath a conceit that he already knows. We all go to the philoſophers, talking at all adventures upon negative and poſitive duties; good and evil; fair and baſe. We praiſe, cenſure, accuſe; we judge and diſpute about fair and baſe enterprizes. And for what do we go to the philoſophers? To learn what we ſuppoſe ourſelves not to know. And what is this? Theorems. We are deſirous to hear what the philoſophers ſay, for its elegance and acuteneſs; and ſome with a view only to gain. Now it is ridiculous to ſuppoſe, that a perſon will learn any thing, but what he deſires to learn; or make an improvement, in what he doth not learn. But moſt are deceived, in the ſame manner as Theopompus, the orator, when he blames Plato, for defining every thing. "For, ſays he, did none of "us, before you, uſe the words *good* and *juſt*: or "did we utter them as empty ſounds, without un-"derſtanding what each of them meant?" But it is not poſſible, to adapt pre-conceptions to their correſpondent ſubjects, without having minutely diſtin-

guiſhed them, and examined what is the proper ſubject to each. You may make the ſame objection to the phyſicians. For who of us did not uſe the words, wholeſome and unwholeſome, before Hippocrates was born: or did we utter them as empty ſounds? For we have ſome pre-conception of wholeſome, too; but we cannot adapt it. Hence, one ſays, let the patient abſtain from meat; another, give it him: one ſays, let him be bled; another, cup him. And what is the reaſon, but not being able to adapt the pre-conception of wholeſome, to particular caſes? Thus, too in life: who of us doth not talk of good and evil; advantageous and diſadvantageous: for who of us hath not a pre-conception of each of theſe? But is it then a diſtinct and perfect one? Show me this.

How ſhall I ſhow it?

§. 2. Adapt it properly to particular ſubjects. Plato, to go no farther, puts definitions under the pre-conception of uſeful; but you, under that of uſeleſs. Can both of you be right? How is it poſſible? Again: doth not one man adapt the pre-conception of good, to riches? Another, not to riches, but to pleaſure, or health? Upon the whole, if none of us, who uſe words, either utter them without meaning, or need to take any manner of care in diſtinguiſhing our pre-conceptions, why do we differ? Why do we wrangle? Why do we cenſure each other? But what occaſion have I to mention this mutual contradiction? If you yourſelf adapt your pre-conceptions properly, how comes it to paſs, that you do not proſper? why do you meet with any hindrance? Let us for the preſent omit the ſecond topic, concerning the *purſuits*, and the duties relative

to them: let us omit the third too, concerning *aſſent*. I make you a preſent of all theſe. Let us inſiſt only on the firſt; which affords almoſt a ſenſible proof, that you do not adapt your pre-conceptions right. You deſire what is poſſible in itſelf, and poſſible for you. Why are you hindered? why are not you in a proſperous way? You do not decline what is neceſſary. Why then do you incur any thing [which is your averſion?] why are you unfortunate? when you deſire any thing, why doth it not happen? when you do not deſire it, why doth it happen? For this is the greateſt demonſtration of ill ſucceſs and miſery. I deſire ſomething; and it doth not happen: and what is more wretched than I? From an impatience of this, Medea came to murder her own children: an action of a noble ſpirit in this view: for ſhe had a proper impreſſion of what it was to be diſappointed of one's deſire, "Thus "I ſhall puniſh him, who hath injured and diſhonour-"ed me: and what is ſo wicked a wretch good for? "but how is this to be effected? I will murder the "children: but that will be puniſhing myſelf. And "what do I care?" This is the error of a ſoul indued with great powers. For ſhe knew not where the completion of our deſires is to be found: that it is not to be had from without; nor by altering the appointment of things. Do *not* deſire the man for your huſband, and nothing which you *do* deſire will fail to happen. Do not deſire to keep him to yourſelf. Do not deſire to ſtay at Corinth; and, in a word, have no will, but the will of God; and who ſhall reſtrain you; who ſhall compel *you*, any more than Jupiter? When you have ſuch a guide, and conform your will and inclinations to his, what need

you fear being disappointed? Yield up your desire and aversion [as slaves] to riches, or poverty; the one will be disappointed, the other incurred. Yield them up to health, power, honours, your country, friends, children, in short, to any thing independent on choice, you will be unfortunate. But yield them up to Jupiter, and the other Gods. Give yourself up to these: let these govern: let both be ranged on the same side with these; and how can you be any longer unprosperous? But if, poor wretch, you envy, and pity, and are jealous, and tremble, and never cease, a single day, from complaining of yourself, and the Gods, why do you boast of your education? What education, man? That you have learned convertible syllogisms? why do not you, if possible, unlearn all these, and begin again; convinced, that hitherto, you have not even touched upon the point? And, for the future, beginning from this foundation, proceed, in order, to the superstructure; that nothing may happen which you do wish, and that every thing may happen which you do. Give me but one young man, who brings this intention with him to the school; who is a champion for this point; and says, "I yield up all the rest: it "suffices me, if once I become able to pass my life "free from hindrance and grief: to stretch out my "neck to all events, as free; and to look up to "heaven, as the friend of God; fearing nothing that "can happen." Let any one of you show himself of such a disposition, that I may say, "Come into "the place, young man, that is of right your own; "for you are destined to be an ornament to philoso-"phy. Yours are these possessions; yours these "books; yours these discourses." Then, when he

hath maſtered, and got the better of this firſt claſs, let him come to me again, and ſay; "I deſire indeed "to be free from paſſion, and perturbation; but I "deſire too, as a pious, a philoſophic, and a care-"fully attentive man, to know, what is my duty to "God, to my parents, to my relations, to my coun-"try, and to ſtrangers." "Come into the ſecond "claſs too; for this likewiſe is yours." "But I "have ſufficiently ſtudied the ſecond claſs too; and "I would willingly be ſecure, and unſhaken by er-"ror and deluſion, not only awake, but even when "aſleep; when warmed with wine; when diſeaſed "with the ſpleen." "You are a God, man: your "intentions are great."

§. 3. "No: But I, for my part, deſire to under-"ſtand what Chryſippus ſays, in his logical treatiſe "of the Pſeudomenos."—Go hang yourſelf, pitiful wretch, with ſuch an intention as this. What good will it do you? You will read the whole lamenting all the while; and ſay to others, trembling, "Do "as I do."——"Shall I read to you, my friend "and you to me?——You write ſurpriſingly, Sir; "and you very finely imitate the ſtile of Plato; and "you, of Xenophon; and you, of Antiſthenes." And thus, having related your dreams to each other, you return again to the ſame ſtate. Your deſires and averſions, your purſuits, your intentions, your reſolutions, your wiſhes and endeavours, are juſt what they were. You do not ſo much as ſeek for one to adviſe you; but are offended when you hear ſuch things as theſe; and cry, "An ill-natured old fellow! "he never wept over me, when I was ſetting out; "nor ſaid, to what a danger are you going to be "expoſed! If you come off ſafe, child, I will illu-

" minate my houſe." " This would have been the " part of a good-natured man." Truly, it will be a happineſs, if you do come off ſafe: it will be worth while to make illumination. For you ought to be immortal, and exempt from ſickneſs, to be ſure.

§. 4. Throwing away then, I ſay, this ſelf-conceit, by which we fancy, we have gained ſome knowlege of what is uſeful, we ſhould come to philoſophic reaſoning, as we do to mathematics and muſic: otherwiſe we ſhall be far from making any improvement, even if we have read over all the collections and compoſitions, not only of Chryſippus, but of Antipater and Archedemus too.

CHAP. XVIII.

How the appearances of things are to be combated.

§. 1. EVERY habit and faculty is preſerved, and increaſed, by correſpondent actions: as the habit of walking, by walking; of running, by running. If you would be a reader, read: if a writer, write. But if you do not read for a month together, but do ſomething elſe; you will ſee what will be the conſequence. So, after ſitting ſtill for ten days, get up and attempt to take a long walk; and you will find how your legs are weakened. Upon the whole then, whatever you would make habitual, do not practiſe it; but habituate yourſelf to ſomething elſe.

§. 2. It is the ſame with regard to the operations of the ſoul. Whenever you are angry, be aſſured

that it is not only a preſent evil, but that you have increaſed a habit, and added fuel to a fire. When you are overcome by the company of women, do not eſteem it as a ſingle defeat, but that you have fed, that you have increaſed, your diſſoluteneſs. For it is impoſſible, but that habits and faculties muſt either be firſt produced, or ſtrengthened and increaſed by correſpondent actions. Hence the philoſophers derive the growth of all infirmities. When you once deſire money, for example, if a degree of reaſoning ſufficient to produce a ſenſe of the evil be applied, the deſire ceaſes, and the governing faculty of the mind regains its authority; whereas if you apply no remedy, it returns no more to its former ſtate: but, being again excited by a correſponding appearance, it kindles at the deſire more quickly than before; and by frequent repetitions, at laſt becomes callous: and by this infirmity is the love of money fixed. For he who hath had a fever, even after it had left him, is not in the ſame ſtate of health as before, unleſs he was perfectly cured: and the ſame thing happens in diſtempers of the ſoul likewiſe. There are certain traces and bliſters left in it; which, unleſs they are well effaced, whenever a new hurt is received in the ſame part, inſtead of bliſters, become ſores.

§. 3. If you would not be of an angry temper then, do not feed the habit. Give it nothing to help its increaſe. Be quiet at firſt, and reckon the days in which you have not been angry. I uſed to be angry every day; now every other day; then every third and fourth day: and if you miſs it ſo long as thirty days, offer a ſacrifice of thankſgiving to God. For habit is firſt weakened, and then in-

tirely deſtroyed. "I was not vexed to-day; nor "for three or four months after; but took heed to "myſelf, when ſome provoking things happened." Be aſſured that you are in a fine way. "To-day, "when I ſaw a handſom perſon, I did not ſay to "myſelf, O that I could poſſeſs her! And, how "happy is her huſband! (for he who ſays this, ſays "too, how happy is her gallant)! nor do I go on "to repreſent her as preſent, as undreſſed, as lying "down beſide me." On this I ſtroak my head, and ſay, well done, Epictetus; thou haſt ſolved a pretty ſophiſm, a much prettier than one very celebrated in the ſchools. But, if even the lady ſhould happen to be willing, and give me intimations of it, and ſend for me, and preſs my hand, and place herſelf next to me; and I ſhould then forbear, and get the victory; that would be a ſophiſm beyond all the ſubtleties of logic. This, and not diſputing artfully, is the proper ſubject for exultation.

§. 4. How then is this to be effected? Be willing to approve yourſelf to yourſelf. Be willing to appear beautiful in the ſight of God: be deſirous to converſe in purity with your own pure mind, and with God: and then, if any ſuch appearance ſtrikes you, Plato directs you: "Have recourſe to expia-"tions: go a ſuppliant to the temples of the avert-"ing deities." It is ſufficient, however, if you propoſe to yourſelf the example of wiſe and good men, whether alive or dead; and compare your conduct with theirs. Go to Socrates, and ſee him lying by Alcibiades, yet ſlighting his youth and beauty. Conſider what a victory he was conſcious of obtaining! what an Olympic prize! in what number did he ſtand rom Hercules? So that, by heaven, one might juſt-

ly ſalute him; hail! incredibly great, univerſal victor! not thoſe ſorry boxers and wreſtlers; nor the gladiators, who reſemble them.

§. 5. By placing ſuch an object over-againſt you, you will conquer any appearance, and not be drawn away by it. But, in the firſt place, be not hurried along with it, by its haſty vehemence: but ſay; appearance, wait for me a little. Let me ſee what you are, and what you repreſent. Let me try you. Then, afterwards, do not ſuffer it to go on drawing gay pictures of what will follow; if you do, it will lead you where ever it pleaſes. But rather oppoſe to it ſome good and noble appearance, and baniſh this baſe and ſordid one. If you are habituated to this kind of exerciſe, you will ſee what ſhoulders, what nerves, what ſinews, you will have. But now it is mere trifling talk, and nothing more. He is the true practitioner, who exerciſes himſelf againſt ſuch appearances as theſe. Stay, wretch, do not be hurried away. The combat is great, the atchievement divine; for empire, for freedom, for proſperity, for tranquillity. Remember God. Invoke him for your aid, and protector; as ſailors do Caſtor and Pollux, in a ſtorm. For what ſtorm is greater than that which ariſes from violent appearances, contending to overſet our reaſon? Indeed, what is the ſtorm itſelf, but appearance? For, do but take away the fear of death, and let there be as many thunders and lightenings as you pleaſe, you will find, that, in the ruling faculty, all is ſerenity and calm: but if you are once defeated, and ſay, you will get the victory another time, and then the ſame thing over again; aſſure yourſelf, you will at laſt be reduced to ſo weak and wretched a condition, that you will not ſo much as

know when you do amiſs; but you will even begin to make defences for your behaviour, and thus verify the ſaying of Heſiod:

With conſtant ills, the Dilatory *ſtrive.*

CHAP. XIX.

Concerning thoſe who embrace philoſophy only in words.

§. 1. THE argument, called the ruling one, concerning which diſputants queſtioned each other, appears to have its riſe from hence. Of the following propoſitions, any two imply a contradiction to the third. They are theſe. *That every thing paſt is neceſſarily true: that an impoſſibility is not the conſequence of a poſſibility:* and, *that ſomething is a poſſibility, which neither is nor will be true.* Diodorus, perceiving this contradiction, made uſe of the probability of the two firſt, to prove, that nothing is poſſible, which neither is nor will be true. Some again hold the ſecond and third; that *ſomething is poſſible, which neither is nor will be true;* and, *that an impoſſibility is not the conſequence of a poſſibility*: and, conſequently, aſſert, that *not every thing paſt is neceſſarily true.* This way Cleanthes and his followers took; whom Antipater copiouſly defends. Others, laſtly, maintain the firſt and third; *That ſomething is poſſible, which neither is nor will be true:* and that *every thing paſt is neceſſarily true:* but then, that *an impoſſibility may be the conſequence of a poſſibility.* But all theſe three propoſitions cannot be at once maintained, becauſe of their mutual

contradiction. If any one ſhould aſk me then, which of them I maintain? I anſwer him, that I cannot tell. But I have heard it related, that Diodorus held one opinion about them; the followers of Panthaedes, I think, and Cleanthes, another; and Chryſippus a third.

What then is *yours?*

None. Nor was I born to examine the appearances of things to my own mind; to compare what is ſaid by others, and thence to form ſome principle of my own, as to the topic [which you mention]. Therefore, [in reſpect to it,] I am no better than a grammarian [who repeats what he hath read]. Who was the father of Hector? Priam. Who were his brothers? Paris and Deiphobus. Who was his mother? Hecuba. This I have heard related. From whom? From Homer. But I believe Hellanicus, and other authors, have written on the ſame ſubject. And what better account have I of the ruling argument? But, if I was vain enough, I might, eſpecially at an entertainment, aſtoniſh all the company by an enumeration of authors, relating to it. Chryſippus hath written wonderfully, in his firſt book of poſſibilities. Cleanthes and Archedemus have each written ſeparately on this ſubject. Antipater too hath written, not only in his treatiſe of poſſibilities, but purpoſely in a diſcourſe on the ruling argument. Have not you read the work? No." Read it then. ——And what good will it do him? He will be more trifling and impertinent than he is already. For what elſe have *you* gained by reading it? What principle have you formed upon this ſubject? But you tell us of Helen, and Priam, and the iſle of Calypſo, which never was, nor ever will be. And here, in-

deed, it is of no great conſequence, if you retain the ſtory, without forming any principle of your own. But it is our misfortune to do ſo, much more in morality than upon ſuch ſubjects as theſe.

§. 2. Talk to me concerning good and evil.

Hear.

The wind from Ilium *to the* Cicon's *ſhore,*
Hath driven me——

Of things, ſome are good, ſome evil, and ſome indifferent. Now the good, are the virtues, and whatever partakes of them; and the evil, vices, and what partakes of vice: the indifferent, lie between theſe, as riches, health, life, death, pleaſure, pain.

Whence do you know this?

Hellanicus ſays it, in his Egyptian hiſtory. For what doth it ſignify, whether one names the hiſtory of Hellanicus, or the ethics of Diogenes, or Chryſippus, or Cleanthes? Have you then examined any of theſe things, and formed a principle of your own? But ſhow me, how you are uſed to exerciſe yourſelf on ſhip-board. Remember this diviſion, when the maſt rattles, and ſome idle fellow ſtands by you, while you are ſcreaming, and ſays, "For heaven's "ſake, talk as you did a little while ago. Is it vice "to ſuffer ſhipwreck? or doth it partake of vice?" Would not you take up a log and throw it at his head? "What have we to do with you, Sir? We "are periſhing, and you come and jeſt." Again: if Caeſar ſhould ſummon you, to anſwer an accuſation, remember the diviſion. If, when you are going in, pale and trembling, any one ſhould meet you, and ſay, "Why do you tremble, Sir? what

" is this affair you are engaged in? doth Caeſar " within, give virtue and vice to thoſe who approach " him?"——" What! do you too inſult me, and " add to my evils?"——" Nay, but tell me, " philoſopher, why you tremble? Is there any other " danger, but death, or a priſon, or bodily pain, " or exile, or defamation?"——" Why what " ſhould there be elſe?——" Are any of theſe " vice? or do they partake of vice? What then, " did you yourſelf uſe to ſay of theſe things?"—— " What have you to do with me, Sir? My own " evils are enough for me."——You ſay right. " Your own evils are indeed enough for you; your " baſeneſs, your cowardice, and that arrogance, by " which you were elated, as you ſat in the ſchools. " why did you plume yourſelf with what is not " your own? why did you call yourſelf a Stoic?"

§. 3. Obſerve yourſelves thus in your actions, and you will find of what ſect you are. You will find, that moſt of you are Epicureans; a few Peripatetics, and thoſe but looſe ones. For, by what action will you prove, that you think virtue equal, and even ſuperior, to all other things? Show me a Stoic, if you have one. Where? or how ſhould you? You can ſhow, indeed, a thouſand, who repeat the Stoic reaſonings. But do they repeat the Epicurean worſe? are they not juſt as perfect in the Peripatetic? who then is a Stoic? As we call that a Phidian ſtatue, which is formed according to the art of Phidias; ſo ſhow me ſome one perſon, formed according to the principles which he profeſſes. Show me one, who is ſick, and happy; in danger, and happy; dying, and happy; exiled, and happy; diſgraced, and happy. Show him me; for, by heaven,

I long to ſee a Stoic. But you [will ſay] you have not one perfectly formed. Show me then one who is forming: one who is approaching towards this character. Do me this favour. Do not refuſe an old man a ſight which he hath never yet ſeen. Do you ſuppoſe, that you are [aſked] to ſhow the Jupiter or Minerva of Phidias, a work of ivory or gold? Let any of you ſhow me a human ſoul, willing to have the ſame ſentiments with thoſe of God: not to accuſe either God or man: not to be diſappointed of its deſire, or incur its averſion: not to be angry: not to be envious: not to be jealous: in a word, willing from a man to become a God; and, in this poor mortal body, aiming to have fellowſhip with Jupiter. Show him me. But you cannot. Why then do you impoſe upon yourſelves, and play tricks with others? why do you put on a dreſs not your own; and walk about in it, mere thieves and pilferers of names and things, which do not belong to you? Here, I am you preceptor, and you come to be inſtructed by me. And indeed my intention is to ſecure you from being reſtrained, compelled, hindered: to make you free, proſperous, happy; looking to God upon every occaſion, great or ſmall. And you come to learn and ſtudy theſe things. Why then do not you finiſh your work, if you have the proper intention, the proper qualifications? what is wanting? When I ſee an artificer, and the materials lying ready, I expect the work. Now here is the artificer; here are the materials; what is it we want? Is not the thing capable of being taught? It is. Is it not in our power then? The only thing of all others that is ſo. Neither riches, nor health, nor fame, nor, in ſhort, any thing elſe is in our power, except a right uſe of the

appearances of things. This alone is, by nature, not ſubject to reſtraint, not ſubject to hinderance. Why then do not you finiſh it? Tell me the cauſe. It muſt be by my fault, or yours, or from the nature of the thing. The thing itſelf is practicable, and the only one in our power. The fault then muſt be either in me, or in you, or, more truly, in both. Well then, ſhall we now, at laſt, bring this intention along with us? Let us lay aſide all that is paſt. Let us begin. Only believe me, and you will ſee the conſequence.

CHAP. XX.

Concerning the Epicureans, *and Academics.*

§. 1. TRUE and evident propoſitions muſt, of neceſſity, be uſed even by thoſe, who contradict them. And, perhaps, one of the ſtrongeſt proofs, that there is ſuch a thing as evidence, is the neceſſity which thoſe, who contradict it, are under, to make uſe of it. If a perſon, for inſtance, ſhould deny, that any thing is univerſally true, he will be obliged to aſſert the contrary, that nothing is univerſally true. What, wretch, not even this itſelf? For what is this, but to ſay, that every thing univerſal is falſe. Again: if any one ſhould come, and ſay, "*Know* that "there is nothing to be *known*; but all things "are uncertain:" or another; "*Believe* me, and "it will be the better for you, no man ought to be "*believed* in any thing:" or a third, "*Learn* from "me, that nothing is to be *learned*; I tell you this, "and will teach the proof of it, if you pleaſe."

Now what difference is there between ſuch as theſe, and thoſe who call themſelves academics? Who ſay to us, "Be *convinced*, that no one ever is *convinced* [on good grounds]. Believe us, that no body believes any body."

§. 2. Thus alſo, when Epicurus would deſtroy the natural relation of mankind to each other, he makes uſe of the very thing he is deſtroying. For what doth he ſay? "Be not deceived; be not ſeduced, and miſtaken. There is no natural relation between reaſonable beings. Believe me. Thoſe who ſay otherwiſe, miſlead and impoſe upon you."——What are *you* concerned for *us* then? Let us be deceived. *You* will fare never the worſe, if all the reſt of us be perſuaded, that there is a natural relation between mankind; and that it is by all means to be preſerved. Nay, it will be much ſafer and better. Why do you give yourſelf any trouble about us, Sir? why do you break your reſt for us? why do you light your lamp? why do you riſe early? why do you compoſe ſo many volumes? Is it that none of us ſhould be deceived, concerning the Gods; as if they took any care of men? Or that we may not ſuppoſe the eſſence of good conſiſts in any thing, but pleaſure? For, if theſe things be ſo, lie down and ſleep, and lead the life of which you judge yourſelf worthy; that of a mere reptile. Eat and drink, and ſatisfy your paſſion for women, and eaſe yourſelf and ſnore. What is it to you whether others think right or wrong about theſe things? For what have you to do with us? You take care of ſheep, becauſe they afford us their milk, their wool, and, at laſt, their fleſh. And would it not be a deſirable thing that men might be ſo lulled and inchant-

ed by the Stoics, as to give themſelves up to be milked and fleeced by you, and ſuch as you? Should not theſe doctrines be taught to your brother Epicureans only, and concealed from the reſt of the world; who ſhould by all means, above all things, be perſuaded, that we have a natural relation to each other: and that temperance is a good thing, in order that all may be kept ſafe for *you?* Or is this relation to be preſerved towards ſome, and not towards others? towards whom then, is it to be preſerved? towards ſuch as mutually preſerve, or ſuch as violate it? and who violate it more, than you, who teach ſuch doctrines?

§. 3. What was it then, that waked Epicurus from his ſleep; and compelled him to write what he did? What elſe, but that which is of all others the moſt powerful in mankind, nature; which draws every one, however unwilling and reluctant, to its own purpoſes. For ſince, ſays ſhe, you think that there is no relation between mankind, write this doctrine, and leave it for the uſe of others; and break your ſleep upon that account; and, by your own practice, confute your own principles. Do we ſay, that Oreſtes was rouſed from ſleep by the agitation of the furies; and was not Epicurus waked by furies; more cruel and avenging, which would not ſuffer him to reſt; but compelled him to divulge his own evils, as wine and madneſs do the prieſts of Cybele? So ſtrong and unconquerable a thing is human nature! for how can a vine have the properties not of a vine, but of an olive tree? or an olive tree, not thoſe of an olive tree, but of a vine? It is impoſſible. It is inconceivable. Neither, therefor, is it poſſible for a human creature intirely to loſe

human affections. But even thoſe, who have undergone a mutilation, cannot have their inclinations alſo mutilated: and ſo Epicurus, when he had mutilated all the offices of a man, of a maſter of a family, of a citizen, and of a friend, did not mutilate the inclinations of humanity: for he could not, any more than the idle academics can throw away, or blind their own ſenſes; though this be, of all others, the point they labour moſt. What a misfortune is it, when any one, after having received, from nature, ſtandards and rules for the knowlege of truth, doth not ſtrive to add to theſe, and make up their deficiencies; but, on the contrary, endeavours to take away, and deſtroy, whatever truth may be known even by them?

§. 4. What ſay you, philoſopher? What do you think of piety and ſanctity? If you pleaſe, I will prove, that they are good ——Pray do prove it; that our citizens may be converted, and honour the deity, and may no longer neglect what is of the higheſt importance.——Have you the proofs then? ——I have, and I thank you. Since you are ſo well pleaſed with this then, learn the contrary: that there are no Gods; or, if there are, that they take no care of mankind; neither have we any concern with them: that this piety and ſanctity, which is ſo much talked of by many, is only an impoſition of boaſting and ſophiſtical men; or, perhaps, of legiſlators, for a terror and reſtraint to injuſtice.—— Well done, philoſopher. Our citizens are much the better for you. You have already brought back all the youth, to a contempt of the deity.——What! doth not this pleaſe you, then? Learn next, that juſtice is nothing: that ſhame is folly: that the pa-

ternal relation is nothing; the filial, nothing.—— Well ſaid, philoſopher: perſiſt; convince the youth: that we may have many more, to think and talk like you. By ſuch doctrines as theſe, have our well governed ſtates flouriſhed? Upon theſe was Sparta founded? Lycurgus, by his laws, and method of education, introduced ſuch perſuaſions as theſe; that it is juſt as honourable, as it is diſhonourable, to be ſlaves; and juſt as diſhonourable, as honourable, to be free! they who died at Thermopylae, died from ſuch principles as theſe! and from what other doctrines did the Athenians leave their city?

§. 5. And yet, they who talk thus, marry, and produce children; and engage in public affairs, and get themſelves made prieſts and prophets (of whom? of Gods that have no exiſtence); and conſult the Pythian prieſteſs, only to hear falſhoods, and interpret the oracles to others. What monſtrous impudence and impoſture!

§. 6. What are you doing, man? You contradict yourſelf every day; and yet you will not give up theſe paultry cavils. When you eat, where do you carry your hand? to your mouth, or to your eye? When you bathe, where do you go? do you ever call a kettle, a diſh; or a ſpoon, a ſpit? If I were a ſervant to one of theſe gentlemen, were it at the hazard of being flayed every day, I would plague him. "Throw ſome oil into the bath, boy." I would take pickle, and pour upon his head. "What is this?" Really, Sir, an appearance ſtruck me ſo perfectly alike, as not to be diſtinguiſhed from oil. "Give me the ſoup." I would carry him a diſh full of vinegar. "Did not I aſk for a ſoup?" ——Yes, Sir, this is the ſoup.—"Is not this vine-

" gar?" Why ſo, more than ſoup? " Take it and " ſmell it, take it and taſte it." " How do you " know then, but our ſenſes deceive us?" If I had three or four fellow-ſervants to join with me, I would make him either choke with paſſion, and burſt, or change his opinions. But now they inſult us, by making uſe of the gifts of nature, while in words, they deſtroy them. Grateful and modeſt men, truly? who, if there were nothing elſe in the caſe, while they are eating their daily bread, dare to ſay, " We do not know, whether there be any Ceres, " or Proſerpine, or Pluto." Not to mention that while they enjoy the night and day, the ſeaſons of the year, the ſtars, the earth and ſea, they are not the leaſt affected by any of theſe things; but only ſtudy to throw out ſome idle problem; and, when they have cleared their ſtomachs, go and bathe: but take not the leaſt care what they ſay; nor on what ſubjects; nor to whom; nor what may be the conſequence of their talk: whether any well diſpoſed young man, by hearing ſuch doctrines, may not be affected by them, and ſo affected as intirely to loſe the ſeeds of his good diſpoſition: whether they may not furniſh an adulterer with occaſions of growing ſhameleſs in his guilt: whether a public plunderer may not find excuſes from theſe doctrines: whether he, who neglects his parents, may not gain an additional confidence from them——" What then, in " *your* opinion, is good and evil, fair and baſe; " ſuch things, or ſuch things?"——Why ſhould one ſay any more againſt ſuch creatures as theſe, or give them any account, or receive any from them? or endeavour to convince them? By Jupiter, one might ſooner hope to convince the moſt unnatural

debauchees, than thoſe, who are thus deaf and blind to their own evils.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Inconſiſtency.

§. 1. THERE are ſome things which men confeſs, with eaſe; others, with difficulty. No one, for inſtance, will confeſs himſelf a fool or a blockhead; but, on the contrary, you will hear every one ſay, "I wiſh my fortune was equal "to my mind." But they eaſily confeſs themſelves fearful; and ſay, "I am ſomewhat timorous, I con- "feſs: but in other reſpects you will not find me "a fool." No one will eaſily confeſs himſelf intemperate in his deſires; upon no account diſhoneſt, nor abſolutely very envious, or meddling: but many confeſs themſelves to have the weakneſs of being compaſſionate. What is the reaſon of all this? The principal is, an inconſiſtency and confuſion in what relates to good and evil. But different people have different inducements. In general, whatever they imagine to be baſe, they do not abſolutely confeſs. Fear and compaſſion, they imagine to belong to a well-meaning diſpoſition; but ſtupidity, to a ſlave. Offences againſt ſociety they do not own: but, in moſt faults, they are brought to a confeſſion, chiefly from imagining, that there is ſomething involuntary in them; as in fear and compaſſion. And though a perſon ſhould in ſome meaſure confeſs himſelf intemperate in his deſires, he accuſes his paſſion, and expects forgiveneſs, as for an involuntary

fault. But diſhoneſty is not imagined to be, by any means, involuntary. In jealouſy too, there is ſomething, they ſuppoſe, of involuntary; and this likewiſe, in ſome degree, they confeſs.

§. 2. Converſing among ſuch men, therefor, thus confuſed, thus ignorant what they ſay, what are, or are not, their evils, whence they have them, and how they may be delivered of them; it is worth while, I think, to aſk one's ſelf continually, "Am "I too one of thoſe? what do I imagine myſelf to "be? how do I conduct myſelf? as a prudent, as a "temperate man? Do I, too, ever talk at this rate, "that I am ſufficiently inſtructed for what may hap-"pen? have I that perſuaſion, that I know nothing "which becomes one who knows nothing? do I go "to a maſter, as to an oracle, prepared to obey; "or do I, as well as others, like a ſtupid driveller, "enter the ſchool, only to learn the hiſtory [of "philoſophy], and underſtand books, which I did "not underſtand before; or, perhaps, to explain "them to others?" You have been fighting at home, with your ſervant, Sir: you have turned the houſe upſide down, and alarmed the neighbourhood: and do you come to me, with a pompous ſhow of wiſdom, and ſit and paſs judgment how I explain a ſentence? How I prate whatever comes into my head? Do you come, envious and dejected, that nothing is brought you from home? And, in the midſt of the diſputations, ſit thinking on nothing, but how your father or your brother may behave to you? "What are they ſaying about me "at home? Now they think I am improving: and "ſay, he will come back with univerſal knowlege. "I wiſh I could learn every thing before my return:

" but this requires much labour; and nobody ſends
" me any thing. The baths are very bad at Nico-
" polis; and things go very ill both at home, and
" here."

§. 3. After all this, it is ſaid, nobody is the better for the philoſophic ſchool. Why, who comes to the ſchool? I mean, who comes to be reformed? who, to ſubmit his principles to correction? who, with a ſenſe of his wants? Why do you wonder then, that you bring back from the ſchool, the very thing you carried there? For you do not come to lay aſide, or correct, or change, your principles. How ſhould you? Far from it. Rather conſider this, therefor, whether you have not what you come for. You come to talk about theorems. Well: and are not you more impertinently talkative than you were? Do not theſe paultry theorems furniſh you with matter for oſtentation? do not you ſolve convertible and hypothetical ſyllogiſms? why then, are you diſpleaſed, if you have the very thing for which you came?—" Very true: but, if my child,
" or my brother, ſhould die; or if I muſt die, or
" be tortured myſelf, what good will theſe things
" do me?"—— Why, did you come for *this?* did you attend upon me for *this?* was it upon any ſuch account, that you ever lighted your lamp, or ſat up at night? or did you, when you went into the walk, propoſe any appearance to your own mind to be diſcuſſed, inſtead of a ſyllogiſm? did any of you ever go through ſuch a ſubject jointly? And, after all, you ſay, theorems are uſeleſs. To whom? To ſuch as apply them ill. For medicines for the eyes are not uſeleſs to thoſe, who apply them when, and as, they ought. Fomentations are not uſeleſs: poi-

ſers are not uſeleſs: but they are uſeleſs to ſome; and, on the contrary, uſeful to others. If you ſhould aſk me now, are ſyllogiſms uſeful? I anſwer, that they are uſeful: and, if you pleaſe, I will ſhow you how.——"Will they be of ſervice to me, "then?"——Why: did you aſk, man, whether they would be uſeful to *you*, or in general? If any one in a dyſentery ſhould aſk me, whether acids be uſeful; I anſwer, they are. "Are they uſeful for "*me*, then?"——I ſay, no. Firſt try to get the flux ſtopt, and the exulceration healed. Do you too get the ulcers healed; your fluxes ſtopt. Quiet your mind, and bring it free from diſtraction, to the ſchool; and then you will know what is the force of reaſoning.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Friendſhip.

§. 1. TO whatever objects a perſon devotes his attention, theſe objects he, probably, loves. Do men ever devote their attention then, to evils?——By no means.——Or even to what doth not concern them?——No: nor this.——It remains then, that *good* muſt be the ſole object of their attention; and, if of their attention, of their love too. Whoever, therefor, underſtands *good*, is capable likewiſe of love; and he who cannot diſtinguiſh good from evil, and things indifferent from both, how is it poſſible, that he can love? The prudent perſon alone, then, is capable of loving.

How ſo? I am not this prudent perſon, yet I love my child.

I proteſt it ſurprizes me, that you ſhould, in the firſt place, confeſs yourſelf imprudent. For in what are you deficient? have not you the uſe of your ſenſes? do not you diſtinguiſh the appearances of things? do not you provide food, and cloathing, and habitation, as are ſuitable to you? why then do you confeſs, that you want prudence? In truth, becauſe you are often ſtruck, and diſconcerted by appearances, and their ſpeciouſneſs gets the better of you; and hence you ſometimes ſuppoſe the very ſame things to be good, then evil, and laſtly, neither: and, in a word, you grieve, you fear, you envy, you are diſconcerted, you change. Is it from hence, that you confeſs yourſelf imprudent? And are you not changeable too in love? Riches, pleaſure, in ſhort, the very ſame things, you at ſome times eſteem good, and at others, evil: and do not you eſteem the ſame perſons too, alternately good and bad? And, at one time, treat them with kindneſs, at another, with enmity? One time, commend, and at another, cenſure them?

Yes. This too is the caſe with me.

Well then, can he who is deceived in another, be his friend, think you?

No, ſurely.

Or doth he who loves him with a changeable affection, bear him genuine good-will?

Nor he, neither.

Or he, who now vilifies, then admires him?

Nor he.

Do you not often ſee little dogs careſſing, and playing with each other, that you would ſay, no-

thing could be more friendly: but, to learn what this friendſhip is, throw a bit of meat between them, and you will ſee. Do you throw a bit of an eſtate, betwixt you and your ſon, and you will ſee, that he will quickly wiſh *you* under ground, and you *him*: and then you, no doubt, on the other hand, will exclaim; what a ſon have I brought up! he would bury me alive! throw in a pretty girl, and the old fellow and the young one will, both, fall in love with her: or let fame or danger intervene, the words of the father of Admetus will be yours:

You hold life dear: doth not your father too?

Do you ſuppoſe, that he did not love his own child, when he was a little one? that he was not in agonies, when he had a fever; and often wiſhed to undergo that fever in his ſtead? But after all, when the trial comes home, you ſee what expreſſions he uſes. Were not Eteocles and Polynices born of the ſame mother, and of the ſame father? were they not brought up, and did they not live, and eat, and ſleep, together? Did not they kiſs and fondle each other? So that any one, who ſaw them, would have laughed at all the paradoxes, which philoſophers utter about love. And yet, when a kingdom, like a bit of meat, was thrown betwixt them, ſee what they ſay, and how eagerly they wiſh to kill each other. For univerſally, be not deceived, no animal is attached to any thing ſo ſtrongly, as to its own intereſt. Whatever therefor, appears a hindrance to that, be it brother, or father, or child, or miſtreſs, or friend, is hated, abhorred, execrated; for, by nature, it loves nothing like its own intereſt. This is father, and brother, and family, and coun-

try, and God. Whenever therefor, the Gods ſeem to hinder this, we vilify even them, and throw down their ſtatues, and burn their temples; as Alexander ordered the temple of Eſculapius to be burnt, becauſe he had loſt the man he loved.

§. 2. Whenever therefor, any one makes his intereſt to conſiſt in the ſame thing with ſanctity, virtue, his country, parents, and friends, all theſe are ſecured: but, where-ever they are made to interfere, friends, and country, and family, and juſtice itſelf, all give way, borne down by the weight of ſelf-intereſt. For wherever *I* and *mine* are placed, thither muſt every animal gravitate. If in body, that will ſway us; if in choice, that; if in externals, theſe. If therefor *I* be placed in a right choice, then only, I ſhall be a friend, a ſon, or a father, ſuch as I ought. For, in that caſe, it will be for my intereſt to preſerve the faithful, the modeſt, the patient, the abſtinent, the beneficent, character; to keep the relations of life inviolate. But, if I place my *ſelf* in one thing, and virtue in another, the doctrine of Epicurus will ſtand its ground, that virtue is nothing, or mere opinion.

§. 4. From this ignorance it was, that the Athenians and Lacedemonians quarrelled with each other; and the Thebans with both: the Perſian king, with Greece; and the Macedonians with both: and now, the Romans, with the Getes. And, in ſtill remoter times, the Trojan war aroſe from the ſame cauſe. Paris was the gueſt of Menelaus; and whoever had ſeen the mutual proofs of good-will, that paſſed between them, would never have believed, that they were not friends. But a tempting bit, a pretty woman, was thrown in between them; and for this

they went to war. At preſent, therefor, when you ſee dear brothers have, in appearance, but one ſoul, do not immediately pronounce upon their friendſhip; not though they ſhould ſwear it, and affirm it was impoſſible to live aſunder. (For the governing faculty of a bad man is faithleſs, unſettled, injudicious; ſucceſſively vanquiſhed by different appearances.) But inquire, not as others do, whether they were born of the ſame parents, and brought up together, and under the ſame preceptor; but this thing only, in what they place their intereſt; in externals, or in choice. If in externals, no more call them friends, than faithful, or conſtant, or brave, or free; nay, nor even men, if you are wiſe. For it is no principle of humanity, that makes them bite and vilify each other; and take poſſeſſion of public aſſemblies, as wild beaſts do of ſolitudes and mountains; and convert courts of juſtice into dens of robbers: nor that prompts them to be intemperate, adulterers, ſeducers; or leads them into other offences, that men commit againſt each other, from the one ſingle principle, by which they place themſelves, and their own concerns, in things independent on choice.

§. 4. But, if you hear that theſe men, in reality ſuppoſe good to be placed only in choice, and in a right uſe of the appearances of things; no longer take the trouble of inquiring, if they are father and ſon, or old companions and acquaintance; but as boldly pronounce, that they are friends, as they are faithful and juſt. For where elſe can friendſhip be met, but with fidelity and modeſty, and a communication of virtue; and of no other thing?

Well: but ſuch a one paid me the utmoſt regard, for ſo long a time; and did not he *love* me?

How can you tell, wretch, if that regard be any other than he pays to his ſhoes, or his horſe, when he cleans them? And, how do you know, but when you ceaſe to be a neceſſary utenſil, he may throw you away, like a broken ſtool?

Well: but it is my wife; and we have lived together many years.

And how many did Eriphyle live with Amphiaraus; and was the mother of children, and not a few? But a bracelet fell in between them. What was this bracelet? The principle [ſhe had formed] concerning ſuch things. This turned her into a ſavage animal: this cut aſunder all love; and ſuffered neither the wife, nor the mother, to continue ſuch.

§. 5. Whoever therefor, among you, ſtudies to be, or to gain a friend, let him cut up all theſe principles by the root; hate them; drive them utterly out of the ſoul. Thus, in the firſt place, he will be ſecure from inward reproaches, and conteſts; from change of mind, and ſelf-torment. Then, with reſpect to others; to every one, like himſelf, he will be unreſerved. To ſuch as are unlike, he will be patient, mild, gentle, and ready to forgive them, as failing in points of the greateſt importance: but ſevere to none; being fully convinced of Plato's doctrine, that the ſoul is never willingly deprived of truth. Without all this, you may, in many reſpects, live as friends do; and drink, and lodge, and travel together, and be born of the ſame parents; and ſo may ſerpents too: but neither they, nor you, can ever be friends, while you have theſe brutal and execrable principles.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the Faculty of Speaking.

§. 1. A BOOK will always be read with the greater pleaſure, and eaſe too, if it be written in a fair character: therefor every one will the more eaſily attend to diſcourſes likewiſe, ornamented with proper and beautiful expreſſions. It ought not then to be ſaid, that there is no ſuch thing as the faculty of elocution: for this would be at once the part of an impious and fearful perſon. Impious; becauſe he diſhonours the gifts of God; juſt as if he ſhould deny any uſe in the faculty of ſight, hearing, and ſpeech itſelf. Hath God then given you eyes in vain? Is it in vain, that he hath infuſed into them, ſuch a ſtrong and active ſpirit, as to be able to repreſent the forms of diſtant objects? what meſſenger is ſo quick and diligent? Is it in vain, that he hath made the intermediate air, ſo yielding, and elaſtic, that the ſight penetrates through it? and is it in vain, that he hath made the light; without which all the reſt would be uſeleſs? Man, be not ungrateful; nor, on the other hand, unmindful of your ſuperior advantages: but for ſight, and hearing, and indeed for life itſelf and the ſupports of it, as fruits, and wine, and oil, be thankful to God: but remember, that he hath given you another thing, ſuperior to them all; which makes uſe of them, proves them, eſtimates the value of each. For what is it that pronounces upon the value of each of theſe faculties? is it the faculty itſelf? did you ever perceive

the faculty of ſight or hearing, to ſay any thing concerning itſelf? or wheat, or barley, or horſes, or dogs? No. Theſe things are appointed as inſtruments and ſervants, to obey that which is capable of uſing the appearances of things. If you inquire the value of any thing; of *what* do you inquire? what is it that anſwers you? how then can any faculty be ſuperior to this; which both uſes all the reſt as inſtruments, and tries and pronounces concerning each of them? for which of them knows, what itſelf is; and what is its own value? which of them knows, when it is to be uſed, and when not? which is it, that opens and ſhuts the eyes, and turns them away from improper objects? is it the faculty of ſight? no: but of *choice*. Which is it, that opens and ſhuts the ears? what is it, by which they are made curious and inquiſitive; or, on the contrary, deaf, and unaffected by what is ſaid? is it the faculty of hearing? no: but that of *choice*. Will this then, perceiving itſelf to exiſt in [man amidſt] the other faculties, [which are] all blind and deaf, and unable to diſcern any thing, but thoſe offices, in which they are appointed to miniſter, and be ſubſervient to it; and that itſelf alone ſees clearly, and diſtinguiſhes the value of each of the reſt; will this, I ſay, inform us, that any thing is ſupreme, but itſelf? what doth the eye, when it is opened, do more, than ſee? But whether we ought to look upon the wife of any one, and in what manner, what is it that tells us? The faculty of *choice*. Whether we ought to believe, or diſbelieve what is ſaid; or whether, if we do believe, we ought to be moved by it, or not? what is it that tells us? Is it not the faculty of *choice*? Again: the very faculty of elo-

cution, and that which ornaments diſcourſe, if there be any ſuch peculiar faculty, what doth it more, than merely ornament and arrange expreſſions, as curlers do the hair? But whether it be better to ſpeak, or be ſilent; or better to ſpeak in this or that manner; whether this be decent, or indecent; and the ſeaſon and the uſe of each; what is it that tells us, but the faculty of *choice?* what then, would you have it appear, and bear teſtimony againſt itſelf? What means this? If the caſe be thus, that which ſerves, may be ſuperior to that to which it is ſubſervient; the horſe, to the rider; the dog, to the hunter; the inſtrument, to the muſician; or ſervants to the king. What is it that makes uſe of all the reſt? *Choice.* What takes care of all? *Choice.* What deſtroys the whole man, at one time, by hunger; at another, by a rope, or a precipice? *Choice.* Hath man, then, any thing ſtronger than this? and how is it poſſible, that what is liable to reſtraint ſhould be ſtronger, than what is not? what hath a natural power of hindering the faculty of ſight? Both choice, and what depends on choice. And it is the ſame of the faculties of hearing and ſpeech. And what hath a natural power of hindering choice? Nothing independent on itſelf, only its own perverſion. Therefor *choice* alone is vice: *choice* alone is virtue.

§. 2. Since, then, choice is ſuch a faculty, and placed in authority over all the reſt, let it come forth and ſay to us, that the body is, of all things, the moſt excellent. If even the body itſelf pronounced itſelf to be the moſt excellent, it could not be borne. But now, what is it, Epicurus, that pronounces all this? what was it, that compoſed volumes, con-

cerning the end of [being], the nature of things, the rule [of reaſoning]; that aſſumed a philoſophic beard; that, as it was dying, wrote, that it was *then ſpending its laſt and happieſt day?* was this, body, or was it the faculty of choice? and can you then, without madneſs, confeſs any thing ſuperior to *this?* are you in reality ſo deaf and blind? what then, doth any one diſhonour the other faculties? Heaven forbid! doth any one deny, that the faculty of ſight is uſeful, and preferable [to the want of it]? Heaven forbid! It would be ſtupid, impious, and ungrateful to God. But we render to each its due. There is ſome uſe of an aſs, though not ſo much as of an ox; and of a dog, though not ſo much as of a ſervant; and of a ſervant, though not ſo much as of the citizens; and of the citizens, tho' not ſo much as of the magiſtrates. And, though ſome are more excellent than others, thoſe uſes, which the laſt afford, are not to be deſpiſed. The faculty of elocution hath its value, though not equal to that of choice. When therefor I talk thus, let not any one ſuppoſe, that I would have you neglect elocution, any more than your eyes, or ears, or hands, or feet, or clothes, or ſhoes. But if you aſk me, what is the moſt excellent of things, what ſhall I ſay? I cannot ſay, *elocution;* but a right *choice*: for it is that which makes uſe of this, and all the other faculties, whether great or ſmall. If this be ſet right, a bad man becomes good; if it be wrong, a good man becomes wicked. By this we are unfortunate, fortunate; we diſapprove, or approve each other. In a word, it is this, which, neglected, forms unhappineſs; and, well cultivated, happineſs.

§. 3. But to take away the faculty of elocution; and to ſay, that it is in reality nothing, is not only ingrateful to thoſe who gave it, but cowardly too. For ſuch a perſon ſeems to me to be afraid, that, if there be any ſuch faculty, we may not, on occaſion, be able to treat it with contempt. Such are they too, who deny any difference between beauty, and deformity. Was it poſſible then, to be affected in the ſame manner by ſeeing Therſites, as Achilles; or Helen, as any other woman? Theſe alſo are the fooliſh and clowniſh notions of thoſe, who are ignorant of the nature of things; and afraid, that, whoever perceives a difference, muſt preſently be carried away, and overcome. But the great point is to leave to each thing its proper faculty; and then to ſee what the value of the faculty is, and to learn what is the principal thing, and, upon every occaſion to follow that, and to make it the chief object of your attention: to conſider other things as trifling in compariſon to this; and yet, as far as we are able not to neglect even theſe. We ought, for inſtance, to take care of our eyes; but not as of the principal thing, but only on account of the principal: becauſe *that* will no otherwiſe preſerve its own nature, than by making a due eſtimation of the reſt, and preferring ſome to others. What is the uſual practice then? That of a traveller, who returning into his own country, and meeting on the road with a good *Inn*, being pleaſed with the *Inn*, ſhould remain at the *Inn*. Have you forgot your intention, man? You were not travelling *to* this place, but only *thro'* it. "But this is a fine place." And how many other fine inns are there, and how many pleaſant fields? But only to be paſt through in your way.

The buſineſs is, to return to your country; to relieve the anxieties of your family; to perform the duties of a citizen; to marry; have children; and go through the public offices. For you did not ſet out, to chuſe the fineſt places; but to return, to live in that where you were born, and of which you are appointed a citizen.

§. 4. Such is the preſent caſe. Becauſe by ſpeech, and verbal precepts, we are to arrive at perfection; and purify our own choice; and rectify that faculty, of which the office is, the uſe of the appearances of things: and, becauſe, for the delivery of theorems, a certain manner of expreſſion, and ſome variety and ſubtilty of diſcourſe, becomes neceſſary; many, captivated by theſe very things, one, by expreſſion, another, by ſyllogiſms, a third, by convertible propoſitions, juſt as our traveller was by the good inn, go no further: but ſit down and waſte their lives ſhamefully there, as if amongſt the Sirens. Your buſineſs, man, was to prepare yourſelf for ſuch an uſe of the appearances of things, as nature demands: not to be fruſtrated of your deſires, or incur your averſions: never to be diſappointed, or unfortunate: but free, unreſtrained, uncompelled; conformed to the adminiſtration of Jupiter; obedient to that; finding fault with nothing: but able to ſay, from your whole ſoul, the verſes which begin,

Conduct me, Jove; *and thou, O* Deſtiny.

While you have ſuch a buſineſs before you, will you be ſo pleaſed with a pretty form of expreſſion, or a few theorems, as to chuſe to ſtay and live with them, forgetful of your home? and ſay, "They

" are fine things!" Why, who ſays they are not fine things? But only as a paſſage; as an inn. For, could you ſpeak like Demoſthenes, what hinders, but that you may be a diſappointed wretch? could you reſolve ſyllogiſms like Chryſippus, what hinders, but that you might be miſerable, ſorrowful, envious, in ſhort, diſturbed, unhappy? Nothing. You ſee then, that theſe are mere inns, of ſmall value; and that your point in view is quite another thing. When I talk thus to ſome, they ſuppoſe, that I am overthrowing all care about ſpeaking, and about theorems: but I do not overthrow that; only the reſting in theſe things without end, and placing our hopes there. If any one, by maintaining this, hurts an audience, place me amongſt thoſe hurtful people: for I cannot, when I ſee one thing to be the principal and moſt excellent, call another ſo, to gain your favour.

CHAP. XXIV.

Concerning a perſon whom he treated with diſregard.

§. 1. WHEN a certain perſon ſaid to him; " I have often come to you, with a " deſire of hearing you, and you have never given " me any anſwer; but now, if poſſible, I intreat " you to ſay ſomething to me:" do you think, replied Epictetus, that, as in other things, ſo in ſpeaking, there is an art, by which he, who underſtands it, ſpeaks ſkilfully, and he, who doth not, unſkilfully?

I do think ſo.

He then, who, by ſpeaking, both benefits himſelf, and is able to benefit others, muſt ſpeak ſkilfully: but he who rather hurts, and is hurt, muſt be unſkilful in this art of ſpeaking. For you may find ſome ſpeakers hurt, and others benefited. And are all hearers benefited by what they hear? or will you find ſome benefited, and ſome hurt?

Both.

Then thoſe who hear ſkilfully are benefited, and thoſe who hear unſkilfully hurt.

Granted.

Is there an art of hearing, then, as well as ſpeaking?

It ſeems ſo.

If you pleaſe, conſider it thus too. To whom, do you think, the practice of muſic belongs?

To a muſician.

To whom the proper formation of a ſtatue?

To a ſtatuary.

And do not you imagine ſome art neceſſary, to view a ſtatue ſkilfully?

I do.

If, therefor, to *ſpeak* properly belongs to one who is ſkilful, do not you ſee, that to *hear* with benefit belongs likewiſe to one who is ſkilful? For the preſent, however, if you pleaſe, let us ſay no more of doing things perfectly, and with benefit, ſince we are both far enough, from any thing of that kind: but this ſeem to be univerſally confeſſed, that he, who would hear philoſophers, needs ſome kind of exerciſe in hearing. Is it not ſo? Tell me then, on what I ſhall ſpeak to you? on what ſubject are you able to hear me?

On good and evil.

The good and evil of what? of a horſe?
No.
Of an ox?
No.
What then, of a man?
Yes.

Do we know, then, what *man is*? What is his nature; what our idea of him is; and how far our ears are open in reſpect to this matter. Nay, do you underſtand what nature is; or are you able, and in what degree, to comprehend me, when I come to ſay; "But I muſt uſe demonſtration to you?" How ſhould you? Do you comprehend what demonſtration is; or how a thing is demonſtrated; or by what methods; or, what reſembles a demonſtration; and yet is not a demonſtration? Do you know what true, or falſe is? what is conſequent to a thing, and what contradictory? or unſuitable or diſſonant? But I muſt excite you to philoſophy. How ſhall I ſhow you that contradiction, among the generality of mankind, by which they differ, concerning good and evil, profitable and unprofitable, when you know not what *contradiction* means? Show me then, what I ſhall gain, by diſcourſing with you? Excite an inclination in me, as a proper paſture excites an inclination to eating, in a ſheep: for if you offer him a ſtone, or a peice of bread, he will not be excited. Thus we too have certain natural inclinations to ſpeaking, when the hearer appears to be ſomebody; when he gives us encouragement: but if he ſits by, like a ſtone, or a tuft of graſs, how can he excite any deſire in a man? Doth a vine ſay to an huſbandman, "Take care of me?" No: but invites him to take care of it, by ſhowing

him, that, if he doth, it will reward him for his care. Who is there, whom engaging ſprighty children do not invite to play, and creep, and prattle, with them? But who was ever taken with an inclination to divert himſelf, or bray, with an aſs? for, be the creature ever ſo little, it is ſtill a little aſs.

§. 2. Why do you ſay nothing to me, then?

I have only this to ſay to you: that, whoever is ignorant what he is, and wherefor he was born, and in what kind of a world, and in what ſociety; what things are good, and what evil; what fair, and what baſe: who underſtands neither diſcourſe, nor demonſtration; nor what is true, nor what is falſe; nor is able to diſtinguiſh between them: ſuch a one will neither exert his deſires, nor averſions, nor purſuits, conformably to nature: he will neither intend, nor aſſent, nor deny, nor ſuſpend, his judgment, conformably to nature: but will wander up and down, intirely deaf and blind, ſuppoſing himſelf to be ſomebody; while he is in reality, nobody. Is there any thing new, in all this? Is not this ignorance the cauſe of all the errors that have happened, from the very original of mankind? why did Agamemnon and Achilles differ? was it not for want of knowing what is advantageous, and diſadvantageous? doth not one of them ſay, it is advantageous to reſtore Chryſeis to her father; the other, that it is not? doth not one ſay, that he ought to take away the prize of the other; the other, that he ought not? did they not, by theſe means, forget who they were, and for what purpoſe they had come there? why, what did you come for, man: to gain a miſtreſs, or to fight?——"To fight."——With whom? with the Trojans, or Greeks?——"With

the Trojans."——Leaving Hector, then, do you draw your ſword upon your own king? And do you, good Sir, forgetting the duties of a king,

Intruſted with a nation, and its cares,

go ſquabbling, about a girl, with the braveſt of your allies; whom you ought, by every method, to conciliate and preſerve? and will you be inferior to a ſubtle prieſt, who pays his court, with the utmoſt care, to you fine gladiators?——You ſee the effects, which ignorance of what is advantageous, produces.——"But I am rich [you may ſay], as well as "other people."——What, richer than Agamemnon?——"But I am handſome too."——What, handſomer than Achilles?——"But I have "fine hair too."——Had not Achilles finer and brighter? Yet he neither combed it nicely, nor curled it.——"But I am ſtrong too."——Can you lift ſuch a ſtone then, as Hector, or Ajax?——"But I am of a noble family too."——Is your mother a goddeſs, or your father deſcended from Jupiter? And what good did all this do Achilles, when he ſat crying for a girl?—"But I am an "orator:"——And was not he? do not you ſee how he treated the moſt eloquent of the Greeks, Phoenix and Ulyſſes? how he ſtruck them dumb? This is all I have to ſay to you; and even this, againſt my inclination.

Why ſo?

Becauſe you have given me no encouragement. For what can I ſee in you, to encourage me, as ſpirited horſes do their riders? Your perſon? that you diſfigure. Your dreſs? that is effeminate. Your

behaviour? your look? Abſolutely nothing. When you would hear a philoſopher, do not ſay to him, "You tell me nothing;" but only ſhow yourſelf worthy, or fit to *hear*; and you will find, how you will move him to *ſpeak*.

CHAP. XXV.

That Logic is neceſſary.

WHEN one of the company ſaid to him, "Convince me that Logic is neceſſary;" would you have me demonſtrate it to you, ſays he? ——"Yes."——Then I muſt uſe a demonſtrative form of argument ——"Granted."—— And how will you know then, whether I argue ſophiſtically? On this, the man being ſilent; you ſee, ſays he, that, even by your own confeſſion, Logic is neceſſary; ſince, without its aſſiſtance, you cannot learn ſo much as whether it be neceſſary, or not.

CHAP. XXVI.

What is the property of error in life.

§. 1. EVERY error in life implies a contradiction: for, ſince he who errs, doth not mean to err, but to be in the right, it is evident, that he acts contrary to his meaning. What doth a thief mean? His own intereſt. If, then, thieving be againſt his intereſt, he acts contrary to his meaning. Now every rational ſoul is naturally

averſe to ſelf-contradiction: but ſo long as any one is ignorant, that it is a contradiction, nothing reſtrains him from acting contradictorily: but, whenever he diſcovers it, he muſt as neceſſarily renounce and avoid it, as any one muſt diſſent from a falſhood, whenever he perceives it to be a falſhood: but, while this doth not appear, he aſſents to it, as to a truth.

§. 2. He then is an able ſpeaker, and excels at once in exhortation and conviction, who can diſcover, to each man, the contradiction by which he errs, and prove clearly to him, that what he would, he doth not; and what he would not do, that he doth. For, if that be ſhown, he will depart from it, of his own accord: but, till you have ſhown it, be not ſurprized that he remains where he is: for he doth it on the appearance, that he acts rightly. Hence Socrates, relying on this faculty, uſed to ſay, "It "is not my cuſtom to cite any other witneſs of my "aſſertions; but I am always contented with my "opponent. I call and ſummon him for my witneſs; and his ſingle evidence is inſtead of all o-"thers." For he knew, that, if a rational ſoul be moved by any thing, the ſcale muſt turn, whether it will or no. Show the governing faculty of reaſon a contradiction, and it will renounce it: but, till you have ſhown it, rather blame yourſelf, than him who is unconvinced.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of Finery in Dreſs.

§. 1. A Certain young rhetorician coming to him, with his hair too curiouſly ornamented, and his dreſs very fine; tell me, ſays Epictetus, whether you do not think ſome horſes and dogs beautiful; and ſo of all other animals?

I do.

Are ſome men then likewiſe beautiful; and others deformed?

Certainly.

Do we call each of theſe beautiful then in its kind, on the ſame account, or on ſome account, peculiar to itſelf? You will judge of it, by this: ſince we ſee a dog naturally formed for one thing, a horſe for another, and a nightingale, for inſtance, for another; in general, it will not be abſurd to pronounce each of them beautiful, ſo far as it is in the condition moſt ſuitable to its own nature: but, ſince the nature of each is different, I think each of them muſt be beautiful, in a different way. Is it ſo?

Agreed.

Then, what makes a dog beautiful, makes a horſe deformed; and what makes a horſe beautiful, a dog deformed; if their natures are different.

So it ſeems probable.

For, I ſuppoſe, what makes a good pancratiaſt makes no good wreſtler, and a very ridiculous racer; and the very ſame perſon who appears beautiful as a pentathlete, would appear very deformed, in wreſtling.

Very true.

What, then, makes a man beautiful? is it the ſame, in general, that makes a dog or a horſe ſo?

The ſame.

What is it, then, that makes a dog beautiful?

That excellency which belongs to a dog.

What, a horſe?

The excellency of a horſe.

What, a man? muſt it not be the excellency belonging to a man? If then you would appear beautiful, young man, ſtrive for human excellency.

What is that?

Conſider, when you praiſe, without partial affection, whom you praiſe: Is it the honeſt, or diſhoneſt?

The honeſt.

The ſober, or the diſſolute?

The ſober.

The temperate, or the intemperate?

The temperate.

Then, if you make yourſelf ſuch a character, you know that you will make yourſelf beautiful: but, while you neglect theſe things, though you uſe every contrivance to appear beautiful, you muſt neceſſarily be deformed.

§. 2. I know not how to ſay any thing further to you; for if I ſpeak what I think, you will be vexed, and perhaps go away, and return no more. And, if I do not ſpeak, conſider how I ſhall act:

if you come to me to be improved, and I do not improve you; and you come to me as a philoſopher, and I do not ſpeak like a philoſopher. Beſides: how could it be conſiſtent with my duty towards yourſelf, to overlook, and leave you uncorrected? If hereafter you ſhall come to have ſenſe, you will accuſe me, with reaſon: "What did Epictetus obſerve in me, that, when he ſaw me come to him, in ſuch a ſhameful condition, he overlooked it, and never ſaid ſo much as a word of it? did he ſo abſolutely deſpair of me? was not I young? was not I able to hear reaſon? how many young men, at that age, are guilty of many ſuch errors? I am told of one Polemo, who, from a moſt diſſolute youth, became totally changed. Suppoſe he did not think I ſhould become a Polemo; he might however have ſet my locks to rights: he might have ſtript off my bracelets and rings: he might have prevented my picking off the hairs from my perſon. But when he ſaw me dreſſed like——what ſhall I ſay?——he was ſilent." I do not ſay like what; when you come to your ſenſes, you will ſay it yourſelf, and will know what it is, and who they are who ſtudy ſuch a dreſs.

§. 3. If you ſhould hereafter lay this to my charge, what excuſe could I make:————ay: but if I do ſpeak, he will not regard me. Why, did Laius regard Apollo? did not he go and get drunk, and bid farewel to the oracle? what then? did this hinder Apollo, from telling him the truth? Now I am uncertain, whether you will regard *me*, or not; But Apollo poſitively knew, that Laius would not regard *him*, and yet he ſpoke. "And why did he

" ſpeak? You may as well aſk, why is he Apollo; why doth he deliver oracles; why hath he placed himſelf in ſuch a poſt as a prophet, and the fountain of truth, to whom the inhabitants of the world ſhould reſort? why is KNOW THYSELF inſcribed on the front of his temple, when no one minds it?

§. 4. Did Socrates prevail on all who came to him, to take care of themſelves? Not on the thouſandth part: but however, being as he himſelf declares, divinely appointed to ſuch a poſt, he never deſerted it. What doth he ſay, even to his judges? " If you " would acquit me, on condition, that I ſhould no " longer act as I do now, I will not accept it, nor " deſiſt: but I will accoſt all I meet, whether young " or old, and interrogate them juſt in the ſame manner: but particularly you, my fellow citizens; as " you are more nearly related to me."——" Are " you ſo curious and officious, Socrates? What is " it to you, how we act?——What do you ſay? " While you are of the ſame community, and the " ſame kindred, with me, ſhall you be careleſs of " yourſelf, and ſhow yourſelf a bad citizen to the " city, a bad kinſman to your kindred, and a bad " neighbour to your neighbourhood?"——" Why, " who are *you?*"——Here it is a great thing to ſay, " I am he who ought to take care of mankind;" for it is not every little paultry heifer that dares reſiſt a lion: but if the bull ſhould come up, and reſiſt him, ſay to *him*, if you think proper, *who are you? what buſineſs is it of yours?* In every ſpecies, man, there is ſome one part which by nature excels; in oxen, in dogs, in bees, in horſes. Do not ſay to what excells, *who are you?* If you do, it will, ſomehow or other, find a voice to tell you, " I am like

" the purple thread in a garment. Do not expect " me to be like the reſt; or find fault with my na- " ture, which hath diſtinguiſhed me from others."

§. 5. What then, am *I* ſuch a one? How ſhould *I?* Indeed, are *you* ſuch a one as to be able to hear the truth? I wiſh you were. But however, ſince I am condemned to wear a grey beard and a cloke, and you come to me as to a philoſopher, I will not treat you cruelly, nor, as if I deſpaired of you; but will aſk you—— Who is it, young man, whom you would render beautiful? Know, firſt, who you are; and then adorn yourſelf accordingly. You are a man; that is, a mortal animal, capable of a rational uſe of the appearances of things. And what is this rational uſe? A perfect conformity to nature. What have you then, particularly excellent? is it the animal part? No. The mortal? No. That which is capable of the uſe of the appearances of things? No. The excellence lies in the rational part. Adorn and beautify this; but leave your hair to him who formed it, as he thought good. Well; what other denominations have you? Are you a man, or a woman? A man. Then adorn yourſelf as a man, not a woman. A woman is naturally ſmooth and delicate; and, if hairy, is a monſter, and ſhown among the monſters at Rome. It is the ſame in a man, not to be hairy; and, if he is by nature not ſo, he is a monſter. But, if he clips and picks off his hairs, what ſhall we do with him? where ſhall we ſhow him; and how ſhall we advertiſe him? *A man to be ſeen, who would rather be a woman.* What a ſcandalous ſhow! who would not wonder at ſuch an advertiſement? I believe indeed, that theſe very pickers themſelves would; not ap-

prehending, that it is the very thing of which they are guilty.

§. 6. Of what have you to accuſe your nature, Sir? that it hath made you a man? why; were all to be born women then? in that caſe what would have been the uſe of your finery? for whom would you have made yourſelf fine, if all were women? But the whole affair diſpleaſes you. Go to work upon the whole then. Remove what is the cauſe of theſe hairs; and make yourſelf a woman entirely, that we may be no longer deceived, nor you be half man, half woman. To whom would you be agreeable? to the women? Be agreeable to them as a man.

Ay; but they are pleaſed with ſmooth pretty fellows.

Go hang yourſelf. Suppoſe they were pleaſed with pathics, would you become one? Is this your buſineſs in life? were you born to pleaſe diſſolute women? ſhall we make ſuch a one as you, in the Corinthian republic, for inſtance, governor of the city, maſter of the youth, commander of the army, or director of the games? will you pick your hairs, when you are married? for whom, and for what? will you be the father of children, and introduce them into the ſtate, picked, like yourſelf? O what a fine citizen, and ſenator, and orator! for heaven's ſake, Sir, ought we to pray for a ſucceſſion of young men, diſpoſed and bred like you?

§. 7. Now, when you have once heard this diſcourſe, go home, and ſay to yourſelf; it is not Epictetus that hath told me all theſe things (for how ſhould he?) but ſome propitious God, by him; for it would never have entered the head of Epictetus,

who is not uſed to diſpute with any one. Well; let us obey God then, that we may not incur the divine diſpleaſure. If a crow had ſignified any thing to you, by his croaking; it is not the crow that ſignifies it, but God, by him. And, if you have any thing ſignified to you by the human voice, doth he not cauſe the man to tell it you; that you may know the divine efficacy, which declares its ſignifications to different perſons in different manners; and ſignifies the greateſt and principal things, by the nobleſt meſſengers. What elſe does the poet mean, when he ſays,

Hermes *I ſent, his purpoſe to reſtrain.*

Hermes, deſcending from heaven, was to warn *him;* and the Gods now, likewiſe, ſend Hermes to warn *you*, not to invert the well-appointed order of things; nor be curiouſly trifling: but ſuffer a man to be a man; and a woman, a woman: a beautiful man, to be beautiful, as a man; a deformed man, to be deformed, as a man: for you do not conſiſt of fleſh and hair, but of the faculty of choice. If you take care to have *this* beautiful, you will be beautiful. But all this while, I dare not tell you, that you are deformed; for I fancy you would rather hear any thing than this. But conſider what Socrates ſays to the moſt beautiful and blooming of all men, Alcibiades. "Endeavour to make yourſelf beautiful. What "doth he mean to ſay to him; curl you locks, and "pick the hairs from your legs? Heaven forbid! but, ornament your choice: throw away your wrong principles.

What is to be done with the poor body then?

Leave it to nature. Another hath taken care of ſuch things. Give them up to him.

What! then, muſt one be a ſloven?

By no means: but be neat, conformably to your nature. A man ſhould be neat, as a man; a woman, as a woman; a child, as a child. If not, let us pick out the mane of a lion, that he may not be ſlovenly; and the comb of a cock; for he ought to be neat too. Yes; but let it be as a cock; and a lion, as a lion; and a hound, as a hound.

CHAP. II.

In what a proficient ought to be exerciſed; and that we neglect the principal things.

§. 1 THERE are three topics in philoſophy, in which he, who would be wiſe and good, muſt be exerciſed. That of the *deſires*, and *averſions*; that he may not be diſappointed of the one, nor incur the other. That of the *purſuits*, and *avoidances*; and, in general, the duties of life; that he may act with order and conſideration, and not careleſsly. The third topic belongs to circumſpection, and a freedom from deception; and, in general, whatever belongs to aſſent.

§. 2. Of theſe topics, the principal and moſt urgent, is that of the paſſions: for paſſion is produced no otherwiſe, than by a diſappointment of the deſires, and an incurring of the averſions. It is this which introduces perturbations, tumults, misfortunes, and calamities: this is the ſpring of ſorrow,

lamentation, and envy: this renders us envious, and emulous; and incapable of hearing reaſon.

§. 3. The next topic regards the duties of life. For I am not to be undiſturbed by paſſions, in the ſame ſenſe as a ſtatue is; but as one who preſerves the natural and acquired relations; as a pious perſon, as a ſon, as a brother, as a father, as a citizen.

§. 4. The third topic belongs to thoſe who are now making a proficiency; and is a ſecurity to the other two, that no unexamined appearance may ſurpriſe us, either in ſleep, or wine, or in the ſpleen. This, ſay you, is above us. But our preſent philoſophers, leaving the firſt and ſecond topics [the affections, and moral duties], employ themſelves wholly about the third; convertible, definitive, hypothetical propoſitions [and other logical ſubtilties]. For, they ſay, that we muſt, by engaging even in theſe ſubjects, take care to guard againſt deception. Who muſt? A wiſe and good man. Is this ſecurity from deception, then, the thing you want? have you maſtered the other ſubjects? are you not liable to be deceived by money? when you ſee a fine girl, do you oppoſe the appearance which is raiſed in your mind? if your neighbour inherits an eſtate, do you feel no vexation? do you, at preſent, want nothing more than perſeverance? You learn even theſe very things, wretch, with trembling, and a ſolicitous dread of contempt; and are inquiſitive to know, what is ſaid of you; and, if any one comes and tells you, that, in a diſpute which was the beſt of the philoſophers, one of the company ſaid, that ſuch a one was the only philoſopher, that little ſoul of yours grows to the ſize of two cubits, inſtead of an inch; but if another ſhould come, and ſay, "You

" are miſtaken, he is not worth hearing; for what " doth he know? He hath the firſt rudiments, but " nothing more;" you are thunder-ſtruck; you preſently turn pale, and cry out, " I will ſhow him " what a man, and how great a philoſopher I am." It is evident [what you are], by theſe very things; why do you aim to ſhow it by others? Do not you know, that Diogenes ſhowed ſome ſophiſt in this manner, by extending his middle finger; and, when he was mad with rage, this, ſays Diogenes, is *he*: I have ſhowed him to you. For a man is not ſhowed in the ſame ſenſe as a ſtone, or a piece of wood, by the finger; but whoever ſhows his principles, ſhows him as a man.

§. 5. Let us ſee *your* principles too. For is it not evident, that you conſider your own choice as nothing; but look out for ſomething external, and independent on it? As, what ſuch a one will ſay of you, and what you ſhall be thought; whether a man of letters; whether to have read Chryſippus, or Antipater; for, if Archedemus too, you have every thing you wiſh. Why, are you ſtill ſolicitous, leſt you ſhould not ſhow us what you are? will you let me tell you, what you have ſhowed us that you are? A mean, diſcontented, paſſionate, cowardly fellow; complaining of every thing; accuſing every body; perpetually reſtleſs; good for nothing. This you have ſhowed us. Go now and read Archedemus: and then, if you hear but the noiſe of a mouſe, you are a dead man; for you will die ſome ſuch kind of death as——who was it? Crinis; who valued himſelf extremely too, that he underſtood Archedemus.

§. 6. Wretch, why do not you let alone things,

that do not belong to you? Theſe things become ſuch as are able to learn them, without perturbation; who can ſay, "I am not ſubject to anger, or "grief, or envy. I am not reſtrained; I am not "compelled. What remains for me to do? I am "at leiſure; I am at eaſe. Let us ſee how con-"vertible propoſitions are to be treated: let us con-"ſider, when an hypotheſis is laid down, how we "may avoid a contradiction." To ſuch perſons do theſe things belong. They who are ſafe may light a fire; go to dinner, if they pleaſe; and ſing, and dance: but you come and hoiſt a flag, when your veſſel is juſt ſinking.

CHAP. III.

What is the ſubject-matter of a good man; and in what we chiefly ought to be practitioners.

§. 1. THE ſubject-matter of a wiſe and good man is, his own governing faculty. The body is the ſubject-matter of a phyſician, and of a maſter of exerciſe; and a field, of the huſbandman. The buſineſs of a wiſe and good man is, an uſe of the appearances of things, conformable to nature. Now, every ſoul, as it is naturally formed for an aſſent to truth, a diſſent from falſhood, and a ſuſpence with regard to uncertainty; ſo it is moved by a deſire of good, an averſion from evil, and an indifference to what is neither good nor evil. For, as a money-changer, or a gardener, is not at liberty to reject Caeſar's coin; but when once it is ſhown, is obliged, whether he will or not, to deliver

what is ſold for it; ſo is it in the ſoul. Apparent good at firſt ſight attracts, and evil repells. Nor will the ſoul any more reject an evident appearance of good, than [they will] Caeſar's coin.

§. 2. Hence depends every movement, both of God and man; and hence *good* is preferred to every obligation, however near. My connexion is not with my father; but with good.———Are you ſo hard-hearted?———Such is my nature, and ſuch is the coin which God hath given me. If, therefor, *good* is made to be any thing but fair and juſt, away go father, and brother, and country, and every thing. What! ſhall I overlook my own good, and give it up to *you?* for what? "I am "your father." But not my *good.* "I am your "brother." But not my *good.* But, if we place it in a right choice, *good* will conſiſt in an obſervance of the ſeveral relations of life; and then, he who gives up ſome externals, acquires *good.* Your father deprives you of your money; but he doth not hurt you. Your brother will poſſeſs as much larger a portion of land than you, as he pleaſes; but will he poſſeſs more honour? more fidelity? more fraternal affection? who can throw you out of this poſſeſſion? Not even Jupiter: for, indeed, it is not his will; but he hath put this good into my own power, and given it me, like his own, uncompelled, unreſtrained, and unhindered. But, when any one hath a coin different from this, [for his coin], whoever ſhows it to him, may have whatever is ſold for it, in return. A thieviſh proconſul comes into the province: what coin doth he uſe? Silver. Show it him, and carry off what you pleaſe. An adulterer comes: what coin doth he uſe? Women. Take

the coin, ſays one, and give me this trifle. "Give "it me, and it is yours." Another is addicted to boys: give him the coin, and take what you pleaſe. Another is fond of hunting: give him a fine nag, or a puppy; and, though with ſighs and groans, he will ſell you for it, what you will; for he is inwardly compelled by another, who hath conſtituted his coin.

§. 3. In this manner, ought every one chiefly to exerciſe himſelf. When you go out in a morning, examine whomſoever you ſee, or hear: anſwer, as to a queſtion. What have you ſeen? a handſome perſon? apply the rule. Is this dependent or independent, on choice? Independent. Throw it away. What have you ſeen? one grieving for the deceaſe of a child? apply the rule. Death is independent on choice. Throw it by. Hath a conſul met you? apply the rule. What kind of thing is the conſular office? dependent, or independent, on choice? Independent. Throw aſide this too. It is not proof. Caſt it away. It is nothing to *you*.

§. 4. If we acted thus, and practiſed in this manner, from morning till night, by heaven, ſomething would be done. Whereas now, on the contrary, we are caught by every appearance, half aſleep; and, if we ever do awake, it is only a little in ſchool: but, as ſoon as we go out, if we meet any one grieving, we ſay, "He is undone." If a conſul, "How happy is he!" If an exile, "How mi-"ſerable." If a poor man, "How wretched; he "hath nothing to eat!"

§. 5. Theſe vicious principles then are to be lopped off: and here is our whole ſtrength to be applied. For what is weeping and groaning? Prin-

ciple. What is misfortune? Principle. What is ſedition, diſcord, complaint, accuſation, impiety, trifling? All theſe are principles, and nothing more; and principles concerning things independent on choice, as if they were either good or evil. Let any one transfer theſe principles to things dependent on choice, and I will engage, that he will preſerve his conſtancy, whatever be the ſtate of things about him.

§. 6. The ſoul reſembles a veſſel filled with water: the appearances of things reſemble a ray falling upon its ſurface. If the water is moved, the ray will ſeem to be moved likewiſe, though it is in reality without motion. Whenever therefor, any one is ſeized with a ſwimming in his head, it is not the arts and virtues that are confounded, but the mind, in which they are: and, if this recover its compoſure, ſo will they likewiſe.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning one who exerted himſelf, with indecent eagerneſs in the theatre.

§. 1. WHEN the governor of Epirus had exerted himſelf indecently, in favour of a comedian, and was, upon that account, publicly railed at; and, when he came to hear it, was highly diſpleaſed with thoſe who railed at him: why: what harm, ſays Epictetus, have theſe people done? They have favoured a player; which is juſt what you did.

Is this a proper manner then, of expreſſing their favour?

Seeing you, their governor, and the friend and vicegerent of Caeſar, expreſs it thus, was it not to be expected, that they would expreſs it thus too? For, if it is not right to expreſs favour, in this manner, to a player, be not guilty of it yourſelf; and, if it is, why are you angry at them, for imitating you? for, whom have the many to imitate, but *you*, their ſuperiors? from whom are they to take example, when they come into the theatre, but from *you*? "Do but look how Caeſar's vicegerent ſees the play? "hath he cried out? I will cry out too. Hath he "leaped up from his ſeat? I will leap up from mine. "Do his ſlaves ſit in different parts of the houſe, "making an uproar? I indeed have no ſlaves; but "I will make as much uproar as I can myſelf, in-"ſtead of ever ſo many."

§. 2. You ought to conſider then, that when you appear in the theatre, you appear as a rule and example to others, how they ought to ſee the play. Why is it, that they have railed at you? Becauſe every man hates what hinders him. *They* would have one actor crowned; *you* another. They hindered you; and you, them. You proved the ſtronger. They have done what they could: they have railed at the perſon who hindered them. What would you have then? would you *do* as you pleaſe, and not have them even *talk* as they pleaſe? where is the wonder of all this? doth not the huſbandman rail at Jupiter, when he is hindered by him? doth not the ſailor? do men ever ceaſe railing at Caeſar? how then doth he act? He knows, that, if

he was to puniſh all railers, he would have nobody left to command.

§. 3. When you enter the theatre then, ought you to ſay, "Come, let Sophron be crowned?" No. But, "Come, let me preſerve my choice, in "a manner conformable to nature, upon this occa- "ſion. No one is dearer to me than myſelf. It "is ridiculous then, that, becauſe another man gains "the victory as a player, *I* ſhould be hurt. Whom "do I wiſh to gain the victory? Him who doth "gain it; and thus he will always be victorious, "whom I wiſh to be ſo."——But I would have Sophron crowned.——Why, celebrate as many games as you will, at your own houſe; Nemean, Pythian, Iſthmian, Olympic; and proclaim him victor in all: but, in public, do not arrogate more than your due, nor ſeize to yourſelf what lies in common; otherwiſe, bear to be railed at: for, if you act like the mob, you reduce yourſelf to an equality with them.

CHAP. V.

Concerning thoſe who pretend ſickneſs, as an excuſe to return home.

§. 1. I Am ſick here, ſaid one of the ſcholars. I will return home.

Were you never ſick at home then? Conſider, whether you are doing any thing here, conducive to the regulation of your choice: for, if you make no improvement, it was to no purpoſe that you came. Go home. Take care of your domeſtic af-

fairs. For, if your ruling faculty cannot be brought to a conformity to nature, your land may. You may increaſe your money, ſupport the old age of your father, mix in the public aſſemblies, and make a bad governor, as you are a bad man, and do other things of that ſort. But, if you are conſcious to yourſelf, that you are caſting off ſome of your wrong principles, and taking up different ones in their room, and that you have transferred your ſcheme of life from things not dependent on choice, to thoſe which are; and that, if you do ſometimes cry *alas*, it is not upon the account of your father, or your brother, but yourſelf; why do you any longer plead ſickneſs? Do not you know, that both ſickneſs and death muſt overtake us: at what employment? The huſbandman, at his plow; the ſailor, on his voyage. At what employment would you be taken? For, indeed, at what employment ought you to be taken? If there is any better employment, at which you can be taken, follow that. For my own part, I would be taken engaged in nothing, but in the care of my own faculty of choice; how to render it undiſturbed, unreſtrained, uncompelled, free. I would be found ſtudying this, that I may be able to ſay to God, "Have I tranſgreſſed thy commands? have I "perverted the powers, the ſenſes, the pre-conceptions, which thou haſt given me? have I ever accuſed thee, or cenſured thy diſpenſation? I have been ſick, becauſe it was thy pleaſure; and ſo have others; but *I* willingly. I have been poor, it being thy will; but with joy. I have not been in power; becauſe it was not thy will; and power I have never deſired. Haſt thou ever ſeen me out of humour, upon this account? have I not

" always approached thee, with a chearful counte-
" nance; prepared to execute thy commands, and
" the ſignifications of thy will? is it thy pleaſure
" that I ſhould depart from this aſſembly? I de-
" part. I give thee all thanks, that thou haſt
" thought me worthy to have a ſhare in it, with
" thee, to behold thy works, and to join with thee,
" in comprehending thy adminiſtration." Let death overtake me while I am thinking, while I am writing, while I am reading, ſuch things as theſe.

§. 2. But I ſhall not have my mother; to hold my head, when I am ſick.

Get home then to your mother; for you are fit to have your head held, when you are ſick.

But I uſed at home, to lie on a fine couch.

Get to this couch of yours; for you are fit to lie upon ſuch a one, even in health: ſo do not loſe the doing what you are qualified for. But what ſays Socrates? " As one man rejoices in the
" improvement of his eſtate, another, of his horſe,
" ſo do I daily rejoice in apprehending myſelf to
" grow better."

In what? in pretty ſpeeches?

Good words, I intreat you.

In trifling theorems? in what doth he employ himſelf? For indeed I do not ſee, that the philoſophers are employed, in any thing elſe.

Do you think it nothing, never to accuſe or cenſure any one, either God or man? always to carry abroad, and bring home, the ſame countenance? Theſe were the things which Socrates knew; and yet he never profeſſed to know, or to teach any thing; but if any one wanted pretty ſpeeches, or little theorems, he brought him to Protagoras, to

Hippias: juſt as if any one had come for pot-herbs, he would have taken him to a gardener. Who of you then hath ſuch an [earneſt] intention as this? If you had, you would bear ſickneſs, and hunger, and death, with chearfulneſs. If any of you hath been in love, he knows that I ſpeak truth.

CHAP. VI.

Miſcellaneous.

§. 1. WHEN he was aſked, how it came to paſs, that, though the art of reaſoning is more ſtudied now, yet the improvements were greater, formerly? In what inſtance, anſwered he, is it more ſtudied *now*; and in what were the improvements greater *then?* For in what is ſtudied, at preſent, in that will be found likewiſe the improvements, at preſent. The preſent ſtudy is the ſolution of ſyllogiſms; and in this, improvements are made. But formerly, the ſtudy was to preſerve the governing faculty conformable to nature; and improvement was made in that. Therefor do not confound things; nor when you ſtudy one, expect improvement in another; but ſee whether any of us, who applies himſelf to think and act conformably to nature, ever fails of improvement. Depend upon it, you will not find one.

§. 2. A good man is invincible? for he doth not contend, where he is not ſuperior. If you would have his land, take it: take his ſervants; take his public poſt; take his body. But you will never fruſtrate his deſire, nor make him incur his averſion.

He engages in no combat, but what concerns the objects of his own choice. How can he fail then to be invincible?

§. 3. Being aſked, what common ſenſe was? he anſwered; as that may be called a common ear, which diſtinguiſhes only ſounds; but that, which diſtinguiſhes notes, an artificial one; ſo there are ſome things, which men, not totally perverted, diſcern by their common natural powers; and ſuch a diſpoſition is called common ſenſe.

§. 4. It is not eaſy to gain the attention of effeminate young men; for you cannot take cuſtard by a hook: but the ingenuous, even if you diſcourage them, are the more eager for learning. Hence Rufus, for the moſt part, did diſcourage them; and made uſe of that, as a criterion of the ingenuous and diſingenuous. For he uſed to ſay, as a ſtone, even if we throw it up, will, by its own propenſity, be carried downward; ſo an ingenuous mind, the more it is forced from its natural bent, the more ſtrongly will it incline towards it.

CHAP. VII.

Concerning a governor of the free ſtates, who was an Epicurean.

§. 1. WHEN the governor, who was an Epicurean, came to him; it it fit, ſays he, that we ignorant people ſhould enquire of you philoſophers, what is the moſt valuable thing, in the world; as thoſe who come into a ſtrange city do of the citizens, and ſuch as are acquainted with it;

that, after this enquiry, we may go and take a view of it, as they do in cities. Now, ſcarcely any one denies, but that there are three things belonging to man; ſoul, body, and externals. It remains for you to anſwer which is the beſt. What ſhall we tell mankind? Is it fleſh?

And was it for this, that Maximus took a voyage in winter as far as Caſſiope, to accompany his ſon? was it to gratify the fleſh?

No, ſurely.

Is it not fit, then, to employ your chief ſtudy on what is beſt?

Yes, beyond all other things.

What have we, then, better than fleſh?

The ſoul.

Are we to prefer the good of the better, or of the worſe?

Of the better.

Doth the good of the ſoul conſiſt in what is dependent, or independent, on choice?

In what is dependent on it.

Doth the pleaſure of the ſoul then depend on choice?

It doth.

And whence doth this pleaſure ariſe? from itſelf? This is unintelligible. For there muſt ſubſiſt ſome principal eſſence of good, in the attainment of which, we ſhall enjoy this pleaſure of the ſoul.

This too is granted.

In what then conſiſts this pleaſure of the ſoul? For if it be in mental objects, the eſſence of good is found. For it is impoſſible, that we ſhould be reaſonably elated with pleaſure, unleſs by good; or that, if the leading cauſe is not good, the effect

ſhould be good. For, to make the effect reaſonable, the cauſe muſt be good. But this, if you are in your ſenſes, you will not allow; for it would be to contradict both Epicurus, and the reſt of your principles. It remains then, that the pleaſures of the ſoul muſt conſiſt in bodily objects; and that *there* muſt be the leading cauſe, and the eſſence of good. Maximus therefor did fooliſhly, if he took a voyage for the ſake of any thing but body; that is, for the ſake of what is beſt. He doth fooliſhly too, if he refrains from what is another's, when he is a judge, and able to take it. But let us conſider only this, if you pleaſe, how it may be done ſecretly, and ſafely, and ſo that no one may know it. For Epicurus himſelf doth not pronounce ſtealing to be evil, only the being found out in it: and ſays, "Do not ſteal;" for no other reaſon, but becauſe it is impoſſible to inſure ourſelves againſt a diſcovery. But I ſay to you, that, if it be done dexterouſly and cautiouſly, we ſhall not be diſcovered. Beſides: we have powerful friends, of both ſexes, at Rome; and the Greeks are weak; and nobody will dare to go up to Rome, on ſuch an affair. Why do you refrain from your own proper good? It is madneſs; it is folly. But if you were to tell me, that you do refrain, I would not believe you. For, as it is impoſſible to aſſent to an apparent falſhood, or to deny an apparent truth, ſo it is impoſſible to abſtain from an apparent good. Now, riches are a good; and, indeed, the chief inſtrument of pleaſures. Why do not you acquire them? and why do not we corrupt the wife of our neighbour, if it can be done ſecretly? and if the huſband ſhould happen to be impertinent, why not cut his throat too?

if you have a mind to be a philoſopher as you ought to be, a complete one, to be conſiſtent with your own principles. Otherwiſe you would not differ from us, who are called Stoics. For we too ſay one thing, and do another: we talk well, and act ill: but you will be perverſe in a contrary way; teach bad principles, and act well.

§. 2. For heaven's ſake repreſent to yourſelf a city of Epicureans. "I do not marry." "Nor "I. For we are not to marry, nor have children; "nor to engage in public affairs." What will be the conſequence of this? whence are the citizens to come? who will educate them? who will be the governor of the youth? who, the maſter of the exerciſes? what then will he teach them? will it be what uſed to be taught at Athens, or Lacedemon? Take a young man; bring him up, according to your principles. Theſe principles are wicked; ſubverſive of a ſtate; pernicious to families; nor becoming, even to women. Give them up, Sir. You live in a capital city. You are to govern, and judge uprightly, and to refrain from what belongs to others. No one's wife, or child, or ſilver or gold plate, is to have any charms for you; but your own. Provide yourſelf with principles, conſonant to theſe truths; and, ſetting out from thence, you will with pleaſure refrain from things ſo perſuaſive to miſlead, and get the better. But, if to their own purſuaſive force, we add ſuch a philoſophy, as hurries us upon them, and confirms us in them, what will be the conſequence?

§, 3. In a ſculptured vaſe, which is the beſt; the ſilver, or the workmanſhip? In the hand, the ſubſtance is fleſh: but its operations are the principal

thing. Accordingly, the duties, relative to it, are likewiſe threefold; ſome have reſpect to mere exiſtence; others, to the manner of exiſtence; and a third ſort are the leading operations themſelves. Thus likewiſe, do not ſet a value on the materials of man, mere paultry fleſh; but on the principal operations belonging to him.

What are theſe?

Engaging in public buſineſs; marrying; the production of children; the worſhip of God; the care of our parents; and, in general, the having our deſires and averſions, our purſuits and avoidances, ſuch as each of them ought to be, conformable to our nature.

What is our nature?

To be free, noble-ſpirited, modeſt. (For what other animal bluſhes? what other hath the idea of ſhame?) But pleaſure muſt be ſubjected to theſe, as an attendant and handmaid, to call forth our activity, and to keep us conſtant in natural operations.

But I am rich, and want nothing.

Then why do you pretend to philoſophize? Your gold and ſilver plate is enough for you. What need have you of principles?

Beſides, I am a judge of the Greeks.

Do you know how to judge? who hath imparted this knowlege to you?

Caeſar hath given me a commiſſion.

Let him give you a commiſſion to judge of muſic? and what good will it do you? but how were you made a judge? whoſe hand have you kiſſed? that of Symphorus, or Numenius? Before whoſe bed-chamber have you ſlept? to whom have you ſent

preſents? after all, do you perceive that the office of judge is of the ſame value as Numenius?

But I can throw whom I pleaſe in priſon.

As you may a ſtone.

But I can beat whom I will too.

As you may an aſs. This is not a government over men. Govern us like reaſonable creatures. Show us what is for our intereſt, and we will purſue it: ſhow us what is againſt our intereſt, and we will avoid it. Like Socrates, make us imitators of yourſelf. He was properly a governor of men, who ſubjected their deſires and averſions, their purſuits, their avoidances, to himſelf. "Do this: do "not do that, or I will throw you into priſon." Going thus far only, is not governing men, like reaſonable creatures. But——"Do as Jupiter hath "commanded, or you will be puniſhed. You will "be a loſer."

What ſhall I loſe?

Nothing more, than the not doing what you ought. You will loſe your fidelity, honour, decency. Look for no greater loſſes, than theſe

CHAP. VIII.

How we are to exerciſe ourſelves, againſt the appearances of things.

§. 1. IN the ſame manner, as we exerciſe ourſelves, againſt ſophiſtical queſtions, we ſhould exerciſe ourſelves likewiſe, in relation to ſuch appearances, as every day occur: for theſe too offer queſtions to us.——Such a one's ſon is dead. What

do you think of it? Anſwer: it is independent on choice: it is not an evil.——Such a one is diſinherited by his father. What do you think of it? It is independent on choice: it is not an evil——He hath been afflicted by it.——This is dependent on choice: it is an evil.——He hath ſupported it bravely.——This is dependent on choice: it is a good.

§. 2. If we accuſtom ourſelves in this manner, we ſhall make an improvement; for we ſhall never aſſent to any thing, but what the appearance itſelf comprehends. A ſon is dead.——What hath happened?——A ſon is dead.——Nothing more?——Nothing.——A ſhip is loſt.——What hath happened?——A ſhip is loſt. He is carried to priſon.——What has happened? He is carried to priſon. That he is *unhappy*, is an addition, that every one makes of his own.——"But Jupiter doth not "order theſe things right."——Why ſo? Becauſe he hath made you patient? becauſe he hath made you brave? becauſe he hath made them to be no evils? becauſe it is permitted you, while you ſuffer them, to be happy? becauſe he hath opened you the door, whenever they do not ſuit you? Go out, man, and do not complain.

§. 3. If you would know how the Romans treat philoſophers, hear. Italicus, eſteemed one of the greateſt philoſophers among them, being in a paſſion with his own people, as if he had ſuffered ſome intolerable evil, ſaid once when I was by, "I cannot "bear it; you are the ruin of me; you will make "me juſt like *him*;" pointing to me.

CHAP. IX.

Concerning a certain orator who was going to Rome *on a law ſuit.*

§. 1. WHEN a perſon came to him, who was going to Rome, on a law ſuit, in which his dignity was concerned; and, after telling him what he thought of the affair? If you aſk me, ſays Epictetus, what will happen to you at Rome, and whether you ſhall gain, or loſe your cauſe, I have no theorem for *this*. But if you aſk me, how you ſhall fare? I can anſwer, if you have right principles, well; if wrong ones, ill. For principle is to every one, the cauſe of action. For what is the reaſon, that you ſo earneſtly deſired to be voted governor of the Gnoſſians? Principle. What is the reaſon, that you are now going to Rome? Principle. And in winter too; and with danger, and expence? why: becauſe it is neceſſary. What tells you ſo? Principle. If then, principles are the cauſes of all our actions, where-ever any one hath bad principles, the effect will be anſwerable to the cauſe. Well then: are all our principles ſound? are both yours, and your antagoniſts? how then do you differ? or are yours better than his? why? You think ſo; and ſo doth he, that his are better; and ſo do madmen. This is a bad criterion. But ſhow me, that you have made ſome examination, and taken ſome care of your principles. As you now take a voyage to Rome, for the government of the Gnoſſians, and are not contented to ſtay at home, with the honours you before enjoyed, but deſire ſome-

thing greater, and more illuſtrious; did you ever take ſuch a voyage, in order to examine your own principles; and to throw away the bad ones, if you happened to have any? did you ever apply to any one, upon this account? what time did you ever ſet yourſelf? what age? Run over your years. If you are aſhamed of me, do it to yourſelf. Did you examine your principles, when you were a child? did you not *then* do every thing, juſt as you do every thing, *now?* when you were a youth, and frequented the ſchools of the orators, and made declamations yourſelf, did you ever imagine, that you were deficient in any thing? and when you became a man, and entered upon public buſineſs, pleaded cauſes, and acquired credit, who, any longer, appeared to be equal to you? how would you have borne, that any one ſhould examine, whether your principles were bad? what, then, would you have me ſay to you?

Aſſiſt me in this affair.

I have no theorem for that. Neither are you come to me, if it be upon that account you came, as to a philoſopher; but as you would come to an herb-ſeller, or a ſhoe-maker.

To what purpoſes then, have the philoſophers theorems?

For preſerving and conducting the ruling faculty conformably to nature, whatever happens. Do you think this a ſmall thing?

No: but the greateſt.

Well: and doth it require but a ſhort time? and may it be taken, as you paſs by? If you can, take it then: and ſo you will ſay, "I have viſited Epictetus."——Ay: juſt as you would a ſtone, or a

ſtatue. For you have *ſeen* me, and nothing more. But he viſits a man, as a man, who learns his principles; and, in return, ſhows his own. Learn my principles. Show me yours. *Then* ſay, you have viſited me. Let us confute each other. If I have any, take it away. If you have any, bring it forth. This is viſiting a philoſopher. No. But "It lies "in our way, and, while we are about hiring a "ſhip, we may call on Epictetus. Let us ſee what "it is he ſays." And then, when you are gone, "you ſay, "Epictetus is nothing. His language "was inaccurate, was barbarous." For what elſe did you come to judge of? "Well: but if I em-"ploy myſelf in theſe things, I ſhall be without "an eſtate, like you."—Nothing perhaps is neceſſary to be ſaid to this, but that I do not want them. But, if you poſſeſs many things, you ſtill want others: ſo that, whether you will or not, you are poorer than I.

§. 2. What then do I want?

What you have not: conſtancy; a mind conformable to nature; and a freedom from perturbation. Patron, or no patron, what care *I?* But *you* do. I am richer than you. I am not anxious what Caeſar will think of me. I flatter no one, on that account. This I have, inſtead of ſilver and gold plate. You have your veſſels, of gold; but your diſcourſe, your principles, your aſſents, your purſuits, your deſires, of mere earthen ware. When I have all theſe conformable to nature, why ſhould not I beſtow ſome ſtudy upon my reaſoning too? I am at leiſure. My mind is under no diſtraction. In this freedom from diſtraction, what ſhall I do? have I any thing more becoming a man, than this?

You, when you have nothing [to do], are reſtleſs; you go to the theatre, or perhaps to bathe. Why ſhould not the philoſopher poliſh his reaſoning? You have fine chryſtal and myrrhine vaſes; I have acute forms of reaſoning. To *you*, all you have appears little; to *me*, all I have, great. Your appetite is unſatiable; mine is ſatisfied. When children thruſt their hand into a narrow jar of nuts and figs, if they fill it, they cannot get it out again; then they fall a crying. Drop a few of them, and you will get out the reſt. And do you too drop your deſire: do not covet many things, and you will get [ſome].

CHAP. X.

In what manner we ought to bear ſickneſs.

§. 1. WE ſhould have all our principles ready, to make uſe of, on every occaſion. At dinner, ſuch as relate to dinner; in the bath, ſuch as relate to the bath; and in the bed, ſuch as relate to the bed.

Let not the ſtealing God of ſleep ſurpriſe,
Nor creep in ſlumbers, on thy weary eyes,
Ere every action of the former day
Strictly thou doſt, and righteouſly ſurvey,
What have I done? in what have I tranſgreſs'd?
What good, or ill, has this day's life expreſs'd?
Where have I fail'd, in what I ought to do?
If evil were thy deeds, repent and mourn,
If good, rejoice——

Rowe's Pythagoras.

We ſhould retain theſe verſes, ſo as to apply them to our uſe: not merely to repeat them aloud, as we do the verſes in honour of Apollo, [without minding what we are about].

§. 2. Again: in a fever, we ſhould have ſuch principles ready, as relate to a fever; and not, as ſoon as we are taken ill, to loſe and forget all. Provided I do but act like a philoſopher, let what will happen. Some way or other depart I muſt, from this frail body, whether a fever comes, or not. What is it to be a philoſopher? is it not to be prepared againſt events? do not you comprehend, that you ſay, in effect, if I am but prepared to bear all events with calmneſs, let what will happen? otherwiſe, you are like a pancratiaſt, who, after receiving a blow, ſhould quit the combat. In that caſe indeed you may allowably leave off, and not [run the hazard] of being whipt. But what ſhall we get by leaving off philoſophy? what then ought each of us to ſay upon every difficult occaſion? "It was for this, that I exerciſed: it was for this, "that I prepared myſelf." God ſays to you, give me a proof if you have gone through the preparatory combats, according to the rule: if you have followed a proper diet; a proper exerciſe: if you have obeyed your maſter: and, after this, do you faint, at the very time of action? Now is the proper time for a fever. Bear it well: for thirſt: bear it well: for hunger: bear it well. Is it not in your power? who ſhall reſtrain you? A phyſician may reſtrain you from drinking; but he cannot reſtrain you from bearing hunger, well.—But I cannot follow my ſtudies.——And for what end do you follow them, wretch? is it not that you may be prof-

perous? that you may be conſtant? that you may think and act conformably to nature? what reſtrains you, but that in a fever, you may preſerve your ruling faculty conformable to nature? Here is the proof of the matter. Here is the trial of the philoſopher: for a fever, is a part of life, juſt as a walk, a voyage, or a journey. Do you read, when you are walking? No: nor in a fever. But when you walk well, you have every thing belonging to a walker: ſo, if you bear a fever well, you have every thing belonging to one in a fever. What is it to bear a fever well? Not to blame either God or man: not to be afflicted at what happens: to expect death in a right and becoming manner; and to do what is to be done. When the phyſician enters, not to dread what he may ſay; nor, if he ſhould tell you that you are in a fair way, to be too much rejoiced: for what good hath he told you? when you were in health, what good did it do you? not to be dejected, when he tells you, that you are very ill? For what is it to be very ill? To be near the ſeparation of ſoul and body. What harm is there in this, then? if you are not near it now, will you not be near it hereafter? what, will the world be quite overſet when you die? why then, do you flatter your phyſician? why do you ſay, "If you pleaſe, Sir, I ſhall do well?" why do you furniſh an occaſion to his pride? why do not you treat a phyſician, with regard to an inſignificant body, which is not yours, but by nature mortal, as you do a ſhoemaker, about your foot; or a carpenter, about a houſe? Theſe are the things neceſſary, to one in a fever. If he fulfils theſe, he hath what belongs to him. For it is not the buſineſs of a phi-

loſopher to take care of theſe mere externals; of his wine, his oil, or his body; but his ruling faculty: and how, with regard to externals? So as not to behave inconſiderately, about them. What occaſion then, is there for fear? what occaſion for anger, about what belongs to others, and what is of no value? For, two rules we ſhould always have ready: that nothing is good or evil, but choice: and, that we are not to lead events, but to follow them. "My brother ought not to have treated me ſo." Very true; but *he* muſt ſee to that. However he treats me, I am to act right with regard to him; for the one is my own concern; the other is not: the one cannot be reſtrained; the other may.

CHAP. XI.

Miſcellaneous.

§. 1. THERE are ſome puniſhments appointed, as by a law, for ſuch as diſobey the divine adminiſtration. Whoever ſhall eſteem any thing good, except what depends on choice, let him be full of perturbation. Whoever eſteems any thing elſe to be evil, let him grieve, let him mourn, let him lament, let him be wretched.——And yet, though thus ſeverely puniſhed, we cannot deſiſt.

Remember what the poet ſays, of a ſtranger.

A worſe than thou might enter here ſecure:
No rude affront ſhall drive him from my door;
For ſtrangers come from Jove——

HOMER.

§. 2. This too you ſhould be prepared to ſay, with regard to a father: it is not lawful for me to affront you, father; even if a worſe than you ſhould have come: for all are from paternal Jove. And ſo of a brother; for all are from kindred Jove. And thus we ſhall find Jove to be the inſpector of all the other relations.

CHAP. XII.

Of Aſcetic Exerciſe

§. 1. WE are not to carry our exerciſes beyond nature; nor merely to attract admiration: for thus we, who call ourſelves philoſophers, ſhall not differ from jugglers. For it is difficult too, to walk upon a rope; and not only difficult, but dangerous. Ought *we* too, for that reaſon, to make it our ſtudy to walk upon a rope, or ſet up a palm-tree, or graſp a ſtatue? By no means. It is not every thing difficult, or dangerous, that is a proper exerciſe; but ſuch things as are conducive, to what lies before us to do.

And what is it that lies before us to do?

To have our deſires and averſions free from reſtraint.

How is that?

Not to be diſappointed of our deſire, nor incur our averſion. To this ought our exerciſe to be turned. For, without ſtrong and conſtant exerciſe, it is not poſſible to preſerve our deſire undiſappointed, and our averſion unincurred; and therefor, if we ſuffer it to be externally employed on things in-

dependent on choice, be aſſured, that your deſire will neither gain its object, nor your averſion, avoid it.

§. 2. And, becauſe habit hath a powerful influence, and we are habituated to apply our deſire and averſion to externals only, we muſt oppoſe one habit to another; and, where the appearances are moſt ſlippery, there oppoſe exerciſe. I am inclinable to pleaſure. I will bend myſelf beyond a due proportion to the other ſide, for the ſake of exerciſe. I am averſe to pain. I will break and exerciſe the appearances [which ſtrike my mind], that I may withdraw my averſion, from every ſuch object. For who is the practitioner in exerciſe? He who endeavours totally to reſtrain deſire, and to apply averſion only to things dependent on choice: and endeavours it moſt in the moſt difficult caſes. Hence different perſons are to be exerciſed, in different ways. What ſignifies it, to this purpoſe, to ſet up a palm tree, or carry about a tent of ſkins, or a peſtle and mortar? If you are haſty, man, let it be your exerciſe to bear ill language patiently; and, when you are affronted, not to be angry. Thus, at length, you may arrive at ſuch a proficiency, as, when any one ſtrikes you, to ſay to yourſelf, "Let me ſuppoſe "this, to be graſping a ſtatue." Next, exerciſe yourſelf to make a decent uſe of wine: not to drink a great deal; for even in this, there are ſome ſo fooliſh as to exerciſe themſelves: but at firſt to abſtain from it; and to abſtain from a girl, and from delicacies in eating. Afterwards you will venture into the liſts, at ſome proper ſeaſon, by way of trial, if at all, to ſee whether appearances get the better of you, as much as they uſed to do. But at firſt, fly

from what is ſtronger than you. The conteſt of a fine girl, with a young man, juſt initiated into philoſophy, is unequal. The braſs pot and the earthen pitcher, as the fable ſays, are an unſuitable match.

§. 3. Next to the deſires and averſions, is the ſecond claſs, of the purſuits and avoidances; that they may be obedient to reaſon; that nothing may be done improperly in point of time or place, or in any other reſpect.

§. 4. The third claſs relates to aſſent, and what is plauſible and perſuaſive. As Socrates ſaid, that we are not to lead an unexamined life; ſo neither are we to admit an unexamined appearance; but to ſay, "Stop: let me ſee what you are, and whence "you come." (As the watch ſay, ſhow me the ticket.) "Have you that ſignal from nature, which "is neceſſary to the admiſſion of every appearance?"

§. 5. In ſhort, whatever things are applied to the body, by thoſe who exerciſe it, if they any way affect deſire or averſion, they may be uſed in aſcetic exerciſe. But, if this be done for mere oſtentation, it belongs to one who looks out and hunts for ſomething external, and ſeeks for ſpectators to exclaim, "What a great man!" Hence Apollonius ſaid well. "If you have a mind to exerciſe yourſelf, for your "own benefit, when you are choaking with heat, "take a little cold water in your mouth; and ſpit "it out again, and tell nobody."

CHAP. XIII.

What Solitude is; and what a ſolitary perſon.

§. 1. SOLITUDE is the ſtate of a helpleſs perſon. For not he who is alone, is therefor *ſolitary*, any more than one in a croud, the contrary. When therefor we loſe a ſon, or a brother, or a friend, on whom we have been uſed to repoſe, we often ſay, we are left *ſolitary*, even in the midſt of Rome, where ſuch a croud is continually meeting us; where we live among ſo many, and when we have, perhaps, a numerous train of ſervants. For he is underſtood to be *ſolitary*, who is helpleſs and expoſed to ſuch as would injure him. Hence, in a journey eſpecially, we call ourſelves ſolitary, when we fall among thieves: for it is not the ſight of a *man* that removes our ſolitude, but of an *honeſt* man; a man of honour, and a helpful companion. If merely being alone is ſufficient for ſolitude, Jupiter may be ſaid to be ſolitary at the conflagration, and bewail himſelf, that he hath neither Juno nor Pallas, nor Apollo, nor brother, nor ſon, nor deſcendant, nor relation. This, ſome indeed ſay, he doth, when he is alone at the coſlagration. Such as theſe, moved by ſome principle, ſome natural deſire of ſociety, and mutual love, and by the pleaſure of converſation, do not rightly conſider the ſtate of a perſon who is alone. We ought, however, to be prepared in ſome manner for this alſo, to be ſelf ſufficient, and able to bear our own company. For as Jupiter converſes with him-

ſelf, acquieſces in himſelf, and contemplates his own adminiſtration, and is employed in thoughts worthy of himſelf; ſo ſhould we be able to talk with ourſelves, and not to need the converſation of others; nor be at a loſe [for employment]: to attend to the divine adminiſtration; to conſider our relation to other beings: how we have formerly been affected by events; how we are affected now: what are the things that ſtill preſs upon us: how theſe too may be cured; how removed: if any thing wants completing, to complete it, according to reaſon. You ſee, that Caeſar hath procured us a profound peace: there are neither wars, nor battles, nor great robberies, nor piracies; but we may travel at all hours, and ſail from Eaſt to Weſt. But can Caeſar procure us peace from a fever too? from a ſhipwreck? from a fire? from an earthquake? from a thunder ſtorm? nay, even from love? He cannot. From grief? from envy? No: not from any one of theſe. But the doctrine of philoſophers promiſes to procure us peace, from theſe too. And what doth it ſay? "If you will attend to me, O mortals, where-ever "you are, and whatever you are doing, you ſhall "neither grieve, nor be angry, nor be compelled, "nor reſtrained: but you ſhall live impaſſive, and "free from all." Shall not he who enjoys this peace, proclaimed, not by Caeſar (for how ſhould *he* have it to proclaim?) but by God, through reaſon, be contented, when he is alone reflecting, and conſidering; "To me there can now no ill happen: "there is no thief, no earthquake. All is full of "peace, all full of tranquillity; every road, every "city, every aſſembly. My neighbour, my com-"panion, unable to hurt me." Another, whoſe

care it is, provides you with food, with clothes, with ſenſes, with pre conceptions. Whenever he doth not provide what is neceſſary, he ſounds a retreat: he opens the door, and ſays to you; "Come." Whither? To nothing dreadful; but to that, whence you were made: to what is friendly and congenial, to the elements. What in you was fire, goes away to fire; what was earth, to earth; what air, to air; what water, to water. There is no Hades, nor Acheron, nor Cocytus, nor Pyriphlegethon; but all is full of Gods and demons. He who can have ſuch thoughts; and can look upon the ſun, moon, and ſtars, and enjoy the earth and ſea, is no more ſolitary, than he is helpleſs.——Well: but ſuppoſe any one ſhould come and murder me, when I am alone.———Fool: not *you*; but that inſignificant *body* of yours.

§. 2. What ſolitude is there then left? what deſtitution? why do we make ourſelves worſe than children? what do they do, when they are left alone? They take up ſhells and duſt: they build houſes; then pull them down: then build ſomething elſe: and thus never want amuſement. Suppoſe you were all to ſail away; am I to ſit, and cry, becauſe I am left alone, and ſolitary? Am I ſo unprovided with ſhells and duſt? But children do this from folly; and *we* are wretched from wiſdom.

§. 3. Every great faculty is dangerous to a beginner. Study firſt how to live like a perſon in ſickneſs; that in time you may know how to live like one in health. Abſtain from food. Drink water. Totally repreſs your deſire, for ſome time, that you may at length uſe it according to reaſon; and, if

according to reaſon, [as you may,] when you [come to] have ſome good in you, you will uſe it well. No: but we would live immediately as men already wiſe; and be of ſervice to makind.——— Of what ſervice? what are you doing? why: have you been of ſervice to yourſelf? but you would exhort them. *You* exhort! would you be of ſervice to them, ſhow them, by your own example, what kind of men philoſophy makes; and be not impertinent. When you eat, be of ſervice to thoſe who eat with you. Be of ſervice to them, by giving way to all, yielding to them, bearing with them; and not by throwing out your own ill humour upon them.

CHAP. XIV.

Miſcellaneous.

§. 1. AS bad performers cannot ſing alone, but in a chorus; ſo ſome perſons cannot walk alone. If you are any thing, walk alone; talk by yourſelf; and do not ſkulk in the chorus. Think a little at laſt: look about you: ſift yourſelf, that you may know what you are.

§. 2 If a perſon drinks water, or doth any thing elſe, for the ſake of exerciſe, upon every occaſion he tells all he meets; "I drink water." Why: do you drink water merely for the ſake of drinking it? If it doth you any good to drink it, drink; if not, you act ridiculouſly. But, if it is for your advantage, and you drink it, ſay nothing about it before thoſe who are apt to take offence. What then? Theſe are the very people you wiſh to pleaſe.

§. 3. Of actions ſome are performed on their own account; others occaſioned by circumſtances: ſome proceed from motives of prudence: ſome from complaiſance to others; and ſome are done in purſuance of a manner of life, which we have taken up.

§. 4. Two thing muſt be rooted out of men; conceit and diffidence. Conceit lies in thinking you want nothing: and diffidence, in ſuppoſing it impoſſible, that, under ſuch adverſe circumſtances, you ſhould ever ſucceed. Now, conceit is removed by confutation; and of this Socrates was the author. And [in order to ſee] that the undertaking is not impracticable, conſider and enquire. The enquiry itſelf will do you no harm: and it is almoſt being a philoſopher, to enquire, how it is poſſible to make uſe of our deſire and averſion, without hindrance.

§. 5. I am better than you; for my father hath been conſul. I have been a tribune, ſays another, and not you. If we were horſes, would you ſay, my father was ſwifter than yours? I have abundance of oats and hay, and fine trappings? what now, if, while you were ſaying this, I ſhould anſwer; "Be "it ſo. Let us run a race then." Is there nothing in man analogous to a race in horſes, by which it may be known, which is better or worſe? Is there not honour, fidelity, juſtice? Show yourſelf the better in theſe; that you may be the better, as a man. But if you tell me, you can kick violently; I will tell you again, that you value yourſelf on the property of an aſs.

CHAP. XV.

That every thing is to be undertaken with circumſpection.

§. 1. IN every affair conſider what precedes and follows; and then undertake it. Otherwiſe you will begin with ſpirit; but, not having thought of the conſequences, when ſome of them appear, you will ſhamefully deſiſt. "I would conquer at the Olympic games." But conſider what proceeds and follows, and then, if it be for your advantage, engage in the affair. You muſt conform to rules; ſubmit to a diet; refrain from dainties; exerciſe your body, whether you chuſe it or not, at a ſtated hour, in heat and cold; you muſt drink no cold water; nor, ſometimes, even wine. In a word, you muſt give yourſelf up to your maſter, as to a phyſician. Then, in the combat, you may be thrown into a ditch, diſlocate your arm, turn your ankle, ſwallow abundance of duſt, be whipt; and, after all, loſe the victory. When you have reckoned up all this, if your inclination ſtill holds, ſet about the combat. Otherwiſe take notice, you will behave like children, who ſometimes play wreſtlers, ſometimes gladiators; ſometimes blow a trumpet, and ſometimes act a tragedy: when they happen to have ſeen and admired theſe ſhows. Thus you too will be, at one time, a wreſtler; at another a gladiator; now, a philoſopher; then, an orator: but, with your whole ſoul, nothing at all. Like an ape, you mimick all you ſee; and one thing af-

ter another is ſure to pleaſe you; but is out of favour, as ſoon as it becomes familiar. For you have never entered upon any thing conſiderately, nor after having viewed the whole matter on all ſides, or made any ſcrutiny into it; but raſhly, and with a a cold inclination. Thus ſome, when they have ſeen a philoſopher, and heard a man ſpeaking like Euphrates, (though, indeed, who can ſpeak like him?) have a mind to be philoſophers too. Conſider firſt, man, what the matter is, and what your own nature is able to bear. If you would be a wreſtler, conſider your ſhoulders, your back, your thighs: for different perſons are made for different things. Do you think, that you can act as you do, and be a philoſopher? that you can eat, and drink, and be angry, and diſcontented, as you are now? You muſt watch; you muſt labour; you muſt get the better of certain appetites: you muſt quit your acquaintance; be deſpiſed by your ſervant; be laughed at by thoſe you meet: come off worſe than others, in every thing; in magiſtracies; in honours; in courts of judicature. When you have conſidered all theſe things round, approach, if you pleaſe: if, by parting with them, you have a mind to purchaſe apathy, freedom, and tranquillity. If not, do not, come hither: do not, like children, be one while a philoſopher, then a publican, then an orator, and then one of Caeſar's officers. Theſe things are not conſiſtent. You muſt be one man, either good or bad. You muſt cultivate either your own ruling faculty, or externals; and apply yourſelf either to things within or without you; that is, be either a philoſopher, or one of the vulgar.

CHAP. XVI.

What caution is neceſſary in condeſcenſion and complaiſance.

§. 1. HE who frequently converſes with others, either in diſcourſe, or entertainments, or in any familiar way of living, muſt neceſſarily either become like his companions, or bring them over to his own way. For, if a dead coal be applied to a live one, either the firſt will quench the laſt, or the laſt kindle the firſt. Since then, the danger is ſo great, caution muſt be uſed in entering into theſe familiarities with the vulgar; remembering, that it is impoſſible to touch a chimney ſweeper, without being partaker of his ſoot. For what will you do, if you are to talk of gladiators, of horſes, of wreſtlers, and what is worſe, of men? "Such a one is "good; another, bad: this was well, that ill done." Beſides: what if any one ſhould ſneer, or ridicule, or be ill-natured? Is any of you prepared, like a harper; who, when he takes his harp, and tries the ſtrings, finds out which notes are diſcordant, and knows how to put the inſtrument in tune? hath any of you ſuch a faculty as Socrates had? who, in every converſation, could bring his companions to his own purpoſe? whence ſhould you have it? you muſt therefor be carried along by the vulgar. And why are they more powerful than you? Becauſe they utter their corrupt diſcourſes from principle, and you your good ones, only from your lips. Hence they are without ſtrength, or life; and it would

turn one's ſtomach to hear your exhortations, and poor miſerable virtue, celebrated up-hill and down. Thus it is, that the vulgar get the better of you: for principle is always ſtrong, always invincible. Therefor, before theſe good opinions are fixed in you, and you have acquired ſome faculty for your ſecurity, I adviſe you to be cautious, in your familiarity with the vulgar: otherwiſe, if you have any impreſſions made on you in the ſchools, they will melt away daily, like wax before the ſun. Get away then, far from the ſun, while you have theſe waxen opinions.

§. 2. It is for this reaſon, that the philoſophers adviſe us to leave our country; becauſe inveterate manners draw the mind aſide, and prevent the beginning of a new habit. We cannot bear thoſe, who meet us, to ſay, "Hey-day! ſuch a one is "turned philoſopher; who was ſo and ſo." Thus phyſicians ſend patients, with lingering diſtempers, to another place, and another air: and they do right. Do you too import other manners, inſtead of thoſe you carry out. Fix your opinions, and exerciſe yourſelves in them. No: but from hence to the theatre, to the gladiators, to the walks, to the *circus*; then thither again: then back again; juſt the ſame perſons all the while. No good habit, no attention, no animadverſion, upon ourſelves. No obſervation what uſe we make of the appearances preſented to our minds; whether it be conformable, or contrary, to nature, whether we anſwer them right, or wrong; whether we ſay to things independent on choice, "You are nothing to me." If this be not yet your caſe, fly from your former habits:

fly from the vulgar, if you would ever begin to be any thing.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Providence.

§. 1. WHENEVER you lay any thing to the charge of providence, do but reflect; and you will find, that it hath happened agreeably to reaſon.

Well: but a diſhoneſt man hath the advantage.

In what?

In money.

Why: he is better [qualified] for it than you: becauſe he flatters, he throws away ſhame, he keeps awake: and where is the wonder? but look whether he hath the advantage of you in fidelity, or in honour. You will find he hath not: but, where ever it is beſt for you to have the advantage of him, there you have it. I once ſaid to one who was full of indignation, at the good fortune of Philoſtorgus, "Why: would you be willing to ſleep with Sura?" Heaven forbid, ſaid he, that day ſhould ever come! ——Why then are you angry, that he is paid for what he ſells: or how can you call him happy, in poſſeſſions acquired by means, which you deteſt? or what harm doth providence do, in giving the beſt things to the beſt men? is it not better to have a ſenſe of honour, than to be rich?——Granted. ——Why then are you angry, man, if you have what is beſt? Always remember then, and have it ready, that a better man hath the advantage of a

worſe, in that inſtance, in which he is better; and you will never have any indignation.

But my wife treats me ill.

Well: if you are aſked, what is the matter? anſwer; "My wife treats me ill."

Nothing more?

Nothing.

My father gives me nothing.———What is the matter?———My father gives me nothing. To denominate this an evil, ſome external and falſe addition muſt be made. We are not therefor to get rid of poverty; but of our principle concerning it; and we ſhall do well.

When Galba was killed, ſomebody ſaid to Rufus, "Now, indeed, the world is governed by Provi-"dence." I never thought, anſwered Rufus, of bringing the ſlighteſt proof, that the world was governed by Providence, from Galba.

CHAP. XVIII.

That we ought not to be alarmed, by any news that is brought us.

§. 1. WHEN any alarming news is brought you, always have it at hand, that no news can be brought you, concerning what is in your own choice. Can any one bring you news, that your opinions or deſires are ill conducted? By no means: but that ſomebody is dead. What is that to you then? that ſomebody ſpeaks ill of you. And what is that to *you* then? that your father is forming ſome contrivance, or other. Againſt what?

againſt your choice? how can he? well: but againſt your body; againſt your eſtate? You are very ſafe: this is not againſt *you*.——But the judge [perhaps] hath pronounced you guilty of impiety. And did not the judges pronounce the ſame of Socrates? is his pronouncing a ſentence, any buſineſs of yours? No. Then why do you, any longer, trouble yourſelf about it? There is a duty incumbent on your father; which, unleſs he performs, he loſes the character of a father, of natural affection, of tenderneſs. Do not want him to loſe any thing elſe, by this: for no perſon is ever guilty in one inſtance, and a ſufferer in another. Your duty, on the other hand, is to make your defence, with conſtancy, modeſty, and mildneſs: otherwiſe you loſe the character of filial piety; of modeſty, and generoſity of mind. Well: and is your judge free from danger? No. He runs an equal hazard. Why then, are you ſtill afraid of his deciſion? what have you to do with the evil of another? Making a bad defence would be you own evil. Let it be your only care to avoid that; but whether ſentence is paſſed on you, or not, as it is the buſineſs, ſo it is the evil, of another. "Such a one threatens you."——*Me?* No.——"He cenſures you."——Let him look to it, how he doth his own buſineſs——"He will give an unjuſt ſentence againſt you."——Poor wretch!

CHAP. XIX.

What is the condition of the vulgar; and what of a philoſopher.

§. 1. THE firſt difference between one of the vulgar, and a philoſopher, is this: the one ſays, I am undone, on the account of my child, my brother, my father: but the other, if ever he be obliged to ſay, I am undone! reflects, and adds, on account of myſelf. For choice cannot be reſtrained, or hurt, by any thing to which choice doth not extend; but only by itſelf. If therefor we always would incline this way, and whenever we are unſucceſsful, would lay the fault on ourſelves, and remember, that there is no cauſe of perturbation and inconſtancy, but principle, I would engage we ſhould make ſome proficiency. But we ſet out in a very different way, from the very beginning. In infancy, for example, if we happen to ſtumble, our nurſe doth not chide *us*, but beats the ſtone. Why; what harm hath the ſtone done? was it to move out of its place, for the folly of your child? again: if we do not find ſomething to eat, when we come out of the bath, our governor doth not try to moderate our appetite, but beats the cook. Why: did we appoint you governor of the cook, man? No: but of our child. It is he whom you are to correct and improve. By theſe means, even when we are grown up, we appear children. For an unmuſical perſon is a child in muſic; an illiterate perſon, a

child in learning; and an untaught one a child in life.

CHAP. XX.

That ſome advantages may be gained, from every external circumſtance.

§. 1. IN appearances that are merely objects of contemplation, almoſt all perſons have allowed good and evil to be in ourſelves, and not in externals. No one ſays, it is good, to be day; evil, to be night; and the greateſt evil, that three ſhould be four: but what? That knowlege is good, and error evil. So that, concerning falſhood itſelf, there exiſts one good thing; the knowlege, that it is falſhood. Thus then, ſhould it be, in life alſo. Health is a good; ſickneſs, an evil. No, Sir. But what? A right uſe of health is good; a wrong one an evil. So that, in truth, it is poſſible to be a gainer, even by ſickneſs. And is it not poſſible, by death too? by mutilation? do you think Menaeceus an inconſiderable gainer by death?——"May who-"ever talks thus, be ſuch a gainer as he was!"—Why: pray, Sir, did not he preſerve his patriotiſm, his magnanimity, his fidelity, his gallant ſpirit? and if he had lived on, would he not have loſt all theſe? would not cowardice, mean-ſpiritedneſs, and hatred of his country, and a wretched love of life, have been his portion? well, now: do not you think him a conſiderable gainer, by dying? No: but I warrant you, the father of Admetus was a great gainer, by living on, in ſo mean-ſpirited and wretched a way, as he did? why: did not he die at laſt?

For heaven's ſake, ceaſe to be thus ſtruck, by the mere materials, [of action.] Ceaſe to make yourſelves ſlaves; firſt of things, and then, upon their account; of the men who have the power, either to beſtow, or take them away. Is there any advantage then to be gained from theſe men? From all; even from a reviler. What advantage doth a wreſtler gain from him, with whom he exerciſes himſelf, before the combat? the greateſt. Why: juſt in the ſame manner I exerciſe myſelf with this man. He exerciſes me in patience, in gentleneſs, in meekneſs. No: but I ſuppoſe, I gain an advantage from him who manages my neck, and ſets my back and ſhoulders in orders; and the beſt thing a man of exerciſe can ſay, is, "Lift him up with both hands," and the heavier he is, the greater is my advantage: and yet, it is no advantage to me, when I am exerciſed in gentleneſs of temper! this is not knowing, how to gain an advantage from men. Is my neighbour a bad one? He is ſo, to himſelf; but a good one, to me. He exerciſes my good temper, my moderation. Is my father bad? To himſelf; but not to me. "This is the rod of Hermes. Touch with "it whatever you pleaſe, and it will become gold." No: but bring whatever you pleaſe, and I will turn it into *good*. Bring ſickneſs, death, want, reproach, capital trial. All theſe, by the rod of Hermes, ſhall turn to advantage.——"What will you make of death?"——Why: what but an ornament to you; what but a means of your ſhowing, by action, what the man is, who knows, and follows the will of nature. "What will you make of ſickneſs?"—— I will ſhow its nature. I will make a good figure in it; I will be compoſed and happy. I will not

flatter my phyſician. I will not wiſh to die. What need you aſk further? whatever you give me, I will make it happy, fortunate, reſpectable, and eligible. No.——"But, take care not to be ſick." Juſt as if one ſhould ſay, "Take care, that the appearance "of three being four, doth not preſent itſelf to you." "It is an evil." How an evil, man? If I think as I ought about it, what hurt will it any longer do me? will it not even be an advantage to me? If then I think as I ought, of poverty, of ſickneſs, of being out of power, is not that enough for me? why then muſt I any longer ſeek good or evil, in externals? but what is the ſtate of the caſe? Theſe things are allowed here; but nobody carries them home; but immediately every one is in a ſtate of war with his ſervant, his neighbours, with thoſe who ſneer and ridicule him. Well fare Leſbius, for proving every day, that I know nothing.

CHAP. XXI.

Concerning thoſe who readily ſet up for Sophiſts.

§. 1. THEY who have received bare propoſitions, are preſently inclined to throw them up, as a ſick ſtomach doth its food. Firſt concoct it, and then you will not throw it up; otherwiſe it will be crude and impure, and unfit for nouriſhment. But ſhow us, from what you have digeſted, ſome change in your ruling faculty; as wreſtlers do in their ſhoulders, from their exerciſe and their diet: as artificers, in their ſkill, from what they have learnt. A carpenter doth not come and ſay,

" Hear me diſcourſe on the art of building:" but he hires a houſe, and fits it up, and ſhows himſelf maſter of his trade. Let it be your buſineſs likewiſe to do ſomething like this: eat like a man; drink, dreſs, marry, have children, perform the duty of a citizen; bear reproach; bear with an unreaſonable brother; bear with a father; bear with a ſon, a neighbour, a companion; as becomes a man. Show us theſe things, that we may ſee that you have really learnt ſomewhat, from the philoſophers. No: " But come and hear me repeat commentaries." Get you gone, and ſeek ſomebody elſe, to throw them out upon. " Nay, but I will explain the doctrines " of Chryſippus to you, ſo as no other perſon can: " I will elucidate his diction, in the cleareſt man- " ner." And is it for this then, that young men leave their country, and their own parents, that they may come and hear you explain *words?* Ought they not to return patient, active, free from paſſion, free from perturbation; furniſhed with ſuch a proviſion for life, that, ſetting-out with it, they will be able to bear all events well, and derive ornament from them? but how ſhould you impart what you have not? for have you yourſelf done any thing elſe, from the beginning, but ſpent your time in ſolving ſyllogiſms, and convertible propoſitions, and interrogatory arguments.——" But ſuch a one hath a " ſchool, and why ſhould not I have one?"—— Wretch, theſe things are not effected, in a careleſs and fortuitous manner. But there muſt be age, and a method of life, and a guiding God. Is it not ſo? No one quits the port, or ſets ſail, till he hath ſacrificed to the Gods, and implored their aſſiſtance: do men ſow, without firſt invoking Ceres? And

ſhall any one who hath undertaken ſo great a work, undertake it ſafely, without the Gods? and ſhall they, who apply to ſuch a one, apply to him with ſucceſs? what are you doing elſe, man, but divulging the myſteries? And you ſay, "There is a tem-"ple at Eleuſis; and here is one too. *There* is a "prieſt; and *I* will make a prieſt *here*; *there* is a "herald; and *I* will appoint a herald too; *there* is a "torch-bearer; and *I* will have a torch-bearer: *there* "are torches; and ſo ſhall there be *here*. The "words ſaid, the things done, are the ſame. Where "is the difference betwixt one and the other." Moſt impious man! is there no difference? Are theſe things of uſe out of place, and out of time? A man ſhould come with ſacrifices and prayers, previouſly purified, and his mind affected with a ſenſe, that he is approaching to ſacred and ancient rites. Thus the myſteries become uſeful: thus we come to have an idea, that all theſe things were appointed by the ancients, for the inſtruction and correction of life. But you divulge and publiſh them, without regard to time and place; without ſacrifices, without purity: you have not the garment that is neceſſary for a prieſt, nor the hair, or the girdle, that is neceſſary; nor the voice, nor the age: nor have you purified yourſelf, like him. But, when you have got the words by heart, you ſay, "The "words are ſacred of themſelves." Theſe things are to be approached, in another manner. It is a great, it is a myſtical affair; not given by chance, or to every one indifferently. Nay, mere wiſdom, perhaps, is not a ſufficient qualification for the care of youth. There ought to be likewiſe a certain readineſs and aptitude for this, and indeed a particular

conſtitution of body; and, above all, a counſel from God to undertake this office, as he counſelled Socrates to undertake the office of confutation; Diogenes, that of authoritative reproof; Zeno, that of dogmatical inſtruction. But *you* ſet up for a phyſician, provided with nothing but medicines, and without knowing, or having ſtudied, where, or how, they are to be applied. "Why: ſuch a one "had medicines for the eyes; and I have the ſame." Have you, then, a faculty too of making uſe of them? do you, at all, know when, and how, and to whom, they will be of ſervice? why then do you act at hazard? why are you careleſs in things of the greateſt importance? why do you attempt a matter unſuitable to you? Leave it to thoſe who can perform it, and do it honour. Do not you bring a a ſcandal upon philoſophy, by your means; nor be one of thoſe, who cauſe the thing itſelf to be calumniated. But, if theorems delight you, ſit quiet, and turn them every way by yourſelf; but never call yourſelf a philoſopher; nor ſuffer another to call you ſo: but ſay, "He is miſtaken: for my "deſires are not different from what they were; "nor my purſuits directed to other objects; nor "my aſſent otherwiſe given; nor have I at all made "any change in the uſe of the appearances, from "my former condition." Think and ſpeak thus of yourſelf, if you would think as you ought: if not, act at all hazards, and do as you do; for it becomes you.

CHAP. XXII.

Of the Cynic philoſophy.

§. 1. WHEN one of his ſcholars, who ſeemed inclined to the Cynic philoſophy, aſked him, what a Cynic muſt be, and what was the general plan of that ſect? Let us examine it, ſays he, at our leiſure. But this much I can tell you now, that he who attempts ſo great an affair without God, is an object of divine wrath, and would only bring public diſhonour upon himſelf. For, in a well regulated houſe, no one comes, and ſays to himſelf, "I ought to be the manager here." If he doth, and the maſter returns, and ſees him inſolently giving orders, he drags him out, and hath him whipt. Such is the caſe likewiſe in this great city [of the world]. For here too is a maſter of the family, who orders every thing. "*You* are the "ſun: you can, by making a circuit, form the "year, and the ſeaſons, and increaſe and nouriſh "the fruits; raiſe and calm the winds, and give a "moderate warmth to the bodies of men. Go: "make your circuit, and thus intimately move every "thing, from the greateſt to the leaſt. *You* are a "calf: when the lion appears, do your part, or "you will ſuffer for it. *You* are a bull, come and "fight; for that is incumbent on *you*, and becomes "you, and you can do it. *You* can lead an ar-"my to Troy: be you Agamemnon. You can "engage in ſingle combat with Hector: be you "Achilles." But, if Therſites had come and claim-

ed the command, either he would have had obtained it; or, if he had, he would have diſgraced himſelf, before the more witneſſes.

§. 2. Do you, too, carefully deliberate upon this matter: it is not what you think it. "I wear an "old cloke now; and I ſhall have one then. I "ſleep upon the hard ground now; and I ſhall "ſleep ſo then. I will moreover take a wallet and "a ſtaff, and go about, and will beg of thoſe I "meet, and begin by abuſing them: and, if I ſee "any one uſing means to take off the hair from his "face, or body; or ſetting his curls, or walking "in purple, I will rebuke him." If you imagine this to be the thing, avaunt; come not near it: it doth not belong to you. But, if you imagine it to be what it really is, and do not think yourſelf unworthy of it, conſider how great a thing you undertake. Firſt, with regard to yourſelf: you muſt no longer, in any inſtance, appear like what you do now. You muſt totally ſuppreſs deſire; and muſt transfer averſion to ſuch things only as are dependent on choice. You muſt have neither anger, nor reſentment, nor envy, nor pity. Neither boy, nor girl, nor fame, nor delicacies in eating, muſt have charms for you. For you muſt know, that other men indeed fence themſelves with walls, and houſes, and darkneſs, when they do any think of this kind, and have many concealments: a man ſhuts the door, places ſomebody before the apartment; "Say, he "is gone out; ſay, he is not at leiſure." But the Cynic, inſtead of all this, muſt fence himſelf with virtuous ſhame; otherwiſe *he* will act indecently, naked, and in the open air. This is *his* houſe; this, *his* door; this, *his* porter; this, *his* darkneſs. He

muſt not wiſh to conceal any thing relating to himſelf: for, if he doth, he is gone; he hath begun to fear ſomething external; he hath begun to need a concealment; nor can he get it when he will. For where ſhall he conceal himſelf, or how? For if this tutor, this pedagogue of the public, ſhould happen to ſlip, what muſt *he* ſuffer? can he then, who dreads theſe things, be thoroughly bold within, and preſcribe to other men? Impracticable, impoſſible.

§. 3. In the firſt place then, you muſt purify your own ruling faculty, conformably to this method of life. Now the ſubject-matter for me to work upon, is my own mind; as wood is for a carpenter, or leather for a ſhoe-maker: and my buſineſs is, a right uſe of the appearances of things. But body is nothing to me; its parts nothing to me. Let death come when it will; either of the whole, or of a part. "Go into exile." And whither? can any any turn me out of the world? He cannot. But where-ever I go, there is the ſun, the moon, the ſtars, auguries, communication with God. And even this preparation is, by no means, ſufficient for a true Cynic. But it muſt farther be known, that he is a meſſenger ſent from Jupiter to men, concerning good and evil; to ſhow them, that they are miſtaken, and ſeek the eſſence of good and evil where it is not; but do not obſerve it where it is: that he is a ſpy, like Diogenes, when he was brought to Philip, after the battle of Chaeronea. For, in effect, a Cynic is a ſpy, to diſcover what things are friendly, what hoſtile, to man: and he muſt, after making an accurate obſervation, come and tell them the truth: nor be ſtruck with terror, ſo as to point out to them enemies, where there are none; nor, in any

other inſtance, diſconcerted or confounded by appearances.

§. 4. He muſt then, if it ſhould ſo happen, be able to lift up his voice, come upon the ſtage, and ſay, like Socrates, "O mortals, whither are you "hurrying? what are you about? why do you "tumble up and down, wretches, like blind men? "You are going a wrong way, and have forſaken "the right. You ſeek proſperity and happineſs in "a wrong place, where it is not; nor do you give "credit to another, who ſhows you where it is. "Why do you ſeek it without? It is not in body: "if you do not believe me, look upon Myro; "look upon Oſellius. It is not in wealth; if you "do not believe me, look upon Croeſus; look upon the rich of the preſent age, how full of lamentation their life is. It is not in power: for, otherwiſe, they, who have been twice and thrice "conſuls, muſt be happy: but they are not. To "whom ſhall we give credit in this affair? to you "who look only upon the externals of their condition, "and are dazled by appearances, or to themſelves? "what do they ſay? Hear them, when they groan, "when they ſigh, when they think themſelves more "wretched, and in more danger, from theſe very "conſulſhips, this glory, and ſplendor. It is not "empire: otherwiſe Nero and Sardanapalus had "been happy. But not even Agamemnon was "happy, though a better man than Sardanapalus, "or Nero. But, when others are ſnoring, what "is *he* doing?"

He rends his hairs———

And what doth he ſay himſelf?

Scarce can my knees theſe trembling limbs ſuſtain;
And ſcarce my heart ſupport its load of pain.

POPE.

Why: which of your affairs goes ill, poor wretch? your poſſeſſions? No. Your body? No. But you have gold and braſs in abundance. What then goes ill? That part of you, whatever it be called, is neglected and corrupted, by which we deſire, and are averſe; by which we purſue, and avoid.——How neglected?——It is ignorant of that for which it was naturally formed, of the eſſence of good, and of the eſſence of evil. It is ignorant what is its own, and what another's. And, when any thing belonging to others goes ill, it ſays, "I am undone; the "Greeks are in danger!" (Poor ruling faculty! which alone is neglected, and hath no care taken of it.) "They will die by the ſword of the "Trojans!"——And, if the Trojans ſhould not kill them, will they not die?—Yes: but not all at "once."——Why: where is the difference? For if it be an evil to die, whether it be all at once, or ſingly, it is equally an evil. Will any thing more happen, than the ſeparation of ſoul and body?—— "Nothing."——And when the Greeks periſh, is the door ſhut againſt *you?* is it not in your own power to die?——"It is."——Why then do you lament, while you are a king, and hold the ſceptre of Jove? A king is no more to be made unfortunate than a God. What are you then? You are a ſhepherd, truly ſo called: for you weep, juſt as ſhepherds do, when the wolf ſeizes any of their ſheep: and they who are governed by you are mere ſheep. But why did you come hither? was your deſire in

any danger? your averſion? your purſuits? your avoidances? "No," ſays he: "But my brother's "wife hath been ſtolen."——Is it not great good luck then, to be rid of a ſorry adulterous wife?—— "But muſt we be held in contempt by the Trojans?" ——What are they? wiſe men, or fools? If wiſe, why do you go to war with them? If fools, why do you mind them?

§. 5. Where then doth our good lie, ſince it doth not lie in theſe things? Tell us, Sir; you who are our meſſenger and ſpy.——Where you do not think, nor are willing to ſeek it. For, if you were willing, you would find it in yourſelves: nor would you wander abroad, nor ſeek what belongs to others, as your own. Turn your thoughts into yourſelves. Conſider the pre-conceptions which you have. What do you imagine good to be?—— What is proſperous, happy, unhindered.—Well: and do not you naturally imagine it great? do not you imagine it valuable? do not you imagine it incapable of hurt? in what materials then muſt you ſeek proſperity, and exemption from hindrance? in that which is enſlaved, or free?—in the free.— is your body then inſlaved, or free?—We do not know.——Do not you know, that it is the ſlave of fever, gout, defluxion, dyſentery: of a tyrant; of fire, ſteel; of every thing ſtronger than itſelf?— Yes, it is a ſlave —How then can any thing belonging to the body be unhindered? and how can that be great, or valuable, which is, by nature, lifeleſs, earth, clay? what then, have you nothing free?— Poſſibly nothing.——Why: who can compel you to aſſent to what appears falſe?—No one.—— Or who, not to aſſent to what appears true?—No

one.——Here then you ſee, that there is ſomething in you, by nature, free. But who of you can deſire or be averſe, or uſe his active powers of purſuit or avoidance, or concert, or purpoſe, unleſs he hath been impreſſed by an appearance of its being for his advantage, or his duty?—No one.—— You have then, in theſe two, ſomething unreſtrained and free. Cultivate this, wretches; take care of this; ſeek for good here.—— "But how is it poſſible, that a man, "naked, without houſe or home, ſqualed, unat-"tended, who belongs to no country, can lead a "proſperous life?"——See: God hath ſent us one, to ſhow, in fact, that it is poſſible. "Take notice "of me that I am without a country, without a "houſe, without an eſtate, without a ſervant: I lie "on the ground: no wife, no children, no coat; "but only earth, and heaven, and one ſorry cloke. "And, what do I want? am not I without ſorrow, "without fear? am not I free? did any of you e-"ver ſee me diſappointed of my deſire, or incurring "my averſion? did I ever blame God or man? did "I ever accuſe any one? hath any of you ſeen me "look diſcontented? How do I treat thoſe whom "*you* fear, and of whom you are ſtruck with awe? "is it not like ſorry ſlaves? who that ſees me, doth "not think, that he ſees his own king and maſter?" This is the language, this the character, this the undertaking, of a Cynic. No: I warrant you; but the wallet, and the ſtaff, and the great jaws: ſwallowing, or treaſuring up, whatever is given you; abuſing unſeaſonably thoſe you meet; or ſhowing a brawny arm. Do you conſider, how you ſhall attempt ſo important an affair? Firſt take a mirror. View your ſhoulders, examine you back, your thighs.

You are going to be enrolled a combatant at the Olympic games, man; not in a poor ſlight conteſt. In the Olympic games, a champion is not allowed merely to be conquered, and depart: but muſt firſt be diſgraced, in the view of the whole world; not only of the Athenians, or Spartans, or Nicopolitans: and then he, who hath raſhly departed, muſt be whipt too; and, before that, muſt ſuffer thirſt, and heat; and ſwallow an abundance of duſt.

§. 6. Conſider carefully; know yourſelf; conſult the Divinity; attempt nothing without God: for, if he counſels you, be aſſured, that it is his will, that you ſhould be a great man; or, [which comes to the ſame thing,] ſuffer many a blow. For there is this very fine circumſtance connected with the character of a Cynic, that he muſt be beat like an aſs; and when he is beat, muſt love thoſe who beat him, as the father, as the brother of all. No, to be ſure, but, if any one beats you, ſtand publicly and roar out, "O, Caeſar, am I to ſuffer ſuch things, in "breach of your peace? Let us go before the pro-"conſul."——But what is Caeſar to a Cynic, or what is the proconſul, or any one elſe, but Jupiter? who hath deputed him, and whom he ſerves. Doth he invoke any other but him? and is not he perſuaded, that whatever he ſuffers of this ſort, it is Jupiter, who doth it to exerciſe him? Now Hercules, when he was exerciſed by Euryſtheus, did not think himſelf miſerable; but executed, with alacrity, all that was to be done. And ſhall *he* who is appointed to the combat, and exerciſed by Jupiter, cry out, and take offence at things? A worthy perſon, truly, to bear the ſcepter of Diogenes! hear what *he*, in a fever, ſaid to thoſe who were paſſing

by. "Sorry wretches, why do not you ſtay? do "you take ſuch a journey to Olympia, to ſee the "deſtruction, or combat, of the champions; and "have you no inclination to ſee the combat between "a man and a fever?" Such a one, who took a pride in difficult circumſtances, and thought himſelf worthy to be a ſpectacle to thoſe who paſſed by, was a likely perſon, indeed, to accuſe God, who had deputed him, as treating him unworthily! for what ſubject of accuſation ſhall he find? that he preſerves a decency of behaviour? with what doth he find fault? that he ſets his virtue in a clearer light?—well: and what doth he ſay of poverty? of death? of pain? how did he compare his happineſs with that of the Perſian king; or rather thought it beyond compariſon. For, amidſt perturbations, and griefs, and fears, and diſappointed deſires, and incurred averſions, how can there be any entrance for happineſs? And where there are corrupt principles, there muſt all theſe things neceſſarily be.

§. 7. The ſame young man, enquiring, whether if a friend ſhould be willing to come to him, and take care of him when he was ſick, he ſhould comply? and where, ſays Epictetus, will you find me the friend of a Cynic? For to be worthy of being numbered among his friends, a perſon ought to be ſuch another as himſelf: he ought to be a partner of the ſcepter and kingdom, and a worthy miniſter, if he would be honoured with his friendſhip; as Diogenes was the friend of Antiſthenes; as Crates, of Diogenes. Do you think, that he who only comes to him, and ſalutes him, is his *friend*; and that he will think him worthy of being entertained as ſuch? If ſuch a thought comes into your head, ra-

ther look round you, for ſome clever dunghill, to ſhelter you in your fever, from the North wind, that you may not periſh by taking cold. But you ſeem to me, to want [only] to get into ſomebody's houſe, and to be well fed there a while. What buſineſs have *you* then, even to attempt ſo important an affair as this?

§. 8. But (ſaid the young man) will a Cynic engage himſelf in marriage, and the production of children, as a principal point?

If you will allow me a republic of ſages, no one there, perhaps, will readily apply himſelf to the Cynic philoſophy. For on whoſe account ſhould he embrace that method of life? However, ſuppoſe he doth, there will be nothing to reſtrain him from marrying, and having children. For his wife will be ſuch another as himſelf; his father-in-law ſuch another as himſelf; and his children will be brought up in the ſame manner. But as the ſtate of things now is, like that of an army prepared for battle, is it not neceſſary that a Cynic ſhould be without diſtraction; intirely attentive to the ſervice of God: at liberty to walk about among mankind: not tied down to vulgar duties, nor entangled in relations; which, if he tranſgreſſes, he will no longer keep the character of a wiſe and good man; and which, if he obſerves, there is an end of him, as the meſſenger, and ſpy, and herald of the Gods? For, conſider, there are ſome due to his father-in-law; ſome to the other relations of his wife; ſome to his wife herſelf: beſides, after this, he is confined to the care of his family when ſick, and making proviſion for their ſupport. Not to ſpeak of other things, he muſt have a veſſel, to warm water in, to bathe his child. There muſt

be wool, oil, a bed, a cup, for his wife, after her delivery; and thus the furniture increaſes: more buſineſs, more diſtraction. Where, for the future, is this king, whoſe time is devoted to the public good?

To whom its ſafety, a whole people owes.

Who ought to overſee others; married men, fathers of children: [to obſerve] who treats his wife well; who, ill: who quarrels: which family is well regulated; which, not: like a phyſician, who goes about, and feels the pulſe of his patients; "*You* "have a fever; *you* the head-ach; *you*, the gout. "Do *you* abſtain from food: do *you* eat: do *you* "omit bathing: *you* muſt have an inciſion made: "*you* muſt be cauteriſed" Where ſhall he have leiſure for this, who is tied down to vulgar duties? muſt not he provide clothes for his children; and ſend them with pens, and ink, and paper, to a ſchoolmaſter? muſt not he provide a bed for them? (For they cannot be Cynics from their very birth) otherwiſe, it would have been better to expoſe them, as ſoon as they were born, than to kill them thus. Do you ſee to what we bring down our Cynic? how we deprive him of his kingdom?——"Well: "but Crates was married." The caſe of which you ſpeak was a particular one, ariſing from love; and the woman another Crates. But we are enquiring about ordinary and common marriages: and in this enquiry we do not find the affair mightily ſuited to the condition of a Cynic.

§. 9. How then ſhall we keep up ſociety? For heaven's ſake, do they conſer a greater be-

nefit upon the world, who leave two or three ſniveling children in their ſtead, than thoſe, who, as far as poſſible, overſee all mankind; what they do; how they live; what they attend to; what they neglect, contrary to their duty. Did all they, who left children to the Thebans, do them more good than Epaminondas, who died childleſs? And did Priam, who was the father of fifty profligates, or Danaus or Æolus, conduce more to the advantage of ſociety, than Homer? Shall a military command, or any other poſt, then, exempt a man from marrying, and becoming a father, ſo that he ſhall be thought to have made ſufficient amends for the want of children: and ſhall not the kingdom of a Cynic be a proper compenſation for it? Perhaps we do not underſtand his grandeur, nor duly repreſent to ourſelves the character of Diogenes; but conſider Cynics as they are now: who ſtand like dogs watching at tables, and who imitate the others in nothing, unleſs, perhaps, in breaking wind; but abſolutely in nothing beſides: elſe this [which you have objected] would not move us; nor ſhould we be aſtoniſhed, that a Cynic will not marry, nor have children. Conſider, Sir, that he is the father of human kind: that all men are his ſons, and all women his daughters. Thus he attends; thus takes care of all. What! do you think it is from impertinence, that he rebukes thoſe he meets? He doth it as a father, as a brother, as a miniſter of the common parent, Jove.

§. 10. Aſk me, if you pleaſe, too, whether a Cynic will engage in the adminiſtration of the commonwealth. What commonwealth do you enquire after, blockhead, greater than what he adminiſters?

Whether *he* will harangue among the Athenians, about revenues and taxes, whoſe buſineſs it is to debate with all mankind; with the Athenians, Corinthians, and Romans, equally; not about taxes and revenues, or peace and war, but happineſs and miſery, proſperity and adverſity, ſlavery and freedom. Do you aſk me, whether a man engages in the adminiſtration of the commonwealth, who adminiſters ſuch a commonwealth as this? Aſk me too, whether he will accept any command? I will anſwer you again, what command, fool, greater than that which he now exerciſes?

§. 11. A Cynic, however, hath need of a conſtitution duly qualified: for, if he ſhould appear conſumptive, thin, and pale, his teſtimony hath no longer the ſame authority. For he muſt not only give a proof to the vulgar, by the conſtancy of his mind, that it is poſſible to be a man of figure and merit, without thoſe things that ſtrike *them* with admiration: but he muſt ſhow too, by his body, that a ſimple and ſlender diet, under the open air, doth no injury to the conſtitution. "See, I and my body "are a witneſs to this." As Diogenes did: for he went about freſh, and plump; and gained the attention of the many, by the very appearance of a healthy body. But a pitiable Cynic ſeems a mere beggar; all avoid him: all are offended at him: for he ought not to appear ſlovenly, ſo as to drive people from him; but even his rough negligence ſhould be neat and engaging.

§. 12. Much natural agreeableneſs and acuteneſs are likewiſe neceſſary in a Cynic, (otherwiſe he becomes a mere driveller, and nothing elſe); that he may be able to give an anſwer readily, and perti-

nently, upon every occaſion. Like Diogenes, to one who aſked him, "Are you that Diogenes, who "do not believe, there are any Gods? "How ſo, "replied he, when I think you odious to them?" Again: when Alexander ſurpriſed him ſleeping, and repeated,

To waſte long nights in indolent repoſe
Ill fits a chief, who mighty nations guides,

before he was quite awake, he anſwered,

Directs in council, and in war preſides.
POPE's Homer, B. II. V. 27.

§. 13. But, above all, the ruling faculty of a Cynic muſt be purer than the ſun: otherwiſe he muſt neceſſarily be a common cheat, and a raſcal; if, while he is guilty of ſome vice himſelf, he reproves others. For, conſider how the caſe ſtands. Arms and guards give a power to common kings and tyrants of reproving, and of puniſhing delinquents, though they are wicked themſelves: but to a Cynic, inſtead of arms and guards, conſcience gives this power; when he knows, that he hath watched and laboured for mankind: that he hath ſlept pure, and waked ſtill purer: and that he hath regulated all his thoughts as the friend, as the miniſter of the Gods, as a partner of the empire of Jupiter: that he is ready to ſay, upon all occaſions,

Conduct me, Jove, *and thou, O* Deſtiny.

And, "if thus it pleaſes the Gods, thus let it be." Why ſhould not he dare to ſpeak boldly to his own

brethren, to his children? in a word, to his kindred? Hence he, who is thus qualified, is neither impertinent, nor a buſy body: for he is not buſied about the affairs of others, but his own, when he overſees the tranſactions of men. Otherwiſe ſay, that a general is a buſy body, when he overſees, examines, and watches his ſoldiers; and puniſhes the diſorderly. But, if you reprove others, at the very time that you have a cake [concealed] under your own arm, I will aſk you; had you not better, Sir, go into a corner, and eat up what you have ſtolen? But what have you to do with the concerns of others? for what are *you*? are you the bull in the herd, or the queen of the bees? Show me ſuch enſigns of empire, as ſhe hath from nature. But, if you are a drone, and arrogate to yourſelf the kingdom of the bees, do not you think, that your fellow citizens will drive you out, juſt as the bees do the drones?

§. 14. A Cynic muſt, beſides, have ſo much patience, as to ſeem inſenſible, and a ſtone, to the vulgar. No one reviles, no one beats, no one affronts *him;* but he hath ſurrendered his body to be treated at pleaſure, by any one who will. For he remembers, that the inferior, in whatever inſtance it is the inferior, muſt be conquered by the ſuperior: and the body is inferior to the multitude, the weaker to the ſtronger. He never, therefor, enters into a combat where he can be conquered; but immediately gives up what belongs to others: he doth not claim what is ſlaviſh and dependent: but, where choice, and the uſe of the appearances, are concerned, you will ſee, that he hath ſo many eyes, you would ſay, Argos was blind to him. Is his aſſent

ever precipitate? his purſuits ever raſh? his deſire, ever diſappointed? his averſion, ever incurred? his intention, ever fruitleſs? is he ever querulous, ever dejected, ever envious? Here lies all his attention and application. With regard to other things, he ſnores ſupine. All is peace. There is no robber, no tyrant of the choice.——But of the body?——Yes.—— The eſtate?——Yes.—— Magiſtracies and honours?——Yes. And what doth he care for theſe? When any one therefor would frighten him with them, he ſays, "Go, look for children: "vizards are frightful to *them;* but *I* know they "are only ſhell, and have nothing withinſide."

§. 15. Such is the affair about which you are deliberating: therefor, if you pleaſe, for heaven's ſake, defer it: and firſt conſider how you are prepared for it. Mind what Hector ſays to Andromache.

No more——but haſten to thy taſks at home,
There guide the ſpindle, and direct the loom.
Me, glory ſummons to the martial ſcene,
The field of combat is the ſphere for men.

POPE's Homer.

Thus conſcious he was of his own qualifications, and of her weakneſs.

CHAP. XXIII.

Concerning ſuch as read and diſpute, oſtentatiouſly.

§. 1. FIRST ſay to yourſelf, what you would be; and then do, what you have to do. For, in almoſt every thing elſe, we ſee this to be the practice. Olympic champions firſt determine what they would be, and then act accordingly. To a racer, in a longer courſe, there muſt be one kind of diet, walking, anointing, and exerciſe: to one in a ſhorter, all theſe muſt be different; and to a pentathlete, ſtill more different. You will find the caſe the ſame in the manual arts. If a carpenter, you muſt have ſuch and ſuch things: if a ſmith, ſuch other. For, if we do not refer each of our actions to ſome end, we ſhall act at random: if to an improper one, we ſhall miſs our aim. Further: there is a general and particular end. Firſt, to act as a man. What is comprehended in this? Not to be, though gentle, like a ſheep; nor miſchievous, like a wild beaſt. But the particular end relates to the ſtudy, and choice of each individual. A harper is to act as a harper; a carpenter, as a carpenter; a philoſopher, as a philoſopher; an orator, as an orator. When therefor you ſay, "Come, and "hear me read: obſerve firſt, not to do this at random; and, in the next place, after you have found to what end you refer it, conſider whether it be a proper one. Would you be uſeful, or be praiſed? You preſently hear him ſay, "What do I value the "praiſe of the multitude? And he ſays well: for

this is nothing to a muſician, or a geometrician as ſuch. You would be uſeful then. In what? Tell us, that we too may run, to make part of your audience. Now, is it poſſible for any one to benefit others, who hath received no benefit himſelf? No: for neither can he, who is not a carpenter, or a ſhoe-maker, benefit any, in reſpect to thoſe arts. Would you know then, whether you have received benefit? Produce your principles, philoſopher: what is the aim and promiſe of deſire? Not to be diſappointed. What of averſion? Not to be incurred. Come: do we fulfil this promiſe? Tell me the truth: but, if you falſify, I will tell it *you*. The other day, when you were praiſed, you went about, aſking every body, "What did you think "of me?—"Upon my life, Sir, it was prodigi-"ous."—"But, how did I expreſs myſelf upon "that ſubject?"—"Which?"—"Where I gave a "deſcription of Pan, and the *nymphs?*"—"Moſt "excellently."——And do you tell me, after this, that you regulate your deſires and averſions conformably to nature? Get you gone. Perſuade ſomebody elſe. Did not you, the other day, praiſe a man contrary to your own opinion? did not you flatter a certain ſenator? would you wiſh your own children to be like him?—"Heaven forbid!"—"Why "then did you praiſe and cajole him?"—"He is "an ingenious young man, and attentive to diſ-"courſes—"How ſo?"—"He admires me." Now indeed you have produced your proof. After all, what do you think? do not theſe very people ſecretly deſpiſe you? when therefor a man, conſcious of no good action, or intention, finds ſome philoſopher ſaying, "You are a great genius, and of a

" frank and candid diſpoſition;" what do you think he ſays, but, " This man hath ſome need of " me." Pray tell me what action of a great genius he hath ſhown. You ſee, he hath long converſed with you, hath heard your diſcourſes, hath heard your lectures. Hath he turned his attention to himſelf? hath he perceived his own faults? hath he thrown off his conceit? doth he ſeek an inſtructor? ——Yes, he doth.——An inſtructor how to *live?* No, fool; but how to *talk*: for it is upon this account that he admires *you*. Hear what he ſays. " This man writes with very great art, and much " more finely than Dion." This is quite another thing. Doth he ſay, this is a modeſt, faithful, calm perſon? But, if he ſaid this too, I would aſk him, ſince he is *faithful*, what is it to be *faithful?* And, if he could not tell, I would add, firſt learn the meaning of what you ſay, and then ſpeak. While you are in this bad diſpoſition then, and gaping after applauders, and counting your hearers, would you be of benefit to others? " To-day I had many more " hearers." " Yes, many: we think there were " five hundred." You ſay nothing, make them a thouſand.——" Dion never had ſo great an audi- " ence." " How ſhould he?"——" And they have " a fine taſte for diſcourſes."——" What is excel- " lent, Sir, will move even a ſtone." Here is the language of a philoſopher! here is the diſpoſition of one, who is to be beneficial to mankind! here is the man, attentive to diſcourſes! who hath read the works of the Socratic philoſophers, as ſuch; not as if they were the writings of orators, like Lyſius and Iſocrates. " *I have wondered by what arguments*, " etc. No: *by what argument*: that is the more

" perfectly accurate expreſſion." Is this to have read them any otherwiſe, than as you read little pieces of poetry? If you read them as you ought, you would not dwell on ſuch trifles; but would rather conſider ſuch a paſſage as this: Anytus *and* Melitus *may kill; but they cannot hurt me.* And, *I am always ſo diſpoſed, as to regard none of my friends, but that reaſon, which, after examination, appears to me to be the beſt.* Hence, who ever heard Socrates ſay, " I know, or teach, any thing?" But he ſent different people to different inſtructors: ſo they came to him, deſiring to be recommended to the philoſophers; and he took and recommended them. No: but I warrant you, as he accompanied them, he uſed to give them ſuch advice as this: " Hear " *me* diſcourſe to-day at the houſe of Quadratus." ——Why ſhould I hear you? have you a mind to ſhow me how finely you put words together, Sir? and what good doth that do you? " But praiſe me." ——What do you mean by praiſing you?—— Say, incomparable! prodigious!——well: I do ſay it. But, if praiſe be that which the philoſophers call by the appellation of *good*, what have I to praiſe you for? If it be a good to ſpeak well, teach me, and I will praiſe you.——" What then, ought theſe " things to be heard without pleaſure?"——By no means, I do not hear even a harper, without pleaſure; but am I therefor to ſtand playing upon the harp? Hear what Socrates ſays to his judges. " It " would not be decent for me to appear before you, " at this age, compoſing ſpeeches, like a boy." Like a boy, ſays he. For it is, without doubt, a pretty knack, to chuſe out words, and place them together: and then to read or ſpeak them gracefully in

public; and, in the midſt of the diſcourſe, to obſerve, that "he vows by all that is good, there are "but few capable of theſe things." But doth a philoſopher apply to people to hear him? doth not he attract thoſe who are fitted to receive benefit from him, in the ſame mannner as the ſun, or their neceſſary food doth? what phyſician applies to any body to be cured by him? (Though now indeed I hear, that the phyſicians at Rome apply for patients; but in my time they were applied to) "I apply to "you, to come and hear that you are in a bad "way; and that you take care of every thing, but "what you ought: that you know not what is "good or evil; and are unfortunate, and unhappy." A fine application! and yet, unleſs the diſcourſe of a philoſopher hath this effect, both that, and the ſpeaker, are void of life. Rufus uſed to ſay, if you are at leiſure to praiſe me, I ſpeak to no purpoſe. And indeed he uſed to ſpeak in ſuch a manner, that each of us, who heard him, ſuppoſed, that ſome perſon had accuſed us to him; ſo he hit upon what was done by us, and placed the faults of every one, before his eyes.

§. 2. The ſchool of a philoſopher is a ſurgery. You are not to go out of it with pleaſure, but with pain; for you come there, not in health: but one of you hath a diſlocated ſhoulder; another, an abſceſs: a third, a fiſtula; a fourth, the head-ach. And am I then, to ſit uttering pretty trifling thoughts, and little exclamations, that, when you have praiſed me, you may each of you go away with the ſame diſlocated ſhoulder, the ſame aching head, the ſame abſceſs, that you brought? and is it for this that young men are to travel? and do they leave their

parents, their friends, their relations, and their eſtates, that they may praiſe you, while you are uttering little exclamations? was this the practice of Socrates? of Zeno? Of Cleanthes? "What then! "is there not in ſpeaking, a ſtyle and manner of "exhortation?"——Who denies it? Juſt as there is a manner of confutation, and of inſtruction. But who ever therefor, added that of *oſtentation* for a fourth? for in what doth the exhortatory manner conſiſt? In being able to ſhow to one and all, the contradictions in which they are involved; and that they care for every thing rather than what they mean to care for: for they mean the things conducive to happineſs; but they ſeek them where they are not to be found. To effect this, muſt a thouſand ſeats be placed, and an audience invited; and you, in a fine robe, or cloke, aſcend the roſtrum, and deſcribe the death of Achilles? Forbear, for heaven's ſake, to bring, as far as you are able, good words and practices into diſgrace. Nothing, to be ſure, gives more force to exhortation, than when the ſpeaker ſhows, that he hath need of the hearers? But tell me, who, when he hears you reading, or ſpeaking, is ſolicitous about *himſelf?* or turns his attention upon *himſelf?* or ſays, when he is going away, "The philoſopher hit me well." Inſtead of this, even though you are in high vogue, is not all that one man ſays; "He ſpoke finely about Xerxes."——"No, ſays another; but on the battle of "Thermopylae." Is this the audience of a philoſopher.

CHAP. XXIV.

That we ought not to be affected, by things not in our own power.

§. 1. LET not what is contrary to nature in another, be an evil to you: for you were not born to be depreſſed, and unhappy, along with others; but to be happy, along with them. And, if any one is unhappy, remember, that he ſo for himſelf: for God made all men to enjoy felicity, and a ſettled good condition. He hath furniſhed all with means for this purpoſe; having given them ſome things for their own; others, not for their own. Whatever is ſubject to reſtraint, compulſion, or deprivation, not their own: whatever is not ſubject to reſtraint, their own. And the eſſence of good and evil, he hath placed in things which are our own; as it became him, who provides for, and protects us, with paternal care.

But I have parted with ſuch a one, and he is in grief.

And why did he eſteem what belonged to another, his own? why did he not conſider, while he was pleaſed with ſeeing you, that you are mortal, that you are ſubject to change your abode? Therefor he bears the puniſhment of his own folly. But to what purpoſe, or for what cauſe do you too break your ſpirits? have not *you* neither ſtudied theſe things? But, like trifling, ſilly women, conſidered the things you delighted in; the places, the perſons, the converſations, as if they were to laſt for ever;

and now ſit crying, becauſe you do not ſee the ſame people, nor live in the ſame place? Indeed you deſerve to be ſo affected, and thus to become more wretched than ravens or crows; which, without groaning, or longing for their former ſtate, can fly where they will, build their neſts in another place, and croſs the ſeas.

Ay: but this happens from their want of reaſon.

Was reaſon then given to us by the Gods, for the purpoſe of unhappineſs and miſery, to make us live wretched and lamenting? O, by all means, let every one be immortal! let nobody go from home! let us never go from home ourſelves, but remain rooted to a ſpot, like plants! and, if any of our acquaintance ſhould quit his abode, let us ſit and cry; and when he comes back, let us dance, and clap our hands, like children. Shall we never wean ourſelves, and remember what we have heard from the philoſophers, (unleſs we have heard them only as juggling enchanters;) that the world is one great city, and the ſubſtance one, out of which it is formed: that there muſt neceſſarily be a certain rotation of things: that ſome muſt give way to others; ſome be diſſolved, and others riſe in their ſtead: ſome remain in the ſame ſituation, and others be moved: but that all is full of friendſhip: firſt of the Gods, and then of men, by nature endeared to each other: that ſome muſt be ſeparated; others live together, rejoicing in the preſent, and not grieving for the abſent: and that man, beſides a natural greatneſs of mind, and contempt of things independent on choice, is likewiſe formed not to be rooted to the earth: but to go at different times to different places; ſometimes on urgent occaſions, and ſometimes merely

for the ſake of obſervation. Such was the caſe of Ulyſſes; who,

Wand'ring from clime to clime obſervant ſtray'd,
Their manners noted, and their ſtates ſurvey'd.
POPE's Odyſſ. I.

And yet before him, of Hercules, to travel over the world,

Juſt and unjuſt recording in his mind,
And, with ſure eyes, inſpecting all mankind.
POPE's Odyſſ. XVII. v. 580.

To expel and clear away the one, and, in its ſtead, to introduce the other. Yet how many friends do you think he muſt have at Thebes? how many at Argos? how many at Athens? and how many did he acquire in his travels? He married too, when he thought it a proper time, and became a father, and then quitted his children; not lamenting and longing for them, nor as if he had left them orphans: for he knew, that no human creature is an orphan; but that there is a father, who always, and without intermiſſion, takes care of all. For he had not merely heard it, as matter of talk, that Jupiter was the father of mankind; but he eſteemed and called him his own father, and performed all that he did, with a view to him. Hence, he was, in every place, able to live happy. But it is never poſſible to make happineſs conſiſtent with a deſire of what is not preſent. For what is happy muſt have all it wiſhes for; muſt reſemble a perſon ſatisfied with food: there muſt be no thirſt, no hunger.

But Ulyſſes longed for his wife, and ſat crying on a rock.

Why: do you mind Homer, and his fables, in every thing? Or, if Ulyſſes really did cry, what was he, but a wretched man? but what wiſe and good man is wretched? The univerſe is ſurely but ill governed, unleſs Jupiter takes care, that his ſubjects may be happy like himſelf. But theſe are unlawful and profane thoughts; and Ulyſſes, if he did indeed cry and bewail himſelf, was not a good man. For who can be a good man, who doth not know what he is? and who knows this, and forgets, that all things made are periſhable; and that it is not poſſible for man and man always to live together? what then? To deſire impoſſibilities is baſe and fooliſh: it is the behaviour of a ſtranger [to the world]; of one who fights againſt God, the only way he can, by his principles.

But my mother grieves, when ſhe doth not ſee me.

And why hath not ſhe learnt theſe doctrines? I do not ſay, that care ought not to be taken that ſhe may not lament; but that we are not to wiſh abſolutely, what is not in our own power. Now, the grief of another is not in our power; but my own grief is. I will therefor abſolutely ſuppreſs my own, for that is in my power; and I will endeavour to ſuppreſs another's grief, as far as I am able: but I will not endeavour it abſolutely, otherwiſe I ſhall fight againſt God; I ſhall reſiſt Jupiter, and oppoſe him, in the adminiſtration of the univerſe. And not only my children's children will bear the puniſhment of this diſobedience, and fighting againſt God, but myſelf too; ſtarting, and full of perturbation, be-

in the day time, and in my dreams by night; trembling at every meſſage, and having my enjoyment dependent on the intelligence of others. "Some-"body is come from Rome." "No harm, I hope." Why, what harm can happen to you, where you are not?—"From Greece." "No harm I hope." Why, at this rate, every place may be the cauſe of misfortune to you. Is it not enough for you to be unfortunate where you are, but it muſt be beyond ſea too, and by letters? Such is the ſecurity of your condition!

But what if my friends there ſhould be dead?

What indeed, but that thoſe are dead, who were born to die. Do you at once wiſh to live to be old, and yet not to ſee the death of any one you love? do not you know, that, in a long courſe of time, many and various events muſt neceſſarily happen? that a fever muſt get the better of one; a highwayman, of another; a tyrant, of a third? For ſuch is the world we live in; ſuch they who live in it with us. Heats and colds, improper diet, journeys, voyages, winds, and various accidents deſtroy ſome, baniſh others; deſtine one to an embaſſy, another to a camp. And now, pray, ſit in a flutter about all theſe things; lamenting, diſappointed, wretched, dependent on another; and that not one or two, but ten thouſand times ten thouſand.

§. 2. Is this what you have heard from the philoſophers? this what you have learnt? do not you know what ſort of a thing a warfare is? One muſt keep guard; another go out for a ſpy; another, to battle too. It is neither poſſible, that all ſhould be in the ſame place, nor indeed better: but you, neglecting to perform the orders of your general, com-

plain, whenever any thing a little hard is commanded; and do not conſider what you make the army become, as far as lies in your power. For, if all ſhould imitate you, nobody will dig a trench, or throw up a rampart, or watch, or expoſe himſelf in danger; but every one will appear uſeleſs to the expedition. Again: if you were a ſailor in a voyage, fix upon one place, and there remain. If it ſhould be neceſſary to climb the maſt, refuſe to do it; if to run to the head of the ſhip, refuſe to do it. And what captain will bear you? would not he throw you over board, as a uſeleſs piece of goods, and mere luggage, and a bad example to the other ſailors? Thus alſo, in the preſent caſe: every one's life is a warfare, and that long and various. You muſt obſerve the duty of a ſoldier, and perform every thing, at the nod of your general; and even, if poſſible, divine what he would have done. For there is no compariſon between the above-mentioned general and this, either in power, or excellence of character. You are placed in an extenſive command, and not in a mean poſt; but you are a ſenator: do not you know, that ſuch a one muſt ſpend but little time on his affairs at home; but be much abroad, either commanding or obeying; attending on the duties either of a magiſtrate, a ſoldier, or a judge. And now pray, would you be fixed and rooted to the ſame ſpot, like a plant?

Why: it is pleaſant.

Who denies it? And ſo is a ragout pleaſant; and a fine woman is pleaſant. Is not this juſt what they ſay who make pleaſure their end? do not you perceive whoſe language you have ſpoken? That of Epicureans and Catamites. And while you follow

their practices, and hold their principles, do you talk to us of the doctrines of Zeno and Socrates? Why do not you throw away, to as great a diſtance as poſſible, thoſe ornaments which belong to others, and which you have nothing to do with? what elſe do the Epicureans deſire, than to ſleep without hindrance, and riſe without compulſion; and, when they are got up, to yawn at their leiſure, and waſh their face; then write and read what they pleaſe; then prat about ſome trifle or other, and be applauded by their friends, whatever they ſay: then go out for a walk; and, after they have taken a turn, bathe, and then eat; and then to bed: in what manner they ſpent their time there, why ſhould one ſay? For it is eaſily gueſſed. Come: now do *you* alſo tell me, what courſe of life *you* deſire to lead, who are a zealot for truth, and Diogenes, and Socrates? what would you do at Athens? theſe very ſame things? why then do you call yourſelf a Stoic? they who falſely pretend to the Roman citizenſhip, are puniſhed ſeverely: and muſt thoſe be diſmiſſed with impunity, who falſely claim ſo great a thing, and ſo venerable a title, as you do? or is this impoſſible; and is there not a divine, and powerful, and inevitable law, which exacts the greateſt puniſhments from thoſe, who are guilty of the greateſt offences? For what ſays this law? *Let him who claims what doth not belong to him, be arrogant; be vain-glorious, be baſe, be a ſlave: let him grieve, let him envy, let him pity; and, in a word, let him be unhappy, let him lament.*

§. 3. What then! would you have me pay my court to ſuch a one? would you have me frequent this door?

If reaſon requires it, for your country, for your relations, for mankind, why ſhould you not go? You are not aſhamed to go to the door of a ſhoemaker, when you want ſhoes; nor of a gardener, when you want lettuce. Why then of the rich, when you have ſome ſimilar want?

Ay: but I am not ſtruck with awe of a ſhoemaker.

Nor of a rich man neither.

I need not flatter a gardener.

Nor a rich man neither.

How then ſhall I get what I want?

Why, do I bid you go, in expectation of *getting* it? No: only that you may do what becomes yourſelf.

Why then, after all, ſhould I go?

That you may have gone; that you may have diſcharged the duties of a citizen, of a brother, of a friend. And, after all, remember, that you are going to a ſhoemaker, to a gardener, who hath not the power of any thing great or reſpectable, though he ſhould ſell it ever ſo dear. You are going to buy lettuces. They are ſold for a penny, not for a talent. So here too, the matter is worth going to his door about. Well: I will go. It is worth talking with him about. Well: I will talk with him.

Ay: but one muſt kiſs his hand too, and cajole him with praiſe.

Away with you. That is worth a talent. It is not expedient for myſelf, nor my country, nor my fellow citizens, nor my friends, to deſtroy the good citizen, and the friend [in my own character.]

But one ſhall appear not to have ſet heartily about the buſineſs, if one fails.

What, have you forgot again, why you went? Do not you know, that a wiſe and good man doth nothing for appearance; but for the ſake of having acted well?

What advantage then is it to him, to have acted well?

What advantage is it to one, who writes the name of Dion as he ought? The having writ it.

Is there no reward then?

Why: do you ſeek any greater reward, for a good man, than the doing what is fair and juſt? And yet, at Olympia, you deſire nothing elſe; but think it enough, to be crowned victor. Doth it appear to you ſo ſmall and worthleſs a thing, to be fair, good and happy? Beſides: being introduced by God into this great city, [the world,] and bound to diſcharge, at this time, the duties of a man, do you ſtill want nurſes and a mamma; and are moved and effeminated by the tears of poor fooliſh women? are you thus determined never to ceaſe being an infant? do not you know that he who acts like a child, the older he is, ſo much is he the more ridiculous?

§. 4. Did you never viſit any one at Athens, at his own houſe?

Yes: whomſoever I pleaſed.

Why: now you are here, be willing to viſit this perſon, and you will ſtill ſee whom you pleaſe; only let it be without meanneſs, without deſire, or averſion, and your affairs will go well: but their going well, or not, doth not conſiſt in going to the houſe, and ſtanding at the door, or not; but lies within, in your own principles; when you have ac-

quired a contempt of things independent on choice, and eſteem none of them your own; but that what belongs to you is only to judge, to think, to exert your purſuits, your deſires, and averſions, right. What further room is there, after this, for flattery, for meanneſs? why do you ſtill long for the quiet you enjoyed there; for places familiar to you? Stay a little, and theſe will become familiar to you, in their turn; and then, if you are ſo mean-ſpirited, weep and lament again at leaving theſe.

How then am I to preſerve an affectionate temper?

As becomes a noble-ſpirited and happy perſon. For reaſon will never tell you to be dejected, and broken-hearted; or to depend on another; or to reproach either God, or man. Be affectionate in ſuch a manner as to obſerve all this. But if, from *affection*, as you call it, you are to be a ſlave and a wretch, it is not worth your while to be affectionate. And what reſtrains you from loving any one as a mortal, as a perſon who may be obliged to quit you? pray did not Socrates love his own children? But it was as became one, who was free, and mindful that his firſt duty was, to gain the love of the Gods. Hence he violated no part of the character of a good man, either in his defence, or in fixing a penalty on himſelf. Nor yet before, when he was a ſenator, or a ſoldier. But *we* make uſe of every pretence to be mean-ſpirited; ſome, on account of a child; ſome, of a mother; and ſome, of a brother. But it is not fit to be unhappy, on the account of any one; but happy, on the account of all; and chiefly of God, who hath conſtituted us for this purpoſe. What! did Diogenes love nobody; who was ſo

gentle, and benevolent, as chearfully to undergo ſo many pains and miſeries of body, for the common good of mankind? Yes: he did love them: but how? As became a miniſter of Jove; at once taking care of men, and obedient to God. Hence the whole earth, not any particular place, was his country. And, when he was taken captive, he did not long for Athens, and his friends and acquaintance there? but made himſelf acquainted with the pirates, and endeavoured to reform them: and, when he was at laſt ſold, he lived at Corinth, juſt as before at Athens: and, if he had gone to the Perrhaebeans. he would have been exactly the ſame. Thus is freedom acquired. Hence he uſed to ſay, "Ever ſince "Antiſthenes made me free, I have ceaſed to be a "ſlave." How did *he* make him free? Hear what he ſays. "He taught me what was my own, and "what not. An eſtate is not my own. Kindred, "domeſtics, friends, reputation, familiar places, man-"ner of life, all belong to another." "What is "your own then?" "The uſe of the appearances "of things. He ſhewed me, that I have *this*, not "ſubject to reſtraint, or compulſion: no one can "hinder or force me to uſe them, any otherwiſe "than I pleaſe. Who then, after this, hath any "power over me? Philip, or Alexander, or the "Perſian king? whence ſhould they have it? For "he, that is to be ſubdued by man, muſt, long "before, be ſubdued by things. He therefor, "of whom neither pleaſure, nor pain, nor fame, "nor riches, can get the better; and who is able, "whenever he thinks fit, to throw away his whole "body, with contempt, and depart, whoſe ſlave "can he ever be? to whom is he ſubject?" But if

Diogenes had taken pleaſure in living at Athens, and had been ſubdued by that manner of life, his affairs would have been at every one's diſpoſal; and whoever was ſtronger, would have had the power of grieving him. How would he have flattered the pirates, think you, to make them ſell him to ſome Athenian, that he might ſee again the fine Piraeum, the long walls, and the citadel? how would you ſee them, you wretch? As a diſpirited ſlave. And what good will that do you? — "No: but free."——— Show in what manner, free. See, ſomebody lays hold on you; whoever takes you away from your uſual manner of life, and ſays, "You are my ſlave: "for it is in my power to reſtrain you from living "as you like. It is in my power to afflict and "humble you. Whenever I pleaſe, you may be "chearful again; and ſet out, elated, for Athens." What do you ſay to him who thus enſlaves you? what method will you find of getting free? or dare you not ſo much as look up at him; but, without making many words, ſupplicate to be diſmiſſed? You ought to go to priſon, man, with alacrity, with ſpeed, and to precede your conductors. Inſtead of this, do you regret living at Rome, and long for Greece? And, when you muſt die, will you then too come crying to us, that you ſhall no more ſee Athens, nor walk in the Lycaeum? have you travelled for *this?* Is it for *this*, that you have been ſeeking for ſomebody to do you good? what good? that you may the more eaſily ſolve ſyllogiſms, and manage hypothetical arguments? and is it for this reaſon, you left your brother, your country, your friends, your family, that you might carry back ſuch improvements as theſe? So that you did not travel for conſtancy, nor for tranquillity; nor that, ſecured from harm,

you might complain of no one, accuſe no one: that no one might injure you; and that thus you might preſerve your relative duties, without impediment. You have made a fine traffic of it, to carry home hypothetical arguments, and convertible propoſitions! if you pleaſe too, ſit in the market, and cry them for ſale, as mountebanks do their medicines. Why will you not rather deny, that you know even what you have learned; for fear of bringing a ſcandal upon theorems as uſeleſs? what harm hath philoſophy done you? in what hath Chryſippus injured you, that you ſhould give a proof, by your actions, that philoſophy is of no value? had you not evils enough at home? how many cauſes for grief and lamentation had you there, even if you had not travelled? But you have added more; and, if you ever get any new acquaintance and friends, you will find freſh cauſes for groaning; and, in like manner, if you attach yourſelf to any other country. To what purpoſe therefor do you live? to heap ſorrow upon ſorrow, to make you wretched? And then you tell me that is *affection*. What affection, man? If it be good, it is not the cauſe of any ill: if ill, I will have nothing to do with it. I was born for my own good; not ill.

§. 5. What then is the proper exerciſe in this caſe?

Firſt, the higheſt, and principal, and obvious, as it were at your door, is, that when you attach yourſelf to any thing, it may not be as to what cannot be taken away.

But as to what?

As to ſomething of the ſame kind with an earthen pot, or a glaſs cup; that, when it happens to be broken, you may remember not to be troubled. So

here too: when you kiſs your child, or your brother, or your friend, never intirely give way to the appearance, nor ſuffer the pleaſure to diffuſe itſelf as far as it will; but curb it, reſtrain it, like thoſe who ſtand behind triumphant victors, and remind them, that they are men. Do you likewiſe remind yourſelf, that you love what is mortal; that you love what is not your own. It is allowed you for the preſent, not irrevocably, not for ever; but as a fig, or a bunch of grapes, in the appointed ſeaſon. If you long for theſe in winter, you are a fool. So, if you long for your ſon, or your friend, when he is not allowed you, know, you wiſh for figs in winter. For as winter is to a fig, ſo is every accident in the univerſe, to thoſe things which are taken away by it. In the next place, repreſent to yourſelf appearances contrary to whatever objects give you pleaſure. What harm is there, while you are kiſſing your child, to ſay ſoftly, "To-morrow you will "die:" and ſo to your friend, to-morrow either "you or I ſhall go away, and we ſhall ſee each o-"ther no more."

But theſe ſayings are ominous.

And ſo are ſome incantations: but, becauſe they are uſeful, I do not mind it; only let them be uſeful. But do you call any thing *ominous*, except what is the ſignification of ſome ill? Cowardice is *ominous*; mean-ſpiritedneſs is *ominous*; lamentation, grief, want of ſhame. Theſe are words of bad omen; and yet we ought not to be ſcrupulous of uſing them, as a guard againſt the things they mean. But do you tell me, that a word is *ominous* which is ſignificant of any thing natural? Say too, that it is *ominous*, for ears of corn to be reaped; for this ſignifies

the deſtruction of the corn; but not of the world. Say too, that the fall of the leaf is *ominous*; and that a candiet maſs ſhould be produced from figs; and raiſins, from grapes. For all theſe are changes from a former, into another ſtate; not a deſtruction, but a certain appointed oeconomy and adminiſtration. Such is abſence, a ſmall change: ſuch is death, a greater change: not from what now is nothing, but to what now is not.

What then, ſhall I be no more?

You will be: but [you will be] ſomething elſe, of which, at preſent, the world hath no need: for even *you* were not produced when you pleaſed, but when the world had need [of you.] Hence a wiſe and good man, mindful who he is, and whence he came, and by whom he was produced, is attentive only how he may fill his poſt regularly, and dutifully to God. "Is it thy pleaſure I ſhould any lon-" ger continue in being? I will continue, free, ſpi-" rited, agreeably to thy pleaſure: for thou haſt " made me incapable of reſtraint, in what is my " own. But haſt thou no farther uſe for me? Fare " thou well! I have ſtaid thus long for thy ſake a-" lone, and no other; and now I depart in obedi-" ence to thee."——"How do I depart?"—— " Again: agreeably to thy pleaſure; as free, " as thy ſervant, as one ſenſible of thy com-" mands, and thy prohibitions. But, while I " am employed in thy ſervice, *what* wouldſt thou " have me be? a prince, or a private man; a ſena-" tor, or a plebeian; a ſoldier, or a general; a pre-" ceptor, or the maſter of a family? Whatever poſt " or rank thou ſhalt aſſign me, like Socrates, I will " die a thouſand times rather than deſert it. *Where*

" wouldſt thou have me be? at Rome, or at Athens;
" at Thebes, or at Gyaros? Only remember me
" there. If thou ſhalt ſend me, where men cannot
" live conformably to nature, I do not depart from
" thence, in diſobedience to thy will; but as receiv-
" ing my ſignal of retreat from thee. I do not de-
" ſert thee: heaven forbid! but I perceive thou haſt
" no uſe for me. If a life conformable to nature
" be granted, I will ſeek no other place, but that in
" which I am; nor any other company, but thoſe
" with whom I am."

§. 6. Let theſe things be ready at hand, night and day. Theſe things write; theſe things read; of theſe things talk both to yourſelf and others. [Aſk them], " Have you any aſſiſtance to give me
" for this purpoſe?" And again, go and aſk another. Then, if any of thoſe things ſhould happen that are ſaid to be againſt our will, immediately this will be a relief to you; in the firſt place, that it was not unexpected. For it is a great matter, upon all occaſions, to [be able to] ſay, " I knew that I begot
" one born to die." Thus do you ſay too; " I
" knew that I was liable to die, to remove, to be
" exiled, to be impriſoned." If afterwards you turn to yourſelf, and ſeek from what quarter the event proceeds, you will preſently recollect: " It is
" from things independent on choice; not from
" what is my own. What then is it to me?" Then farther (which is the chief): who ſent it? The commander, the general, the city? Give it me then; for I muſt always obey the law in all things. Farther yet: when any appearance moleſts you (for [to prevent] *that*, is not in your power,) ſtrive againſt it; and, by reaſon, conquer it. Do not ſuffer i

to gain ſtrength, nor to lead you on to conſequences; and repreſent what, and how, it pleaſes. If you are at Gyaros, do not repreſent to yourſelf the manner of living at Rome; how many pleaſures you uſed to find there, and how many would attend your return; but be intent on this point; how he, who lives at Gyaros, may live with ſpirit and comfort, at Gyaros. And, if you are at Rome, do not repreſent to yourſelf the manner of living at Athens: but conſider only, how you ought to live where you are. Laſtly: to all other pleaſures oppoſe that of being conſcious, that you are obeying God; and performing, not in word, but in deed, the duty of a wiſe and good man. How great a thing is it to be able to ſay to yourſelf, "What others are now ſolemnly arguing in the ſchools, and ſeem to carry beyond probability, this I am [actually] performing. They are ſitting and expatiating upon *my* virtues, and diſputing about *me*, and celebrating *me*. Jupiter hath been pleaſed to let me receive a demonſtration of this from myſelf; and indeed that *he* may know, whether he hath a ſoldier, a citizen, ſuch as he ſhould be, and to produce me as a witneſs to other men, concerning things independent on choice. See that your fears were vain, your appetites vain. Seek not good from without: ſeek it in yourſelves, or you will never find it. For this reaſon, he now brings me hither, now ſends me thither; ſhows me to mankind, poor, without authority, ſick; ſends me to Gyaros; leads me to priſon: not that he hates me: heaven forbid! for who hates the beſt of his ſervants? Nor that he neglects me: for he doth not neglect any one of the ſmalleſt things: but to

" exerciſe me, and make uſe of me as a witneſs to " others. Appointed to ſuch a ſervice, do I ſtill " care where I am, or with whom, or what is ſaid " of me, inſtead of being wholly attentive to God, " and to his orders and commands?"

§. 7. Having theſe things always at hand, and practiſing them by yourſelf, and making them ready for uſe, you will never want any one to comfort and ſtrengthen you. For ſhame doth not conſiſt in having any thing to eat, but in not having reaſon enough to exempt you from fear and ſorrow. But, if you once acquire that exemption, will a tyrant, or his guards, or courtiers, be any thing to you? will any deſtination of offices, or they who offer ſacrifices in the capitol, on being admitted into the emperor's train, give *you* uneaſineſs, who hath received ſo great a command from Jupiter? Only, do not make a parade of it, nor grow inſolent upon it. But ſhow it by your actions: and, though no one ſhould perceive it, be content, that you are well, and happy.

CHAP. XXV.

Concerning thoſe who deſiſt from their purpoſe.

§. 1. CONSIDER which of the things, which you at firſt propoſed to yourſelf, you have retained, which not, and how; which give you pleaſure, which pain, in the reflection; and, if poſſible, recover yourſelf, where you have failed. For the champions, in this greateſt of combats, muſt not grow weary; but are even contentedly to bear

whipping. For this is no combat of wreſtling or boxing; where both he who ſucceeds, and he who doth not ſucceed, may poſſibly be of very great worth, or of little; indeed may be very fortunate, or very miſerable: but the combat is for good fortune and happineſs itſelf. What is the caſe then? *Here*, even if we have renounced the conteſt, no one reſtrains us from renewing it; nor need we wait for another four years, for the return of another Olympiad; but recollecting, and recovering yourſelf, and returning with the ſame zeal, you may renew it immediately: and even if you ſhould again yield, you may again begin: and, if you once get the victory, you may become like one who hath never yielded. Only do not begin, from a habit of this, to do it with pleaſure, and then, like quails that hath fled the pit, go about as if you were a brave champion, though you have been conquered, all the games round.——"The appearance of a pretty girl "conquers me." What then? "Have not I been "conquered before? I have a mind to rail at ſome-"body. Well: have not I railed before?"—You talk to us juſt as if you had come off unhurt. Like one that ſhould ſay to his phyſician, who hath forbidden him to bathe, "Why, did not I bathe be-"fore?" Suppoſe the phyſician ſhould anſwer him, "Well; and what was the conſequence of your "bathing? were not you feveriſh? had not you "the head ach?" So, when you before railed at ſomebody, did not you act like an ill-natured perſon; like an impertinent one? have not you fed this habit of yours, by actions familiar to it? when you were conquered by a pretty girl, did you come off with impunity? why then do you talk of what

you have done *before?* You ought to remember it, I think, as ſlaves do whipping, ſo as to refrain from the ſame faults.——" But the caſe is unlike: for " there it is pain that cauſes the remembrance: but " what is the pain, what the puniſhment, of my " committing faults? for when was I ever habi. " tuated [by any ſuffering] to avoiding acting ill?" " ——Therefor the pains of experience, whether we will, or not, have their uſe.

CHAP. XXVI.

Concerning thoſe who are in dread of want.

§. 1. ARE not you aſhamed to be more fearful and mean-ſpirited than fugitive ſlaves? to what eſtates, to what ſervants, do *they* truſt, when they run away, and leave their maſters? do not they, after carrying off a little with them for the firſt days, travel over land and ſea, contriving firſt one, then another method of getting food? and what fugitive ever died with hunger? But *you* tremble, and lie awake by night, for fear you ſhould want neceſſaries. Wretch! are you ſo blind? do not you ſee the way where the want of neceſſaries leads?

Why, where doth it lead?

Where a fever, where even a ſtone falling on you, leads——to death. Have not you, yourſelf then, often ſaid this to your companions? have not you read, have not you written, many things of this kind? And how often have you arrogantly boaſted, that you are eaſy with regard to death?

Ay: but my family too will ſtarve with hunger.

What then? doth their hunger lead any other way than yours? is there not the ſame deſcent? the ſame ſtate below? will you not then, in every want and neceſſity, look with confidence there, where even the moſt rich and powerful, and kings and tyrants themſelves muſt deſcend? you, indeed, hungry perhaps; and they, burſt with indigeſtion and drunkenneſs? what beggar have you almoſt ever ſeen, who did not live to old-age, nay, to extreme old-age? Chilled with cold day and night, lying on the ground, and eating only what is barely neceſſary, they come nearly to an impoſſibility of dying.—— Cannot you write? cannot you keep a ſchool? cannot you be a watch-man at ſomebody's door?

But it is ſhameful to come to this neceſſity.

Firſt therefor, learn what things are ſhameful; And then tell us, you are a philoſopher: but at preſent, do not bear, that even any one elſe ſhould call you ſo. Is that ſhameful to *you*, which is not your own act? of which you are not the cauſe? which hath happened to you by accident, like a fever, or the head-ach? if your parents were poor, or left others their heirs, or, though they are living, do not aſſiſt you, are theſe things ſhameful for *you?* Is this what you have learned from the philoſophers? have you never heard, that what is ſhameful is blameable; and what is blameable deſerves to be blamed? whom do you blame for an action not his own, which he hath not done himſelf? did *you* then make your father ſuch a one [as he is]? Or is it in *your* power to mend him? is that permitted you? what then, muſt you deſire what is not permitted; and, when you fail of it, be *aſhamed?* are you thus ha-

bituated, even when you are ſtudying philoſophy, to depend upon others, and to hope nothing from yourſelf? Sigh then, and groan, and eat in fear that you ſhall have no victuals to-morrow. Tremble, leſt your ſervants ſhould rob you, or run away from you, or die. Thus live on, without ceaſing, whoever you are, who have applied to philoſophy in name only; and, as much as in you lies, have diſgraced its theorems, by ſhowing, that they are unprofitable and uſeleſs to thoſe who take up the profeſſion of them. You have never made conſtancy, tranquillity, and apathy, the object of your deſires; have attended on no one upon this account; but on many, for the ſake of ſyllogiſms: nor have ever, by yourſelf, examined any one of theſe appearances. "Can I bear this, or can I not bear it? what re-"mains for me to do?" But, as if all your affairs went ſafe and well, you have dwelt upon the third claſs, that of ſecurity from failure; that you may never fail—of what?—Fear, mean-ſpiritedneſs, admiration of riches, an unaccompliſhed deſire, and unſucceſsful averſion. Theſe are the things which you have been labouring to ſecure. Ought you not firſt to have acquired ſomething by the uſe of reaſon, and then to have provided ſecurity for *that?* whom did you ever ſee building a round of battlements, without placing them upon a wall? and what porter is ever ſet where there is no door? But you *ſtudy*. Can you ſhow me what you ſtudy?

Not to be ſhaken by ſophiſtry.

Shaken from what? Show me firſt, what you have in your cuſtody; what you meaſure, or what you weigh; and then accordingly ſhow me the balance, or the buſhel. What ſignifies it to go on,

ever ſo long, meaſuring duſt? ought you not to ſhow, what makes men happy, what makes their affairs proceed as they wiſh? how we may blame no one, accuſe no one; how acquieſce in the adminiſtration of the univerſe? Show me theſe things. "See, I do ſhow them," ſay you; "I will ſolve "ſyllogiſms to you." —— This is the meaſure, wretch, and not the thing meaſured. Hence you now pay the penalty due for neglecting philoſophy. You tremble, you lie awake, you adviſe with every body, and if what you are adviſed to, doth not pleaſe every body, you think that you have been ill-adviſed. Then you dread hunger, as you fancy: but it is not hunger that you dread; but you are afraid, that you ſhall not have a cook; that you ſhall not have another perſon for a butler; another, to pull off your ſhoes; a fourth, to dreſs you; others, to rub you; others, to follow you: that, when you have undreſſed yourſelf in the bathing-room, and ſtretched yourſelf out like thoſe who are crucified, you may be rubbed here and there; and the perſon who preſides over theſe operations may ſtand by, and ſay, "Come this way; give your ſide; take "hold on his head; turn your ſhoulder:" and that, when you are returned home from the bath, you may bawl out, "Doth nobody bring any "thing to eat?" And then, "Take away; wipe "the table." This is your dread, that you ſhall not be able to lead the life of a ſick man. But learn the life of thoſe in health: how ſlaves live; how labourers; how, thoſe who are genuine philoſophers; how Socrates lived, even with a wife and children; how, Diogenes; how, Cleanthes, at once ſtudying and drawing water. If theſe are the things you

would have, you will have them every-where, and with a fearleſs confidence.

In what?

In the only thing that can be confided in; what is ſure, incapable of being reſtrained, or taken away; your own choice.

§. 2. But why have you contrived to make yourſelf ſo uſeleſs, and good for nothing, that nobody will receive you into their houſe; nobody take care of you: but though, if any ſound uſeful veſſel was thrown out of doors, whoever finds it, will take it up, and eſteem it as a gain; yet nobody will take up *you*; but every body eſteem you a loſs. What, cannot you ſo much as perform the office of a dog, or a cock? why then do you wiſh to live any longer, if you are ſo worthleſs? doth any good man fear, that food ſhould fail him? It doth not fail the blind, it doth not fail the lame. Shall it fail a good man? A paymaſter is not wanting to a ſoldier, or a labourer, or to a ſhoemaker; and ſhall one be wanting to a good man? is God ſo negligent of his own inſtitutions; of his ſervants; of his witneſſes, whom alone he makes uſe of as examples to the uninſtructed, both that he *is*, and that he adminiſters the univerſe rightly; and doth not neglect human affairs; and that no evil happens to a good man, either living or dead? what then is the caſe, when he doth not beſtow food? what elſe, than that, like a good general, he hath made me a ſignal of retreat? I obey, and follow; ſpeaking well of my leader, praiſing his works. For I came when it ſeemed good to him; and again, when it ſeems good to him, I depart: and in life it was my buſineſs to praiſe God,

both by myſelf, to each particular perſon, and to the world. Doth he not grant me many things? doth he not grant me affluence? It is not his pleaſure, that I ſhould live luxuriouſly: for he did not grant that even to Hercules, his own ſon; but another reigned over Argos and Mycenae; while *he* lived ſubject to command, laboured, and was exerciſed. And Euryſtheus was juſt what he was; neither king of Argos, nor Mycenae; not being indeed king of himſelf. But Hercules was ruler and governor of the whole earth and ſeas; and expeller of lawleſſneſs and injuſtice; the introducer of juſtice and ſanctity. And this he effected naked and alone. Again: when Ulyſſes was ſhipwrecked, and caſt away, did his helpleſs condition at all deject him? did it break his ſpirit? No: but how did he go to Nauſicaa, and her attendants, to aſk thoſe neceſſaries which it ſeems moſt ſhameful to beg from another?

As the fierce lion, on the mountain bred,
Confiding in his ſtrength———

Confiding in what? Not in glory, nor in riches, nor in dominion; but in his own ſtrength: that is, in his principles, concerning what things are in our own power; what, not. For theſe alone are what render us free, render us incapable of reſtraint; raiſe the head of the dejected, and make them look, with unaverted eyes, full in the face of the rich, and of the tyrants: and this was the gift of the philoſopher. But *you* will not ſet out with confidence; but trembling, about ſuch trifles as clothes and plate. Wretch! have you thus waſted your time till now?

But what, if I ſhould be ſick?

You will be ſick as you ought.

Who will take care of me?

God: your friends.

I ſhall lie in a hard bed.

But like a man.

I ſhall not have a convenient room.

You ſhall be ſick in an inconvenient one then.

Who will provide victuals for me?

They who provide for others too: you will be ſick like Manes.

But, beſides, what will be the concluſion of my ſickneſs? any other than death?

Why, do not you know then, that the origin of all human evils, and of mean-ſpiritedneſs, and cowardice, is not *death*; but rather the *fear* of death? Fortify yourſelf therefor againſt this. Hither let all your diſcourſes, readings, exerciſes, tend. And then you will know, that thus alone are men made free.

END *of the* THIRD BOOK.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

Of Freedom.

§. 1. HE is free, who lives as he likes; who is not ſubject either to compulſion, to reſtraint, or to violence: whoſe purſuits are unhindered, his deſires ſucceſsful, his averſions unincurred. Who then would wiſh to lead a wrong courſe of life?——"No one."——Who would live deceived, prone to miſtake, unjuſt, diſſolute, diſcontented, dejected?——"No one."——No wicked man then lives as he likes; therefor neither is he free. And who would live in ſorrow, fear, envy, pity; with diſappointed deſires, and incurred averſions?——"No one."——Do we then find any of the wicked exempt from ſorrow, fear, diſappointed deſires, incurred averſions?——"Not one."——Conſequently then, not free.

§. 2. If a perſon who hath been twice conſul ſhould hear this, provided you add, "but *you* are a "wiſe man; this is nothing to *you*;" he will forgive you. But if you tell him the truth; that, in point of ſlavery, he doth not differ from thoſe who have been thrice ſold, what muſt you expect, but to be beaten? "For how, ſays he, am I a ſlave? My father was free, my mother free. Beſides, I am

" a ſenator too, and the friend of Caeſar; and have " been twice conſul; and have myſelf many ſlaves." ——In the firſt place, moſt worthy Sir, perhaps your father too was a ſlave of the ſame kind; and your mother, and your grandfather, and all your anceſtors ſucceſſively. But even if they were ever ſo free, what is that to *you?* For what, if they were of a generous, you of a mean ſpirit; they, brave; and you, a coward: they, ſober; and you, diſſolute?

§. 3. And, " What, ſays he, is this towards be- " ing a ſlave?"——Do you think it nothing towards being a ſlave, to act againſt your will? compelled, and lamenting?——" Be it ſo. But who " can compel me, but the maſter of all, Caeſar?" ——By your own confeſſion then, you have *one* maſter: and let not his being, as you ſay, maſter of all, give you any comfort; but know, that you are a ſlave in a great family. Thus the Nicopolitans, too frequently cry out, " By the life of Cae- " ſar, we are *free!*"

§. 4. For the preſent, however, if you pleaſe, we will let Caeſar alone. But tell me this. Have you never been in love with any one, either of a ſervile or liberal condition?—" Why, what is *that* to " the being either a ſlave or free?"—Was you never commanded any thing by your miſtreſs, that you did not chuſe? have you never flattered your ſlave? have you never kiſſed her feet? And yet, if you were commanded to kiſs Caeſar's feet, you would think it an outrage, and an exceſs of tyranny. Have you never gone out by night, where you did not chuſe? have you never ſpent more than you choſe? have not you ſometimes uttered your words

with ſighs and groans? born to be reviled, and ſhut out of doors? But, if you are aſhamed to confeſs your own follies, ſee what Thraſonides ſays, and doth; who, after having fought more battles perhaps than you, went out by night, when Geta would not dare to go: nay, had he been compelled to it by him, would have gone roaring, and lamenting his bitter ſervitude. And what doth [this maſter of "his] ſay afterwards, "A ſorry girl hath enſlaved "*me*, whom no enemy ever enſlaved."—(Wretch! to be the ſlave of a girl, and a ſorry girl too! why then do you call yourſelf *free?* why do you boaſt your military expeditions?)——Then he calls for a ſword, and is angry with a perſon who, out of kindneſs, denies it; and ſends preſents to her who hates him; and begs, and weeps, and then again is elated on every little ſucceſs. But how is he elated even then? Is it ſo, as neither paſſionately to deſire or fear.

§. 5. Conſider, in animals, what is our idea of freedom. Some keep tame lions, and feed, and even carry them about with them; and who will ſay, that any ſuch lion is free? Nay, doth he not live the more ſlaviſhly, the more he lives at eaſe? and who, that had ſenſe and reaſon, would wiſh to be one of thoſe lions? again: how much do birds, which are taken and kept in a cage, ſuffer, by trying to fly away? Nay, ſome of them ſtarve with hunger, rather than undergo ſuch a life: then, as many of them as are ſaved, it is ſcarcely, and with difficulty, and in a pining condition; and the moment they find any hole, out they hop. Such a deſire have they of natural freedom, and to be at their own diſpoſal, and unreſtrained.——"And

" what harm doth this confinement do you?——
" What ſay you? I was born to fly where I pleaſe,
" to live in the open air, to ſing when I pleaſe.
" You deprive me of all this, and ſay, what *harm*
" doth it do you?"

§. 6. Hence we ſhall allow thoſe only to be free, who do not endure captivity; but, as ſoon as they are taken, die, and eſcape. Thus Diogenes ſomewhere ſays, that the only way to freedom is to die with eaſe. And he writes to the Perſian king; " You can no more enſlave the Athenians, than you " can fiſh."—— " How? what, ſhall not I take " them?"—— " If you do take them, ſays he, they " will leave you, and be gone, like fiſh. For take " a fiſh, and it dies. And, if the Athenians too " die, as ſoon as you have taken them, of what " uſe are your warlike preparations?"——This is the voice of a free man, who hath examined the matter in earneſt; and, as it might be expected, found it out. But, if you ſeek it where it is not, what wonder, if you never find it?

§. 7. A ſlave wiſhes to be immediately ſet free. Think you it is becauſe he is deſirous to pay his fine to the officer? No: but becauſe he fancies, that, for want of acquiring his freedom, he hath hitherto lived under reſtraint, and unproſperouſly. " If I " am at once ſet free, ſays he, it is all proſperity: " I care for no one; I ſpeak to all, as their equal, " and on a level with them. I go where I will, I come " when, and how I will." He is at laſt made free; and preſently, having nothing to eat, he ſeeks whom he may flatter, with whom he may ſup. He then either ſubmits to the baſeſt and moſt infamous proſtitution; and, if he can obtain admiſſion to ſome

great man's table, falls into a ſlavery much worſe than the former: or, if the creature, void of ſenſe and right taſte, happens to acquire an affluent fortune, he doats upon ſome girl, and is unhappy, and wiſhes for ſlavery again. "For what harm did it "do me? Another clothed me, another ſhod me, "another fed me, another took care of me when "I was ſick. It was but in a few things, by way "of return, I uſed to ſerve him. But now, miſe-"rable wretch! what do I ſuffer, in being a ſlave "to many, inſtead of one! yet, if I can obtain "the equeſtrian rings, I ſhall live with the utmoſt "proſperity and happineſs." In order to obtain them, he firſt ſuffers what he deſerves; and, as ſoon as he hath obtained them, it is all the ſame again. "But then, ſays he, if I do but get a military com-"mand, I ſhall be delivered from all my troubles." He gets a military command. He ſuffers as much as the vileſt rogue of a ſlave: and, nevertheleſs, he aſks for a ſecond command, and a third: and when he hath put the finiſhing hand, and is made a ſenator, then he is a ſlave indeed. When he comes into the aſſembly, it is then that he undergoes his fineſt and moſt ſplendid ſlavery.

§. 8.——*. Not to be a fool; but to learn what Socrates taught; the nature of things: and not to adapt pre conceptions raſhly to particular ſubjects. For the cauſe of all human evils is, the not being able to adapt general pre-conceptions to particular caſes. But different people have different opinions. One thinks the cauſe of his evils to be, that he is ſick. By no means: but that he doth not a-

* Something is here wanting in the original.

dapt his pre-conceptions right. Another, that he is poor: another, that he hath a harſh father and mother: another, that he is not in the good graces of Caeſar. This is nothing elſe, but not underſtanding how to adapt our pre-conceptions. For, who hath not a pre-conception of evil, that it is hurtful? that it is to be avoided? that it is by all means to be prudently guarded againſt? One pre-conception doth not contradict another, except when it comes to be adapted. What then is this evil, thus hurtful, and to be avoided? "Not to be the friend of Caeſar," ſaith one. He is gone; he fails in the adapting; he is embarraſſed; he ſeeks what is nothing to the purpoſe. For, if he gets to be Caeſar's friend, he is never the leſs diſtant from what he ſought. For what is it that every man ſeeks? To be ſecure, to be happy, to do what he pleaſes without reſtraint, and without compulſion. When he becomes the friend of Caeſar then, doth he ceaſe to be reſtrained? to be compelled? is he ſecure? is he happy? whom ſhall he aſk? whom can we better credit than this very man, who hath been his friend? come forth and tell us, whether you ſleep more quietly now, or before you were the friend of Caeſar? You preſently hear him cry, "Leave off, for heaven's ſake, "and do not inſult me. You know not the miſe-"ries I ſuffer: there is no ſleep for me; but one "comes, and ſaith, that Caeſar is already awake; "another, that he is juſt going out. Then follow "perturbations, then cares." Well: and when did you uſe to ſup more pleaſantly; formerly, or now? Hear what he ſays about this too. When he is not invited, he is diſtracted; and if he is, he ſups like a ſlave with his maſter, ſolicitous all the

while, not to ſay or do any thing fooliſh. And what think you? is he afraid of being whipped, like a ſlave? how can he hope to eſcape ſo well? No: but as becomes ſo great a man, Caeſar's friend, of loſing his head.—And when did you bathe more quietly; when did you perform your exerciſes more at your leiſure; in ſhort, which life would you wiſh to live, your preſent, or the former? I could ſwear, there is no one ſo ſtupid and inſenſible, as not to deplore his miſeries, in proportion as he is more the friend of Caeſar.

§. 9. Since then, neither they who are called kings, nor the friends of kings, live as they like; who, after all, are free? Seek, and you will find: for you are furniſhed by nature with means for diſcovering the truth. But, if you are not able by theſe alone to find the conſequence, hear them who have ſought it. What do they ſay? do you think freedom a good?—"The greateſt."—Can any one then, who attains the greateſt good be unhappy, or unſucceſsful in his affairs?—"No."—As many, therefor, as you ſee unhappy, lamenting, unproſperous, confidently pronounce them not free.—"I "do."—Henceforth then we have done with buying and ſelling, and ſuch like ſtated conditions of becoming ſlaves. For, if you have made theſe conceſſions properly, whether a great or a little king, a conſular, or twice a conſul, be unhappy, he is not free.—"Agreed."

§. 10. Further then, anſwer me this: do you think freedom to be ſomething great, and noble, and valuable?—"How ſhould I not?"—Is it poſſible then, that he who acquires any thing ſo great, and valuable, and noble, ſhould be of an abject ſpirit?

—"It is not."—Whenever then you ſee any one ſubject to another, and flattering him, contrary to his own opinion, confidently ſay, that he too is not free: and not only if he doth it for a ſupper, but even if it be for a government; nay, a conſulſhip: but call thoſe indeed little ſlaves, who act thus for the ſake of little things; and the others, as they deſerve, great ſlaves.—"Be this too agreed."—Well: do you think freedom to be ſomething independent and ſelf-determined?—"How can it be otherwiſe?"—him then, whom it is in the power of another to reſtrain or to compel, affirm confidently, to be not free. And do not mind his grandfathers, or great grandfathers; or inquire, whether he hath been bought or ſold: but, if you hear him ſay, from his heart, and with emotion, *my maſter*, though twelve lictors ſhould march before him, call him a ſlave. And, if you ſhould hear him ſay, *Wretch, that I am! what do I ſuffer!* call him a ſlave. In ſhort, if you ſee him wailing, complaining, unproſperous, call him a ſlave in purple.—"Suppoſe then he doth nothing of all this?"—Do not yet ſay, he is free; but learn whether his principles are liable to compulſion, to reſtraint, or diſappointment; and, if you find this to be the caſe, call him a ſlave, keeping holiday during the Saturnalia. Say, that his maſter is abroad: he will come preſently; and you will know what he ſuffers.—"Who will "come?"—Whoever hath the power either of beſtowing, or taking away, any of the things, he wiſhes for.—"Have we ſo many maſters then?"—We have. For, prior to all ſuch, we have the things themſelves for our maſters; now, they are many: and it is through theſe, that it becomes neceſſary that ſuch as have the diſpoſal of them, ſhould be our maſters too. For no one fears Caeſar himſelf;

but death, baniſhment, loſs of goods, priſon, diſgrace. Nor doth any one love Caeſar, unleſs he be a perſon of great worth: but we love riches, the tribunate, the praetorſhip, the conſulſhip. When we love, and hate, and fear theſe things, they who have the diſpoſal of them muſt neceſſarily be our maſters. Hence we even worſhip them as Gods. For we conſider, that whoever hath the diſpoſal of the greateſt advantages, is a deity: and then we ſubjoin falſely, *but ſuch a one hath the power of the greateſt advantages; therefor he is a deity.* For, if we ſubjoin falſely, the inference ariſing from thence muſt be falſe likewiſe.

§. 11. "What is it then that makes a man free "and independent? For neither riches, nor conſul-"ſhip, nor command of provinces, or kingdoms, "make him ſo; but ſomething elſe muſt be found." —What is it that preſerves any one from being hindered and reſtrained in writing? —"The ſcience of "writing."—In muſic?—"The ſcience of muſic." —Therefer, in life too, the ſcience of living. As you have heard it in general then, conſider it likewiſe in particulars. Is it poſſible for him to be unreſtrained, who deſires any of thoſe things, that are in the power of others?—"No."—Can he avoid being hindered?—"No."—Therefor neither can he be free. Conſider then, whether we have nothing or all, in our own power alone, or whether ſome things are in our own power, and ſome in that of others.—"What do you mean?"——When you would have your body perfect, is it in your own power, or is it not?—"It is not."——When you would be healthy?—"Nor this."——When you would be handſome?—"Nor this."——Live or

die?—"Nor this."——Body then is not your own; but ſubject to every thing ſtronger than itſelf.—"Agreed."——Well: is it in your own power to have an eſtate when you pleaſe, and and as long as you pleaſe, and ſuch a one as you pleaſe?—"No."—Slaves?—"No."——Clothes?—"No."——A houſe?—"No."——horſes?—"Indeed none of theſe."——Well: if you would ever ſo fain have your children live, or your wife, or your brother, or your friends, is it in your own power?—"No, nor this."——Will you ſay then, that there is *nothing* independent, which is in your own power alone, and unalienable? See then, if you have any thing of this ſort.—"I do not know."——But, conſider it thus: can any one make you aſſent to a falſhood?—"No."——In the topic of aſſent then, you are unreſtrained and unhindered.—"Agreed:"——Well: and can any one compel you to exert your purſuits, towards what you do not like?—"He can. For when he threatens me "with death, or fetters, he compels me to exert "them."——If then you were to deſpiſe dying, or being fettered, would you any longer regard him?—"No"——Is deſpiſing death then an action in our power, or is it not? "It is."—— Is it therefor in your power alſo, to exert you purſuits towards any thing, or is it not? "Agreed, that it is. But in "whoſe power is my avoiding any thing?"——This too is in your own. "What then, if, when I am exert-"ing myſelf to walk, any one ſhould reſtrain me?"——What part of you can he reſtrain? can he reſtrain your aſſent? "No: but my body."——Ay, as he may a ſtone.—"Be it ſo. But ſtill I "walk no more."——And who told you, that walking was an action of your own, that cannot be

reſtrained? For I only ſaid, that your exerting yourſelf towards it could not be reſtrained. But where there is need of body, and its aſſiſtance, you have already heard, that nothing is in your power.—"Be this too agreed."!——And can any one compel you to deſire againſt your will?—"No one."——Or to propoſe, or intend, or, in ſhort, not to make uſe of the appearances which preſent themſelves to you?—"Nor this. But when I deſire any "thing, he will reſtrain me from obtaining what I "deſire."——If you deſire any thing that is your own, and that cannot be reſtrained, how can he reſtrain you? "By no means."——And pray who tells you, that he who deſires what depends on another, cannot be reſtrained?——"May not "I deſire health then?"——By no means: nor any thing elſe that depends on another: for what is not in your own power, either to procure, or to preſerve, when you will, *that* belongs to another. Keep off not only your hands from it, but, far prior to theſe, your deſires. Otherwiſe you have given yourſelf up a ſlave: you have put your neck under the yoke, if you admire any of the things not your own, but ſubject and mortal, to which ſoever of them you are attached.—"Is not my hand my own?"——It is a part of you; but it is, by nature, clay; liable to reſtraint, to compulſion; a ſlave to every thing ſtronger than itſelf. And why do I ſay your *hand?* You ought to poſſeſs your whole *body* as a paultry aſs, with a pack-ſaddle on, as long as may be, as long as it is allowed you. But, if there ſhould come a preſs, and a ſoldier ſhould lay hold on it, let it go. Do not reſiſt or murmur: otherwiſe you will be firſt beat, and loſe the aſs after all. And, ſince you are to conſi-

der the body [itſelf] in this manner, think what remains to do, concerning thoſe things which are provided for the ſake of the body. If *that* be an aſs, the reſt are bridles, pack-ſaddles, ſhoes, oats, hay, for the aſs. Let theſe go too. Quit them more eaſily and expeditiouſly, than the aſs. And when you are thus prepared, and thus exerciſed, to diſtinguiſh what belongs to others from your own; what is liable to reſtraint, from what is not; to eſteem the one your own property, the other not; to keep your deſire, to keep your averſion, carefully turned to this point; whom have you any longer to fear? —"No one."——For about what ſhould you be afraid? about what is your own, in which conſiſts the eſſence of good and evil? and who hath any power over *this?* who can take it away? who can hinder you? No more than God [can be hindered]. But are you afraid for body, for poſſeſſions, for what belongs to others, for what is nothing to you? and what have you been ſtudying all this while, but to diſtinguiſh between your own, and not your own; what is in your power, and what is not in your power; what is liable to reſtraint, and what is not? and for what purpoſe have you applied to the philoſophers? that you might be never the leſs diſappointed and unfortunate? No doubt you will be exempt from fear and perturbation! and what is *grief* to *you?* For [nothing but] what we fear, when expected, affects us with grief, when preſent. And what will you any longer paſſionately wiſh for? For you have a temperate and ſteady deſire of things dependent on choice, as they are good, and preſent: and you have no deſire of things independent on choice, ſo as to leave room for that irrational and impetuous, and immoderately haſty paſſion.

§. 12. Since then you are thus affected with regard to *things*, what *man* can any longer be formidable to you? what hath *man* formidable to man, either in appearance, or ſpeech, or mutual intercourſe? No more than horſe to horſe, or dog to dog, or bee to bee. But *things* are formidable to every one, and when ever any perſon can either confer or take away theſe from another, *he* becomes formidable too.—"How then is the citadel" [the ſeat of tyranny] "to be deſtroyed?"——Not by ſword or fire, but by principle. For if we ſhould demoliſh that which is in the town, ſhall we have demoliſhed alſo that of a fever, of pretty girls, in ſhort, the citadel within ourſelves; and turned out the tyrants, to whom we are ſubject upon all occaſions, every day; ſometimes the ſame, ſometimes others? From hence we muſt begin; from hence demoliſh the citadel; turn out the tyrants: give up body, its parts, riches, power, fame, magiſtracies, honours, children, brothers, friends: eſteem all theſe as belonging to others. And, if the tyrants be turned out from hence, why ſhould I beſides demoliſh the [external citadel; at leaſt, on my own account? for what doth it do to *me* by ſtanding? why ſhould I turn out the guards? for in what point do they affect *me*? It is againſt others they direct their faſces, their ſtaves, and their ſwords. Have I ever been reſtrained from what I willed; or compelled againſt my will? indeed how is this poſſible? I have ranged my purſuits under the direction of God. Is it his will, that I ſhould have a fever? It is my will too. Is it his will, that I ſhould purſue any thing? It is my will too. Is it his will that I ſhould deſire? It is my will too. Is it his will, that I ſhould obtain any thing? It is mine too.

Is it not his will? It is not mine. Is it his will, that I ſhould be tortured? Then it is my will to be tortured. Is it his will, that I ſhould die? Then it is my will to die. Who can any longer reſtrain or compel me, contrary to my own opinion? No more than Jupiter [can be reſtrained]. It is thus that cautious travellers act. Doth any one hear, that the road is beſet by robbers? He doth not ſet out alone; but waits for the retinue of an embaſſador, or quaeſtor, or a proconſul: and, when he hath joined himſelf to their company, goes along in ſafety. Thus doth the prudent man act in the world. There are many robberies, tyrants, ſtorms, diſtreſſes, loſſes of things the moſt dear. Where is there any refuge? how can he go along unattacked? what retinue can he wait for, to go ſafely through his journey? to what company join himſelf? to ſome rich man? to ſome conſular ſenator? and what good will that do me? He is [often] ſtript himſelf; groans and laments. And what if my fellow traveller himſelf ſhould turn againſt me, and rob me? what ſhall I do? I will be the friend of Caeſar. While I am his companion, no one will injure me. Yet, before I can become illuſtrious enough for this, what muſt I bear and ſuffer! how often, and by how many muſt I be robbed! and then, if I do become the friend of Caeſar, he too is mortal; and if, by any accident, he ſhould become my enemy, where ſhall I beſt retreat? to a deſert? well: and doth not a fever come there? what can be done then? is it not poſſible to find a fellow-traveller, ſafe, faithful, brave, incapable of being ſurpriſed? A perſon, who reaſons thus, underſtands and conſiders, that, if he joins himſelf to God, he ſhall go ſafely through his journey.—"How do you

"mean, join himſelf?"——That whatever is the will of God, may be *his* will too: whatever is not the will of God, may not be *his*. "How then can "this be done?"—Why, how otherwiſe than by conſidering the exertions of God's power, and his adminiſtration? what hath he given me, my own, and independent? what hath he reſerved for himſelf? he hath given me whatever depends on choice. The things in my power he hath made incapable of hindrance or reſtraint. But how could he make a body of clay incapable of hindrance? Therefor he hath ſubjected [that, and] poſſeſſions, furniture, houſe, children, wife, to the revolution of the univerſe. Why then do I fight againſt God? why do I will to retain what depends not on will? what is not granted abſolutely; but how? In ſuch a manner, and for ſuch a time, as was thought proper. But he who gave, takes away. Why then do I reſiſt? Not to ſay, that I ſhall be a fool in contending with a ſtronger than myſelf; what is a prior conſideration, I ſhall be unjuſt. From whence had I theſe things, when I came into the world? My father gave them to me. And who gave them to *him?* and who made the ſun? who, the fruits? who, the ſeaſons? who, their connexion and relation to each other?, and, after you have received all, and even your very ſelf from another, are you angry with the giver; and complain, if he takes any thing away from you? who are you; and for what purpoſe did you come? was it not he who brought you here? was it not he who ſhowed you the light? hath not he given you aſſiſtants? hath not he given you ſenſes? hath not he given you reaſon? and as whom did he bring you here? was it not as a mor-

tal? was it not as one to live, with a little portion of flesh upon earth, and to see his administration; to behold the spectacle with him, and partake of the festival for a short time? after having beheld the spectacle, and the solemnity, then, as long as it is permitted you, will you not depart, when he leads you out, adoring and thankful for what you have heard and seen?—"No: but I would enjoy the "feast still longer."——So would the initiated too be longer in their initiation; so, perhaps, would the spectators at Olympia see more combatants. But the solemnity is over. Go away. Depart, like a a grateful and modest person: make room for others. Others too must be born, as you were; and, when they are born, must have a place, and habitations, and necessaries. But, if the first do not give way, what [room] is there left? why are you insatiable? why are you unconscionable? why do you crowd the world?—"Ay: but I would have my wife and "children with me too."——Why, are they *yours?* are they not the giver's? are they not his who made *you* also? will not you quit what belongs to another then? will you not yield to your superior?—"Why then did he bring me into the world upon "these conditions?"——Well: if it is not worth your while, depart. He hath no need of a discontented spectator. He wants such as may share the festival; make part of the chorus: who may rather extol, applaud, celebrate the solemnity: he will not be displeased to see the wretched and fearful dismissed from it. For, when they were present they did not behave as at a festival, nor fill a proper place; but lamented, found fault with the deity, fortune their companions: insensible both of their advanta

ges, and their powers, which they received for contrary purpoſes; the powers of magnanimity, nobleneſs of ſpirit, fortitude, and the ſubject of preſent enquiry, freedom. "For what purpoſe then have "I received theſe things?" To uſe them.—"How long?" As long as he, who lent them, pleaſes. If then they are not neceſſary, do not attach yourſelf to them, and they will not be ſo: do not tell yourſelf, that they are neceſſary, and they are not.

§. 13. This ſhould be our ſtudy from morning till night, beginning from the leaſt and fraileſt thing, from an earthen veſſel, from a glaſs. Afterwards, proceed to a ſuit of clothes, a dog, a horſe, an eſtate: from thence to yourſelf, body, parts of the body, children, wife, brothers. Look every where around you, and throw them from yourſelf. Correct your principles. See that nothing cleave to you, which is not your own; nothing grow to you, that may give you pain when it is torn away. And ſay, when you are daily exerciſing yourſelf as you do here, not that you act the philoſopher (admit this to be an inſolent title), but that you are aſſerting your freedom. For this is true freedom. This is the freedom that Diogenes gained from Antiſthenes; and declared, it was impoſſible, that he ſhould ever after be a ſlave, to any one. Hence, when he was taken priſoner, how did he treat the pirates? did he call any of them maſter? (I do not mean the name, for I am not afraid of a word, but the diſpoſition from whence the word proceeds). How did he reprove them for feeding their priſoners ill? how was he ſold? did he ſeek a maſter? No: but a ſlave. And when he was ſold, how did he converſe with his

lord? He immediately diſputed with him, that he ought not to be dreſſed nor ſhaved in the manner he was; how he ought to bring up his children. And where is the wonder? for if the ſame maſter had bought an inſtructor for his children, in the exerciſes of the Palaeſtra, would he in thoſe exerciſes have treated him as a ſervant, or as a maſter? and ſo if he had bought a phyſician or an architect? In every ſubject, the ſkilful muſt neceſſarily be ſuperior to the unſkilful. What elſe then can he be but maſter, who poſſeſſes the univerſal knowlege of life? for who is maſter in a ſhip? The pilot. Why? Becauſe whoever diſobeys him is a loſer. "But a "maſter can put me in chains." Can he do it then without being a loſer? "So I, among others, "uſed to think." But, becauſe he muſt be a loſer, for that very reaſon it is not in his power: for no one acts unjuſtly, without being a loſer?— "And what loſs doth he ſuffer, who puts his own "ſlave in chains?" What think you? The very putting him in chains. This you yourſelf muſt grant, if you would preſerve the doctrine, that man is not a wild, but a gentle animal. For when is it that a vine is in a bad condition?—"When it is in "a condition contrary to its nature." When a cock? "The ſame." Therefor, a man too. What then is his nature? to bite, and kick, and throw into priſon, and cut off heads? No: but to do good, to aſſiſt, to indulge the wiſhes of others. Whether you will, or not then, he is in a bad condition, whenever he acts unreaſonably. "And ſo, "was not Socrates in a bad condition?" No: but his judges and accuſers. "Nor Helvidius, at Rome?" —No: but his murderer. "How do you talk?"

—Why, juſt as you do. You do not call that cock in a bad condition, which is victorious, and wounded; but that which is conquered, and comes off unhurt. Nor do you call a dog happy, which neither hunts nor toils; but when you ſee him ſweating, and in pain, and panting, with the chace. In what do we talk paradoxes? if we ſay, that the evil of every thing conſiſts in what is contrary to its nature, is this a paradox? do not you ſay it with regard to all other things? why therefor, in the caſe of man alone, do you take a different turn? But farther: it is no paradox to ſay, that by nature man is gentle, and ſocial, and faithful. "This is none "neither." How then [is it paradox to ſay,] that, when he is whipped, or impriſoned, or beheaded, he is not hurt? if he ſuffers nobly, doth not he come off even the better, and a gainer? But he is the perſon hurt, who ſuffers the moſt miſerable and ſhameful evils: who, inſtead of a man, becomes a wolf, or viper, or a hornet.

§. 14. Come then: let us recapitulate what hath been granted. The man who is unreſtrained, who hath all things in his power as he wills, is free: but he who may be reſtrained, or compelled, or hindered, or thrown into any condition againſt his will, is a ſlave. "And who is unreſtrained?" He that deſires none of thoſe things, that belong to others?"

"And what are thoſe things, which belong to o-"thers?" Thoſe which are not in our own power, either to have, or not to have; or to have them of ſuch a ſort, or in ſuch a ſtate. Body, therefor, belongs to another; its parts, to another; poſſeſſions, to another. If then, you attach yourſelf to any of theſe as your own, you will be pu-

niſhed, as he deſerves, who deſires what belongs to others. This is the way, that leads to freedom; this the only deliverance from ſlavery; to be able at length to ſay, from the bottom of one's ſoul,

Conduct me, Jove, *and thou, O* Deſtiny,
Where-ever your decrees have fixt my lot.

§. 15. But what ſay you, philoſopher? A tyrant ſummons you to ſpeak ſomething unbecoming you. Will you ſay it, or will you not?—"Stay, let me "conſider." Would you conſider *now?* and what did you uſe to conſider, when you were in the ſchools? did not you ſtudy what things are good, and evil, and what indifferent? "I did." Well: and what were the opinions that pleaſed us?

"That juſt and fair actions were good; unjuſt and baſe ones, evil." Is living a good? "No." Dying, an evil? No." A priſon? "No." And what did a mean and diſhoneſt ſpeech, the betraying a friend, or the flattering of a tyrant, appear to us? "Evils." Why then are you ſtill conſidering, and have not already conſidered, and come to a reſolution? for what ſort of conſideration is this? *Whether I ought, when it is in my power, to procure myſelf the greateſt good, inſtead of procuring myſelf the greateſt evil.* A fine and neceſſary conſideration, truly, and deſerving mighty deliberation! why do you trifle with us, man? There never was any ſuch point conſidered: nor, if you really imagined what was fair and honeſt to be good, what baſe and diſhoneſt, evil, and all other things indifferent, would you ever be at ſuch a ſtand as this, or near it? but you would pre-

ſently be able to diſtinguiſh, by your underſtanding, as you do by your ſight. For do you ever conſider, whether black is white: or light, heavy? do not you follow the plain evidence of your ſenſes? why then do you ſay, that you are now conſidering, whether things indifferent are to be avoided, rather than evils? The truth is, you have no principles: for neither doth the one ſort of things appear to you indifferent, but the greateſt evils; nor the other evils, but matters of no concern to you. For thus you have accuſtomed yourſelf from the firſt. "Where am I? in the ſchool? and is there an au-"dience? I talk as the philoſophers do. But am "I got out from the ſchool? Away with this ſtuff, "that belongs only to ſcholars and fools. This "man is accuſed by the teſtimony of a philoſopher, "his friend: this philoſoper turns paraſite; that "hires himſelf out for money; a third doth it in "the very ſenate. Who doth not wiſh what ap-"pears [to himſelf to be right]? His principles ex-"claim from within." You are a poor cold lump of opinion, conſiſting of mere words; on which you hang, as by a hair. But preſerve your ſelf firm, and make a due uſe of the appearances; remembering, that you are to be exerciſed in things. In what manner do you hear, I do not ſay, that your child is dead, (for how ſhould you hear that?) but that your oil is ſpilled, your wine drank out? That any one, while you are bawling, might only ſay this; "Philoſopher, you talk otherwiſe "in the ſchools. Why do you deceive us? why, "when you are a worm, do you call yourſelf a "man?" I ſhould be glad to be near one of theſe philoſophers, while he is revelling in debauchery,

that I might ſee how he exerts himſelf, and what ſayings he utters; whether he remembers his title, and the diſcourſes which he hears, or ſpeaks, or reads.

§. 16. "And what is all this to freedom?" Truly nothing elſe is, but this, whether you rich people will or not. "And who is your evidence "of this? Who, but yourſelves? who have a powerful maſter, and live by his motion and nod, and faint away, if he doth but look ſternly upon you: who pay your court to old men, and old women, and ſay, "I cannot do this, it is not in my "power." Why is it not in your power? did not you juſt now contradict me, and ſay, you were free? "But Aprylla hath forbid me." Speak the truth then, ſlave, and do not run away from your maſters; nor deny them, nor dare to aſſert your freedom, when you have ſo many proofs of your ſlavery. One might indeed find ſome excuſe for a perſon, compelled by love to do ſomething contrary to his opinion, even when at the ſame time he ſees what is beſt, and yet hath not reſoluti-on enough to follow it; ſince he is with-held by ſomething violent, and in ſome meaſure, divine. But who can bear you, who are in love with old men and women; and wipe their noſes, and waſh them, and bride them with preſents, and wait upon them when they are ſick, like a ſlave; at the ſame time wiſhing they may die, and enquiring of the phyſician, whether their diſtemper be yet mortal? And again, when for theſe great and venerable ma-giſtracies and honours, you kiſs the hands of the ſlaves of others; ſo that you are the ſlave of thoſe who are not free themſelves! and then you walk a-bout in ſtate, a praetor, or a conſul. Do not I know how you came to be a praetor; whence you

received the conſulſhip; who gave it you? For my own part, I would not even live, if I muſt live by Felicio's means, and bear his pride, and ſlaviſh inſolence. For I know what a ſlave is, blinded by what he thinks good fortune.

§. 17. Are you free yourſelf then? (It will be ſaid.) By heaven I wiſh and pray for it. But I cannot yet face my maſters. I ſtill pay a regard to my body, and ſet a great value on keeping it whole; though at the ſame time it is not whole. But I can ſhow you one who was free, that you may no longer ſeek an example. Diogenes was free.——"How ſo?" Not becauſe he was of free parents, for he was not: but becauſe he was ſo himſelf; becauſe he had caſt away all handles of ſlavery; nor was there any way of getting at him, nor anywhere to lay hold on him, to enſlave him. Every thing ſat looſe upon him, every thing only juſt hung on. If you took hold on his poſſeſſions, he would rather let them go, than follow you for them: if on his leg, he let go his leg: if his body, he let go his body: acquaintance, friends, country, juſt the ſame. For he knew whence he had them, and from whom, and upon what conditions he had received them. But he would never have forſaken his true parents the Gods, and his real country; nor have ſuffered any one to be more dutiful and obedient to them than he: nor would any one have died more readily for his country than he. For he never ſought when it would be proper for him to act for the ſake of any thing elſe, [except his real country the univerſe;] but he remembered, that every thing that exiſts is from thence, and carried on by it, and commanded by its ruler. Accordingly, ſee what he himſelf ſays and writes. "Upon this account, ſays

" he, O Diogenes, it is in your power to converſe " as you will with the Perſian monarch, and with " Archidamus, king of the Lacedemonians."—— Was it becauſe *he* was born of free parents? or was it becauſe *they* were deſcended from ſlaves, that all the Athenians, and all the Lacedemonians, and Corinthians, could not converſe with them as they pleaſed; but feared and paid court to them? why then is it in *your* power, Diogenes? " Becauſe I do " not eſteem this ſorry body as my own. Becauſe " I do want nothing. Becauſe theſe [principles,] " and nothing elſe, are a law to me." Theſe were the things that ſuffered him to be free.

§. 18. And that you may not think, that I ſhow you the example of a man clear of incumbrances; without a wife or children, or country or friends, or relations, to bend and draw him aſide: take Socrates, and conſider him, who had a wife and children, but not as his own; a country, friends, relations; but only as long as it was proper, and in the manner that was proper; and all theſe he ſubmitted to the law, and to the obedience due to it. Hence, when it was proper to fight, he was the firſt to go out, and expoſed himſelf to danger, without the leaſt reſerve. But when he was ſent by the thirty tyrants to apprehend Leo; becauſe he eſteemed it a baſe action, he did not deliberate about it, tho' he knew, that, perhaps, he might die for it. But what did that ſignify to *him?* for it was ſomething elſe that *he* wanted to preſerve, not his paultry fleſh: but his fidelity, his honour, free from attack, or ſubjection. And afterwards, when he was to make a defence for his life, doth he behave like one who had children? or a wife? No; but like a ſingle

man. And how doth he behave, when he was to drink the poiſon? when he might have eſcaped, and Crito perſuaded him to get out of priſon, for the ſake of his children, what doth he ſay? doth he eſteem it a fortunate opportunity? how ſhould he? But he conſiders what is becoming, and neither ſees nor regards any thing elſe. "For I am not deſirous, "ſays he, to preſerve this pitiful body; but that "[part of me] which is improved and preſerved by "juſtice, and impaired and deſtroyed by injuſtice." Socrates is not to be baſely preſerved. He, who refuſed to vote for what the Athenians commanded: he, who contemned the thirty tyrants: he, who held ſuch diſcourſes on virtue, and moral beauty: ſuch a man is not to be preſerved by a baſe action; but is preſerved by dying, not by running away. For even a good actor is preſerved by leaving off when he ought; not by going on to act beyond his time. "What then will become of your children?" "If "I had gone away into Theſſaly, you would have "taken care of them; and will there be no one to "take care of them, when I am departed to Hades?" You ſee how he ridicules, and plays with death. But, if it had been you or I, we ſhould preſently have proved, by philoſophical argumens, that thoſe who act unjuſtly, are to be repaid in their own way; and ſhould have added, "If I eſcape, I ſhall be of "uſe to many; if I die, to none." Nay, if it had been neceſſary, we ſhould have crept through a mouſe-hole to get away. But how ſhould *we* have been of uſe to any? for where muſt they have dwelt? if we were uſeful alive, ſhould not we be of ſtill more uſe to mankind, by dying when we ought, and as we ought? And now the remembrance of the death of Socrates is not leſs, but even

more uſeful to the world, than that of the things which he did and ſaid when alive.

§. 19. Study theſe points, theſe principles, theſe diſcourſes; contemplate theſe examples, if you would be free, if you deſire the thing in proportion to its value. And where is the wonder, that you ſhould purchaſe ſo great a thing at the price of others, ſo many, and ſo great? Some hang themſelves, others break their necks, and ſometimes even whole cities have been deſtroyed, for that which is reputed freedom: and will not you, for the ſake of the true, and ſecure, and inviolable freedom, repay God what he hath given, when he demands it? will not you ſtudy, not only as Plato ſays, to die, but to be tortured, and baniſhed, and ſcourged; and, in ſhort, to give up all that belongs to others. If not, you will be a ſlave among ſlaves, though you were ten thouſand times a conſul: and, even though you ſhould riſe to the palace, you will be never the leſs ſo. And you will feel, that though philoſophers (as Cleanthes ſays) do, perhaps, talk contrary to common opinion, yet not contrary to reaſon. For you will find it true in fact, that the things that are eagerly followed and admired, are of no uſe to thoſe, who have gained them: while they who have not yet gained them, imagine, that, if they are acquired, every good will come along with them: and then, when they are acquired, there is the ſame feveriſhneſs, the ſame agitation, the ſame nauſeating, and the ſame deſire of what is abſent. For freedom is not procured by full enjoyment of what is deſired, but by proving the deſire to be a wrong one. And, in order to know that this is true, take the ſame pains about theſe, which you have taken about other

things. Lie awake to acquire a ſet of principles, that will make you free. Inſtead of a rich old man, pay your court to a philoſopher. Be ſeen about his doors. You will not get any diſgrace by being ſeen there. You will not return empty, or unprofited, if you go as you ought. However, try at leaſt. The trial is not diſhonourable.

CHAP. II.

Of Complaiſance.

§. 1. TO this point you muſt attend before all others: not to be ſo attached to any one of your former acquaintance or friends, as to condeſcend to the ſame behaviour with his; otherwiſe you will undo yourſelf. But, if it comes into your head, *I ſhall appear odd to him, and he will not treat me as before*, remember, that there is nothing to be had for nothing: nor is it poſſible, that he who acts in the ſame manner, ſhould not be the ſame perſon. Chuſe then, whether you will be loved by thoſe you were formerly, and be like your former ſelf; or be better, and not meet with the ſame treatment. For, if this is preferable, immediately incline altogether that way, and let no other kinds of reaſoning draw you aſide: for no one can improve while he is wavering. If then you prefer this to every thing, if you would be fixed only on this, and employ all your pains about it, give up every thing elſe. Otherwiſe this wavering will affect you both ways; you will neither make a due improvement, nor preſerve the advantages you had before.

For before, by ſetting your heart intirely on things of no value, you were agreeable to your companions. But you cannot excel in both kinds: but muſt neceſſarily loſe as much of the one, as you partake of the other. If you do not drink with thoſe, with whom you uſed to drink, you cannot appear equally agreeable to them. Chuſe then, whether you would be a drunkard, and agreeable to them, or ſober, and diſagreeable to them. If you do not ſing with thoſe, with whom you uſed to ſing, you cannot be equally dear to them. Here too then, chuſe which you will. For it is better to be modeſt and decent, than to have it ſaid of you, *what an agreeable fellow!* give up the reſt; renounce it; withdraw yourſelf; have nothing to do with it. But, if this doth not pleaſe you, incline, with your whole force, the contrary way. Be one of the Catamites; one of the adulterers. Act all that is conſequent to ſuch a character, and you will obtain what you would have. Jump up in the theatre too, and roar out in praiſe of the dancer. But characters ſo different are not to be confounded. You cannot act both Therſites and Agamemnon. If you would be Therſites, you muſt be hump-backed and bald: if Agamemnon, tall and handſome, and a lover of thoſe who are under your care.

CHAP. III.

What things are to be exchanged for others.

§. 1. WHEN you have loſt any thing external, have this always at hand, what you

have got inſtead of it: and, if that be of more value, do not by any means ſay, "I am a loſer:" whether it be a horſe for an aſs; an ox for a ſheep; a good action for a piece of money; a due compoſedneſs of mind for a dull jeſt; or modeſty for indecent diſcourſe. By continually remembering this, you will preſerve your character ſuch as it ought to be. Otherwiſe conſider, that you are ſpending your time in vain; and all that you are now applying your mind to, you are going to ſpill and overſet. And there needs but little, and a ſmall deviation from reaſon, to deſtroy and overſet all. A pilot doth not need the ſame apparatus to overſet a ſhip, as to ſave it; but, if he turns it a little to the wind, it is loſt: even if he ſhould not do it by deſign, but only for a moment be thinking of ſomething elſe, it is loſt. Such is the caſe here too. If you do but nod a little, all that you have hitherto collected is gone. Take heed then to the appearances of things. Keep yourſelf awake over them. It is no inconſiderable matter you have to guard; but modeſty, fidelity, conſtancy, enjoyment, exemption from grief, fear, perturbation; in ſhort, freedom. For what will you ſell theſe? Conſider what the purchaſe is worth.—"But ſhall I not get ſuch a thing "inſtead of it?"—Conſider, if you do get it, what it is that you obtain for the other. I have decency; another the office of a tribune: I have modeſty; he hath the praetorſhip. But I do not make acclamations where it is unbecoming: I ſhall not riſe up [to do honour to another] in a caſe where I ought not: for I am free, and the friend of God, ſo as to obey him willingly: but I muſt not value any thing elſe; neither body, nor poſſeſſions, nor fame; in

ſhort, nothing. For it is not his will, that I ſhould value them. For, if this had been his pleaſure, he would have made them my good, which now he hath not done: therefor I cannot tranſgreſs his commands.—"In every thing preſerve your own proper good."—"But what of the reſt?"—"Preſerve *them* too according as it is permitted, and ſo far as to behave agreeably to reaſon in relation to them; contented with this alone. Otherwiſe you will be unfortunate, diſappointed, reſtrained, hindered." Theſe are the laws, theſe the ſtatutes, tranſmitted from thence. Of theſe one ought to be an expoſitor, and to theſe obedient, not to thoſe of Maſurius and Caſſius.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning thoſe who earneſtly deſire a life of repoſe.

§. 1. REMEMBER, that it is not only the deſire of riches and power, that renders us mean, and ſubject to others, but even of quiet, and leiſure, and learning, and travelling. For, in general, valuing any external thing whatever, ſubjects us to another. Where is the difference then, whether you deſire to be a ſenator, or not to be a ſenator? where is the difference whether you deſire power, or to be out of power? where is the difference, whether you ſay, "I am in a wretched way, I have nothing to do; but am tied down to books, as inactive as if I were dead;—or, "I am in a wretched way, I have no leiſure to read?" For as levees and power are among things external,

and independent on choice, ſo likewiſe is a book. For what purpoſe would you read? Tell me. For if you reſt merely in being amuſed, and learning ſomething, you are inſignificant and miſerable. But if you refer it to what you ought, what is that but a proſperous life? and if reading doth not procure a proſperous life, of what uſe is it? "But it doth "procure a proſperous life (ſay you); and there-"for I am uneaſy at being deprived of it.——And what ſort of proſperity is that, which every thing, I do not ſay Caeſar, or the friend of Caeſar, but a crow, a piper, a fever, ten thouſand other things, can hinder? But nothing is eſſential to proſperity, as the being perpetual, and unhindered. I am now called to do ſomething. I now go therefor, and will be attentive to the bounds and meaſures, which ought to be obſerved; that I may act modeſtly, ſteadily, and without deſire or averſion with regard to externals. In the next place, I am attentive to other men; what they ſay, and how they are moved: and that not from ill-nature, nor that I may have an opportunity for cenſure or ridicule: but I turn to myſelf, [and aſk,] "Am I alſo guilty of the "ſame faults; and how then ſhall I leave them off?" Once I too was faulty; but, God be thanked, not now. Well: when you have done thus, and been employed in this manner, have not you done as good a work, as if you had read a thouſand lines, or written as many? For are you uneaſy at not reading while you are eating, or bathing, or exerciſing? are not you ſatisfied with performing theſe actions conformably to what you have read? why then do you not think uniformly about every thing? when you approach Caeſar, or any other perſon, if you pre-

ſerve yourſelf unpaſſionate, unalarmed, ſedate; if you are rather an obſerver of what is done, than [yourſelf] obſerved; if you do not envy thoſe who are preferred to you; if the materials of action do not ſtrike you; what do you want? books? how, or to what end? for is not this a kind of preparation for living, but living itſelf, made up of things different? Juſt as if a champion, when he enters the liſts, ſhould fall a crying, becauſe he is not exerciſing without. It was for this, that you uſed to be exerciſed. For this, were the poiſers, the duſt, the young fellows, your antagoniſts. And do you now ſeek for theſe, when it is the time for buſineſs? This is juſt as if, in the topic of aſſent, when we are preſented with appearances, of which ſome are evidently true, others not, inſtead of diſtinguiſhing them, we ſhould want to read diſſertations on evidence.

§. 2. What then is the cauſe of this? That we have neither read nor written, in order to treat the appearances that occur to us, conformably to nature, in our behaviour. But we ſtop at learning what is ſaid, and being able to explain it to others; at ſolving ſyllogiſms, and ranging hypothetical arguments. Hence, where the ſtudy is, there too is the hindrance. Do you deſire abſolutely what is out of your power? Be reſtrained then, be hindered, be diſappointed. But if we read diſſertations about the exertion of the efforts, not merely to ſee what is ſaid about the efforts, but to exert them well: on deſire and averſion, that we may not be diſappointed of our deſires, nor incur our averſions: on the duties of life, that, mindful of our relations, we may do nothing irrationally, nor contrary to them: we ſhould not be provoked at being hindered in our

reading; but ſhould be contented with the performance of actions ſuitable to us, and ſhould not compute as we have hitherto been accuſtomed to compute. "To-day I have read ſo many lines; I have "written ſo many;" but, "To-day I have uſed my "efforts as the philoſophers direct. I have reſtrained my deſires abſolutely; I have applied my averſion only to things dependent on choice. I "have not been terrified by ſuch a one, nor put "out of countenance by ſuch another. I have exerciſed my patience, my abſtinence, my beneficence." And thus we ſhould thank God for what we ought to thank him. But now we reſemble the vulgar in another way alſo, and do not know it. One is afraid, that he ſhall not be in power; *you*, that you ſhall. By no means be afraid of it, man; but as you laugh at *him*, laugh at *yourſelf*. For there is no difference whether you thirſt, like one in a fever, or dread water, like him that is bit by a mad dog. Elſe, how can you ſay, like Socrates, "If it "ſo pleaſes God, ſo let it be?" do you think that Socrates, if he had fixed his deſires on the leiſure of the Lyceum, or the academy, or the converſation of the youth there, day after day, would have made ſo many campaigns as he did ſo readily? would not he have lamented and groaned; "How wretched am "I! now muſt I be miſerable here, when I might be "ſunning myſelf in the Lyceum?" was that your buſineſs in life then, to ſun yourſelf? was it not to be proſperous? to be unreſtrained? unhindered? and how could he have been Socrates, if he had lamented thus? how could he, after that, have written paeans in a priſon?

§. 3. In ſhort then, remember this, that what-

ever external to your own choice you eſteem, you deſtroy that choice. And not only power is external to it, but the being out of power too: not only buſineſs, but leiſure too.—"Then, muſt I live in "this tumult now?"——What do you call a tumult?—"A multitude of people."——And where is the hardſhip? Suppoſe it is the Olympic games. Think it a public aſſembly. There too ſome bawl out one thing, ſome do another; ſome puſh the reſt. The baths are crowded. Yet who of us is not pleaſed with theſe aſſemblies, and doth not grieve to leave them? Do not be hard to pleaſe, and ſqueamiſh at what happens. "Vinegar is diſagree-"able, [ſays one]; for it is ſour. Honey is diſ-"agreeable, ſays a ſecond; for it diſorders my con-"ſtitution. I do not like vegetables, ſays a third. "Thus too [ſay others] I do not like retirement; "it is a deſert: I do not like a crowd; it is a tu-"mult."—Why, if things are ſo diſpoſed, that you are to live alone, or with few, call this condition a repoſe; and make uſe of it as you ought. Talk with yourſelf: exerciſe the appearances preſented to your mind: work up your pre-conceptions to accuracy. But if you light on a crowd, call it one of the public games, a grand aſſembly, a feſtival. Endeavour to ſhare in the feſtival with the reſt of the world. For what ſight is more pleaſant to a lover of mankind, than a great number of men? We ſee companies of oxen, or horſes, with pleaſure. We are highly delighted to ſee a great many ſhips. Who is ſorry to ſee a great many men?—"But they ſtun "me with their noiſe."——Then your hearing is hindered; and what is that to *you?* Is your faculty of making a right uſe of the appearances of things

hindered too? or who can reſtrain you from uſing your deſire and averſion, your powers of purſuit and avoidance, conformable to nature? what tumult is ſufficient for this? do but remember the general rules. *What is mine? what not mine? what is allotted me? what is the will of God, that I ſhould do now? what is not his will?* A little while ago it was his will, that you ſhould be at leiſure, ſhould talk with yourſelf, write about theſe things, read, hear, prepare yourſelf. You have had ſufficient time for this. At preſent, he ſays to you, "Come now to "the combat. Show us what you have learned; "how you have wreſtled." How long would you exerciſe by yourſelf? It is now the time to ſhow, whether you are of the number of thoſe champions who merit victory, or of thoſe who go about the world, conquered in all the games round. Why then are you out of humour? There is no combat without a tumult. There muſt be many preparatory exerciſes, many acclamations, many maſters, many ſpectators.—"But I would live in quiet."——Why then, lament and groan, as you deſerve. For what greater puniſhment is there to the uninſtructed, and diſobedient to the orders of God, than to grieve, to mourn, to envy; in ſhort, to be diſappointed, and unhappy? are not you willing to deliver yourſelf from all this?—And how ſhall I deliver myſelf?——Have not you heard, that you muſt abſolutely with-hold deſire, and apply averſion to ſuch things only, as are dependent on choice? that you muſt give up all, body, poſſeſſions, fame, books, tumults, power, exemption from power? For to which ſoever your propenſion is, you are a ſlave; you are under ſubjection; you are made liable to re-

ſtraint, to compulſion; you are altogether the property of others. But have that of Cleanthes always ready,

Conduct me, Jove; *and thou, O* Deſtiny!

Is it your will, that I ſhould go to Rome? Conduct me to Rome. To Gyaros?—To Gyaros. To Athens?—To Athens. To priſon?—To priſon. If you once ſay, "When is one to go to Athens?" you are undone. This deſire, if it be unaccompliſhed, muſt neceſſarily render you diſappointed; and if fulfilled, vain on what ought to elate you: on the contrary, if you are hindered, wretched, by incurring what you do not like. Therefor give up all theſe things.—"Athens is a fine place."——But it is a much finer thing to be happy, impaſſive, tranquil, not to have what concerns you dependent on others.—"Rome is full of tumults and viſits."——But proſperity is worth all difficulties. If then it be a proper time for theſe, why do not you withdraw your averſion from them? (What neceſſity is there for you to be made to carry your burden, by being cudgelled like an aſs?) Otherwiſe conſider, that you muſt always be a ſlave to him, who hath the power to procure your diſcharge, to every one who hath the power of hindering you; and muſt worſhip him, like your evil genius.

§. 4. The only way to real proſperity (let this rule be at hand morning, noon, and night,) is, a reſignation of things dependent on choice; to eſteem nothing as a property; to deliver up all things to our tutelar genius, and to fortune; to make thoſe the governors of them, whom Jupiter hath made ſo;

to be ourſelves devoted to that only, which is our property; to that which is incapable of reſtraint; and whatever we read, or write, or hear, to refer all to this.

§. 5. Therefor I cannot call any one induſtrious, if I hear only that he reads, or writes; nor even if he adds the whole night to the day, do I call him ſo, unleſs I know to what he refers it. For not even *you* would call him induſtrious, who ſits up for the ſake of a girl; nor therefor, in the other caſe do *I*. But, if he doth it for fame, I call him ambitious; if for money, avaritious; if from the deſire of learning, bookiſh; but not induſtrious. But, if he refers his labour to his ruling faculty, in order to treat and regulate it conformably to nature, then only I call him induſtrious. For never either praiſe or blame any perſon, on account of outward actions that are common to all; but on the account of principles. Theſe are the peculiar property of each individual, and the things which make actions good or bad.

§. 6. Mindful of this, be pleaſed with the preſent, and contented with whatever it is the ſeaſon for. If you perceive any of theſe things, which you have learned and ſtudied, occurring to you in action, rejoice in them. If you have laid aſide ill-nature and reviling; if you have leſſened your harſhneſs, indecent language, inconſiderateneſs, effeminacy; if you are not moved by the ſame things as formerly; if not in the ſame manner as formerly; you may keep a perpetual feſtival: to-day, becauſe you have behaved well in one affair: to-morrow, becauſe in another. How much better a reaſon for ſacrifice is this, than obtaining a conſulſhip, or a government? Theſe things you have from yourſelf, and from the

Gods. Remember this, who it is that gave them, and to whom, and for what purpoſe. Habituated once to theſe reaſonings, can you ſtill think there is any difference, in what place you are to pleaſe God? are not the Gods every-where at the ſame diſtance? do not they every where equally ſee what is doing?

CHAP. V.

Concerning the quarrelſome, and ferocious.

§. 1. A WISE and good perſon neither quarrels with any one himſelf, nor, as far as poſſible, ſuffers another. The life of Socrates affords us an example of this too, as well as of the other [virtues]; who not only every-where avoided quarrelling himſelf, but did not even ſuffer others to quarrel. See in Xenophon's Sympoſium, how many quarrels he ended; how, again, he bore with Thraſymachus, with Polus, with Callicles, how, with his wife; how, with his ſon, who attempted to confute him, and cavilled with him. For he well remembered, that no one is maſter of the ruling faculty of another; and therefor he deſired nothing but what was his own.—"And what is that?"—Not that this [or that] perſon ſhould be moved conformably to nature; for that belongs to others; but that while they act in their own way, as they pleaſe, he ſhould nevertheleſs be affected, and live conformably to nature, only doing what belongs to himſelf, in order to make them too live conformably to nature. For this is the point, that a wiſe and good perſon hath in view. To have the command of an army? No: but if it be allotted him, to preſerve on this ſubject of action, the

right conduct of his own ruling faculty. To marry? No: but if a marriage be allotted him, to preſerve himſelf, on this ſubject of action, conformable to nature. But, if he would have his wife, or his child, exempt from fault, he would have that his own, which belongs to others. And being inſtructed, conſiſts in this very point, to learn what things are our own, and what belong to others.

§. 2. What room is there then for quarrelling, to a perſon thus diſpoſed? for doth he wonder at any thing that happens? doth it appear new to him? doth not he expect worſe and more grievous injuries from bad people, than happen to him? doth he not reckon it ſo much gained, as they come ſhort of the laſt extremities? Such a one hath reviled you.—You are much obliged to him, that he hath not ſtruck you.——But he hath ſtruck you too.——You are much obliged to him, that he hath not wounded you too.——But he has wounded you too.——You are much obliged to him, that he hath not killed you. For when did he ever learn, or from whom, that he is a gentle, that he is a ſocial animal: that the very injury itſelf is a great miſchief to the injurious? as then he hath not learned theſe things, nor believes them, why ſhould he not follow what appears for his intereſt? Your neighbour hath thrown ſtones. What then? is it any fault of *yours?* But your goods are broken. What then? are you a piece of furniture? No: but your eſſence conſiſts in the faculty of choice. What behaviour then is aſſigned you, in return? If you conſider yourſelf as a wolf—to bite again, to throw more ſtones. But if you aſk the queſtion, as a man, examine your treaſure: ſee what faculties you have

brought into the world with you. Are they diſpoſitions to ferocity? to revenge? when is a horſe miſerable? when he is deprived of his natural faculties. Not when he cannot crow, but when he cannot run. And a dog? Not when he cannot fly, but when he cannot hunt. Is not a man then alſo unhappy in the ſame manner? Not he, who cannot ſtrangle lions, or graſp ſtatues, (for he hath received no faculties for this purpoſe from nature;) but who hath loſt his rectitude of mind, his fidelity. Such a one is the perſon, who ought to be publicly lamented, for the misfortunes into which he is fallen: not, by heaven, either he who is born or dies; but he, whom it hath befallen while he lives to loſe what is properly his own: not his paternal poſſeſſions, his paultry eſtate, or his houſe, his lodging, or his ſlaves, (for none of theſe are a man's own; but all belonging to others, ſervile, dependent, and given at different times, to different perſons, by the diſpoſers of them;) but his perſonal qualifications as a man, the impreſſions which he brought into the world ſtampt upon his mind: ſuch as we ſeek in money; and, if we find them, allow it to be good; if not, throw it away. "What impreſſion hath this piece of money?" —"Trajan's." "Give it me."—"Nero's." Throw it away. It is falſe: it is good for nothing. So in the other caſe. "What impreſſion have his prin-"ciples?" "Gentleneſs, ſocial affection, patience, "good-nature." Bring them hither. I receive them. I make ſuch a man a citizen; I receive him for a neighbour, a fellow traveller. Only ſee that he hath not the Neronian impreſſion. Is he paſſionate? is he reſentful? is he querulous? would he if he took the fancy, break the head of thoſe who

fall in his way? why then do you call him a man? for is every thing diſtinguiſhed by a mere outward form? Then ſay, juſt as well, that a piece of wax is an apple, or that it hath the ſmell and taſte too. But the external figure is not enough: nor, conſequently, is it ſufficient to make a man, that he hath a noſe and eyes, if he hath not the proper principles of a man. Such a one doth not underſtand reaſon, or apprehend when he is confuted. He is an aſs. Another is dead to the ſenſe of ſhame. He is a worthleſs creature; any thing, rather than a man. Another ſeeks whom he may kick or bite: ſo that he is neither ſheep nor aſs. But what then? He is a wild beaſt.

§. 3. "Well: but would you have me deſpiſed "then?"—By whom? by thoſe who know you? and how can they deſpiſe yon, who know you to be gentle and modeſt? but, perhaps, by thoſe who do not know you? and what is that to you? for no other artiſt troubles himſelf about the ignorant. —"But people will be much the readier to attack "me."——Why do you ſay *me?* can any one hurt your choice, or reſtrain you from treating conformably to nature, the appearances that are preſented to you? why then are you diſturbed, and deſirous to make yourſelf appear more formidable? why do not you make public proclamation, that you are at peace with all mankind, however they may act; and that you chiefly laugh at thoſe, who ſuppoſe they can hurt you. "Theſe wretches neither know "who I am, or in what conſiſt my good and evil: "or that there is no acceſs for *them* to what is re-"ally *mine.*" Thus the inhabitants of a fortified city laugh at the beſiegers. "What trouble now

" are theſe people giving themſelves for nothing?
" Our wall is ſecure; we have proviſions for a very
" long time, and every other preparation." Theſe are what render a city fortified, and impregnable: but nothing but its principles render the human ſoul ſo. For what wall is ſo ſtrong, what body ſo impenetrable, or poſſeſſion ſo unalienable, or what dignity ſo ſecured againſt ſtratagems? All things elſe, every where elſe, are mortal, eaſily reduced; and whoever, in any degree, fixes his mind upon them, muſt neceſſarily be ſubject to perturbation, deſpair, terrors, lamentations, diſappointed deſires, and incurred averſions.

§. 4. And will we not fortify then the only place of ſecurity that is granted us; and, withdrawing ourſelves from what is mortal and ſervile, diligently improve what is immortal, and by nature free? do not we remember, that no one either hurts or benefits another? but the principle, which we hold concerning every thing, doth it. It is this that hurts us; this that overturns us. Here is the fight, the ſedition, the war. It was nothing elſe, that made Eteocles and Polynices enemies, but their principle concerning empire, and their principle concerning exile: that the one ſeemed the extremeſt evil; the other, the greateſt good. Now the very nature of every one is to purſue good, to avoid evil; to eſteem him as an enemy and betrayer, who deprives us of the one, and involves us in the other, though he be a brother, or a ſon, or father. For nothing is more nearly related to us than good. So that if good and evil conſiſt in externals, there is no affection between father and ſon, brother and brother; but all is every where full of enemies, betrayers,

ſycophants. But if a right choice be the only good, and a wrong one the only evil, what further room is there for quarrelling, for reviling? about what? about what is nothing to us? againſt whom? againſt the ignorant, againſt the unhappy, againſt thoſe who are deceived in things of the greateſt importance?

§. 5. Mindful of this, Socrates lived in his own houſe, patiently bearing a furious wife, a ſenſeleſs ſon. For what were the effects of her fury? The throwing as much water as ſhe pleaſed on his head, the trampling a cake under her feet. "And what "is this to me, if I think ſuch things nothing to "me? This very point is my buſineſs: and nei- "ther a tyrant, nor a maſter, ſhall reſtrain my "will; nor multitudes, though I am a ſingle per- "ſon; nor one ever ſo ſtrong, though I am ever "ſo weak. For this is given by God to every one "free from reſtraint."

§. 6. Theſe principles make friendſhip in families, concord in cities, peace in nations. They make a perſon grateful to God, every where in good ſpirits, [about externals,] as belonging to others, as of no value. But we, alas! are able indeed to write and read theſe things, and to praiſe them when they are read; but very far from being convinced by them. Therefor what is ſaid of the Lacedemonians,

Lions at home, Foxes at Epheſus,

may be applied to us too; lions in the ſchool, but foxes out of it.

CHAP. VI.

Concerning thoſe who grieve at being pitied.

§. 1. IT vexes me, ſay you, to be pitied. Is this *your* affair then, or *theirs*, who pity you? And further: how is it in your power to prevent it?—"It is, if I ſhow them, that I do not "need pity."—But are you now in ſuch a condition, as not to need pity, or are you not?—"I think I "am. But theſe people do not pity me for what, "if any thing, would deſerve pity, my faults; but "for poverty, and want of power, and ſickneſſes, and "deaths, and other things of that kind."—Are you then prepaaed to convince the world, that none of theſe things is in reality an evil: but that it is poſſible for a perſon to be happy, even when he is poor, and without honours, and power? or are you prepared to appear to them, rich and powerful? The laſt of theſe is the part of an arrogant, ſilly, worthleſs fellow. Obſerve too, by what means this fiction muſt be carried on. You muſt hire ſome paultry ſlaves, and get poſſeſſed of a few little pieces of plate, and often ſhow them in public; and, though they are the ſame, endeavour to conceal that they are the ſame: you muſt have gay clothes, and other finery; and make a ſhow of being honoured by your great people; and endeavour to ſup with them, or be *thought* to ſup with them; and uſe ſome vile arts with your perſon, to make it appear handſomer and genteeler than it really is. All this you muſt contrive, if you would take the ſecond way not to be

pitied. And the firſt is impracticable, as well as tedious, to undertake the very thing, that Jupiter himſelf could not do: to convince all mankind what things are really good and evil. Is this granted you? The only thing granted you is, to convince *yourſelf*: and you have not yet done that: and do you, notwithſtanding, undertake to convince *others*? why, who hath lived ſo long with you, as you have with yourſelf; who is ſo likely to have faith in you, as you in yourſelf? who is a better wiſher, or a nearer friend to you, than you to yourſelf? how is it then, that you have not yet convinced yourſelf? ſhould not you now turn theſe things every way in your thoughts? What you were ſtudying is this? to learn to be exempt from grief, perturbation, and meanneſs, and to be free. Have not you heard then, that the only way that leads to this is, to give up what doth not depend on choice: to withdraw from it; and confeſs, that it belongs to others? what kind of thing then is this another's opinion about you?—"Independent on choice."——Is it nothing then to *you*?—"Nothing."——While you are ſtill piqued and diſturbed about it then, do you think, that you are convinced concerning good and evil?

§. 2. Letting others alone then, why will you not be your own ſcholar and teacher? Let others look to it, whether it be for their advantage to think and act contrary to nature: but no one is nearer to me than myſelf. What then is the meaning of this? I have heard the reaſonings of philoſophers, and aſſented to them: yet, in fact, I am never the more relieved. Am I ſo ſtupid? and yet in other things, that I had an inclination to, I was not found very

ſtupid: but I quickly learned grammar, and the exerciſes of the Palaeſtra, and geometry, and the ſolution of ſyllogiſms. Hath not reaſon then convinced me? And yet there is no one of the other things, that I ſo much approved or liked from the very firſt. And now I read concerning theſe ſubjects, I hear diſcourſes upon them, I write about them, and I have not yet found any reaſoning of greater ſtrength than this. What then do I want? is it not, that the contrary principles are not removed out of my mind? is it not, that I have ſtrengthened theſe opinions by exerciſe, nor accuſtomed them to occur in action; but, like arms thrown aſide, they are grown ruſty, and do not fit me? Yet neither in the Palaeſtra, nor writing, nor reading, nor ſolving ſyllogiſms, am I contented with mere learning: but I turn the arguments every way, which are preſented to me, and I compoſe others; and the ſame of convertible propoſitions. But the neceſſary theorems, by which I might become exempted from fear, grief, paſſion, unreſtrained and free, I neither exerciſe, nor ſtudy, with a proper application. And then I trouble myſelf, what others will ſay of me; whether I ſhall appear to them worthy of regard; whether I ſhall appear to them happy.—Will you not ſee, wretch, what you can ſay of *yourſelf?* what ſort of perſon you appear to *yourſelf*, in your opinions, in your purſuits, in your preparation, in your intention, in the other proper works of a man? But, inſtead of that, do you trouble yourſelf, whether *others* pity you?—"Very true. But I am pitied "improperly."——Then are not you pained by this? and is not he who is in pain to be pitied?—"Yes."——How then are you pitied improperly?

For you render yourſelf worthy of pity by what you ſuffer upon being pitied.

§. 3. What ſays Antiſthenes then? have you never heard? "It is kingly, O Cyrus, to do well, and "to be ill ſpoken of." My head is well, and all around me think it akes. What is that to *me*? I am free from a fever; and they compaſſionate me, as if I had one. "Poor ſoul, what a long while "have you had this fever!" I ſay too, with a diſmal countenance, ay, indeed, it is now a long time that I have been ill.—"What can be the conſequence "then?"—What pleaſes God. And at the ſame time I ſecretly laugh at them, who pity me. What forbids then, but that the ſame may be done in the other caſe? I am poor: but I have right principles concerning poverty. What is it to me then, if people pity me for my poverty? I am not in power, and others are: but I have ſuch opinions as I ought to have concerning power, and the want of power. Let them ſee to it, who pity me. But I am neither hungry, nor thirſty, nor cold. But, becauſe they are hungry and thirſty, they ſuppoſe me to be ſo too. What can I do for them then? am I to go about, making proclamation, and ſaying, do not deceive yourſelves, good people, I am very well: I regard neither poverty, nor want of power, nor any thing elſe, but right principles. Theſe I poſſeſs unreſtrained. I care for nothing farther.—But what trifling is this? how have I right principles, when I am not contented to be what I am; but am out of my wits, how I ſhall appear? But others will get more, and be preferred to me.—Why, what is more reaſonable, than that they who take pains for

any thing, ſhould get moſt in that particular, in which they take pains? They have taken pains for power; you, for principles: they, for riches; you, for a proper uſe of the appearances of things. See whether they have the advantage of you in that, for which you have taken pains, and which they neglect: if they aſſent better, concerning the natural bounds and limits of things: if their deſires are leſs diſappointed than yours, their averſions leſs incurred: if they take a better aim in their intention, in their purpoſes, in their purſuits: whether they preſerve a becoming behaviour, as men, as parents, and ſo on in reſpect of the other relations of life. But, if they are in power, and you not: why will you not ſpeak the truth to yourſelf; that *you* do nothing for the ſake of power; but that *they* do every thing? And it is very unreaſonable, that he who carefully ſeeks any thing, ſhould be leſs ſucceſsful than he who neglects it.—"No: but ſince I take care to have "right principles, it is more reaſonable that I ſhould "have power"—Yes, in reſpect to what you take care about, your principles. But give up to others the things, in which they have taken more care than you. Elſe it is juſt as if, becauſe you have right principles, you ſhould think it fit, that when you ſhoot an arrow, you ſhould hit the mark better than an archer, or that you ſhould forge better than a ſmith. Therefor let alone taking pains about principles, and apply yourſelf to the things which you wiſh to poſſeſs, and then fall a crying, if you do not ſucceed; for you deſerve to cry. But now you ſay, that you are engaged in other things; intent upon other things: and it is a true ſaying, that one

buſineſs doth not ſuit with another. One man, as ſoon as he riſes and goes out, ſeeks to whom he may pay his compliments; whom he may flatter; to whom he may ſend a preſent; how he may pleaſe the danger [in vogue]; how, by doing ill-natured offices to one, he may oblige another. Whenever he ſacrifice, he ſacrifices for things like theſe. To theſe he transfers the Pythagorean precept;

Let not the ſtealing God of ſleep ſurpriſe, etc.

Where have I failed in point of flattery? *what have I done?* any thing like a free, brave-ſpirited man? If he ſhould find any thing of this ſort, he rebukes and accuſes himſelf. "What buſineſs had you "to ſay that? for could not you have lied? Even "the philoſophers ſay there is no objection againſt "telling a lye."

§. 4. But on the other hand, if you have in reality been careful about nothing elſe, but to make a right uſe of the appearance of things; as ſoon as you are up in the morning, conſider what do I want in order to be free from paſſion? what, to enjoy tranquillity? what am I? am I a meer worthleſs body? am I eſtate? am I reputation? None of theſe. What then? I am a reaſonable creature. What then is required of me? Recollect your actions. *Where have I failed*, in any requiſite for proſperity? *what have I done*, either unfriendly, or unſociable? *what have I omitted*, that was neceſſary in theſe points?

§. 5. Since there is ſo much difference in your deſires, your actions, your wiſhes, would you yet have an equal ſhare with others in thoſe things, a-

bout which you have not taken pains, and they have? and do you wonder, after all, and are you out of humour, if they pity you? But they are not out of humour, if you pity them. Why? Becauſe they are convinced, that they are in poſſeſſion of their proper good; but you are not convinced that you are. Hence you are not contented with your own condition; but deſire theirs: whereas they are contented with theirs, and do not deſire yours. For, if you were really convinced, that it is *you* who are in poſſeſſion of what is good, and that *they* are miſtaken, you would not ſo much as think what they ſay about you.

CHAP. VII.

Of Fearleſſneſs.

§. 1. WHAT makes a tyrant formidable? his guards, ſay you, and their ſwords; they who belong to the bed-chamber; and they who ſhut out thoſe, who would go in. What is the reaſon then, that, if you bring a child to him when he is ſurrounded by his guards, it is not afraid? is it becauſe the child doth not know what they mean? Suppoſe then, that any one doth know what is meant by guards, and that they are armed with ſwords; and, for that very reaſon, comes in the tyrant's way, being deſirous, on account of ſome misfortune, to die, and ſeeking to die eaſily by the hand of another; doth ſuch a man fear the guards? No: for he wants the very thing, that renders them formidable. Well then: if any one, without an ab-

ſolute deſire to live or die, but, as it may happen, comes in the way of a tyrant, what reſtrains his approaching him without fear? Nothing. If then another ſhould think concerning his eſtate, or wife, or children, as this man doth concerning his body; and, in ſhort, from ſome madneſs or folly, ſhould be of ſuch a diſpoſition, as not to care whether he hath them, or hath them not; but, as children, playing with ſhells, make a difference indeed in the play, but do not trouble themſelves about the ſhells; ſo he ſhould pay no regard to the materials [of action]; but apply himſelf to the playing with, and management of, them; what tyrant, what guards, or their ſwords, are any longer formidable to ſuch a man?

§. 2. And is it poſſible, that any one ſhould be thus diſpoſed towards theſe things from madneſs; and the Galileans, from mere habit; yet that no one ſhould be able to learn, from reaſon and demonſtration, that God made all things in the world, and the whole world itſelf, unreſtrained, and perfect; and all its parts for the uſe of the whole? All other creatures are indeed excluded from a power of comprehending the adminiſtration of the world; but a reaſonable being hath abilities for the conſideration of all theſe things: both that it [ſelf] is a part, and what part; and that it is fit the parts ſhould ſubmit to the whole. Beſides, being by nature conſtituted noble, magnanimous, and free, it ſees, that, of the things which relate to it, ſome are unreſtrained, ſuch as depend on choice; the reſtrained, ſuch as do not depend on it. And, for this reaſon, if it eſteems its good and its intereſt to conſiſt in things unreſtrained, and in its own power, it will be free, proſpe-

rous, happy, unhurt, magnanimous, pious; thankful to God for every thing; never finding fault with any thing, never cenſuring any thing that is brought to paſs by him. But, if it eſteems its good, and its intereſt, to conſiſt in externals, and things independent on choice, it muſt neceſſarily be reſtrained, be hindered, be enſlaved by thoſe who have the power over thoſe things which it admires, and fears; it muſt neceſſarily be impious, as ſuppoſing itſelf injured by God, and unequitable, as claiming more than its ſhare; it muſt neceſſarily too be abject, and mean-ſpirited.

§. 3. What forbids, but that he, who diſtinguiſhes theſe things, may live with an eaſy and light heart, quietly expecting whatever may happen, and bearing contentedly what hath happened? would you have poverty [be my lot]? Bring it; and you will ſee what poverty is, when it hath got one to act it well. Would you have power? Bring toils too along with it. Baniſhment? Where-ever I go, it will be well with me there: for it was well with me *here*, not on account of the place, but of the principles, which I ſhall carry away with me; for no one can deprive me of theſe: on the contrary, they alone are my property, and cannot be taken away? and retaining them, ſuffices me where-ever I am, or whatever I do.—"But it is now time to die."——What is it that you call dying? Do not talk of the thing in a tragedy ſtrain; but ſay, as the truth is, that it is time for a compound piece of matter to be reſolved back into its original. And where is the terror of this? what part of the world is going to be loſt? what is going to happen new, or prodigious? Is it for this,

that a tyrant is formidable? is it on this account, that the ſwords of his guards ſeem ſo large and ſharp? Try theſe things upon others. For my part, I have examined the whole. No one hath an authority over me. God hath made me free: I know his commands: after this, no one can enſlave me. I have a proper aſſertor of my freedom; proper judges. Is it not of my body, that you are the maſter? what is that to *me* then? of that triſle my eſtate? what is that to *me* then? is it of baniſhment and chains, that you are the maſter? Why, all theſe again, and my whole body I give up to you: whenever you pleaſe, make trial of your power, and you will find how far it extends.

§. 4. Whom then can I any longer fear? thoſe who belong to the bed chamber? Leſt they ſhould do——What? ſhut me out? If they find me deſirous to come in, let them.—"Why do you come "to the door then?"——Becauſe it is fitting for me, that while the play laſts, I ſhould play too.—"How then are you incapable of being ſhut out?"——Becauſe, if I am not admitted, I would not wiſh to go in; but would much rather, that things ſhould be as they are: for I eſteem what God wills, to be better than what I will. I give myſelf up a ſervant and a follower to him. I purſue, I deſire in ſhort, I *will* along with him. Being ſhut out doth not relate to *me*; but to thoſe who puſh to get in. Why then do not I puſh too? Becauſe I know, that there is not any good diſtributed there to thoſe who get in. But when I hear any one congratulated on the favour of Caeſar, I ſay, what hath he got?—"A province."——Hath he then got ſuch principles too, as he ought to have?—"A pub-

" lic charge."——Hath he then got with it the knowlege how to uſe it too? if not, why ſhould I be thruſt about any longer to get in? Some one ſcatters nuts and figs. Children ſcramble and quarrel for them; but not men: for they think them trifles. But, if any one ſhould ſcatter ſhells, not even children would ſcramble for theſe. Provinces are diſtributing. Let children look to it. Money. Let children look to it. Military command, a conſulſhip. Let children ſcramble for them. Let theſe be ſhut out, be beat, kiſs the hands of the giver, of his ſlaves. But to me, they are but mere figs and nuts.—" What then is to be done?"——If you miſs them, while he is throwing them, do not trouble yourſelf about it: but, if a fig ſhould fall into your lap, take it, and eat it; for one may pay ſo much regard even to a fig. But, if I am to ſtoop and throw down one, or be thrown down by another, and flatter thoſe who are got in, a fig is not worth this, nor any other of the things which are not really good, and which the philoſophers have perſuaded me not to eſteem as good.

§. 5. Show me the ſwords of the guards.—" See how big, and how ſharp they are."——What then do theſe great and ſharp ſwords do?—" They kill."——And what doth a fever do?—" Nothing elſe."——And a tile?—" Nothing elſe."——Would you have me then be ſtruck with an awful admiration of all theſe, and worſhip them, and go about a ſlave to them all? Heaven forbid! but, having once learnt, that every thing that is born muſt likewiſe die, (that the world may not be at a ſtand, or the courſe of it hindered), I no longer make any difference, whether this be effected by a

ſever, or a tile, or a ſoldier: but, if any compariſon is to be made, I know, that the ſoldier will effect it with leſs pain, and more ſpeedily. Since then I neither fear any of thoſe things, which he can inflict upon me, nor covet any thing which he can beſtow, why do I ſtand any longer in awe of a tyrant? why am I ſtruck with aſtoniſhment? why do I fear his guards? why do I rejoice, if he ſpeaks kindly to me, and receives me graciouſly; and relate to others, in what manner he ſpoke to me? for is he Socrates, or Diogenes, that his praiſe ſhould ſhow what I am? or have I ſet my heart on imitating his manners? But, to keep up the play, I go to him, and ſerve him, as long as he commands nothing unreaſonable or improper. But, if he ſhould ſay to me, "Go to Salamis, and bring Leo," I anſwer him, ſeek another, for I play no longer.—"Lead him away."——I follow, in ſport.—"But your "head will be taken off."——And will his own always remain on; or yours, who obey him?—"But you will be thrown out, unburied."——If *I* am the corpſe, *I* ſhall be thrown out; but if *I* am ſomething elſe than the corpſe, ſpeak more handſomely, as the thing is, and do not think to fright me. Theſe things are frightful to children and fools. But if any one, who hath once entered into the ſchool of a philoſopher, doth not know what he himſelf is, he deſerves to be frighted, and to flatter what he lately flattered; if he hath not yet learnt, that he is neither fleſh, nor bones, nor nerves; but that which makes uſe of theſe, and regulates, and comprehends the appearances of things.

§. 6. "Well: but theſe reaſonings make men "deſpiſe the laws."——And what reaſonings then

render thoſe, who uſe them, more obedient to the laws? But the law of fools is no law. And yet, ſee how theſe reaſonings render us properly diſpoſed, even towards ſuch perſons, ſince they teach us, not to claim, in oppoſition to them, any thing wherein they have it in their power to be ſuperior to us. They teach us to give up body, to give up eſtate, children, parents, brothers, to yield up every thing, to let go every thing, excepting only principles; which even Jupiter hath excepted, and decreed to be every one's own property. What unreaſonableneſs, what breach of the laws, is there in this? Where you are ſuperior and ſtronger, there I give way to *you*: where, on the contrary, I am ſuperior, do you ſubmit to *me*; for this hath been my ſtudy, and not yours. Your ſtudy hath been to walk upon a Moſaic floor, to be attended by your ſervants and clients, to wear fine clothes, to have a great number of hunters, fiddlers, and players. Do I lay any claim [to theſe?] but [on the other hand,] have you then ſtudied principles, or even your own rational faculty? do you know, of what parts it conſiſts? how they are connected; what are its articulations; what powers it hath, and of what kind? why then do you take it amiſs, if another, who hath ſtudied them, hath the advantage of you in theſe things?—"But they are of all things the greateſt."——Well: and who reſtrains you from being converſant with them, and attending to them ever ſo carefully? or who is better provided with books, with leiſure, with aſſiſtants? Only turn your thoughts now and then to theſe matters; beſtow but a little time upon your own ruling faculty. Conſider what it is you have, and whence it came, that

uſes all other things, that examines them all, that chuſes, that rejects. But while you employ yourſelf about externals, you will have thoſe indeed, ſuch as no one elſe hath; but your ruling faculty, ſuch as you like to have it, ſordid and neglected.

CHAP. VIII.

Concerning ſuch as haſtily run into the philoſophic dreſs.

§. 1. NEVER commend nor cenſure any one for common actions, nor aſcribe them either to ſkilfulneſs or unſkilfulneſs; and thus you will at once be free both from raſhneſs and ill-nature. Such a one bathes in a mighty little time. Doth he therefor do it ill? Not at all. But what? In a mighty little time.—"Is every thing well done then?" ——By no means. But what is done from good principles is well done; what from bad ones ill. But till you know from what principle any one acts, neither commend nor cenſure the action. But the principle is not eaſily judged of from the external appearances. Such a one is a carpenter. Why? He uſes an axe. What ſignifies that? Such a one is a muſician: for he ſings. What ſignifies that? Such a one is a philoſopher. Why? Becauſe he wears a cloke and long hair. What then do mountebanks wear? And ſo, when people ſee any of theſe acting indecently, they preſently ſay, "See what the "philoſopher doth." But they ought rather, from his acting indecently, to ſay, he is no philoſopher. For, if indeed the idea, which we have of a philoſopher, and his profeſſion, was, to wear a cloke and long

hair, they would ſay right: but, if it be rather to keep himſelf free from faults, ſince he doth not fulfil his profeſſion, why do not they deprive him of his title? For this is the way with regard to the other arts. When we ſee any one handle an axe aukwardly, we do not ſay, "Where is the uſe of "this art? See how ill carpenters perform." But we ſay the very contrary: "This man is no carpen-"ter; for he handles an axe aukwardly." So, if we hear any one ſing badly, we do not ſay, "Ob-"ſerve how muſicians ſing:" but rather, "This "fellow is no muſician." It is with regard to philoſophy alone, that people are thus affected. When they ſee any one acting contrary to the profeſſion of a philoſopher, they do not take away his title; but, laying it down, that he is a philoſopher, and then aſſuming from the very fact that he behaves indecently, they infer, that philoſophy is of no uſe.

§. 2. "What then is the reaſon of this?" Becauſe we pay ſome regard to the pre-conception "which we have of a carpenter, and a muſician, and ſo of other artiſts; but not of a philoſopher; which being thus vague and confuſed, we judge of it only from external appearances. And of what other art do we take up our judgment from the dreſs and the hair? hath it not theorems too, and materials, and an end, [to diſtinguiſh it?] what then is the ſubject-matter of a philoſopher? is it a cloke? No: but reaſon. What his end? to wear a cloke? —No: but to have his reaſon correct. What are his theorems? are they how to get a great beard, or long hair?—No: but rather, as Zeno expreſſes it, to know the elements of reaſon, what each of them is in particular, and how they are adapted to each other, and what are their conſequences.

§. 3. Why then will you not firſt ſee, whether, by acting in an unbecoming manner, he anſwers his profeſſion, and ſo proceed to blame the ſtudy? Whereas now, when you act ſoberly yourſelf, you ſay, from what he appears to do amiſs, "Obſerve "the *philoſopher!*" as if it was decent to call a perſon, who doth ſuch things, a *philoſopher*. And, again, "This is *philoſophical!*" but do not ſay, "Obſerve the carpenter, or obſerve the muſician," when you know one of them to be an adulterer, or ſee him to be a glutton. So, in ſome ſmall degree, even you perceive, what the profeſſion of a philoſopher is; but are miſled, and confounded by your own careleſſneſs. But indeed even they, who are called philoſophers, enter upon their profeſſion by things which are common to them with others. As ſoon as they have put on a cloke, and let their beard grow, they cry, "I am a philoſopher." Yet no one ſays, "I am a muſician;" becauſe he hath bought a fiddle and fiddleſtick: nor, "I am a ſmith;" becauſe he is dreſt in the Vulcanian cap and apron. But they take their name from their art, not from their habit.

§. 4. For this reaſon, Euphrates was in the right to ſay, "I long endeavoured to conceal my embrac-"ing the philoſophic life; and it was of uſe to me. "For, in the firſt place, I knew that, what I did "right, I did it not for ſpectators; but for myſelf. "I eat in a proper manner, for myſelf. I had a "compoſed look, and walk, all for God and myſelf. "Then, as I fought alone, I was alone in danger. "philoſophy was in no danger, on my doing any "thing ſhameful, or unbecoming: nor did I hurt "the reſt of the world; which, by offending as a

" philoſopher, I might have done. For this rea-
" ſon, they who were ignorant of my intention,
" uſed to wonder, that while I converſed, and lived
" intirely with philoſophers, I never took up the
" character. And where was the harm, that I
" ſhould be diſcovered to be a philoſopher, by my
" actions, and not by the uſual badges. See how
" I eat, how I drink, how I ſleep, how I bear,
" how I forbear; how I aſſiſt others; how I
" make uſe of my deſires, how of my averſions;
" how I preſerve the natural and acquired relations,
" without confuſion, and without impediment.
" Judge of me from hence, if you can. But, if
" you are ſo deaf and blind, that you would not
" ſuppoſe Vulcan himſelf to be a good ſmith, un-
" leſs you ſaw the cap upon his head, where is the
" harm of not being found out by ſo fooliſh a judge?"

§. 5. It was thus too that Socrates concealed himſelf from the generality: and ſome even came and deſired him to recommend them to philoſophers. Did he uſe to be diſpleaſed then, like us; and ſay, what! do not you take *me* for a philoſopher? No: he took and recommended them; contented with only being a philoſopher, and rejoicing in not being vexed, that he was not thought one. For he remembered his buſineſs: and what is the buſineſs of a wiſe and good man? to have many ſcholars? By no means. Let thoſe ſee to it, who have made this their ſtudy. Well then: is it to be a perfect maſter of difficult theorems? Let others ſee to that too. In what then was he, and did he deſire to be, ſomebody? in what conſtituted his hurt or advantage? " If, ſays he, any one can hurt me, I am doing
" nothing. If I depend for my advantage upon an-
" other, I am nothing. Do I wiſh for any thing, and it

" doth not come to paſs? I am unhappy." To ſuch a combat he invited every one, and, in my opinion, yielded to no one. But do you think it was by making proclamation, and ſaying, " I am " impaſſive and undiſturbed. Be it known to you " mortals, that while *you* are fluctuating and buſtling about for things of no value, *I* alone am free " from all perturbation."——Are you then ſo far from being contented with having no pain yourſelf, that you muſt needs make proclamation: " Come " hither, all you that have the gout, or the head-ake, or " a fever, or are lame, or blind; and ſee *me* free from every diſtemper." This is vain and ſhocking, unleſs you could ſhow, like Æſculapius, by what method of cure they may preſently become as free from diſtempers as yourſelf, and bring your own health as a proof of it.

§. 6. Such is the Cynic, honoured with the ſceptre and diadem from Jove: who ſays, " That you " may ſee, O mankind, that you do not ſeek happineſs and tranquillity where it is, but where it is " not; behold, I am ſent an example to you, from " God; who have neither eſtate, nor houſe, nor " wife, nor children, nor even a bed, or coat, or " furniture. And ſee how healthy I am. Try " me: and, if you ſee me free from perturbation, " hear the remedies, and by what means I was cured." This now is benevolent and noble. But conſider whoſe buſineſs it is.——Jupiter's, or his whom he judges worthy of this office; that he may never diſcover any thing to the world, by which he may invalidate his own teſtimony, which he gives for virtue, and againſt externals.

No ſickly pale his beauteous features wear,
Nor from his cheek he wipes the languid tear.
HOMER.

And not only this, but he doth not deſire or ſeek for company or place, or amuſement, as boys do the vintage time, or holy-days: always fortified by virtuous ſhame, as others are by walls, and gates, and centinels.

§. 7. But now they, who have only ſuch an inclination to philoſophy, as bad ſtomachs have to ſome kinds of food, of which they will preſently grow ſick, immediately run to the ſceptre, to the kingdom. They let grow their hair, aſſume the cloke, bare the ſhoulder, wrangle with all they meet; and even, if they ſee one in a warm thick coat, wrangle with him. Firſt harden yourſelf againſt all weather, man. Conſider your inclination; whether it be not that of a bad ſtomach, or of a longing woman. Firſt ſtudy to conceal what you are; philoſophiſe a little while by yourſelf. Fruit is produced thus. The ſeed muſt firſt be buried in the ground, lie hid there ſome time, and grow up by degrees, that it may come to perfection. But, if it produces the ear before the ſtalk hath its proper joints, it is imperfect, and of the garden of Adonis. Now *you* are a poor plant of this kind. You have bloſſomed too ſoon: the winter will kill you. See what countrymen ſay about ſeeds of any ſort, when the warm weather comes on too early. They are in great anxiety, for fear the ſeeds ſhould ſhoot out too luxuriantly: and then, one froſt taking them, ſhows how prejudicial their forwardneſs was. Beware you too, man. You have ſhot out too luxuriantly;

you have ſprung forth towards a trifling fame, before the proper ſeaſon. You ſeem to be ſomebody, as a fool may among fools. You will be taken by the froſt: or rather, you are already frozen downwards, at the root: you ſtill bloſſom indeed a little at the top, and therefor you think you are ſtill alive and flouriſhing. Let *us*, at leaſt, ripen naturally. Why do you lay us open? why do you force us? We cannot yet bear the air. Suffer the root to grow; then the firſt, then the ſecond, then the third joint of the ſtalk to ſpring from it; and thus nature will force out the fruit, whether I will or not. For who that is big with, and full of ſuch principles, doth not perceive too his own qualifications, and exert his efforts to correſpondent operations? Not even a bull is ignorant of his own qualifications, when any wild beaſt approaches the herd, nor waits for any one to encourage him; nor a dog, when he ſpies any game. And, if I have the qualifications of a good man, ſhall I wait for you to qualify me for my own proper operations; but believe me, I have them not yet. Why then would you wiſh *me* to be withered before my time, as *you* are?

CHAP. IX.

Concerning a perſon who was grown immodeſt.

§. 1. WHEN you ſee another in power, ſet againſt it, that you have the advantage of not wanting power. When you ſee another rich, ſee what you have inſtead of riches: for, if you have nothing in their ſtead, you are miſerable. But

if you have the advantage of not needing riches, know, that you have ſomething more than he hath, and of far greater value. Another poſſeſſes a handſome woman; you, the happineſs of not deſiring a handſome woman. Do you think theſe are little matters? And what would thoſe very perſons, who are rich, and powerful, and poſſeſs handſome women, give, that they were able to deſpiſe riches and power, and thoſe very women whom they love, and whom they acquire: do not you know of what nature the thirſt of one in a fever is? It hath no reſemblance to that of a perſon in health. He drinks, and is ſatisfied. But the other, after being delighted a very little while, grows ſick, turns the water into choler, throws it up, hath pain in his bowels, and becomes more violently thirſty. Of the ſame nature is it to have riches, or dominion, or enjoy a fine woman, with fondneſs of any one of theſe things. Jealouſy takes place; fear of loſing the beloved object; indecent diſcourſes; indecent deſigns; unbecoming actions.

§. 2. "And what, ſay you, do I loſe all the "while?"——You were modeſt, man, and are ſo no longer. Have you loſt nothing? inſtead of Chryſippus and Zeno, you read Ariſtides and Euenus. Have you loſt nothing then? Inſtead of Socrates and Diogenes, you admire him who can corrupt and entice the moſt women. You ſet out your perſon, and would be handſome, when you are not. You love to appear in fine clothes, to attract the eyes of the women; and, if you any-where meet with a perfumer, you eſteem yourſelf a happy man. But formerly you did not ſo much as think of any of theſe things; but only where you might find a de-

cent diſcourſe, a worthy perſon, a noble deſign. For this reaſon, you uſed to ſleep like a man; to appear in public like a man; to wear a manly dreſs; to hold diſcourſes worthy of a man. And after this, do you tell me, you have loſt nothing? what then, do men loſe nothing but money? is not modeſty to be loſt? is not decency to be loſt? or may he, who loſes theſe, ſuffer no damage? You indeed perhaps no longer think any thing of this ſort to be a damage. But there was once a time, when you accounted this to be the only damage and hurt; when you were anxiouſly afraid, leſt any one ſhould ſhake your regard from theſe diſcourſes and actions. See, it is not ſhaken by another; but by yourſelf. Fight againſt yourſelf, recover yourſelf to decency, to modeſty, to freedom. If you had formerly been told any of theſe things of me, that any one prevailed on me to commit adultery, to wear ſuch a dreſs as yours, to be perfumed, would not you have gone and laid violent hands on the man, who thus abuſed me? and will you not now then help yourſelf? for how much eaſier is that aſſiſtance? You need not kill, or fetter, or affront, or go to law with any one; but merely to talk with yourſelf, who will moſt readily be perſuaded by you, and with whom no one hath greater credit than you. And, in the firſt place, condemn your actions: but when you have condemned them, do not deſpair of yourſelf, nor be like thoſe poor-ſpirited people, who when they have once given way, abandon themſelves intirely, and are carried along, as by a torrent. Take example from the wreſtling maſters. Hath the boy fallen down? Get up again, they ſay; wreſtle again, till you have acquired ſtrength. Be you af-

fected in the ſame manner. For, be aſſured, that there is nothing more tractable than the human mind. You need but will, and it is done, it is ſet right: as, on the contrary, you need but nod over the work, and it is ruined. For both ruin and recovery are from within.

§. 3. "And, after all, what good will this do "me?"—What greater good do you ſeek? From impudent, you will become modeſt; from indecent, decent; from diſſolute, ſober. If you ſeek any greater things than theſe, go on as you do. It is no longer in the power of any God to ſave you.

CHAP. X.

What things we are to deſpiſe, and on what to place a diſtinguiſhed value.

§. 1. THE doubts and perplexities of all men are concerning externals. What they ſhall do? how it may be? what will be the event? whether this thing may happen, or that? All this is the talk of perſons engaged in things independent on choice. For who ſays, how ſhall I do, not to aſſent to what is falſe? how, not to diſſent from what is true? If any one is of ſuch a good diſpoſition, as to be anxious about theſe things, I will remind him: why are you anxious? It is in your own power. Be aſſured. Do not ruſh upon aſſent before you have applied the natural rule. Again, if he be anxious, for fear his deſire would be ineffectual and diſappointed, or his averſion incurred, I will firſt kiſs him, becauſe, ſlighting what others are

in a flutter and terrified about, he takes care of what is his own; where his very being is: then I will ſay to him; if you would not be diſappointed of your deſires, or incur your averſions, deſire nothing that belongs to others; be averſe to nothing not in your own power; otherwiſe your deſire muſt neceſſarily be diſappointed, and your averſion incurred. Where is the doubt here? where the room for, *how will it be? what will be the event?* and, *will this happen, or that?* now, is not the event independent on choice?—"Yes."——And doth not the eſſence of good and evil conſiſt in what depends on choice?—"Yes."——It is in your power then, to treat every event conformably to nature? can any one reſtrain you?—"No one."——Then do not ſay to me any more, *how will it be?* For, however it be, you will ſet it right, and the event to you will be lucky.

§. 2. Pray what would Hercules have been, if he had ſaid, "What can be done to prevent a great "lion, or a great boar, or ſavage men from com-"ing in my way?" Why, what is that to you? If a great boar ſhould come in your way, you will fight the greater combat: if wicked men, you will deliver the world from wicked men.—"But then if "I ſhould die by this means?——You will die a good man, in the performance of a gallant action. For ſince, at all events, one muſt die, one muſt neceſſarily be found doing ſomething, either tilling, or digging, or trading, or ſerving a conſulſhip, or ſick of an indigeſtion, or a flux. At what employment then would you have death find you? For my part I would have it be ſome humane, beneficent, public-ſpirited gallant action. But if I cannot be found doing any ſuch great things, yet, at leaſt, I would

be doing what I am incapable of being reſtrained from, what is given me to do, correcting myſelf, improving that faculty which makes uſe of the appearances of things, to procure tranquillity, and render to the ſeveral relations of life their due; and, if I am ſo fortunate, advancing to the third topic, a ſecurity of judging right. If death overtakes me in ſuch a ſituation, it is enough for me, if I can ſtretch out my hands to God, and ſay, "The "opportunities which thou haſt given me, of com- "prehending and following [the rules] of thy ad- "miniſtration, I have not neglected. As far as in "me lay, I have not diſhonoured thee. See how "I have uſed my perceptions; how my pre-con- "ceptions. Have I at any time found fault with "thee? have I been diſcontented at thy diſpenſati- "ons; or wiſhed them otherwiſe? have I tranſ- "greſſed the relations of life? I thank thee, that "thou has brought me into being. I am ſatisfied "with the time that I have enjoyed the things, which "thou haſt given me. Receive them back again, "and aſſign them to whatever place thou wilt; for "they were all thine, and thou gaveſt them to "me."

§. 3, Is it not enough to make one's exit in this ſtate of mind? And what life is better, and more becoming than that of ſuch a one? Or what concluſion happier? But, in order to attain theſe advantages, there are no inconſiderable things, both to be taken and loſt. You cannot wiſh both for a conſulſhip and theſe too, nor take pains to get an eſtate and theſe too, or be ſolicitous both about your ſervants and yourſelf. But, if you wiſh any thing abſolutely, of what belongs to others, what is your own is

loſt. This is the nature of the affair. Nothing is to be had for nothing. And where is the wonder? If you would be conſul, you muſt watch, run about, kiſs hands, be wearied down with waiting at the doors of others, muſt ſay, and do many ſlaviſh things, ſend gifts to many, daily preſents to ſome. And what is the conſequence [of ſucceſs]? Twelve bundles of rods; to ſit three or four times on the tribunal; to give the Circenſian games, and ſuppers in baſkets to all the world; or let any one ſhow me what there is in it more than this. Will you then be at no expence, no pains to acquire apathy, tranquillity, to ſleep ſound while you do ſleep, to be thoroughly awake while you are awake, to fear nothing, to be anxious for nothing? but, if any thing belonging to you be loſt, or idly waſted, while you are thus engaged, or another gets what you ought to have had, will you immediately begin fretting at what hath happened? will you not compare the exchange you have made? how much for how much? But you would have ſuch great things for nothing, I ſuppoſe. And how can you? One buſineſs doth not ſuit with another: you cannot beſtow your care both upon externals and your own ruling faculty. But, if you would have the former, let the latter alone; or you will ſucceed in neither, while you are drawn different ways, towards both. On the other hand, if you would have the latter, let the former alone.—"The oil will be ſpilled, the furni-" ture will be ſpoiled:"——but ſtill I ſhall be free from paſſion.—"There will be a fire when I am " not in the way, and the books will be deſtroyed:" ——but ſtill I ſhall treat the appearances of things conformably to nature.—"But I ſhall have nothing

" to eat."——If I am ſo unlucky, dying is a ſafe harbour. That is the ſafe harbour for all, death: that is the refuge; and, for that reaſon, there is nothing difficult in life. You may go out of doors when you pleaſe, and be troubled with ſmoke no longer.

§. 4. Why then are you anxious? why do you keep yourſelf waking? why do not you calculate where your good and evil lies: and ſay, they are both in my own power; neither can any deprive me of the one, or involve me, againſt my will, in the other. Why then do not I lay myſelf down and ſnore? What is my own, is ſafe. Let what belongs to others look to itſelf, who carries it off, how it is given away by him, that hath the diſpoſal of it. Who am I, to will, that it ſhould be ſo and ſo? for is the option given to me? hath any one made me the diſpenſer of it? What I have in my own diſpoſal is enough for me. I muſt make the beſt I can of this. Other things muſt be as the maſter of them pleaſes.

§. 5. Doth any one, who hath theſe things before his eyes, lie awake [like Achilles,], and ſhift from ſide to ſide? what would he have, or what doth he want? Patroclus, or Antilochus, or Menelaus? why, did he ever think any one of his friends immortal? why, when had not he it before his eyes, that the morrow, or the next day, himſelf, or that friend, might die?—" Ay, very true, ſays he: but " I reckoned, that he would ſurvive me, and bring " up my ſon."——Becauſe you were a fool, and reckoned upon uncertainties. Why then do you blame yourſelf; but ſit crying, like a girl?—" But " he uſed to ſet my dinner before me."——Becauſe

he was alive, fool; but now he cannot. But Automedon will ſet it before you; and, if he ſhould die, you will find ſomebody elſe. What if the pipkin, in which your meat uſed to be cooked, ſhould happen to be broken; you muſt die with hunger, becauſe you have not your old pipkin? do not you ſend and buy a new one?

What greater evil (ſays he) *could afflict my breaſt?*

Is *this* your evil then? and, inſtead of removing it, do you accuſe your mother, that ſhe did not foretel it to you, that you might have ſpent your whole life in grieving from that time forward?

§. 6. Do not you think now, that Homer compoſed all this on purpoſe to ſhow us, that the nobleſt, the ſtrongeſt, the richeſt, the handſomeſt of men, may, nevertheleſs, be the moſt unfortunate, and wretched, if they have not the principles they ought to have?

CHAP. XI.

Of purity and cleanlineſs.

§. 1. SOME doubt whether ſociableneſs be comprehended in the nature of man: and yet theſe very perſons do not ſeem to me to doubt, but that purity is by all means comprehended in it; and that by this, if by any thing, it is diſtinguiſhed from brute animals. When therefor we ſee any animal cleaning itſelf, we are apt to cry, with wonder, it is like a human creature. On the con-

trary, if an animal is accuſed [of dirtineſs], we are preſently apt to ſay, by way of excuſe, that it is not a human creature. Such excellence we do ſuppoſe to be in man, which we firſt received from the Gods. For, as they are by nature pure and uncorrupt, in proportion as men approach to them by reaſon, they are tenacious of purity and incorruption. But, ſince it is impracticable that their eſſence, compoſed of ſuch materials, ſhould be abſolutely pure, it is the office of reaſon to endeavour to render it as pure as poſſible.

§. 2. The firſt and higheſt purity, or impurity, then, is that which is formed in the ſoul. But you will not find the impurity of the ſoul and body to be alike. For what elſe [of impurity] can you find in the ſoul, than that which renders it filthy with regard to its operations? Now the operations of the ſoul are its purſuits and avoidances, its deſires, averſions, preparations, aſſents. What then is that which renders it defiled and impure in theſe operations? Nothing elſe than its perverſe judgments. So that the impurity of the ſoul conſiſts in wicked principles; and its purification in the forming right principles; and that is pure which hath right principles; for that alone is unmixed and undefiled in its operations.

§. 3. Now we ſhould, as far as poſſible, endeavour after ſomething like this in the body too. It is impoſſible but, in ſuch a compoſition as man, there muſt be a defluxion of rheum. For this reaſon, nature hath made hands, and the noſtrils themſelves as channels to let out the moiſture. If any one therefor ſnuffs it up again, I ſay, that he performs not the operation of a man. It was impoſ-

ſible, but that the feet muſt be bemired and ſoiled from what they paſs through. Therefor nature hath prepared water and hands. It was impoſſible, but that ſome filth muſt cleave to the teeth from eating. Therefor, ſhe ſays, waſh your teeth. Why? That you may be a man, and not a wild beaſt, or a ſwine. It was impoſſible, but, from perſpiration, and the preſſure of the clothes, ſomething dirty, and neceſſary to be cleaned, ſhould remain upon the body. For this, there is water, oil, hands, towels, bruſhes, ſope, and other neceſſary apparatus, for its purification.—No: a ſmith indeed will get the ruſt off his iron, and have proper inſtruments for that purpoſe: and you yourſelf will have your plates waſhed before you eat; unleſs you be quite dirty and ſlovenly: but you will not waſh nor purify your body.—"Why ſhould I?" (ſay you.)—I tell you again, in the firſt place, that you may be like a man; and, in the next, that you may not offend thoſe with whom you converſe. * * * Without being ſenſible of it, you do ſomething like this. Do you think you deſerve to ſtink? Be it ſo. But do thoſe deſerve [to ſuffer by] it who ſit near you? who are placed at the table with you? who ſalute you? Either go into a deſert, as you deſerve, or live ſolitary at home, and ſmell yourſelf: for it is fit you ſhould enjoy your naſtineſs alone. But, to what ſort of character doth it belong, to live in a city, and behave ſo careleſsly and inconſiderately? If nature had truſted even a horſe to your care, would you have overlooked and neglected him? Now conſider your body as committed to you, inſtead of a horſe. Waſh it, rub it, take care that it may not be any one's averſion, nor diſguſt any one. Who is not

more diſguſted at a ſtinking, unwholeſome-looking ſloven, than at a perſon who hath been rolled in filth? The ſtench of the one is adventitious from without; but that which ariſes from want of care, is a kind of inward putrefaction.—"But Socrates bathed but ſel-"dom."——But his perſon looked clean, and was ſo agreeable and pleaſing, that the moſt beautiful and noble youths were fond of him, and deſir-ed rather to ſit by him, than by thoſe who had the fineſt perſons. He might have omitted both bathing and waſhing, if he had pleaſed; and yet bathing, though ſeldom, had its effect.—"But "Ariſtophanes calls him, one of the *ſqualid ſlip-"ſhod philoſophers*."——Why, ſo he ſays too, that he walked in the air, and ſtole clothes from the Pa-laeſtra. Beſides, all who have written of Socrates, affirm quite the contrary; that he was not only a-greeable in his converſation, but in his perſon too. And, again, they write the ſame of Diogenes. For we ought not to fright the world from philoſophy, by the appearance of our perſon; but to ſhow our-ſelves chearful and eaſy, by the care of our perſons, as well as by other marks. "See, all of you, that "I have nothing; that I want nothing. Without "houſe, without city, and an exile, (if it happens "to be the caſe,) and without a home, I live more "eaſily and proſperouſly than the noble and rich. "Look upon my perſon too, that it is not injured "by coarſe fare."——But, if any one ſhould tell me this, with the habit and viſage of a condemned criminal, what God would perſuade me to come near philoſophy, while it renders men ſuch figures? Heaven forbid! I would not do it, even if I was ſure to become a wiſe man for my pains. I declare for my own part, I would rather that a young man,

on his firſt inclination to philoſophy, ſhould come to me finically dreſſed, than with his hair ſpoiled and dirty. For there appears in him ſome idea of beauty, and deſire of decency; and where he imagines it to be, there he applies his endeavours. One hath nothing more to do, but to point it out to him, and ſay, "You ſeek beauty, young man; and you do "well. Be aſſured then, that it ſprings from the "rational part of you. Seek it there, where the "purſuits and avoidances, the deſires and averſions, "are concerned Herein conſiſts your excellence: "but the paultry body is by nature clay. Why do "you trouble yourſelf, to no purpoſe, about it? "You will be convinced by time, if not otherwiſe, "that it is nothing." But, if he ſhould come to me bemired, dirty, with whiſkers down to his knees, what can I ſay to him? by what ſimilitude allure him? for what hath he ſtudied, which hath any reſemblance to beauty, that I may transfer his attention, and ſay, that beauty is not there, but here? would you have me tell him, that beauty doth not conſiſt in filth, but in reaſon? for hath he any deſire of beauty? hath he any appearance of it? Go, and argue with the hog, not to roll in the mire.

§. 4. It was in the quality of a young man that loved beauty, that Polemo was touched by the diſcourſes of Xenocrates. For he entered with ſome incentives to the ſtudy of beauty, though he ſought it in the wrong place. And indeed nature hath not made the very brutes dirty, which live with man. Doth a horſe wallow in the mire? or a good dog? But ſwine, and filthy geeſe, and worms, and ſpiders, which are baniſhed to the greateſt diſtance from human ſociety. Will you then, who are a man, chuſe

not to be even one of the animals, that are conſervant with man; but rather a worm, or a ſpider? will you not bathe ſometimes, be it in whatever manner you pleaſe? will you never uſe water to waſh yourſelf? will you not come clean, that they who converſe with you may have ſome pleaſure in you? but will you accompany us, a mere lump of naſtineſs, even to the temples; where it is not lawful for any one ſo much as to ſpit, or blow his noſe?

§. 5. What then, would any body have you dreſs yourſelf out to the utmoſt? By no means; except in thoſe things where our nature requires it; in reaſon, principles, actions: but, in our perſons, only as far as neatneſs, as far as not to give offence. But if you hear, that it is not right to wear purple, you muſt go, I ſuppoſe, and roll your cloke in the mud, or tear it.—"But where ſhould I have a fine cloke?"——You have water, man; waſh it.—"What an "amiable youth is here? how worthy this old man, "to love, and be loved!"——A fit perſon to be truſted with the inſtruction of our ſons and daughters, and attended by young peole, as occaſion may require,——to read them lectures on a dung-hill! every deviation proceeds from ſomething human: but this approaches very nearly towards being not human.

CHAP. XII.

Of Attention.

§. 1. WHEN you let go your attention for a little while, do not fancy you may recover it when-ever you pleaſe: but remember this, that, by means of the fault of to-day, your affairs muſt neceſſarily be in a worſe condition for the future. Firſt, what is the ſaddeſt thing of all, a habit ariſes of not attending; and then a habit of deferring the attention, and always driving off from time to time, and procraſtinating a proſperous life, a propriety of behaviour, and the thinking and acting conformably to nature. Now, if the procraſtination of any thing is advantageous, the abſolute omiſſion of it is ſtill more advantageous: but, if it be not advantageous, why do not you preſerve a conſtant attention?—"I would play to day."—What then? Ought you not to do it, with proper attention to yourſelf?—"I would ſing."—Well: and what forbids but that you may ſing, with attention to yourſelf? For there is no part of life exempted, to which attention doth not extend. For will you do it the worſe by attending, and the better by not attending? what elſe in life is beſt performed by inattentive people? doth a ſmith forge the better by not attending? doth a pilot ſteer the ſafer by not attending? or is any other, even of the minuteſt operations, performed the better by inattention? do not you perceive, that, when you have let your mind looſe, it is no longer in your power to call it back,

either to propriety, or modeſty, or moderation? But you do every thing as it happens: you follow your inclinations.

§. 2. To what then am I to attend?

Why, in the firſt place, to thoſe univerſal maxims, which you muſt always have at hand; and not ſleep, or get up, or drink, or eat, or converſe without them; that no one is the maſter of another's choice; and it is in choice alone that good and evil conſiſt. No one therefor is the maſter either to procure me any good, or to involve me in any evil: but I alone have the diſpoſal of myſelf, with regard to theſe things. Since theſe then are ſecured to me, what need have I to be troubled about externals? what tyrant is formidable? what diſtemper? what poverty? what offence?—"I have not pleaſed ſuch "a one."—Is he my concern then? is he my conſcience?—"No."—Why do I trouble myſelf any further about him then?—"But he is thought to be "of ſome conſequence." Let him look to that, and they who think it ſo. But I have one, whom I muſt pleaſe, to whom I muſt ſubmit, whom I muſt obey; God, and thoſe who are next him. He hath entruſted me with myſelf, and made my choice ſubject to myſelf alone, having given me rules for the right uſe of it. If I follow the proper rules in ſyllogiſms, in convertible propoſitions, I do not regard, nor care for any one, who ſays any thing contrary to them. Why then am I vext at being cenſured in matters of greater conſequence? what is the matter of this perturbation? Nothing elſe, but that in this inſtance I want exerciſe. For every ſcience deſpiſes ignorance, and the ignorant; and not only the ſciences, but even the arts. Take any ſhoe-

maker, take any ſmith you will, and he laughs at the reſt of the world, with regard to his own buſineſs.

§. 3. In the firſt place then, theſe are the maxims we muſt have ready, and do nothing without them; but direct the ſoul to this mark, to purſue nothing external, nothing that belongs to others, but as he, who hath the power, hath appointed: things dependent on choice are to be purſued always; and the reſt, as it is permitted. Beſides this, we muſt remember, who we are, and what name we bear, and endeavour to direct the ſeveral offices of life to the rightful demands of its ſeveral relations: what is the proper time for ſinging, what for play, in what company: what will be the conſequence of our performance: whether our companions will deſpiſe us, or we ourſelves: when to employ raillery, and when to ridicule: upon what occaſions to comply, and with whom; and then, in complying, how to preſerve our own character.

§. 4. Where-ever you deviate from any of theſe rules, the damage is immediate; not from any thing external, but from the very action itſelf.—"What "then, is it poſſible, by theſe means, to be faultleſs?" Impracticable: but this is poſſible, to uſe a conſtant endeavour to be faultleſs. For we ſhall have cauſe to be ſatisfied, if, by never remitting this attention, we ſhall be exempt at leaſt from a few faults. But now, when you ſay, I will begin to attend to morrow; be aſſured, it is the ſame thing as if you ſay, "I will be ſhameleſs, impertinent, baſe, to day: it "ſhall be in the power of others to grieve me: I "will be paſſionate, I will be envious to-day." See to how many evils you give yourſelf up.—"But

" all will be well to morrow."——How much bet-ter to-day? If it be for your intereſt to-morrow, much more to-day, that it may be in your power to-morrow too, and that you may not defer it again to the third day.

CHAP. XIII.

Concerning ſuch as readily diſcover their own affairs.

§. 1. WHEN any one appears to us to diſcourſe frankly of his own affairs, we too are ſome way induced to diſcover our ſecrets to him; and we ſuppoſe this to be acting with frankneſs. Firſt, becauſe it ſeems unfair, that, when we have heard the affairs of our neighbour, we ſhould not, in return, communicate ours to him; and, beſides, we think, that we ſhall not appear of a frank character in concealing what belongs to ourſelves. Indeed it is often ſaid, " I have told you all my af-" fairs; and will you tell me none of yours? where " do people act thus?" Laſtly, it is ſuppoſed, that we may ſafely truſt him who hath already truſted us: for we imagine, that he will never diſcover our affairs, for fear we, in our turn, ſhould diſcover his. It is thus that the inconſiderate are caught by the ſoldiers at Rome. A ſoldier ſits by you, in a common dreſs, and begins to ſpeak ill of Caeſar. Then you, as if you had received a pledge of his fidelity, by his firſt beginning the abuſe, ſay likewiſe what you think; and ſo you are led away in chains to execution.

§. 2. Something like this is the caſe with us in

general. But when one hath ſafely intruſted his ſecrets to me, ſhall I, in imitation of him, truſt mine to any one who comes in my way? The caſe is different. I indeed hold my tongue, (ſuppoſing me to be of ſuch a diſpoſition) but he goes, and diſcovers them to every body: and then, when I come to find it out, if I happen to be like him, from a deſire of revenge, I diſcover his; and aſperſe, and am aſperſed. But, if I remember, that one man doth not hurt another, but that every one is hurt and profited by his own actions, I indeed keep to this, not to do any thing like him: yet, by my own talkative folly, I ſuffer what I do ſuffer.

§. 3. "Ay: but it is unfair, when you have heard "the ſecrets of your neighbour, not to communi-"cate any thing to him, in return."——Why, did I aſk you to do it, Sir? did you tell me your affairs, upon condition that I ſhould tell you mine, in return? If you are a blab, and believe all you meet to be friends, would you have *me* too become like you? but, what if the caſe be this: that you did right in truſting your affairs to *me*, but it is not right that I ſhould truſt *you*? would you have me run headlong, and fall? This is juſt as if I had a ſound barrel, and you a leaky one: and you ſhould come and depoſite your wine with me to put it into my barrel; and then ſhould take it ill, that, in my turn I ſhould not truſt you with my wine. No. You have a leaky barrel. How then are we any longer upon equal terms? You have depoſited your affairs with an honeſt man, and a man of honour; one who eſteems his own actions alone, and nothing external, to be either hurtful or profitable. Would you have me depoſite mine with you; a man who

have diſhonoured your own faculty of choice, and who would get a paultry ſum, or a poſt of power or preferment at court, even if, for the ſake of it, you were to kill your own children, like Medea? where is the equality of this? But ſhow me, that you are faithful; a man of honour, ſteady; ſhow me, that you have friendly principles; ſhow me, that your veſſel is not leaky; and you ſhall ſee, that I will not ſtay till you have truſted your affairs to me; but I will come and entreat you to hear an account of mine. For who would not make uſe of a good veſſel? who deſpiſes a benevolent and friendly adviſer? who will not gladly receive one to ſhare the burden, as it were, of his difficulties; and, by ſharing, to make it lighter?—"Well: but I truſt "*you*, and you do not truſt *me*."——In the firſt place, you do not really truſt me; but you are a blab, and therefor can keep nothing in. For, if the former be the caſe, truſt *only* me. But now, whomever you ſee at leiſure, you ſit down by him, and "My dear friend, there is not a man in the world "that wiſhes me better, or hath more kindneſs for "me, than you; I intreat you to hear my affairs." And this you do to thoſe, with whom you have not the leaſt acquaintance. But, if you do [really] truſt me, it is plainly as [thinking me] a man of fidelity and honour; and not becauſe I have told you my affairs. Let me alone then, till I too am of this opinion [with regard to you.] Show me, that, if a perſon hath told his affairs to any one, it is a proof of his being a man of fidelity and honour. For, if this was the caſe, I would go about and tell my affairs to the whole world; if, upon that account, I ſhould become a man of fidelity and honour. But

that is no ſuch matter; but requires a perſon to have no ordinary principles.

§. 4. If then you ſee any one taking pains for things that belong to others, and ſubjecting his choice to them, be aſſured, that this man hath a thouſand things to compel and reſtrain him. He hath no need of burning pitch, or the torturing wheel, to make him tell what he knows; but the nod of a girl, for inſtance, will ſhake his purpoſe; the good-will of a courtier, the deſire of a public poſt, of an inheritance; ten thouſand other things of that ſort. It muſt therefor be remembered in general, that ſecret diſcourſes require fidelity, and a certain ſort of principles. And where, at this time, are theſe eaſily to be found? Pray let any one ſhow me a perſon of ſuch a diſpoſition as to ſay, I trouble myſelf only with thoſe things which are my own, incapable of reſtraint, by nature free. This I eſteem the eſſence of good. Let the reſt be as it may happen. It makes no difference to me.

THE END.



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